[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 744 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 744

   To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by 
    requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a 
 consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion 
 for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to 
enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion 
                      of Operation Iraqi Freedom.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 31, 2007

 Ms. Bordallo introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on Armed 
Services, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in 
   each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the 
                jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To enhance congressional oversight of Operation Iraqi Freedom by 
    requiring the President to transmit periodically to Congress a 
 consolidated, comprehensive report to detail the terms of completion 
 for Operation Iraqi Freedom and by requiring the President to seek to 
enter into a multilateral agreement to help provide for the completion 
                      of Operation Iraqi Freedom.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Policy Revitalization and 
Congressional Oversight Enhancement Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) On October 31, 1998, the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 
        (Public Law 105-338) was enacted into law.
            (2) On October 16, 2002, the Authorization for Use of 
        Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107-
        243) was enacted into law.
            (3) On March 19, 2003, the President, pursuant to the 
        authorities provided to the President by Public Law 107-243, 
        committed United States Armed Forces to combat operations in 
        Iraq.
            (4) On April 9, 2003, Saddam Hussein's Ba'athist regime 
        fell to Coalition Forces.
            (5) On April 16, 2003, the Emergency Wartime Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act, 2003 (Public Law 108-11) was enacted into 
        law, which included $2,500,000,000 for the relief and 
        reconstruction of Iraq.
            (6) On May 12, 2003, the Coalition Provisional Authority 
        (CPA) subsumed the Organization for Reconstruction and 
        Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), and citing United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 1483 (2003) and the laws of war, 
        vested itself with executive, legislative, and judicial 
        authority over the Iraqi government until such time as the 
        Iraqi government gained its sovereignty.
            (7) On November 6, 2003, the Emergency Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 
        Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004 (Public Law 108-106) was enacted 
        into law, which included an additional $18,400,000,000 for the 
        relief and reconstruction of Iraq.
            (8) On June 8, 2004, the United Nations Security Council 
        adopted Resolution 1546 (2004), endorsing the transition of 
        sovereignty from the Coalition Provisional Authority to the 
        Interim Government of Iraq, reaffirming the responsibilities of 
        the interim government, and detailing the duration and legal 
        status of Coalition Forces in Iraq, as well as authorizing a 
        Coalition component force to protect United Nations personnel 
        and facilities.
            (9) On June 28, 2004, the new Iraqi government gained its 
        sovereignty.
            (10) On January 30, 2005, the Iraqi people successfully 
        elected their first interim National Assembly, and 18 
        provincial and various local government councils.
            (11) On March 16, 2005, the 275-member interim Iraqi 
        National Assembly convened to appoint an interim national 
        government and to begin the drafting of a constitution.
            (12) On September 18, 2005, the interim Iraqi National 
        Assembly completed negotiations on the draft constitution.
            (13) On October 15, 2005, the Iraqi people approved the 
        draft constitution by a national referendum.
            (14) On November 8, 2005, the United Nations Security 
        Council adopted Resolution 1637 (2005), extending the Coalition 
        Forces' military mandate, pursuant to United Nations Security 
        Council Resolution 1546 (2004), in Iraq to December 31, 2006.
            (15) On November 18, 2005, the House of Representatives 
        failed to agree to H. Res. 571, expressing the sense of the 
        House of Representatives that the deployment of United States 
        forces in Iraq be terminated immediately, by a vote of 3 to 
        403, with six members voting present.
            (16) On November 30, 2005, the President, through the 
        National Security Council, issued the National Strategy for 
        Victory in Iraq.
            (17) On December 15, 2005, the people of Iraq voted to 
        elect the first permanent National Assembly in accordance with 
        the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq.
            (18) On March 16, 2006, the newly-elected National Assembly 
        convened for their first session.
            (19) On May 20, 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister-designee 
        named a cabinet, except for the posts of Minister of Defense 
        and Minister of Interior, and the Prime Minister-designee and 
        the cabinet received a vote of confidence from the National 
        Assembly.
            (20) On June 7, 2006, Iraq's National Assembly approved the 
        individuals that the Iraqi Prime Minister nominated for 
        Minister of Defense, Minister of Interior, and National 
        Security Advisor, completing the formation of Iraq's first 
        permanent democratic government.
            (21) On June 15, 2006, the Emergency Supplemental 
        Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and 
        Hurricane Recovery, 2006 (Public Law 109-234), was enacted into 
        law, providing $400,000,000 for civil-military Provincial 
        Reconstruction Teams, composed of members of the United States 
        Armed Forces and Coalition Forces and personnel of the 
        Department of State, United States Agency for International 
        Development, Department of Justice, Department of Agriculture, 
        U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and contract personnel.
