[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5626 Introduced in House (IH)]
110th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. R. 5626
To reassert the constitutional role of Congress in making long-term
security commitments, to defer significant long-term security
commitments to Iraq to the next Administration and Congress, and to
maintain international legal authority and immunity for United States
Armed Forces in Iraq by promoting the extension of the United Nations
mandate.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
March 13, 2008
Mr. Delahunt (for himself and Ms. DeLauro) introduced the following
bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in
addition to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be
subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration
of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee
concerned
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To reassert the constitutional role of Congress in making long-term
security commitments, to defer significant long-term security
commitments to Iraq to the next Administration and Congress, and to
maintain international legal authority and immunity for United States
Armed Forces in Iraq by promoting the extension of the United Nations
mandate.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
The Act may be cited as the ``Protect Our Troops and Our
Constitution Act of 2008''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress finds the following:
(1) On November 26, 2007, by signing the Declaration of
Principles for a Long-Term Relationship of Cooperation and
Friendship Between the Republic of Iraq and the United States
of America (hereinafter in this Act referred to as the
``Declaration of Principles''), the President of the United
States pledged to negotiate by July 2008 an agreement to
replace the United Nations mandate that currently provides
international legal authority as well as immunity from Iraqi
prosecution for United States Armed Forces and other Coalition
forces operating in Iraq.
(2) In the Declaration of Principles, the President pledged
that this agreement would include the following security
commitments by the United States:
(A) ``Supporting the Republic of Iraq in defending
its democratic system against internal and external
threats.''.
(B) ``Providing security assurances and commitments
to the Republic of Iraq to deter foreign aggression
against Iraq that violates its sovereignty and
integrity of its territories, waters, or airspace.''.
(C) ``Supporting the Republic of Iraq in its
efforts to combat all terrorist groups, at the
forefront of which is Al-Qaeda, Saddamists, and all
other outlaw groups regardless of affiliation, and
destroy their logistical networks and their sources of
finance, and defeat and uproot them from Iraq.''.
(3) However, in testimony before the United States Senate
on February 6, 2008, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates
effectively renounced this pledge by the President when he
said, ``[T]he status of forces agreement that is being
discussed will not contain a commitment to defend Iraq, and
neither will any strategic framework agreement. My
understanding is--and it's, frankly, a clearer point than I
made earlier--and we certainly do not consider the declaration
of principles a security commitment to the Iraqis.''.
(4) On November 26, 2007, the President's Deputy National
Security Advisor for Iraq and Afghanistan, General Douglas
Lute, stated in a press briefing that permanent United States
military bases in Iraq ``will certainly be a key item for
negotiation next year''. On January 28, 2008, when signing into
law the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2008, which includes a ban on permanent United States military
bases in Iraq, President George W. Bush indicated in a signing
statement accompanying the bill that he would not be bound by a
provision of that law that prohibits the United States from
establishing permanent military bases in Iraq.
(5) However, in testimony before the Senate on February 6,
2008, Secretary of Defense Gates stated, ``The fact is, in
every meeting that I've taken part in, it has been affirmed
from the president on down that we do not want permanent bases
in Iraq.''.
(6) General Lute stated in a press briefing on November 26,
2007, in response to a question as to whether the
Administration would seek congressional input into the
agreement, ``We don't anticipate now that these negotiations
will lead to the status of a formal treaty which would then
bring us to formal negotiations or formal inputs from the
Congress.''. However, the Department of State has failed to
consult with congressional leaders on the Declaration of
Principles as required by the Department of State's Circular
175 procedure, which implements United States law regarding the
conduct of negotiations for international agreements.
(7) However, in testimony before the Senate on February 6,
2008, Secretary of Defense Gates stated, ``My view is that
there ought to be a great deal of openness and transparency to
the Congress as we negotiate this status of forces agreement so
that you can satisfy yourselves that those kinds of commitments
are not being made, and that there are no surprises in this.''.
(8) According to the Congressional Research Service, while
the primary purpose of a status of forces agreement between the
United States and another country or organization is typically
to provide United States Armed Forces with immunity from local
prosecution, and no existing status of forces agreement
authorizes offensive combat operations by United States Armed
Forces (absent reference to a treaty, law, or United Nations
Security Council resolution), Secretary of Defense Gates and
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have written in an opinion
piece published February 13, 2008, in the Washington Post that
it is the intention of the Administration to have the status of
forces agreement with Iraq include the ``authority to fight''
for United States Armed Forces engaged in combat operations.
(9) The inconsistencies between the various statements and
pledges described in paragraphs (1) through (8) raise
significant questions about the Administration's objectives in
seeking new agreements with Iraq.
(10)(A) Since August 6, 2004, United States Armed Forces
and other Coalition forces in Iraq have had international legal
authority to operate in Iraq under the United Nations mandate
for the Multinational Force-Iraq, most recently renewed in
December 2007 until December 31, 2008, and have had immunity
from local prosecution under an Iraqi law known as CPA Order
17, which is dependent on that mandate.
(B) The Iraqi Ambassador to the United States, Samir
Sumaidaie, said on February 5, 2008, ``If we cannot have an
agreement by that time [December 31, 2008,] we would have no
choice but to go back to the Security Council. Basically, we
need to have some legal cover for foreign forces.''.
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS.
No funds appropriated or otherwise made available to any department
or agency of the United States may be used--
(1) to establish or maintain any permanent or long-term
United States military base or facility in Iraq; or
(2) to implement any agreement that is consistent with the
security commitments of the United States to Iraq under the
Declaration of Principles, including the security commitments
described in subparagraphs (A) through (C) of section 1(2) of
this Act, or any agreement that provides ``authority to fight''
for United States Armed Forces engaged in combat operations,
other than for self-defense purposes, unless the agreement is
in the form of a treaty with respect to which the Senate has
given its advice and consent to ratification under Article II
of the Constitution of the United States or the agreement is
approved by an Act of Congress enacted after the date of the
enactment of this Act.
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) long-term relations between the United States and Iraq
should be determined by the United States Administration taking
office on January 20, 2009;
(2) in determining its policy toward Iraq, the United
States Administration referred to in paragraph (1) should
consult fully with the United States Congress, the Government
of Iraq, Coalition partners, and Iraq's neighbors; and
(3) to maintain current international legal authority as
well as immunity from Iraqi prosecution for United States Armed
Forces and other Coalition forces operating in Iraq while the
United States Administration referred to in paragraph (1)
determines United States policy toward Iraq, the current United
States Administration should encourage the Government of Iraq
to request the renewal of the United Nations mandate for Iraq
beyond December 31, 2008.
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