[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 7068 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                H. R. 7068

To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional 
 capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to 
     promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the 
 proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure 
 universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
                        and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           September 25, 2008

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Mack, and Mr. 
   Chabot) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster regional 
 capacity and cooperation to counter current and emerging threats, to 
     promote cooperation in the Western Hemisphere to prevent the 
 proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, to secure 
 universal adherence to agreements regarding nuclear nonproliferation, 
                        and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; DEFINITIONS; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Western Hemisphere 
Counterterrorism and Nonproliferation Act of 2008''.
    (b) Definitions.--In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the 
                Committee on Homeland Security of the House of 
                Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations and the 
                Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
                of the Senate.
            (2) Nonhumanitarian assistance.--The term ``nonhumanitarian 
        assistance'' means--
                    (A) any assistance under the Foreign Assistance Act 
                of 1961 (including programs under title IV of chapter 2 
                of part I of such Act, relating to the Overseas Private 
                Investment Corporation), other than--
                            (i) disaster relief assistance, including 
                        any assistance under chapter 9 of part I of 
                        such Act;
                            (ii) assistance which involves the 
                        provision of food (including monetization of 
                        food) or medicine; and
                            (iii) assistance for refugees;
                    (B) sales, or financing on any terms, under the 
                Arms Export Control Act; and
                    (C) financing under the Export-Import Bank Act of 
                1945.
            (3) State sponsor of terrorism.--The term ``state sponsor 
        of terrorism'' means a country the government of which has been 
        determined by the Secretary of State, for purposes of section 
        6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 620A of 
        the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms 
        Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a government 
        that has repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism.
    (c) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; definitions; table of contents.
          TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Statement of policy regarding regional efforts to counter 
                            terrorism in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 103. Amendments to annual country reports on terrorism.
Sec. 104. Amendments to annual determination procedures.
Sec. 105. Amendment to international narcotics control strategy report.
Sec. 106. United States efforts in the Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 107. International Law Enforcement Academy in San Salvador, El 
                            Salvador.
Sec. 108. Actions regarding the Organization of American States.
Sec. 109. Amendment to Department of State Rewards Program.
TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
                       IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Statement of policy regarding the proliferation of weapons-
                            related nuclear, chemical, and biological 
                            materials, technology, and facilities.
Sec. 203. Statement of policy regarding the small quantities protocol.
Sec. 204. Securing adherence to agreements regarding nuclear 
                            nonproliferation by countries in the 
                            Western Hemisphere.
Sec. 205. Halting the proliferation of nuclear fuel fabrication.
Sec. 206. Cooperation with the Proliferation Security Initiative.
Sec. 207. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Nonproliferation 
                            Partnership Initiative.
Sec. 208. Prohibited transactions.
Sec. 209. Restrictions on nuclear cooperation with countries assisting 
                            the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba.
      TITLE III--WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTERS

Sec. 301. Establishment of the Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination 
                            Centers.
Sec. 302. Regional Security Initiative.
Sec. 303. Authorization of appropriations.
 TITLE IV--PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
                               COUNTRIES

Sec. 401. Prohibitions on engagement with certain Western Hemisphere 
                            countries.
                            TITLE V--REPORT

Sec. 501. Report.