            (22) On June 16, 2006, the House of Representatives agreed 
        to H. Res. 861, declaring that the United States will prevail 
        in the Global War on Terror, the struggle to protect freedom 
        from the terrorist adversary, by a vote of 256 to 153, with 
        five members voting present.
            (23) On June 25, 2006, the Iraqi Prime Minister released a 
        24-point plan for national reconciliation.
            (24) The Iraq Study Group was formed at the urging of 
        Congress, and the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act for 
        Defense, the Global War On Terror, and Hurricane Recovery, 2006 
        (Public Law 109-234), provided $1,000,000 for Iraq Study Group 
        operations.
            (25) Members of the Iraq Study Group were appointed in 
        March 2006 and were responsible for providing a forward-
        looking, independent assessment of the strategic environment in 
        and around Iraq, the security of Iraq and key challenges to 
        enhancing security within the country, political developments 
        within Iraq following the elections and formation of the new 
        government, the economy and reconstruction, and how the 
        situation in Iraq affects the surrounding region as well as 
        United States interests.
            (26) On July 27, 2006, the Government of Iraq and the 
        United Nations, with the support of the World Bank, announced 
        the formal launch of a five-year international compact with 
        Iraq that, with the participation of other multilateral 
        organizations and countries, including the United States, 
        aims--
                    (A) to achieve a national vision for Iraq as a 
                united, federal, and democratic country;
                    (B) to consolidate peace and pursue political, 
                economic, and social development within Iraq, including 
                enhancing political inclusion and consensus-building 
                among its various demographic groups;
                    (C) to establish professional security forces to 
                serve the Iraqi people;
                    (D) to combat corruption within Iraq;
                    (E) to create a transparent and efficient oil 
                sector within Iraq;
                    (F) to develop a solid budgetary framework for the 
                Government of Iraq; and
                    (G) to improve governance by building and 
                consolidating effective national institutions for Iraq.
            (27) On December 6, 2006, the Iraq Study Group released its 
        report titled, ``The Iraq Study Group Report''.
            (28) On December 30, 2006, Saddam Hussein was executed by 
        the Government of Iraq.
            (29) On January 10, 2007, the President addressed the 
        American people and provided a plan entitled ``The New Way 
        Forward in Iraq''.

SEC. 3. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    Congress makes the following statements of policy:
            (1) Congress recognizes that Operation Iraqi Freedom, the 
        deteriorating situation within Iraq, and the situation in the 
        Middle East region in general have become a significant test 
        of, and strain on, United States military, diplomatic, and 
        financial capacities, and United States national interests and 
        prestige.
            (2) Congress remains supportive of and inspired by the 
        service and sacrifice made by and dedication and commitment to 
        the establishment of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq 
        displayed by members of the United States Armed Forces and 
        civilian personnel in Iraq and by personnel serving world-wide 
        in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
            (3) Congress remains supportive of and inspired by the 
        service and sacrifice made by and dedication and commitment to 
        the establishment of a democratic, stable, and prosperous Iraq 
        displayed by the military and civilian personnel of Coalition 
        countries serving in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom, and by 
        Iraqi patriots working toward a better future for their country 
        and the children of Iraq.
            (4) Congress recognizes the achievements to date made by 
        the United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi 
        Security Forces, and civilian personnel toward the political, 
        security, infrastructure, and economic development of and 
        governance capacity development at and between the various 
        levels of government in Iraq.
            (5) Congress recognizes the efforts on the part of the 
        United States, Coalition countries, and the Government of Iraq 
        toward the establishment and maintenance of stable, peaceful, 
        productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and its 
        neighboring states, regional states, and the international 
        community.
            (6) Congress recognizes the complex and interdependent 
        nature of the challenges associated with the political, 
        security, infrastructure, and economic development of and 
        governance capacity building at and between the various levels 
        of government in Iraq.
            (7) Congress recognizes that, in order to aid the efforts 
        of civilian, United States Armed Forces, and Coalition Forces 
        personnel to establish a democratic, stable, and prosperous 
        Iraq and to address the complex and interdependent nature of 
        the challenges associated with the political, security, 
        infrastructure, and economic development of and governance 
        capacity building at and between the various levels of 
        government in Iraq, the civil-military Provincial 
        Reconstruction Teams were established in the various provinces 
        in Iraq to be the primary interface between United States and 
        Coalition countries and provincial governments throughout Iraq 
        to assist local Iraqi governing institutions, such as the 
        provincial councils, provincial governors, and local national 
        ministry representatives--
                    (A) to develop a transparent and sustained 
                capability to govern at the provincial level of 
                government in Iraq;
                    (B) to promote increased security and rule of law 
                within Iraq's provinces;
                    (C) to promote political and economic development 
                at the provincial level of government in Iraq; and
                    (D) to provide provincial-level government and 
                governance administration assistance necessary to help 
                meet the basic needs of a particular province.
