[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 787 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 787

    To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 31, 2007

 Mr. Thompson of California (for himself and Mr. Patrick J. Murphy of 
Pennsylvania) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
   Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committees on 
 Foreign Affairs and Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined 
 by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as 
        fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
    To state United States policy for Iraq, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 
2007''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS AND PURPOSES.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Congress and the Nation honor the courage, sacrifices, 
        and efforts of the members of the Armed Forces of the United 
        States and their families.
            (2) In his speech to the Nation on January 10, 2007, 
        President George W. Bush said that ``I've made it clear to the 
        Prime Minister and Iraq's other leaders that America's 
        commitment is not open-ended. If the Iraqi government does not 
        follow through on its promises, it will lose the support of the 
        American people. . . . The Prime Minister understands this''.
            (3) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the 
        Nation that ``America will hold the Iraqi government to the 
        benchmarks it has announced. . . . [T]o take responsibility for 
        security in all of Iraq's provinces by November. To give every 
        Iraqi citizen a stake in the country's economy, Iraq will pass 
        legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis. To show 
        that it is committed to delivering a better life, the Iraqi 
        government will spend $10,000,000,000 of its own money on 
        reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new 
        jobs. To empower local leaders, Iraqis plan to hold provincial 
        elections later this year. And to allow more Iraqis to re-enter 
        their nation's political life, the government will reform de-
        Baathification laws, and establish a fair process for 
        considering amendments to Iraq's constitution''.
            (4) In that speech, President George W. Bush also told the 
        Nation that ``only Iraqis can end the sectarian violence and 
        secure their people''.
            (5) On December 18, 2006, former Secretary of State Colin 
        Powell stated: ``[s]o we have tried this surge of troops over 
        the summer. I am not persuaded that another surge of troops in 
        Baghdad for the purpose of suppressing this communitarian 
        violence, this civil war, will work''.
            (6) On November 15, 2006, General John Abizaid, Commander 
        of the United States Central Command, stated before the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that ``I met with 
        every divisional commander, General Casey, the corps commander, 
        General Dempsey. We all talked together. And I said, in your 
        professional opinion, if we were to bring in more American 
        troops now, does it add considerably to our ability to achieve 
        success in Iraq? And they all said no. And the reason is, 
        because we want the Iraqis to do more. It's easy for the Iraqis 
        to rely upon us to do this work. I believe that more American 
        forces prevent the Iraqis from doing more, from taking more 
        responsibility for their own future''.
            (7) In testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations 
        of the Senate on January 11, 2007, Secretary of State 
        Condoleezza Rice stated that unless the Government of Iraq has 
        met certain benchmarks and reestablishes the confidence of the 
        Iraqi people over the next several months, ``this plan is not 
        going to work''.
            (8) In a statement on January 11, 2007, Secretary of 
        Defense Robert Gates stated ``[a]nd we will probably have a 
        better view a couple of months from now in terms of whether we 
        are making headway in terms of getting better control of 
        Baghdad, with the Iraqis in the lead and with the Iraqis 
        beginning to make better progress on the reconciliation 
        process''.
            (9) The bipartisan Iraq Study Group headed by former 
        Secretary of State James Baker and former Representative Lee 
        Hamilton reached a bipartisan consensus on 79 separate 
        recommendations for a new approach in Iraq. Among those 
        recommendations were calling for a new diplomatic offensive in 
        the region and conditioning American economic assistance to 
        Iraq on specific benchmarks, with the expectation that ``by the 
        first quarter of 2008, subject to unexpected developments in 
        the security situation on the ground, all combat brigades not 
        necessary for force protection could be out of Iraq''.
            (10) In reaction to the speech of President George W. Bush 
        of January 10, 2007, former Secretary of State Baker and former 
        Representative Hamilton wrote that ``[t]he President did not 
        suggest the possibility of a transition that could enable U.S. 
        combat forces to begin to leave Iraq. The President did not 
        state that political, military, or economic support for Iraq 
        would be conditional on the Iraq government's ability to meet 
        benchmarks. Within the region, the President did not announce 
        an international support group for Iraq including all of Iraq's 
        neighbors. . .''.
    (b) Purposes.--The purposes of this Act are as follows:
            (1) To formulate and provide for the implementation of an 
        effective United States policy towards Iraq and the Middle East 
        region that employs military, political, diplomatic, and 
        economic assets to promote and protect the national security 
        interests of the United States.
            (2) To provide for the implementation of a responsible, 
        phased redeployment of the Armed Forces of the United States 
        from Iraq in a substantial and gradual manner that places the 
        highest priority on protecting the lives of members of the 
        Armed Forces and civilian personnel of the United States and on 
        promoting the national security interests of the United States 
        in the Middle East region.
            (3) To urge the political parties and leaders of Iraq to 
        reach the political solution necessary to promote stability in 
        Iraq and enhance the safety of innocent Iraqi civilians.
            (4) To condition future economic assistance to the 
        Government of Iraq on significant progress toward the 
        achievement of political and economic measures to be taken by 
        the Government of Iraq.
            (5) To provide for the initiation of a wider and sustained 
        diplomatic strategy aimed at promoting a political settlement 
        in Iraq, thereby ending the civil war in Iraq, preventing a 
        humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a wider 
        regional conflict.
            (6) To provide, through sections 4 through 7, for the 
        implementation of key recommendations of the Iraq Study Group, 
        a bipartisan panel of experts co-chaired by former Secretary of 
        State James Baker and former Representative Lee Hamilton.