          TITLE I--COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) In 2004, a Lebanese individual, having entered the 
        United States illegally from Mexico, was charged with 
        supporting Hezbollah financially and was described by the 
        United States Attorney as a ``fighter, recruiter and 
        fundraiser''.
            (2) In December 2006, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated nine individuals and two entities as part of a 
        network that is ``a major financial artery to Hezbollah in 
        Lebanon'' and announced an effort to target Hezbollah 
        fundraising in the tri-border area of Brazil, Argentina, and 
        Paraguay.
            (3) In 2007, the Chavez regime established routine civilian 
        airline flights between Venezuela and designated State Sponsors 
        of Terrorism, Iran, and Syria.
            (4) In October 2007, Secretary of Homeland Security Michael 
        Chertoff said, in response to a question about relations 
        between Iran and Venezuela, ``I think [there is] an emerging 
        threat and challenge to the West, which is the export of 
        ideology that we see among Islamist extremists in the Middle 
        East from Iran, and the marriage of that with others who, 
        perhaps for their own reasons, have strong anti-American views 
        or who simply exploit anti-Americanism as a way of promoting 
        their own ideological or power agendas.''.
            (5) In November 2007, Interpol's General Assembly agreed to 
        issue red capture notices for the arrest of a Hezbollah leader 
        and five former senior Iranian officials charged by Argentina 
        in the 1994 Argentine Mutual Jewish Association (AMIA) 
        terrorist attack, in which 85 innocent people were killed and 
        300 more were wounded.
            (6) A 2007 Drug Enforcement Administration report linked 
        nearly half of foreign terrorist organizations around the world 
        today to narcotics trade, underscoring the fact that the fight 
        against terrorism must also include a corresponding fight 
        against illicit drugs.
            (7) In February 2008, Director of National Intelligence 
        Mike McConnell reported to Congress in his presentation of the 
        Intelligence Community's Annual Threat Assessment that the 
        governments of Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, ``to varying 
        degrees, have engaged in sharply anti-U.S. rhetoric, aligned 
        with Venezuela and Cuba-and increasingly Iran-on international 
        issues, and advocated measures that directly clash with U.S. 
        initiatives''.
            (8) In February 2008, a United States Federal law-
        enforcement official shared, ``We've known for some time that 
        Islamic extremists groups were gaining momentum and exploiting 
        the region . . . Iran is no exception--now with Cuba and 
        Venezuela, the door is open.''.
            (9) Venezuela has concluded nearly 200 bilateral agreements 
        with Iran on military cooperation, the sharing of intelligence, 
        expanding financial cooperation, and initiating cultural 
        exchanges, among others.
            (10) According to United States intelligence officials, 
        Iran possesses the potential to use its close relationship with 
        Venezuela to facilitate the smuggling of people, drugs, and 
        weapons into the Western Hemisphere through terrorist proxy 
        groups.
            (11) In March 2008, the Colombian army led a raid against 
        the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and seized computers 
        containing documents that suggest evidence of $300,000,000 in 
        payments to the extremist organization from the Venezuelan 
        Government, high-level contacts by the FARC with officials from 
        Ecuador and Venezuela, and efforts by the FARC to obtain 50 
        kilograms of uranium.
            (12) The Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism of the 
        Organization of American States commits all State parties to 
        establish domestic regulatory institutions that eradicate the 
        financing of terrorist offenses, cooperate with fellow 
        signatories to control borders, provide mutual legal assistance 
        in counterterrorism efforts and prosecution of terrorist 
        offenses, and conform to all other stipulations of the 
        convention designed to prevent, punish, and eliminate terrorist 
        offenses.
            (13) In June 2008, the Department of the Treasury 
        designated two Venezuela-based supporters of Hizballah, Ghazi 
        Nasr al Din and Fawzi Kan'an, along with two travel agencies 
        owned and controlled by Kan'an, explaining it is ``extremely 
        troubling to see the Government of Venezuela employing and 
        providing safe harbor to Hizballah facilitators and 
        fundraisers.''.
            (14) In May 2008, for the third year in a row, the 
        Department of State determined, pursuant to section 40A of the 
        Arms Export Control Act, that Venezuela was not cooperating 
        fully with United States antiterrorism efforts.
            (15) In April 2008, for the fouth year in a row, the 
        Department of State's Annual Country Report on Terrorism stated 
        that the Government of Cuba provided safe haven to members of 
        [several Latin American terrorist groups] and maintained close 
        relationships with other state sponsors of terrorism such as 
        Iran.
            (16) In April 2008, for the fifth year in a row, the 
        Department of State's Annual Country Report on Terrorism also 
        noted that Venezuelan citizenship, identity, and travel 
        documents remain easy to obtain, making Venezuela a potentially 
        attractive way-station for terrorists.

SEC. 102. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING REGIONAL EFFORTS TO COUNTER 
              TERRORISM IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

    To enhance the security of the Western Hemisphere and bolster 
regional capacity to counter terrorism, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to promote the signing, ratification, and implementation 
by all countries in the Western Hemisphere of the following:
            (1) OAS AG/RES. 1840 (XXXII-O/02) Inter-American Convention 
        Against Terrorism.
            (2) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 40 Recommendations 
        on Money Laundering (ML) and 9 Special Recommendations (SR) on 
        Terrorist Financing (TF).
            (3) The 1963 ICAO Convention on Offences and Certain Other 
        Acts Committed on Board Aircraft.
            (4) The 1970 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of 
        Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft.
            (5) The 1971 ICAO Convention for the Suppression of 
        Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
            (6) The 1973 United Nations Convention on the Prevention 
        and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected 
        Person, including Diplomatic Agents.
            (7) The 1979 United Nations International Convention 
        Against the Taking of Hostages.
            (8) The 1988 ICAO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts of Violence at Airports Serving International Civil 
        Aviation, Supplementary to the Convention for the Suppression 
        of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation.
            (9) The 1988 IMO Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation.
            (10) The 1988 IMO Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful 
        Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the 
        Continental Shelf.
            (11) The 1991 ICAO Convention on the Marking of Plastic 
        Explosives for the Purpose of Detection.
            (12) The 1997 United Nations International Convention for 
        the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings.
            (13) The 1999 United Nations International Convention for 
        the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.
            (14) The 2001 United Nations S/Res/1373 Creation of Counter 
        Terrorism Committee (CTC).
            (15) The 2005 United Nations S/Res/1624 Prohibition of 
        incitement to commit terrorist act or acts.

SEC. 103. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM.