            (8) Congress supports the establishment and maintenance of 
        a democratic, pluralistic, federal, and united Government of 
        Iraq.
            (9) Congress recognizes the importance of facilitating the 
        fullest participation practicable of Iraq's eligible voters in 
        national, provincial, and local elections to determine the 
        composition of provincial and local governing bodies necessary 
        for the establishment of good governance practices, peace, and 
        reconciliation in Iraq, and a stable and united Iraq.
            (10) Congress urges elected Iraqis to renew their 
        commitment to establishing, preserving, and strengthening a 
        national unity government for Iraq and to govern in accordance 
        with the principles of a national unity government for Iraq.
            (11) Congress is gravely concerned by the prospect that the 
        Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq may desire to declare 
        independence from Iraq.
            (12) Congress is gravely concerned that, as a result of any 
        declaration of independence from Iraq made by the Kurdish 
        Regional Government in Iraq (or any future regional government 
        in Iraq), certain neighboring states may react to such a 
        declaration of independence with military force against Iraq.
            (13) Congress notes that the provisions contained in 
        Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq require 
        the process to ``normalize'' the situation in the province of 
        Kirkuk to be completed by the end of calendar year 2007, but is 
        gravely concerned that the process called for by the provisions 
        of that Article cannot be implemented in an unbiased, uniform, 
        and equitable manner during calendar year 2007.
            (14) Congress recognizes the importance that implementing, 
        in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner, the provisions 
        contained in Article 140 of the Constitution of the Republic of 
        Iraq has toward the establishment and maintenance of--
                    (A) peace and reconciliation in Iraq;
                    (B) stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory 
                relations between Iraq and certain neighboring states; 
                and
                    (C) a stable and united Iraq.
            (15) Congress is gravely concerned about the extent to 
        which the process called for by the provisions of Article 140 
        of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq can be implemented 
        by the Government of Iraq in an unbiased, uniform, and 
        equitable manner during calendar year 2007, to include a 
        description of, and justification for, actions needed to be 
        taken by the United States, Coalition countries, the Government 
        of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, and the 
        provincial government of Kirkuk, neighboring and regional 
        governments, and the international community to ensure that 
        such process proceeds in an unbiased, uniform, and equitable 
        manner during calendar year 2007 or during future years.
            (16) Congress is gravely concerned that continued violence 
        in Iraq could, or the division of Iraq along notional ethnic, 
        religious, or sectarian lines would, result in the heightened 
        ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence within that country, 
        to include incidences of ethnic-cleansing, and result in the 
        further destabilization of the Government of Iraq.
            (17) Congress is gravely concerned by the possibility that 
        a divided or failed Iraqi state could form the keystone of a 
        geo-political bridge across the Middle East region, from which 
        a heightened incidence of acts of violence or acts of 
        intimidation against allies of the United States in the region 
        can be conducted, or otherwise financially or materially 
        supported, by certain states within the region, violent 
        transnational entities, or partnerships between certain states 
        within the region and violent transnational entities.
            (18) Congress is gravely concerned by the potential 
        detrimental impacts a geo-political bridge formed by a failed 
        or divided Iraqi state would have across the Middle East region 
        if such a bridge is exploited by certain states within the 
        region, violent transnational entities, or partnerships of 
        certain states within the region and violent transnational 
        entities, as evidenced by reports that indicate that members of 
        Jaish al-Mahdi trained with members of Hezbollah in Lebanon and 
        fought together against Israeli Defense Forces in July and 
        August 2006.
            (19) Congress is gravely concerned that certain states 
        within the Middle East region, violent transnational entities, 
        or partnerships of certain states within the region and violent 
        transnational entities could exploit a geo-political bridge 
        across the region to the detriment of national and economic 
        security interests of the United States and those of the 
        international community as a whole, including--
                    (A) disrupting the unimpeded access to hydro-carbon 
                resources essential to the functioning of modern 
                economies globally; and
                    (B) disrupting the unimpeded access to the 
                strategic lines of communication in the region across 
                and along which international commercial activity is 
                conducted.
            (20) Congress is gravely concerned that a failed or divided 
        Iraq could provide a stronger base of operations for terrorists 
        who seek to act regionally or internationally.
            (21) Congress is concerned about the fractured and 
        factional domestic political environment present today at and 
        between the various levels of government in Iraq.
            (22) Congress finds that the fractured and factional 
        domestic political environment present in Iraq is the result, 
        in part, of the conflicting policies, priorities, and biases of 
        the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-oriented 
        political parties and elected and appointed leaders at and 
        between the various levels of government in Iraq.
