Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Iraqi Police Service Improvement Act of 2008

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)In 2004, National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36) transferred responsibility from the Department of State to the Department of Defense for organizing, equipping, and training all Iraqi security forces and stated that at the appropriate time, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall jointly decide when these functions shall transfer to a security assistance organization and other appropriate organizations under the authority of the Secretary of State and the Chief of Mission.. (2)On May 25, 2007, the Independent Commission on the Security Forces of Iraq, also known as the Jones Commission, was created to assess the readiness of Iraq’s military and police forces and report its findings to Congress. (3)The Jones Commission cited progress by the Iraqi Army and the Ministry of Defense but less improvement by the Ministry of Interior, whose dysfunction has hampered the police force. The Jones Commission found the Iraqi Police Service is incapable today of providing security at a level sufficient to protect Iraqi neighborhoods from insurgents and sectarian violence and stressed that the police are central to the long-term establishment of security in Iraq. (4)The Jones Commission report stated that although U.S. military officers rather than senior civilian law enforcement personnel lead the Coalition training effort for the Iraqi Police Service; this arrangement has inadvertently marginalized civilian police advisors and limited the overall effectiveness of the training and advisory effort.. The Jones Commission recommended that leadership of the Coalition Police Assistance Training Team (CPATT) and the Police Training Teams should be transferred to senior civilian law enforcement professionals. (5)The Jones Commission found the number of civilian international police advisors to be insufficient for the task of training the Iraqi Police Service. (6)The Department of Defense’s September 2007 Quarterly Report to Congress on Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq found that the Ministry of Interior and its forces required continued advisory support, training and development, and equipping to be able to progressively assume missions from Coalition forces. The efforts of embedded advisors are focused on addressing continued shortcomings in logistics, leadership and budget execution that hamper improvement, and in certain cases, cause regression.. The advisors also assess and report on the operational readiness of the units they mentor on a monthly basis. (7)The Department of Defense September 2007 Quarterly Report also stated, Current funding levels for the IPA [International Police Advisors] program and availability of military assets do not allow for full coverage of the more than 1,100 provincial and local police headquarters and stations in Iraq.. In the Department of Defense March 2007 Quarterly Report, the Department of Defense stated that cost and risk preclude deploying enough PTTs [Police Transition Teams] to cover all of Iraq’s police stations; at any time, only 5 of Iraq’s 18 provinces have sufficient PTTs . . . Continued PTT presence and participation at Iraqi Police Service stations are needed to improve police readiness and to sustain progress in reforming community policing.. However, Transition Teams are embedded in the Ministry of Defense, the Joint Headquarters, and with most battalions and brigade and division headquarters. (8)The Department of Defense September 2007 Quarterly Report also stated that there were 238 Police Transition Teams for the Iraqi Police Service, with each team composed of approximately 12–15 members, two to four of whom are civilian Department of State contractors, funded by the Department of Defense’s Iraq Security Forces Fund. The remaining members are military personnel. (9)In testimony given to the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, the Department of State stated that since the Department of Defense assumed responsibility for training the Iraqi Security Forces, the Department of Defense has transferred $1,500,000,000 to the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the Department of State to provide trainers and advisors, including 690 International Police Liaison Officers, who are DynCorp contractors, and who serve as advisors in the field to train and mentor Iraqi Police. (10)At hearings on the Iraqi Security Forces conducted by the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the Committee on Armed Services of the House of Representatives, several witnesses agreed that there were not enough civilian police advisors for many units of the Iraqi Police Service and that the military advisors lacked the appropriate policing background to appropriately support the community-policing conducted by the Iraqi Police Service.

Department of State responsibility for Police Transition Teams for the Iraqi Police Service

(a)

Transfer of responsibility

(1)

In general

Notwithstanding National Security Presidential Directive 36 (NSPD–36), not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall assume responsibility from the Department of Defense over the Police Training Teams being used in Iraq to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service. (2)

Statement of understanding

Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense shall submit to Congress a statement of understanding on command structure, including on the roles and responsibilities of members of the Police Training Teams. (b)

Composition of teams

The Secretary of State shall ensure that a majority of the members of each Police Training Team consists of qualified civilian advisors, including employees of the Department of State and employees of contractors secured by the Department of State. Not fewer than two members of each Police Training Team shall be police officers or have retired from police service more than two years before becoming members of a Police Training Team. The leader of each Police Training Team shall also be an employee of the Department of State or an employee of a contractor secured by the Department of State. Members of the United States Armed Forces and personnel from other United States Government agencies, including the Department of Justice, may serve on a Police Training Team in a supporting role. (c)

Transfer of funds

Effective as of the date on which the Secretary of State assumes responsibility from the Department of Defense over the Police Training Teams, all funds made available for the Police Training Teams (currently funded through the Iraq Security Forces Fund of the Department of Defense) and not expended as of that date shall be transferred to the appropriate account for the Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the Department of State for the purpose of using Police Training Teams to provide advisory support, training and development, and equipment for the Iraqi Police Service. (d)

Authorization of appropriations

There are authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of State such sums as may be necessary for the Department of State to staff Police Training Teams in accordance with the findings of the study under section 4(a). (e)

Continued Department of Defense role

In addition to members of the Armed Forces serving on Police Training Teams under subsection (b), the Secretary of Defense, at the request of the Secretary of State, shall make available equipment of the Department of Defense for use by the Police Training Teams. The Armed Forces shall continue to provide security for Police Training Teams, in the manner provided for reconstruction teams operating in Iraq.

Studies required

(a)

Staffing for Police Training Teams

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall, in consultation with the Government of Iraq and Coalition forces, conduct a study and submit to Congress a report containing the recommendations of the Secretary on— (1)the number of civilian advisors needed to sufficiently staff enough Police Training Teams to cover a majority of the approximately 1,100 Iraqi police stations; (2)the availability of Department of State personnel and contractors to staff the Police Training Teams; and (3)the funding required to staff the Police Training Teams. (b)

Update of IG assessment

Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress an update to the 2005 interagency Department of Defense-Department of State Inspector General Assessment of Iraqi Police Training.

Reports on policy implementation

Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, and every 180 days thereafter, the President shall transmit to Congress a report on the actions that have been taken to implement the requirements of this Act. The report shall specifically identify the status of— (1)the assumption of responsibility for Police Training Teams by the Department of State; (2)the equipment level of the Iraqi Police Service, including armored vehicles and heavy weaponry, and the advisors on the Police Training Teams assigned to the Iraqi Police Service; (3)the number of civilian police advisors training the Iraqi Police Service; (4)the number of Police Training Teams and the make-up of each team; (5)issues affecting the recruitment of the appropriate number of advisors; (6)the indicators used to measure the effectiveness of advisors; (7)the indicators used to measure the effectiveness of the Iraqi Police Service; and (8)the impact of transferring to the Government of Iraq in 2007 responsibility for the vetting and recruiting of persons for the Iraqi Police Service with respect to the performance of units of the Iraqi Police Service.