    Section 140(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal 
Years 1988 and 1989 (22 U.S.C. 2656f(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (4)(D), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (5), by striking the period at the end and 
        inserting ``; and'';
            (3) by redesignating the second paragraph (3) and the 
        second paragraph (4) as paragraphs (6) and (7), respectively;
            (4) in paragraph (6), as so redesignated, by striking 
        ``and'' at the end;
            (5) in paragraph (7), as so redesignated, by striking the 
        period at the end; and
            (6) by adding after such paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraphs:
            ``(8) a comprehensive assessment of all United States 
        assistance available to combat terrorism in each country that 
        is a subject of such report; and
            ``(9) with respect to countries in the Western Hemisphere 
        that are the subjects of such report, the level in each such 
        country of threat posed by radical Islamist terrorism.''.

SEC. 104. AMENDMENTS TO ANNUAL DETERMINATION PROCEDURES.

    Section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 
2003 (Public Law 107-228; 22 U.S.C. 2291j-1) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii); by striking ``and'' at 
                the end;
                    (B) by redesignating subparagraph (B) as 
                subparagraph (C);
                    (C) by inserting after subparagraph (A) the 
                following new subparagraph:
                    ``(B) designate each country, if any, identified in 
                such report in which a link has been determined to 
                exist between illicit drug trafficking and a designated 
                foreign terrorist organization and that has failed 
                demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make 
                substantial efforts--
                            ``(i) to adhere to its obligations under 
                        international counterterrorism agreements; and
                            ``(ii) to implement effective 
                        counterterrorism measures, including action on 
                        such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 
                        haven to terrorists, financing and money 
                        laundering, and law enforcement; and''; and
                    (D) in subparagraph (C), as so redesignated, by 
                inserting before the period at the end the following: 
                ``under subparagraph (A) or (B)'';
            (2) in paragraph (3)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``or'' at the 
                end;
                    (B) in subparagraph (B)(2), by striking the period 
                at the end and inserting ``; or''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following new 
                subparagraph:
                    ``(C) subsequent to the designation being made 
                under paragraph (2)(B), the country has made 
                substantial efforts--
                            ``(i) to adhere to its obligations under 
                        international counterterrorism agreements; and
                            ``(ii) to implement effective 
                        counterterrorism measures, including action on 
                        such issues as the rule of law, denying safe 
                        haven to terrorists, financing and money 
                        laundering, and law enforcement.'';
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (8) as paragraph (9); and
            (4) by inserting after paragraph (7) the following new 
        paragraph:
            ``(8) Bilateral agreements.--If a country designated under 
        subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (2) does not receive a 
        determination under subparagraphs (B) or (C) of paragraph (3), 
        the Secretary of State shall negotiate with such country a 
        bilateral agreement describing actions to be taken by the 
        United States and such country to satisfy such determinations 
        during the one year period following such a designation. Such a 
        bilateral agreement should include a needs assessment, a 
        bilateral action plan, the provision of United States training 
        and assistance, the use of International Law Enforcement 
        Academy facilities in the region, and an exchange of model laws 
        and best practices.''.

SEC. 105. AMENDMENT TO INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT.

    Section 489(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 
2291h(a)) is amended by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(9) A separate section that contains information relating 
        to any links between illicit narcotics trafficking or money 
        laundering and terrorists, terrorist acts, or designated 
        foreign terrorist organizations (as such term is used in 
        section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 
        1189)), and any actions taken by the United States Government 
        or foreign government to address such links.''.

SEC. 106. UNITED STATES EFFORTS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

    (a) Determination.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere that 
the President has determined--
            (1) is engaged in military cooperation with a state sponsor 
        of terrorism,
            (2) is engaged in nonmarket-based trade with a state 
        sponsor of terrorism,
            (3) is carrying out policies that threaten United States 
        national security interests, or
            (4) is not fully cooperating with United States 
        counterterrorism or nonproliferation efforts,
the President is authorized to impose any of the sanctions described in 
subsection (b).
    (b) Sanctions.--For any country in the Western Hemisphere with 
respect to which the President has made a determination in accordance 
with subsection (a), the President is authorized to--
            (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign 
        assistance to the government of that country; and
            (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, 
        including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any 
        other specific permission or authority to export any goods or 
        technology under--
                    (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;
                    (B) the Arms Export Control Act;
                    (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                    (D) any other statute that requires the prior 
                review and approval of the United States Government as 
                a condition for the export or re-export of goods or 
                services.

SEC. 107. INTERNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT ACADEMY IN SAN SALVADOR, EL 
              SALVADOR.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in San Salvador, El 
Salvador, should continue to serve as a critical component of United 
States regional counterterrorism efforts.
    (b) Negotiation.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate with the 
appropriate agency entities to ensure that counterterrorism, including 
radical Islamist extremism within the Western Hemisphere, 
nonproliferation, and border security courses are instituted as part of 
the core curriculum at the International Law Enforcement Academy in San 
Salvador.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to--
            (1) complete all physical aspects of the ILEA facility in 
        San Salvador; and
            (2) implement the ILEA Global Network.