            (23) Congress is concerned that the development of 
        alternative, moderate political parties and leaders in Iraq, 
        that can represent broadly the interests of Iraqis from 
        multiple demographic groups and govern according to that broad 
        perspective, is impeded by the dominant influences of the 
        various ethnic, religious, and sectarian-oriented political 
        parties active in Iraq today.
            (24) Congress affirms that the fractured and factional 
        domestic political environment present today at and between the 
        various levels of government in Iraq--
                    (A) contributes to incidences of violence against 
                United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi 
                Security Forces;
                    (B) creates a significant political barrier to the 
                establishment and maintenance of peace and 
                reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the 
                establishment and maintenance of a stable and united 
                Iraq; and
                    (C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi 
                Freedom.
            (25) Congress is concerned that various elected and 
        appointed officials, to include judicial branch officials, 
        within the various levels of government in Iraq, are not 
        fulfilling, to the extent possible, their chief responsibility 
        to conduct public business in an unbiased, uniform, and 
        equitable manner, in accordance with law, and for the public 
        good.
            (26) Congress is concerned by reports that indicate that 
        government offices, the national ministries systems, and 
        independent agencies are unable or unwilling to resist 
        dominance by, and are divided between, beholden to, and guided 
        by the conflicting priorities, policies, and biases of, the 
        various prominent ethnic, religious, or sectarian political 
        parties in Iraq.
            (27) Congress is particularly concerned by reports that 
        indicate that elected and appointed Iraqi Government officials, 
        acting upon direction from, and to benefit and promote, the 
        various prominent ethnic, religious, or sectarian political 
        parties and affiliated entities in Iraq--
                    (A) may abuse the budget authority of the various 
                offices, ministries, and agencies, to include the 
                direction of public funds to certain political parties 
                or certain individuals;
                    (B) may abuse personnel hiring practices of the 
                various offices, ministries, and agencies; and
                    (C) may abuse the contracting practices of the 
                various offices, ministries, and agencies.
            (28) Congress recognizes that the inability or 
        unwillingness of elected and appointed officials within the 
        various levels of government in Iraq to deliver public sector 
        goods and services to all Iraqis in a unbiased, uniform, and 
        equitable manner--
                    (A) contributes to incidences of violence against 
                United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi 
                Security Forces;
                    (B) creates a significant political barrier to the 
                establishment and maintenance of peace and 
                reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the 
                establishment and maintenance of a stable and united 
                Iraq; and
                    (C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi 
                Freedom.
            (29) Congress is deeply concerned about the continued and 
        heightened incidence of violence and threats of violence 
        against United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, Iraqi 
        Security Forces, civilian personnel, and Iraqi civilians in 
        Iraq.
            (30) Congress is gravely concerned about the increase in 
        ethnic, religious, and sectarian violence in Iraq following the 
        February 22, 2006, bombing of the Askariya mosque in Samarra, 
        Iraq, and about continued ethnic, religious, and sectarian 
        tensions across Iraq.
            (31) Congress is gravely concerned about the increasing 
        power that unauthorized politically-aligned militias wield in 
        Iraq, their destabilizing effect on security in Iraq, and the 
        challenges they present to the development of professional 
        Iraqi Security Forces.
            (32) Congress is gravely concerned that the various 
        prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties 
        active in Iraq today, through unauthorized, politically-aligned 
        militias, suborned or sympathetic elements of Iraqi Security 
        Forces, and suborned or sympathetic vigilante or criminal 
        groups, fight for the control and dominance of the various 
        levels of government in Iraq and aim to, and with the effect 
        of, separate governorates, cities, and neighborhoods along 
        ethnic, religious, and sectarian lines.
            (33) Congress is concerned that the purposeful internal 
        separation of Iraqi society by violence, threat of violence, or 
        other means of intimidation pursued by the various prominent 
        ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties in Iraq, 
        forces the Iraqi people into increasingly apparent ethnic, 
        religious, and sectarian divisions, or is in part the impetus 
        for significant emigration of Iraqis (particularly members of 
        the educated and professional classes of Iraqis essential to 
        the establishment and maintenance of civil society in Iraq) to 
        states within the Middle East region or the provinces within 
        Iraq governed by the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq.
            (34) Congress is concerned that the continued and further 
        violent, internal separation of Iraqi society, pursued and 
        effected by the various prominent ethnic, religious, and 
        sectarian political parties abets and strengthens the extremist 
        elements of each party and destabilizes the security situation 
        countrywide.
            (35) Congress considers that the various prominent ethnic, 
        religious, and sectarian political parties in Iraq are 
        complicit in the operations of the various politically-aligned 
        militias operating in Iraq today, and that the political 
        parties have the power and influence necessary to, and the 
        responsibility to, disarm, disband, and reintegrate such 
        militias into Iraqi society.