SEC. 3. APPROPRIATE FORCE LEVELS FOR UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES IN 
              IRAQ.

    Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the levels of the Armed 
Forces of the United States in Iraq after the date of the enactment of 
this Act shall not exceed the levels of such forces in Iraq as of 
January 10, 2007, without specific authority in statute enacted by 
Congress after the date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 4. REDEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES MILITARY FORCES FROM IRAQ.

    (a) Redeployment.--
            (1) Deadline for commencement of redeployment.--Except as 
        otherwise provided in this section, the phased redeployment of 
        the Armed Forces of the United States from Iraq shall commence 
        not later than May 1, 2007.
            (2) Scope and manner of redeployment.--The redeployment of 
        the Armed Forces under this section shall be substantial, shall 
        occur in a gradual manner, and shall be executed at a pace to 
        achieve the goal of the complete redeployment of all United 
        States combat brigades from Iraq by March 31, 2008, consistent 
        with the expectation of the Iraq Study Group, if all the 
        matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B) are not met by such 
        date, subject to the exceptions for retention of forces for 
        force protection, counter-terrorism operations, training of 
        Iraqi forces, and other purposes as contemplated by subsection 
        (g).
            (3) Formulation of plan with military commanders.--The 
        redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section should be 
        conducted pursuant to a plan formulated by United States 
        military commanders that is developed, if practicable, in 
        consultation with the Government of Iraq.
            (4) Protection of united states forces and civilian 
        personnel.--In carrying out the redeployment of the Armed 
        Forces under this section, the highest priority shall be 
        afforded to the safety of members of the Armed Forces and 
        civilian personnel of the United States in Iraq.
    (b) Suspension of Redeployment.--
            (1) In general.--The President may suspend, on a temporary 
        basis as provided in paragraph (2), the redeployment of the 
        Armed Forces under this section if the President certifies to 
        the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives that--
                    (A) doing so is in the national security interests 
                of the United States; and
                    (B) the Government of Iraq--
                            (i) has lifted all restrictions concerning 
                        non-interference in operations of the Armed 
                        Forces of the United States in Iraq and does so 
                        on a continuing basis;
                            (ii) is making significant progress in 
                        reducing sectarian violence in Iraq and in 
                        reducing the size and operational effectiveness 
                        of sectarian militias in Iraq;
                            (iii) is making significant progress 
                        towards removing militia elements from the 
                        Iraqi Army, National Police, Facilities 
                        Protection Services, and other security forces 
                        of the Government of Iraq;
                            (iv) has enacted legislation or established 
                        other binding mechanisms to ensure the sharing 
                        of all Iraqi oil revenues among all segments of 
                        Iraqi society in an equitable manner;
                            (v) is making significant progress towards 
                        making available not less than $10,000,000,000 
                        for reconstruction, job creation, and economic 
                        development in Iraq, with safeguards to prevent 
                        corruption, by January 10, 2008;
                            (vi) has deployed at least 18 Iraqi Army 
                        and National Police brigades to Baghdad and is 
                        effectively ensuring that such units are 
                        performing their security and police functions 
                        in all Baghdad neighborhoods, regardless of 
                        their sectarian composition;
                            (vii) has enacted legislation or 
                        established other binding mechanisms to revise 
                        its de-Baathification laws to encourage the 
                        employment in the Government of Iraq of 
                        qualified Iraqi professionals, irrespective of 
                        ethnic or political affiliation, including ex-
                        Baathists who were not leading figures of the 
                        Saddam Hussein regime;
                            (viii) has established a fair process for 
                        considering amendments to the constitution of 
                        Iraq that promote lasting national 
                        reconciliation in Iraq;
                            (ix) is making significant progress towards 
                        assuming full responsibility for security in 
                        all the provinces of Iraq by November 30, 2007;
                            (x) is making significant progress towards 
                        holding free and fair provincial elections in 
                        Iraq at the earliest date practicable, but not 
                        later than December 31, 2007;
                            (xi) is making substantial progress towards 
                        increasing the size and effectiveness of 
                        Ministry of Defense forces as described on page 
                        11 of ``Highlights of the Iraq Strategy 
                        Review'' published by the National Security 
                        Council in January 2007;
                            (xii) is making significant progress in 
                        reforming and strengthening the civilian 
                        ministries and other government institutions 
                        that support the Iraqi Army and National 
                        Police; and
                            (xiii) is making significant progress 
                        towards reforming its civilian ministries to 
                        ensure that they are not administered on a 
                        sectarian basis and that government services 
                        are delivered in an even-handed and non-
                        sectarian manner.
            (2) Period of suspension.--A suspension of the redeployment 
        of the Armed Forces under this subsection, including any 
        renewal of the suspension under paragraph (3), shall be for a 
        period not to exceed 90 days.
            (3) Renewal.--A suspension of the redeployment of the Armed 
        Forces under this subsection may be renewed. Any such renewal 