SEC. 108. ACTIONS REGARDING THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES.

    (a) Declaration Regarding Terrorism.--The Secretary of State shall 
direct the United States Representative to the Organization of American 
States (OAS) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
at the OAS to move for a declaration at the first meeting of Member 
States of the OAS convened after the date of the enactment of this Act 
calling on countries to systematically deny the use of their 
territories by terrorists or terrorist organizations.
    (b) Reduction in United States Contribution.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall reduce by 50 
        percent the amount of the United States assessed contribution 
        to the OAS for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal 
        year.
            (2) Use of funds.--
                    (A) In general.--Of the amount reduced pursuant to 
                paragraph (1), not less than ten percent of such amount 
                shall be added to United States voluntary contributions 
                to each of the organizations specified in subparagraph 
                (B) and the remaining amount shall be used to establish 
                and maintain the Western Hemisphere Regional 
                Coordination Centers under section 301.
                    (B) Organizations specified.--The organizations 
                referred to in subparagraph (A) are the following:
                            (i) The OAS Inter-American Committee 
                        Against Terrorism (CICTE).
                            (ii) The OAS Inter-American Drug Abuse 
                        Control Commission (CICAD).

SEC. 109. AMENDMENT TO DEPARTMENT OF STATE REWARDS PROGRAM.

    Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 
(22 U.S.C. 2708(b)) is amended--
            (1) in paragraph (6), by striking ``or'' at the end;
            (2) in paragraph (7)(B), by striking the period at the end 
        and inserting ``; or''; and
            (3) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
            ``(8) the arrest or conviction in any country of any 
        individual wanted on terrorism charges pursuant to red notices 
        duly issued by Interpol, if such reward would help advance 
        United States interests or the interests of United States 
        allies in the global struggle against international 
        terrorism.''.

TITLE II--NONPROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
                       IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Venezuela and Iran have established extensive 
        political, military, and economic cooperation.
            (2) Venezuela, under the government of Hugo Chavez, has 
        publicly supported Iran's development of a capacity to enrich 
        uranium, which many observers believe is part of a nuclear 
        weapons program.
            (3) In May 2005, Chavez stated that he was seeking 
        assistance from Iran to establish a nuclear program in 
        Venezuela.
            (4) On February 4, 2006, Venezuela was one of only three 
        countries to vote against a resolution by the Board of 
        Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, 
        to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council for 
        violating its obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty.
            (5) On February 15, 2006, the Speaker of the Iranian 
        parliament, Gholam Ali Haddad-Adel, stated that his government 
        was prepared to discuss providing technical assistance to a 
        Venezuelan nuclear program.
            (6) On a visit to Iran in February 2008, Abel El Zabayar, a 
        member of Venezuela's National Assembly and Mining Commission, 
        stated that Iran will ``practically give away'' its civilian 
        nuclear technology and that ``if relations with Iran lead to 
        sharing nuclear technology with us, we would then give it away 
        to our brothers in Latin America once we are successful.''.
            (7) El Zabayar stated that Venezuela had taken steps toward 
        establishing a civilian nuclear program and that cooperation in 
        this area was being discussed with the Governments of Iran and 
        Belarus.
            (8) Venezuela reportedly has large deposits of uranium ore 
        in the Guiana Shield region.
            (9) In 1985 the Brazilian government announced that it had 
        terminated a clandestine nuclear weapons program run by the 
        military since 1975.
            (10) In August 2005 a former high-ranking Brazilian nuclear 
        official stated that the military had continued to develop 
        elements of a nuclear weapons program into the 1990s.
            (11) On November 20, 2007, Brazilian General Jose Benedito 
        de Barros Moreira publicly called for Brazil to develop the 
        technological capacity to manufacture nuclear weapons.
            (12) The centrifuges at Brazil's Resende uranium enrichment 
        plant can be reconfigured to produce highly enriched uranium in 
        quantities sufficient to produce several nuclear weapons 
        annually.
            (13) Brazil has denied inspectors from the IAEA full access 
        to its uranium enrichment centrifuges at Resende on the grounds 
        that it is protecting commercial secrets.
            (14) The standoff with the IAEA was resolved only by the 
        IAEA agreeing to limit its verification methods to indirect 
        inspections without direct inspection of the centrifuges, which 
        many nonproliferation experts fear could be used as a precedent 
        by Iran and other countries to prevent IAEA inspectors from 
        examining their suspect nuclear facilities.
            (15) A prototype nuclear reactor is being developed at the 
        Armar Research Center for use in Brazil's nuclear-powered 
        submarine program.
            (16) On February 24, 2008, the Governments of Argentina and 
        Brazil agreed to begin negotiations regarding the joint 
        development of a nuclear reactor and construction of a uranium 
        enrichment plant.
            (17) Until 1990 the Argentine Government conducted a 
        clandestine nuclear weapons program.
            (18) In December 1985 Argentina and Iran signed a nuclear 
        cooperation agreement in which Argentina agreed to supply Iran 
        with highly enriched uranium.
            (19) In 1987 and 1988 Argentina signed three agreements 
        with Iran for converting a nuclear reactor to use enriched 
        uranium, for building pilot plants for uranium-dioxide 
        conversion and fuel fabrication.
            (20) Assistance by Argentina to the Iranian nuclear program 
        was reduced, but not terminated, following pressure by the 
        United States.
            (21) Several countries in Latin America, including Brazil 
        and Argentina, have not signed and implemented an Additional 
        Protocol which provides IAEA inspectors with enhanced access to 
        nuclear facilities.
            (22) Some Western Hemisphere countries have not ratified 
        the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
        Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on 
        their Destruction, also referred to as The Chemical Weapons 
        Convention.
            (23) Several countries in Latin America have not signed and 
        ratified The Convention On The Prohibition Of The Development 
        And Stockpiling Of Bacteriological (Biological) And Toxin 
        Weapons And On Their Destruction, also referred to as The 
        Biological Convention.