            (36) Congress recognizes the importance that establishing a 
        political and governance compromise and reconciliation between 
        the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian 
        political parties active in Iraq has toward--
                    (A) the successful recruitment, training, and 
                maintenance of professional, unbiased Iraqi Security 
                Forces;
                    (B) the effective administration of certain 
                national security oriented offices and ministries 
                systems; and
                    (C) the defeat of foreign terrorist organizations 
                operating in Iraq.
            (37) Congress is gravely concerned that the uneven state of 
        readiness, capability, and willingness of Iraqi Security 
        Forces, led by the national security oriented offices and 
        ministries systems, to provide internal security for Iraq in an 
        unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner may require United 
        States Armed Forces and Coalition Forces personnel to remain in 
        Iraq for an extended period of time to provide both extensive 
        internal security training and assistance and the minimum of 
        unbiased internal security within that country.
            (38) Congress is gravely concerned that a prolonged 
        commitment of United States Armed Forces to Iraq may adversely 
        affect the overall readiness of United States Armed Forces and 
        hamper its ability to provide adequate resources to United 
        States efforts in Afghanistan and its ability to adequately 
        respond to other contingencies around the world.
            (39) Congress affirms that the absence of a lasting and 
        meaningful political compromise reached between the various 
        prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian political parties in 
        Iraq and the uneven state of readiness, capability, and 
        willingness of Iraqi Security Forces, led by the national 
        security oriented offices and ministries systems, to provide 
        internal security services in Iraq in a unbiased, uniform, and 
        equitable manner across that country--
                    (A) contributes to incidences of violence against 
                United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi 
                Security Forces;
                    (B) creates a significant political barrier to the 
                establishment and maintenance of peace and 
                reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the 
                establishment and maintenance of a stable and united 
                Iraq; and
                    (C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi 
                Freedom.
            (40) Congress recognizes reported macroeconomic improvement 
        of Iraq's economy, but remains gravely concerned by reports 
        noting the prevalence of corruption in Iraq, the uneven 
        distribution of income, and high unemployment rates at and 
        between the various levels of government in Iraq.
            (41) Congress is gravely concerned by reports that indicate 
        that the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-
        oriented political parties active in Iraq exercise significant 
        control of Iraq's national revenues and expenditures to benefit 
        and promote the conflicting priorities, policies, and biases of 
        such political parties.
            (42) Congress is gravely concerned that the significant 
        control of Iraq's national revenues and expenditures exercised 
        by the various prominent ethnic, religious, and sectarian-
        oriented political parties active in Iraq impedes general 
        economic development at and between the various levels of 
        government in Iraq, limits economic opportunities for the Iraqi 
        people, and forces Iraqis into increasingly apparent ethnic, 
        religious, and sectarian divisions.
            (43) Congress is gravely concerned that the national level 
        economic decisions on key issues, including the development and 
        modernization of Iraq's national energy industry, 
        infrastructure, resources and the utilization of the resultant 
        revenues, may result in unstable economic policies and 
        agreements that reflect the fractured and factional nature of 
        Iraq's current political environment and the ethnic, religious, 
        and sectarian bias present in governance in Iraq.
            (44) Congress notes that the majority of United States 
        economic and infrastructure development assistance for Iraq has 
        been expended and has produced uneven economic results 
        countrywide and an uneven ability for the Government of Iraq to 
        operate and maintain both existing and newly constructed or 
        refurbished infrastructure.
            (45) Congress further notes reports that indicate that the 
        Government of Iraq requires significant and sustained, but not 
        necessarily United States Government provided, economic 
        development and infrastructure in order to achieve vital 
        economic and infrastructure development.
            (46) Congress urges the Government of Iraq to pursue, in an 
        unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner, policies to promote 
        the development of--
                    (A) a market-based economy in Iraq that increases 
                private-sector employment opportunities for Iraqi 
                workers;
                    (B) private-sector investment opportunities for 
                domestic and international investors; and
                    (C) a government budget process that reflects an 
                appropriate level of investment in the development of 
                and the continued operations and maintenance for Iraq's 
                national infrastructure and that provides for the 
                delivery of public goods and services to all Iraqis in 
                a unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner.
            (47) Congress is gravely concerned that impeded general 
        economic development in Iraq, limited economic opportunities 
        for the Iraqi people, and increasingly apparent ethnic, 
        religious, and sectarian economic divisions within Iraq abets 
        and strengthens the extremist elements of each party and 
        destabilizes the security situation countrywide and--
                    (A) contributes to incidences of violence against 
                United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi 
                Security Forces;
                    (B) creates a significant political barrier to the 
                establishment and maintenance of peace and 
                reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the 
                establishment and maintenance of a stable and united 
                Iraq; and
                    (C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi 
                Freedom.
