[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 885 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. R. 885
To support the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 7, 2007
Mr. Lantos (for himself, Mr. Ackerman, and Mr. Sherman) introduced the
following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To support the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means and to authorize voluntary
contributions to the International Atomic Energy Agency to support the
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``International
Nuclear Fuel for Peace and Nonproliferation Act of 2007''.
(b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as
follows:
Sec. 1. Short title and table of contents.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS
Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Sense of Congress.
Sec. 103. Statement of policy.
Sec. 104. Report.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
Sec. 201. Voluntary contributions to the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
Sec. 202. Authorization of appropriations.
TITLE I--INTERNATIONAL REGIME FOR THE ASSURED SUPPLY OF NUCLEAR FUEL
FOR PEACEFUL MEANS
SEC. 101. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) Since the United States Baruch Plan of 1945, the United
States has believed that an increase in the number of countries
that possess nuclear weapons and the means to create such
weapons makes the world less secure and stable by increasing
the chances that nuclear weapons would be used. A world in
which nuclear weapons are used again is less secure for all
concerned, and could well trigger a global arms race, as more
countries will be tempted to arm themselves with nuclear
weapons to prevent attacks by countries that possess nuclear
weapons.
(2) It is therefore in the general security interest of all
countries, and in the vital national security interest of the
United States, that the number of countries that possess a
nuclear weapons capability necessarily be kept to a minimum and
ultimately reduced.
(3) Uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities produce nuclear material that can either be used for
peaceful purposes in electricity-generating reactors, or can be
used to produce uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. As
such, these facilities are inherently a proliferation risk,
allowing their possessor to be just months away from the
production of a nuclear explosive device.
(4) It is also therefore in the general security interest
of all countries that the number of countries that operate
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities also
be kept to a minimum, consistent with the global demand for
nuclear power reactor fuel.
(5) The financing and construction of additional uranium
enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities around the
world is indefensible on economic grounds alone, given current
and future supplies of uranium and existing providers of
uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing services to the
world market.
(6) The desire to construct uranium enrichment and spent-
fuel reprocessing facilities by additional countries,
therefore, is often based upon considerations other than
economic calculations. The possession of such facilities is
often elevated to a matter of national pride--a demonstration
to the world that the country that possesses this technology
has arrived at a level of technological development comparable
to that of the United States, the Russian Federation, France,
the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of China.
(7) Furthermore, the acquisition of uranium enrichment and
spent-fuel reprocessing facilities can be perceived as a
demonstration of the developing world's independence from
technological domination by the more developed states. Article
IV of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) recognizes that State Parties have an ``inalienable right
. . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy
for peaceful purposes without discrimination . . . in
conformity'' with the NPT's obligation for such countries not
to acquire, possess, or develop nuclear weapons or nuclear
explosive devices.
(8) Many countries have claimed that Article IV of the NPT
guarantees the right to develop a complete nuclear fuel cycle,
including uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities. It is also commonly understood by many countries
that this right must never to be compromised nor surrendered,
so long as the countries permitted by the NPT to possess
nuclear weapons--the United States, the Russian Federation,
France, the United Kingdom, and the People's Republic of
China--continue to possess nuclear weapons, uranium enrichment
and spent-fuel reprocessing facilities, and other related
technologies.
(9) It has been long recognized that the proliferation of
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities would increase the likelihood of the emergence of
new nuclear weapon states. Concerned governments,
nongovernmental organizations, and individual experts have for
decades recognized the need to address this problem through
multilateral assurances of the uninterrupted supply of nuclear
fuel, the sharing of peaceful application of nuclear energy, an
international fuel bank to provide fuel if the fuel supply to a
country is disrupted, and even multilateral participation in
international uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities, as a means of reducing incentives of countries to
develop and construct such facilities themselves.
(10) Until recently, such efforts have produced little more
than reports. However, the revelations of a nuclear black-
market in uranium enrichment technology and equipment, combined
with the attempt by North Korea and Iran to possess such
technology and equipment to provide the basis for nuclear
weapons programs, have rekindled this debate with a new
urgency.
(11) Iran has used the specter of a potentially unreliable
international supply of nuclear reactor fuel as a pretext for
developing its own uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing capability, which would enable Iran to also
produce weapons-grade uranium and plutonium for nuclear
weapons.
(12) Several initiatives have been proposed over the last
year to address these concerns. The United States has proposed
the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP), which envisions a
consortium of countries with advanced nuclear capabilities
providing nuclear fuel services--fresh fuel and recovery of
used fuel--to other countries that agree to employ nuclear
energy only for power generation purposes, without possessing
national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel reprocessing
facilities.