SEC. 202. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE PROLIFERATION OF WEAPONS-
              RELATED NUCLEAR, CHEMICAL, AND BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS, 
              TECHNOLOGY, AND FACILITIES.

    (a) In General.--To enhance the prevention of the proliferation of 
weapons-related nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, 
technology, and facilities, it shall be the policy of the United States 
to--
            (1) promote the negotiation and implementation by all 
        countries of--
                    (A) a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the 
                International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); and
                    (B) an Additional Protocol to the safeguards 
                agreement;
            (2) secure guarantees by all countries of unrestricted 
        access by IAEA personnel to all nuclear-related materials and 
        facilities in territories under the control of the host 
        country;
            (3) promote the implementation by all countries of United 
        Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; and
            (4) promote the accession to and ratification and 
        implementation of--
                    (A) the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
                Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of 
                Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction (also 
                referred to as the Chemical Weapons Convention);
                    (B) the 1980 IAEA Convention on the Physical 
                Protection of Nuclear Material;
                    (C) the 2005 United Nations International 
                Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
                Terrorism; and
                    (D) the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
                Development and Stockpiling of Bacteriological 
                (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction 
                (also referred to as the Biological Weapons 
                Convention).
    (b) Additional Protocol Defined.--In this section, the term 
``Additional Protocol'' means the Protocol Additional to an agreement 
between a country and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards.

SEC. 203. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SMALL QUANTITIES PROTOCOL.

    Because a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) sets aside many of the 
operative provisions of a general safeguards agreement, the ability of 
the IAEA to verify that nuclear materials and facilities in a country 
with an SQP are not being diverted for illicit purposes is 
significantly impaired. For this reason, it shall be the policy of the 
United States to--
            (1) oppose the negotiation by the IAEA of an SQP for any 
        country that did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2008; and
            (2) encourage every country with an SQP to withdraw 
        formally from or renegotiate that agreement for the purpose of 
        increasing transparency and eliminating any exemption or 
        provision that could restrict the ability of the IAEA to verify 
        that a country's nuclear materials and facilities are not being 
        diverted to impermissible uses.

SEC. 204. SECURING ADHERENCE TO AGREEMENTS REGARDING NUCLEAR 
              NONPROLIFERATION BY COUNTRIES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.

    (a) In General.--The President shall use all available political, 
economic, and diplomatic tools to ensure that each country in the 
Western Hemisphere--
            (1) has signed and implemented a comprehensive safeguards 
        agreement with the IAEA;
            (2) has signed and implemented an Additional Protocol to 
        its safeguards agreement;
            (3) guarantees unrestricted access for IAEA personnel to 
        all nuclear-related facilities;
            (4) has implemented the provisions of United Nations 
        Security Council Resolution 1540;
            (5) has acceded to, ratified, and fully implemented the 
        conventions referred to in section 202(a)(4);
            (6) does not negotiate with the IAEA an SQP if that country 
        did not have an SQP as of January 1, 2008; and
            (7) withdraws formally from or renegotiates an SQP 
        agreement if a country has such an agreement.
    (b) Sanctions.--For any Western Hemisphere country that has not 
satisfied all of the requirements specified in subsection (a), the 
President is authorized to--
            (1) suspend United States nonhumanitarian foreign 
        assistance to the government of that country; and
            (2) prohibit the sale, provision, or transfer of articles, 
        including the issuance of any specific license or grant of any 
        other specific permission or authority to export any goods or 
        technology under--
                    (A) the Export Administration Act of 1979;
                    (B) the Arms Export Control Act;
                    (C) the Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or
                    (D) any other statute that requires the prior 
                review and approval of the United States Government as 
                a condition for the export or re-export of goods or 
                services.

SEC. 205. HALTING THE PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR FUEL FABRICATION.