            (48) Congress recognizes the influence possessed by the 
        governments of Iraq's neighboring states, regional states, 
        states among the international community, and regional and 
        international multilateral organizations, toward facilitating 
        the establishment and maintenance of stable, peaceful, 
        productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq and its 
        neighboring states, regional states, and the international 
        community as a whole.
            (49) Congress recognizes the importance of engaging the 
        governments of Iraq's neighboring states (where appropriate), 
        regional states, states among the international community, and 
        regional and international multilateral organizations, toward 
        facilitating the establishment and maintenance of stable, 
        peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations between Iraq 
        and its neighboring states, regional states, and the 
        international community as a whole.
            (50) Congress recognizes the importance of the formation of 
        an international compact reached between the United States, 
        Coalition countries and the governments of Iraq's neighboring 
        states (where appropriate), regional states, states among the 
        international community, and regional and international 
        multilateral organizations, to help establish and maintain 
        stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations 
        between Iraq and its neighboring states, regional states, and 
        the international community as a whole, and to help establish 
        peace, reconciliation in, and to assure the stability of and 
        unity of, Iraq.
            (51) Congress notes the recent formation of the 
        International Compact for Iraq between the Government of Iraq 
        and the United Nations, with the support of the World Bank, and 
        in which the United States and Coalition countries participate, 
        as evidence of the need and importance of regionalizing and 
        internationalizing solutions for Iraq's continued political, 
        security, infrastructure, and economic development of and 
        governance capacity building at and between the various levels 
        of government in Iraq.
            (52) Congress notes that the vital measures and other 
        benchmarks identified by the President as necessary and 
        possible to achieve in order to complete Operation Iraqi 
        Freedom pursuant to the reporting requirements of section 4 of 
        this Act would establish a strong foundation for a multilateral 
        agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic of Iraq, 
        appropriate states in the Middle East region, and appropriate 
        multilateral organizations to help establish and maintain 
        stable, peaceful, productive, and conciliatory relations 
        between Iraq and its neighboring states, regional states, and 
        the international community as a whole and to help establish 
        peace, reconciliation in, and to assure the stability of and 
        unity of, Iraq.
            (53) Congress finds that a prolonged absence of a 
        multilateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic 
        of Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and 
        appropriate multilateral organizations based on the vital 
        measures and other benchmarks identified by the President as 
        necessary and possible to achieve in order to complete 
        Operation Iraqi Freedom and pursuant to the findings of the 
        report required by section 4 of this Act and subject to 
        adjustment or other amendment, as provided for by subparagraphs 
        (A) and (B) of section 4(b)(2) of this Act--
                    (A) contributes to incidences of violence against 
                United States Armed Forces, Coalition Forces, and Iraqi 
                Security Forces;
                    (B) creates a significant political barrier to the 
                establishment and maintenance of peace and 
                reconciliation in Iraq, that is necessary for the 
                establishment and maintenance of a stable and united 
                Iraq; and
                    (C) impedes the completion of Operation Iraqi 
                Freedom.
            (54) Congress is concerned that the United States and 
        Coalition countries will not be able to achieve their goals of 
        the establishment of a democratic, pluralistic, federal, and 
        united Government of Iraq that can provide security, good 
        governance, and improved economic opportunity for the people of 
        Iraq and maintain peaceful, productive, and conciliatory 
        relations with neighboring states, regional states, states 
        among the international community, and regional and 
        international multilateral organizations without the United 
        States and other countries simultaneously working toward 
        solving certain long-standing and ongoing conflicts elsewhere 
        in the Middle East region.
            (55) Congress declares that the National Strategy for 
        Victory in Iraq as transmitted by the President to Congress on 
        November 30, 2005, is not specific regarding the vital measures 
        and other benchmarks in Iraq's political, security, 
        infrastructure, and economic development and governance 
        capacity development at and between the various levels of 
        government in Iraq that need to be met to signal to Congress 
        and the American people that victory in Iraq has been achieved 
        and the majority of United States Armed Forces currently 
        deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be redeployed to their 
        peacetime duty stations.
            (56) Congress declares that the plan entitled ``The New Way 
        Forward in Iraq'', as presented to the American people by the 
        President on January 10, 2007, is not specific regarding the 
        vital measures and other benchmarks in Iraq's political, 
        security, infrastructure, and economic development and 
        governance capacity development at and between the various 
        levels of government in Iraq that need to be met to signal to 
        Congress and the American people that victory in Iraq has been 
        achieved and the majority of the United States Armed Forces 
        currently deployed in Operation Iraqi Freedom can be redeployed 
        to their peacetime duty stations.