        shall include a certification to the officers referred to in 
        paragraph (1) on the matters set forth in clauses (i) through 
        (xiii) of subparagraph (B) of that paragraph.
    (c) Disapproval of Suspension.--
            (1) Disapproval.--If Congress enacts a joint resolution 
        disapproving the suspension of the redeployment of the Armed 
        Forces under subsection (b), or any renewal of the suspension, 
        the suspension shall be discontinued, and the redeployment of 
        the Armed Forces from Iraq under this section shall resume.
            (2) Procedures for consideration of joint resolutions.--
                    (A) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of this 
                subsection, the term ``joint resolution'' means only a 
                joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days 
                after the date on which a certification of the 
                President under subsection (b) is received by Congress, 
                the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
                follows: ``That Congress disapproves the certification 
                of the President submitted to Congress under section 
                4(b) of the Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007, on 
                _______.'', the blank space being filled in with the 
                appropriate date.
                    (B) Procedures.--A joint resolution described in 
                paragraph (1) shall be considered in a House of 
                Congress in accordance with the procedures applicable 
                to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8) 
                of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense 
                Appropriations Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) 
                of Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).
    (d) Reports to Congress.--
            (1) In general.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
        the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the 
        President shall submit to the President pro tempore of the 
        Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a report 
        describing and assessing--
                    (A) the progress made by the Government of Iraq on 
                each of the matters set forth in subsection (b)(1)(B); 
                and
                    (B) the progress of the redeployment required by 
                subsection (a).
            (2) Form.--Each report under this subsection shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
    (e) Sense of Congress on Location of Redeployment.--It is the sense 
of Congress that, in redeploying the Armed Forces from Iraq under this 
section, appropriate units of the Armed Forces should be redeployed--
            (1) to the United States;
            (2) to Afghanistan, in order to enhance United States 
        military operations in that country;
            (3) elsewhere in the region, to serve as an over-the-
        horizon force to prevent the conflict in Iraq from becoming a 
        wider war, to reassure allies of the United States of the 
        commitment of the United States to remain engaged in the 
        region, and to position troops to strike directly at al-Qaeda; 
        and
            (4) elsewhere, to meet urgent United States security needs.
    (f) Political Solution in Iraq.--The United States should use the 
redeployment of the Armed Forces under this section, and the possible 
suspension of such redeployment if the benchmarks set forth in 
subsection (b) are met, as a tool to press the Iraqi leaders to promote 
national reconciliation among ethnic and religious groups in Iraq in 
order to establish stability in Iraq.
    (g) Retention of Certain Forces in Iraq.--
            (1) In general.--Notwithstanding the requirement for the 
        redeployment of the Armed Forces under subsection (a) and 
        subject to the provisions of this subsection, personnel of the 
        Armed Forces of the United States may be in Iraq after the 
        completion of the redeployment of the Armed Forces under this 
        section for the following purposes:
                    (A) To protect United States personnel and 
                facilities in Iraq.
                    (B) To conduct targeted counter-terrorism 
                operations.
                    (C) To provide training for Iraqi security forces.
                    (D) To conduct the routine functions of the Office 
                of Defense Attache.
            (2) Certification.--Personnel of the Armed Forces may not 
        be retained in Iraq under this subsection unless the President 
        certifies to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the 
        Speaker of the House of Representatives that--
                    (A) the retention of the Armed Forces in Iraq is 
                necessary for one or more of the purposes set forth in 
                paragraph (1); and
                    (B) the utilization of Armed Forces positioned 
                outside Iraq could not result in the effective 
                achievement of such purpose or purposes.
            (3) Disapproval of retention.--If Congress enacts a joint 
        resolution disapproving the retention of personnel of the Armed 
        Forces in Iraq under this subsection, or any renewal of the 
        retention, the retention of such personnel in Iraq shall be 
        discontinued, and such personnel shall be redeployed from Iraq.
            (4) Procedures for consideration of joint resolutions.--
                    (A) Joint resolution defined.--For purposes of 
                paragraph (3), the term ``joint resolution'' means only 
                a joint resolution introduced not later than 10 days 
                after the date on which a certification of the 
                President under paragraph (2) is received by Congress, 
                the matter after the resolving clause of which is as 
                follows: ``That Congress disapproves the certification 
                of the President submitted to Congress under section 
                4(g)(2) of the Iraq War De-Escalation Act of 2007, on 
                _______.'', the blank space being filled in with the 
                appropriate date.
                    (B) Procedures.--A joint resolution described in 
                subparagraph (A) shall be considered in a House of 
                Congress in accordance with the procedures applicable 
                to joint resolutions under paragraphs (3) through (8) 
                of section 8066(c) of the Department of Defense 
                Appropriations Act, 1985 (as enacted by section 101(h) 
                of Public Law 98-473; 98 Stat. 1936).
    (h) No Permanent Bases.--Congress hereby reaffirms section 1519 of 
the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 
(Public Law 109-364; 120 Stat. 2444), and related provisions of law, 
that prohibit the establishment of military installations or bases for 
the purpose of providing for the permanent stationing of United States 
Armed Forces in Iraq.