    (a) Statement of Policy.--It shall be the policy of the United 
States to oppose the development or acquisition by any country of a 
capacity to fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such 
capacity as of January 1, 2008.
    (b) Prevention of Capacity To Fabricate Nuclear Fuel.--The 
President shall use all available political, economic, and diplomatic 
tools, and shall use the voice, vote, and influence of the United 
States in all international organizations and associations of which it 
is a member, including the IAEA and the Nuclear Suppliers Group, to 
prevent the development or acquisition by any country of a capacity to 
fabricate nuclear fuel if such country did not have such capacity as of 
January 1, 2008.
    (c) Nuclear Technical Cooperation With the IAEA.--The President 
shall direct the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
block the allocation of funds for any IAEA development, environmental, 
or nuclear science assistance or activity to a country the government 
of which--
            (1) the Secretary of State has determined, for purposes of 
        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, section 
        620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, section 40 of the 
        Arms Export Control Act, or other provision of law, is a 
        government that has repeatedly provided support for acts of 
        international terrorism;
            (2) is actively cooperating with a government as described 
        in paragraph (1);
            (3) is under investigation for a breach of or noncompliance 
        with its IAEA obligations or the purposes and principles of the 
        Charter of the United Nations; or
            (4) is in violation of its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
        and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

SEC. 206. COOPERATION WITH THE PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) From its inception on May 31, 2003, the Proliferation 
        Security Initiative, also referred to as the PSI, has 
        repeatedly demonstrated its effectiveness in preventing the 
        proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
            (2) In his February 11, 2004, address at the National 
        Defense University regarding additional measures to enhance 
        global efforts against the proliferation of weapons of mass 
        destruction President Bush proposed that ``the work of the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative be expanded to address more 
        than shipments and transfers. Building on the tools we've 
        developed to fight terrorists, we can take direct action 
        against proliferation networks. We need greater cooperation not 
        just among intelligence and military services, but in law 
        enforcement, as well. PSI participants and other willing 
        nations should use the Interpol and all other means to bring to 
        justice those who traffic in deadly weapons, to shut down their 
        labs, to seize their materials, to freeze their assets. We must 
        act on every lead. We will find the middlemen, the suppliers 
        and the buyers.''.
            (3) The number of countries participating in PSI has 
        steadily increased, thereby greatly enhancing its 
        effectiveness.
            (4) Many countries in the Western Hemisphere formally or 
        informally cooperate with the PSI.
            (5) Expanded law enforcement cooperation throughout the 
        Western Hemisphere, including by means of greater coordination 
        of policies, improved communications, and enhanced capabilities 
        would significantly promote the objectives of the PSI.
    (b) Sense of Congress Concerning Strengthening Cooperation 
Regarding Nonproliferation.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) it is in the national security interest of the United 
        States to establish comprehensive cooperation to prevent the 
        proliferation of nuclear, chemical, and biological materials in 
        the Western Hemisphere; and
            (2) the Secretary of State should seek to secure the formal 
        or informal cooperation by Western Hemisphere countries for the 
        purpose of securing the goals of the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative announced by the President on May 31, 2003.

SEC. 207. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE NONPROLIFERATION 
              PARTNERSHIP INITIATIVE.

    (a) In General.--The Secretary of State is authorized, in 
consultation with relevant United States Government agencies, to 
negotiate with the leaders of the governments of countries in the 
Western Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as 
appropriate, international agreements under which such governments work 
in partnership to establish an initiative to be known as the ``Western 
Hemisphere Nonproliferation Partnership Initiative'' (NPI).
    (b) Purpose.--
            (1) In general.--The NPI shall--
                    (A) encourage the establishment of contacts and 
                cooperative relationships, including the sharing of 
                intelligence, between the responsible individuals and 
                agencies of each participant country with their 
                counterparts in the United States Government and in 
                other participating countries; and
                    (B) encourage bilateral and multilateral support, 
                cooperation, and coordination of national programs and 
                efforts to promote effective and in-depth cooperation 
                to counter the illicit acquisition or trade of weapons-
                related nuclear, chemical, or biological materials, 
                technology, or facilities.
            (2) Cooperative programs.--The cooperative programs 
        referred to under paragraph (1)(B) shall include the following:
                    (A) Training for government officials and agents 
                from participating countries regarding the development 
                and operation of NPI programs.
                    (B) Assistance in developing a comprehensive legal 
                and regulatory framework in each country, as 
                appropriate, to enable the establishment and effective 
                implementation of export controls and the capacity to 
                track nuclear, chemical, and biological materials, 
                equipment, technology, and facilities.
                    (C) Provision of equipment, development of 
                infrastructure, and the acquisition of other resources 
                required by participating countries to effectively 
                carry out the tasks referred to in subparagraphs (A) 
                and (B).

SEC. 208. PROHIBITED TRANSACTIONS.