            (57) Congress notes the findings of the reports submitted 
        to Congress pursuant to the section entitled ``Measuring 
        Stability and Security in Iraq'' of the Joint Explanatory 
        Statement of the Committee of Conference accompanying 
        Conference Report 109-72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency 
        Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global War on 
        Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; Public Law 109-13), that 
        identify security, economic, and Iraqi Security Force training 
        performance standards and goals, accompanied by a notional 
        timetable for achieving these goals.
            (58) Congress notes the findings of the report submitted to 
        Congress pursuant to the United States Policy in Iraq Act 
        (section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
        Fiscal Year 2006; Public Law 109-163), that identify the 
        current military mission and the diplomatic, political, 
        economic, and military measures that are being or have been 
        undertaken to successfully complete or support that mission.
            (59) Congress notes the findings of the report submitted to 
        Congress pursuant to section 9010 of the Department of Defense 
        Appropriations Act, 2007 (division A of Public Law 109-289), 
        that include specific performance indicators and measures of 
        progress toward political, economic, and security stability in 
        Iraq, but also notes that the report is not a comprehensive, 
        single-source of content, information, data, and analysis about 
        the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United 
        States, Coalition countries, or the Government of Iraq that 
        Congress requires to fulfill its constitutional oversight 
        responsibilities.
            (60) Congress is concerned that the findings of the reports 
        described in paragraphs (57), (58), and (59) do not provide 
        sufficient content, information, data, and analysis for 
        Congress to comprehensively evaluate the mission in Iraq.
            (61) Congress notes the advantages of consolidating the 
        reports described in paragraphs (57), (58), and (59) into a 
        single report to be transmitted to Congress pursuant to section 
        4 of this Act.
            (62) Congress urges that the reports transmitted pursuant 
        to section 4 of this Act be organized and written to provide 
        content, information, data, and analysis on the mission in Iraq 
        as it pertains to the political, security, infrastructure, and 
        economic development of and governance capacity building at and 
        between the various levels of government in Iraq.
            (63) Congress further urges that the reports transmitted 
        pursuant to section 4 of this Act be organized and written to 
        provide content, information, data, and analysis on United 
        States and Coalition countries efforts to establish maintain, 
        stabilize, and conciliate relations between Iraq, neighboring 
        states, regional states, and the international community.
            (64) Congress moreover urges that, if the President decides 
        not to adopt and implement some or all of the recommendations 
        offered by the Iraq Study Group in the Group's report, the 
        reports transmitted pursuant to section 4 of this Act should 
        include content, information, data, and analysis to explain and 
        justify the rationale as to why such recommendations were not 
        adopted and implemented.
            (65) It is the duty of Congress under Article I, Section 8 
        of the United States Constitution to ``raise and support 
        Armies,'' and that by requiring the President to report to 
        Congress on Operation Iraqi Freedom, Congress is better able to 
        carry out this constitutional duty.
            (66) Congress declares that satisfactory compliance with 
        the letter and spirit of the reports required to be transmitted 
        pursuant to section 4 of this Act, and compliance with the 
        intended quality of such reports, will provide Congress and the 
        American people a firm basis for which to consider and evaluate 
        the utility of continuing current, or providing for future, 
        economic, reconstruction, and other assistance to, or for the 
        benefit of, the Government of Iraq.

SEC. 4. REPORT.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment 
of this Act, the President shall, in accordance with, in support of, 
and to more clearly define the National Strategy for Victory in Iraq 
and the plan entitled ``The New Way Forward in Iraq'', transmit to 
Congress a report that--
            (1) consolidates the findings of the reports required by--
                    (A) the section entitled ``Measuring Stability and 
                Security in Iraq'' of the Joint Explanatory Statement 
                of the Committee of Conference accompanying Conference 
                Report 109-72 of the bill, H.R. 1268 (the Emergency 
                Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense, the Global 
                War on Terror, and Tsunami Relief, 2005; Public Law 
                109-13);
                    (B) the United States Policy in Iraq Act (section 
                1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for 
                Fiscal Year 2006; Public Law 109-163); and
                    (C) section 9010 of the Department of Defense 
                Appropriations Act, 2007 (division A of Public Law 109-
                289);
            (2) identifies the specific or vital measures or other 
        benchmarks that define the terms of the of completion of and 
        conditions for victory for Operation Iraqi Freedom and their 
        correlation with the strategic objectives and lines of action 
        outlined in the appendix of the National Strategy for Victory 
        in Iraq and the information provided in the plan entitled ``The 
        New Way Forward in Iraq'';
            (3) describes the nature and substance of the programs 
        implemented to achieve such strategic objectives and lines of 
        action; and
            (4) analyzes using metrics the effectiveness of such 
        programs toward achieving the specific vital measures or other 
        benchmarks required to be identified by paragraph (2).
