[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 885 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 885

To support the establishment of an international regime for the assured 
 supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary 
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the 
          establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 7, 2007

Mr. Lantos (for himself, Mr. Ackerman, and Mr. Sherman) introduced the 
 following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To support the establishment of an international regime for the assured 
 supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary 
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the 
          establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International 
Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statement of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.
               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy 
                            Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.

 TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL 
                           FOR PEACEFUL MEANS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1945, the United 
        States has believed that an increase in the number of countries 
        that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such 
        weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing 
        the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in 
        which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all 
        concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more 
        countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear 
        weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear 
        weapons.
            (2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all 
        countries, and in the vital national security interest of the 
        United States, that the number of countries that possess a 
        nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and 
        ultimately reduced.
            (3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for 
        peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be 
        used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As 
        such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk, 
        allowing their possessor to be just months away from the 
        production of a nuclear explosive device.
            (4) It is also therefore in the general security interest 
        of all countries that the number of countries that operate 
        uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also 
        be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for 
        nuclear power reactor fuel.
            (5) The financing and construction of additional uranium 
        enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities around the 
        world is indefensible on economic grounds alone, given current 
        and future supplies of uranium and existing providers of 
        uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing services to the 
        world market.
            (6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
        fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries, 
        therefore, is often based upon considerations other than 
        economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is 
        often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration 
        to the world that the country that possesses this technology 
        has arrived at a level of technological development comparable 
        to that of the United States, the Russian Federation, France, 
        the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China.
            (7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and 
        spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a 
        demonstration of the developing world's independence from 
        technological domination by the more developed states. Article 
        IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
        (NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an ``inalienable right 
        . . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy 
        for peaceful purposes without discrimination . . . in 
        conformity'' with the NPT's obligation for such countries not 
        to acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear 
        explosive devices.
            (8) Many countries have claimed that Article IV of the NPT 
        guarantees the right to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle, 
        including uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities. It is also commonly understood by many countries 
        that this right must never to be compromised nor surrendered, 
        so long as the countries permitted by the NPT to possess 
        nuclear weapons--the United States, the Russian Federation, 
        France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of 
        China--continue to possess nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment 
        and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, and other related 
        technologies.
            (9) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of 
        national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of 
        new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments, 
        nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for 
        decades recognized the need to address this problem through 
        multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear 
        fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an 
        international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a 
        country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in 
        international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to 
        develop and construct such facilities themselves.
            (10) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more 
        than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
        market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined 
        with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such 
        technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear 
        weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new 
        urgency.
            (11) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable 
        international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for 
        developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
        reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also 
        produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear 
        weapons.
            (12) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last 
        year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed 
        the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a 
        consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities 
        providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of 
        used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear 
        energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing 
        national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing 
        facilities.
            (13) The United States also joined France, the Russian 
        Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on 
        May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral 
        Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would 
        create agreements between nuclear fuel suppliers to provide 
        fuel to countries with good nonproliferation credentials in 
        case of market failure.
            (14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its 
        uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international 
        management and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power 
        Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel 
        cycle centers.
            (15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system 
        to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel, under appropriate 
        safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries that are 
        dependent upon or will construct nuclear power reactors that 
        they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel, so long as 
        such countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel 
        reprocessing facilities and are committed to the 
        nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable 
        Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States, 
        France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, 
        and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be 
        expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
            (2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian 
        Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities 
        under international management and oversight is also a welcome 
        development and should be encouraged by the United States;
            (3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of 
        $50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an 
        international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States 
        and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively 
        at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to 
        fulfill the NTI proposal; and
            (4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently 
        engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs 
        (1) through (3) and other initiatives should also identify 
        additional incentives to be included in an international regime 
        for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means, 
        including participation in non-weapons-relevant technology 
        development, fuel financing, and other financial incentives to 
        further persuade countries that participation in such a 
        multilateral arrangement far outweighs the temptation and 
        expense of developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium 
        reprocessing facilities.

SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    It is the policy of the United States to support the establishment 
of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for 
peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.

SEC. 104. REPORT.

    Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs 
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations 
of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to 
support the establishment of an international regime for the assured 
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority, 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report shall 
include an assessment of the feasibility of establishing an 
international uranium enrichment facility within the United States.

               TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK

SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
              AGENCY.

    (a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is 
authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter in this section 
referred to as the ``IAEA'') for the purpose of supporting the 
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a 
reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible 
countries in the case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by 
normal market mechanisms.
    (b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may 
be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign 
Relations of the Senate that--
            (1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not 
        less than $100,000,000 for the purpose of supporting the 
        establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred 
        to in subsection (a);
            (2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
        subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a 
        non-nuclear weapon state and will be under the oversight of the 
        IAEA; and
            (3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in 
        subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country 
        only if--
                    (A) at the time of the request for nuclear reactor 
                fuel, the country is in full compliance with its IAEA 
                safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for 
                safeguards in force;
                    (B) in the case of a country that at any time prior 
                to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been 
                determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA 
                safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors 
                determines that the country has taken all necessary 
                actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director 
                General regarding the activities that led to the prior 
                determination of noncompliance;
                    (C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor 
                fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement; 
                and
                    (D) the country does not operate uranium enrichment 
                or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale.

SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) In General.--To carry out section 201, there is authorized to 
be appropriated to the President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008.
    (b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant 
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are 
authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.
                                 <all>