(13) The United States also joined France, the Russian
Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the Netherlands on
May 31, 2006, in proposing a ``Concept for a Multilateral
Mechanism for Reliable Access to Nuclear Fuel'' that would
create agreements between nuclear fuel suppliers to provide
fuel to countries with good nonproliferation credentials in
case of market failure.
(14) The Russian Federation has proposed that one of its
uranium enrichment facilities be placed under international
management and oversight, as part of a ``Global Nuclear Power
Infrastructure'' proposal to create international nuclear fuel
cycle centers.
(15) In conclusion, the creation of a multi-tiered system
to assure the supply of nuclear reactor fuel, under appropriate
safeguards and conditions, could reassure countries that are
dependent upon or will construct nuclear power reactors that
they will have an assured supply of nuclear fuel, so long as
such countries forgo national uranium enrichment and spent-fuel
reprocessing facilities and are committed to the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons.
SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the ``Concept for a Multilateral Mechanism for Reliable
Access to Nuclear Fuel'', proposed by the United States,
France, the Russian Federation, Germany, the United Kingdom,
and the Netherlands on May 31, 2006, is welcomed and should be
expanded upon at the earliest possible opportunity;
(2) the proposal by the Government of the Russian
Federation to bring one of its uranium enrichment facilities
under international management and oversight is also a welcome
development and should be encouraged by the United States;
(3) the offer by the Nuclear Threat Institute (NTI) of
$50,000,000 in funds to support the creation of an
international nuclear fuel bank by the International Atomic
Energy Agency (IAEA) is also welcomed, and the United States
and other member states of the IAEA should pledge collectively
at least an additional $100,000,000 in matching funds to
fulfill the NTI proposal; and
(4) the governments, organizations, and experts currently
engaged in developing the initiatives described in paragraphs
(1) through (3) and other initiatives should also identify
additional incentives to be included in an international regime
for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means,
including participation in non-weapons-relevant technology
development, fuel financing, and other financial incentives to
further persuade countries that participation in such a
multilateral arrangement far outweighs the temptation and
expense of developing national uranium enrichment and plutonium
reprocessing facilities.
SEC. 103. STATEMENT OF POLICY.
It is the policy of the United States to support the establishment
of an international regime for the assured supply of nuclear fuel for
peaceful means under multilateral authority, such as the International
Atomic Energy Agency.
SEC. 104. REPORT.
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act, the President shall transmit to the Committee on Foreign Affairs
of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate a report on the activities of the United States to
support the establishment of an international regime for the assured
supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful means under multilateral authority,
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The report shall
include an assessment of the feasibility of establishing an
international uranium enrichment facility within the United States.
TITLE II--INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR FUEL BANK
SEC. 201. VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY
AGENCY.
(a) Voluntary Contributions Authorized.--The President is
authorized to make voluntary contributions on a grant basis to the
International Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the ``IAEA'') for the purpose of supporting the
establishment of an international nuclear fuel bank to maintain a
reserve of low-enriched uranium for reactor fuel to provide to eligible
countries in the case of a disruption in the supply of reactor fuel by
normal market mechanisms.
(b) Requirements.--Voluntary contributions under subsection (a) may
be provided only if the President certifies to the Committee on Foreign
Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign
Relations of the Senate that--
(1) the IAEA has received pledges in a total amount of not
less than $100,000,000 for the purpose of supporting the
establishment of the international nuclear fuel bank referred
to in subsection (a);
(2) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will be established within the territory of a
non-nuclear weapon state and will be under the oversight of the
IAEA; and
(3) the international nuclear fuel bank referred to in
subsection (a) will provide nuclear reactor fuel to a country
only if--
(A) at the time of the request for nuclear reactor
fuel, the country is in full compliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement and has an additional protocol for
safeguards in force;
(B) in the case of a country that at any time prior
to the request for nuclear reactor fuel has been
determined to be in noncompliance with its IAEA
safeguards agreement, the IAEA Board of Governors
determines that the country has taken all necessary
actions to satisfy any concerns of the IAEA Director
General regarding the activities that led to the prior
determination of noncompliance;
(C) the country agrees to use the nuclear reactor
fuel in accordance with its IAEA safeguards agreement;
and
(D) the country does not operate uranium enrichment
or spent-fuel reprocessing facilities of any scale.
SEC. 202. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.
(a) In General.--To carry out section 201, there is authorized to
be appropriated to the President $50,000,000 for fiscal year 2008.
(b) Availability of Appropriations.--Amounts appropriated pursuant
to the authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are
authorized to remain available until September 30, 2010.
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