    (b) Update.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall transmit to Congress 
        an update of the report required by subsection (a) not less 
        than once every 90 days after the date on which the President 
        transmits the report required by such subsection until such 
        time as Operation Iraqi Freedom has been completed.
            (2) Contents.--Each update of the report--
                    (A) may reflect adjustments to the specific or 
                vital measures or other benchmarks identified pursuant 
                to subsection (a)(2), or to the nature or substance of 
                the programs described in subsection (a)(3), as 
                realties, circumstances, and events in Iraq change or 
                evolve;
                    (B) shall include detailed justifications as to why 
                adjustments to such specific or vital measures or other 
                benchmarks, or to the nature or substance of such 
                programs, were made; and
                    (C) shall include detailed information regarding 
                the progress toward implementing the multilateral 
                agreement required by section 5 of this Act.
    (c) Additional Requirements.--The report required by subsection (a) 
and updates of the report required by subsection (b)--
            (1) shall be organized and written to provide content, 
        information, data, and analysis on the complex interdependent 
        nature of the challenges associated with the political, 
        security, infrastructure, and economic development of and 
        governance capacity building at and between the various levels 
        of government in Iraq, and to include efforts on the part of 
        the United States and Coalition countries to establish, 
        maintain, stabilize, and conciliate relations between Iraq, 
        neighboring states, regional states, and the international 
        community;
            (2) shall be accompanied by a comprehensive all-source 
        intelligence analysis of Iraq that includes information by and 
        from the various levels of government in Iraq, and to include 
        efforts on the part of the United States and Coalition 
        countries to establish, maintain, stabilize, and conciliate 
        relations between Iraq, neighboring states, regional states, 
        and the international community;
            (3) shall be accompanied by an analysis of the extent to 
        which the process called for by the provisions of Article 140 
        of the Constitution of the Republic of Iraq can be implemented 
        by the Government of Iraq in an unbiased, uniform, and 
        equitable manner during calendar year 2007, to include a 
        description of, and justification for, actions needed to be 
        taken by the United States, Coalition countries, the Government 
        of Iraq, the Kurdish Regional Government in Iraq, and the 
        provincial government of Kirkuk, neighboring and regional 
        governments, and the international community to ensure that 
        such process proceeds in a unbiased, uniform, and equitable 
        manner during calendar year 2007 or during future years; and
            (4) shall, if the President decides not to adopt and 
        implement some or all of the recommendations offered by the 
        Iraq Study Group in the Group's report, include content, data, 
        information, and analysis to explain and justify the rationale 
        as to why such recommendations were not adopted and 
        implemented.
    (d) Form.--The report required by subsection (a) and updates of the 
report required by subsection (b) shall be transmitted in unclassified 
form but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 5. MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO HELP PROVIDE FOR THE COMPLETION OF 
              OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM.

    (a) Multilateral Agreement.--Not later than 45 days after the date 
on which the report required by section 4(a) of this Act is transmitted 
to Congress pursuant to such section, the President shall seek to enter 
into a multilateral agreement with Coalition countries, the Republic of 
Iraq, appropriate states in the Middle East region, and appropriate 
multilateral organizations to help provide for the completion of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.
    (b) Terms.--It is the sense of Congress that, to the maximum extent 
practicable, the terms of the multilateral agreement referred to in 
subsection (a) should--
            (1) be based upon the findings of the report required by 
        section 4 of this Act; and
            (2) be subject to adjustment or other amendment, as 
        provided for by subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 4(b)(2) of 
        this Act, if appropriate and agreed to by the signatory 
        parties.

SEC. 6. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Coalition countries.--The term ``Coalition countries'' 
        means those countries identified by the Department of State and 
        Department of Defense as contributing military forces, 
        materiel, diplomatic support, and economic, technical, and 
        training assistance to the Government of Iraq in support of 
        Operation Iraqi Freedom.
            (2) Coalition forces.--The term ``Coalition Forces'' means 
        the military forces of Coalition countries operating in support 
        of Operation Iraqi Freedom.
            (3) Unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner.--The term 
        ``unbiased, uniform, and equitable manner'' means without 
        regard to religion, race, ethnic identity, gender, age, or 
        geographic location.
            (4) Various levels of government in iraq.--The term 
        ``various levels of government in Iraq'' means the national, 
        capital city, regional, provincial, provincial capital city, 
        and strategic municipal levels of government in Iraq.
            (5) Violent transnational entity.--The term ``violent 
        transnational entity'' means a global, regional, or local 
        entity that threatens the national security of the United 
        States by acts or threats of violence, terrorism, illicit 
        trafficking of arms (to include nuclear, chemical, and 
        biological weapons and technology), piracy, or international 
        organized crime (to include financial transactions, the 
        smuggling of narcotics or persons, uncontrolled refugee 
        migration, and environmental damage conducted across 
        international borders).
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