SEC. 5. INTENSIFICATION OF TRAINING OF IRAQI SECURITY FORCES.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to immediately 
formulate and implement a plan that--
            (1) with the Government of Iraq--
                    (A) removes militia elements from the Iraqi Army, 
                National Police, and other security forces of the 
                Government of Iraq; and
                    (B) puts such forces in charge of maintaining 
                security in Iraq;
            (2) focuses and intensifies United States efforts on 
        training such forces; and
            (3) presses the Government of Iraq to reform the civilian 
        ministries and other government institutions that support the 
        Iraqi Army, National Police, local police, and judicial system.

SEC. 6. AVAILABILITY OF ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE FOR IRAQ.

    (a) Limitation.--Except as provided in subsection (b), after May 1, 
2007, economic assistance may be furnished to the Government of Iraq 
only if the President submits to the President pro tempore of the 
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives a certification 
that the Government of Iraq--
            (1) is making measurable progress toward providing not less 
        than $10,000,000,000 of Iraqi funds for reconstruction, job 
        creation, and economic development in Iraq, with safeguards to 
        prevent corruption, by January 10, 2008;
            (2) is making progress toward meeting the conditions set 
        forth in the International Compact for Iraq and in the stand-by 
        agreement with the International Monetary Fund; and
            (3) is making progress toward reducing sectarian violence 
        and promoting national reconciliation.
    (b) Exceptions.--The limitation in subsection (a) shall not apply 
to assistance for Iraq as follows:
            (1) Humanitarian assistance.
            (2) Assistance to address urgent security and employment 
        needs.
    (c) Assessment of Progress.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, and every 90 days thereafter, the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction shall submit to Congress a 
report describing the progress of the Government of Iraq on each matter 
set forth in subsection (a).

SEC. 7. REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES ON IRAQ.

    (a) Policy of the United States.--It shall be the policy of the 
United States to undertake comprehensive regional and international 
initiatives, involving key nations, that will assist the Government of 
Iraq in achieving the purposes of this Act, including promoting a 
political settlement among the Iraqi people, ending the civil war in 
Iraq, preventing a humanitarian catastrophe in Iraq, and preventing a 
regional conflict.
    (b) Special Envoy.--The President should, not later than 60 days 
after the date of the enactment of this Act, appoint a special envoy 
for Iraq to carry out the policy set forth in subsection (a).
    (c) Strategy on Preventing Wider Regional War.--
            (1) Strategy.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the 
        enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
        President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the 
        House of Representatives a report setting forth a strategy for 
        preventing the conflict in Iraq from becoming a wider regional 
        war.
            (2) Form.--The report under paragraph (1) shall be 
        submitted in unclassified form, but may include a classified 
        annex.
                                 <all>