    (a) In General.--No defense article or defense service may be sold 
or licensed for export under this Act in a fiscal year to a foreign 
country that the President determines and certifies to Congress, not 
later than May 15 of the calendar year in which such fiscal year 
begins, is carrying out policies aimed at undermining United States 
national security interests or is not cooperating fully with United 
States nonproliferation efforts.
    (b) Waiver.--The President may waive the prohibition under 
subsection (a) with respect to a specific transaction if the President 
determines that such transaction is important to the national security 
interests of the United States.

SEC. 209. RESTRICTIONS ON NUCLEAR COOPERATION WITH COUNTRIES ASSISTING 
              THE NUCLEAR PROGRAM OF VENEZUELA OR CUBA.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law or any 
international agreement, no agreement for cooperation between the 
United States and the government of any country that is assisting the 
nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced 
conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba may be submitted 
to the President or to Congress pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), no such agreement may enter into 
force with such country, no license may be issued for export directly 
or indirectly to such country of any nuclear material, facilities, 
components, or other goods, services, or technology that would be 
subject to such agreement, and no approval may be given for the 
transfer or retransfer directly or indirectly to such country of any 
nuclear material, facilities, components, or other goods, services, or 
technology that would be subject to such agreement, until the President 
determines and reports to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House 
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate 
that the government of the country that is assisting the nuclear 
program of Venezuela or Cuba or transferring advanced conventional 
weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba--
            (1) has suspended all nuclear assistance to Venezuela or 
        Cuba and all transfers of advanced conventional weapons and 
        missiles to Venezuela or Cuba; and
            (2) is committed to maintaining such suspension until 
        Venezuela or Cuba has implemented measures that would permit 
        the President to make the determination described in paragraph 
        (1).
    (b) Rules of Construction.--The restrictions described in 
subsection (a)--
            (1) shall apply in addition to all other applicable 
        procedures, requirements, and restrictions required by the 
        Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any other law; and
            (2) shall not be construed as affecting the validity of 
        agreements for cooperation that are in effect on the date of 
        the enactment of this Act.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) Agreement for cooperation.--The term ``agreement for 
        cooperation'' has the meaning given that term in section 11 b. 
        of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2014 b.).
            (2) Assisting the nuclear program of venezuela or cuba.--
        The term ``assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba'' 
        means the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a 
        government, or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a 
        government with the knowledge and acquiescence of such 
        government, of goods, services, or technology listed on the 
        Nuclear Suppliers Group Guidelines for the Export of Nuclear 
        Material, Equipment and Technology (published by the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
        INFCIRC/254/Rev. 3/Part 1, and subsequent revisions) or 
        Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, 
        Material, and Related Technology (published by the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency as Information Circular 
        INFCIR/254/Rev. 3/Part 2, and subsequent revisions).
            (3) Country that is assisting the nuclear program of 
        venezuela or cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons 
        or missiles to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``country that is 
        assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or Cuba or 
        transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles to 
        Venezuela or Cuba'' means--
                    (A) Russia; and
                    (B) any other country determined by the President 
                to be assisting the nuclear program of Venezuela or 
                Cuba or transferring advanced conventional weapons or 
                missiles to Venezuela or Cuba.
            (4) Transferring advanced conventional weapons or missiles 
        to venezuela or cuba.--The term ``transferring advanced 
        conventional weapons or missiles to Venezuela or Cuba'' means 
        the intentional transfer to Venezuela or Cuba by a government, 
        or by a person subject to the jurisdiction of a government with 
        the knowledge and acquiescence of such government, of goods, 
        services, or technology listed on--
                    (A) the Wassenaar Arrangement list of Dual Use 
                Goods and Technologies and Munitions list of July 12, 
                1996, and subsequent revisions; or
                    (B) the Missile Technology Control Regime Equipment 
                and Technology Annex of June 11, 1996, and subsequent 
                revisions.

      TITLE III--WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION CENTERS

SEC. 301. ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE REGIONAL COORDINATION 
              CENTERS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States Government should carry out a 
        comprehensive and integrated approach to United States 
        counterterrorism and nonproliferation efforts, both 
        domestically and abroad; and
            (2) the Secretary of State should seek to engage leaders of 
        the governments of countries in the Western Hemisphere to 
        develop a comprehensive multilateral strategy to counter 
        current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of 
        nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons.
    (b) Purpose.--Western Hemisphere Regional Coordination Centers 
shall serve as joint operational facilities dedicated to coordinating 
efforts, capacity, and intelligence among participating countries to 
counter current and emerging threats and prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons throughout the Western 
Hemisphere.
    (c) Establishment.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate with the 
leaders of the governments of countries in the Western Hemisphere on a 
bilateral or multilateral basis, as appropriate, international 
agreements under which such governments work in partnership to 
establish centers to be known as the ``Western Hemisphere Regional 
Coordination Centers'' (RCC).
    (d) Cooperation With Governments in the Western Hemisphere.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate 
        with--
                    (A) the governments of countries in Central and 
                South America agreements for the establishment of one 
                RCC in a country in Central America and one RCC in a 
                country in South America; and
                    (B) the Government of Brazil, the Government of 
                Argentina, and the Government of Paraguay an agreement 
                for the establishment of a RCC specifically in the tri-
                border area.
            (2) Coordination.--The Secretary of State shall negotiate 
        with the leaders of the governments of countries in the Western 
        Hemisphere on a bilateral or multilateral basis, as 
        appropriate, agreements under which a method is established for 
        staffing parallel representatives, from each participating 
        country or region, for each United States agency represented at 
        the relevant RCC.
    (e) Participation of United States Government Agencies.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall determine which departments and agencies of the 
        United States Government, including the Department of Defense, 
        the Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland Security, 
        the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Justice, the 
        Drug Enforcement Agency, and the Federal Bureau of 
        Investigation, are necessary to ensure the establishment and 
        operation of the RCCs. The Secretary of State, in consultation 
        with the Director of National Intelligence and the Secretary of 
        Defense, shall negotiate agreements with the heads of such 
        agencies to ensure their full participation and cooperation in 
        such establishment and operation.
            (2) Assignment of regional attaches and advisors.--The 
        Secretary of State shall transfer to appropriate RCCs regional 
        attaches and advisors serving at United States diplomatic and 
        consular missions in the Western Hemisphere.
    (f) Structure.--
            (1) Management of the rccs.--The Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and the 
        Secretary of Defense, shall be responsible for the management 
        of the RCCs, including development of the budget, priorities, 
        and programs of the RCCs.
            (2) Staffing and duties.--Each RCC shall have one United 
        States Director, at least one but not more than two United 
        States Deputy Directors, and one host country General Director. 
        The United States Director and United States Deputy Directors 
        may be employees of any of the United States national security 
        agencies and shall be chosen by the Secretary of State, in 
        consultation with the Director of National Intelligence and 
        Secretary of Defense. The Director and Deputy Directors of each 
        RCC shall keep the Chief of Mission of the United States 
        Embassies in the host country of such RCC fully informed of 
        activities and operations of such RCC.
            (3) RCC policy board.--
                    (A) Establishment.--There is established the RCC 
                Policy Board.
                    (B) Composition.--The RCC Policy Board shall be 
                comprised of senior representatives from the 
                departments and agencies determined by the Secretary of 
                State, in consultation with the Director of National 
                Intelligence and the Secretary of Defense, to be 
                necessary to ensure the establishment and operation of 
                the RCCs in accordance with subsection (e).
                    (C) Duties.--The Policy Board shall monitor and 
                provide guidance and oversight for the RCCs to ensure 
                that their operations are consistent with United States 
                foreign policy and law enforcement goals.
                    (D) Meetings.--The Policy Board shall meet bi-
                monthly and shall be co-chaired by officers from the 
                Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism of the 
                Department of State and the National Counterterrorism 
                Center of the Office of the Director of National 
                Intelligence.

SEC. 302. REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVE.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the Latin 
America Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI) should serve as a critical 
component of United States regional counterterrorism and 
nonproliferation efforts.
    (b) Participation With the RCCs.--The Latin America RSI shall 
conduct at least one inter-agency meeting at one of the three RCCs each 
fiscal year. The Director, a Deputy Director, or both, of each RCC 
shall participate in all RSI meetings organized by the Department of 
State.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 45 days after the conclusion of each 
RSI meeting, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report, which shall include a classified 
annex if necessary, that describes--
            (1) the defined objectives of the RSI;
            (2) the extent to which such objectives have been achieved;
            (3) the steps taken by the United States to accomplish such 
        objectives;
            (4) the extent of cooperation by other countries in the 
        Western Hemisphere toward achieving such objectives; and
            (5) the steps the United States will take in the subsequent 
        months to accomplish such objectives.

SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There is authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary for fiscal year 2009 and each subsequent fiscal year to carry 
out this title.

 TITLE IV--PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
                               COUNTRIES

SEC. 401. PROHIBITIONS ON ENGAGEMENT WITH CERTAIN WESTERN HEMISPHERE 
              COUNTRIES.

    Nothing in this Act shall be construed as weakening or removing any 
prohibitions on United States engagement with or assistance to any 
country in the Western Hemisphere that the Secretary of State has 
designated as a state sponsor of terrorism for a minimum of three 
consecutive years.

                            TITLE V--REPORT

SEC. 501. REPORT.

    (a) In General.--Not later than one year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
the activities carried out to achieve the objectives described in 
titles II and III that describe--
            (1) the extent to which each such objective has been 
        achieved;
            (2) the steps taken by the United States and countries in 
        the Western Hemisphere in the preceding calendar year to 
        accomplish such objectives;
            (3) the extent of cooperation by other countries in the 
        Western Hemisphere toward achieving such objectives; and
            (4) the steps the United States will take in the current 
        calendar year to accomplish such objectives.
    (b) Preparation and Form of Report.--The report required under 
subsection (a) shall rely on public information to the extent possible, 
and shall include a classified annex, if necessary.
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