[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2712 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2712

 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             June 14, 2007

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Boozman, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. 
    Chabot, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of 
 Florida, Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida, Mr. Flake, Mr. Fortuno, 
Mr. Mack, Mr. Manzullo, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. McCotter, Mr. Smith of 
    New Jersey, Mr. Pence, Mr. Poe, Mr. Rohrabacher, and Mr. Royce) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                            Foreign Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To promote transparency, accountability, and reform within the United 
                Nations system, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This title may be cited as the ``United Nations 
Transparency, Accountability, and Reform Act of 2007''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents is as follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
Sec. 2. Definitions.
                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 101. Findings.
Sec. 102. Apportionment of the United Nations regular budget on a 
                            voluntary basis.
Sec. 103. Budget justification for United States Contributions to the 
                            regular budget of the United Nations.
      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 201. Findings.
Sec. 202. Definitions.
Sec. 203. Establishment and management of the Office of the United 
                            States Inspector General for Contributions 
                            to the United Nations System.
Sec. 204. Transparency for United States Contributions.
Sec. 205. Authorization of appropriations.
         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

Sec. 301. Annual publication.
Sec. 302. Annual financial disclosure.
Sec. 303. Policy with respect to expansion of the Security Council.
Sec. 304. Access to reports and audits.
Sec. 305. Waiver of immunity.
Sec. 306. Terrorism and the United Nations.
Sec. 307. Report on United Nations reform.
Sec. 308. Report on United Nations personnel.
Sec. 309. Limitations on United States Contributions to UNRWA.
Sec. 310. United Nations treaty bodies.
Sec. 311. Equality at the United Nations.
Sec. 312. Anti-semitism and the United Nations.
Sec. 313. Regional group inclusion of Israel.
             TITLE IV--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

Sec. 401. Findings.
Sec. 402. Human Rights Council membership and funding.
              TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

Sec. 501. International Atomic Energy Agency.
Sec. 502. Sense of Congress regarding the Nuclear Security Action Plan 
                            of the IAEA.
                         TITLE VI--PEACEKEEPING

Sec. 601. Reform of United Nations peacekeeping operations.
Sec. 602. Policy relating to reform of United Nations peacekeeping 
                            operations.
Sec. 603. Certification.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

    In this act:
            (1) Employee.--The term ``employee'' means an individual 
        who is employed in the general services, professional staff, or 
        senior management of the United Nations, including contractors 
        and consultants.
            (2) General assembly.--The term ``General Assembly'' means 
        the General Assembly of the United Nations.
            (3) Member state.--The term ``Member State'' means a Member 
        State of the United Nations. Such term is synonymous with the 
        term ``country''.
            (4) Secretary.--The term ``Secretary'' means the Secretary 
        of State.
            (5) Secretary general.--The term ``Secretary General'' 
        means the Secretary General of the United Nations.
            (6) Security council.--The term ``Security Council'' means 
        the Security Council of the United Nations.
            (7) UN.--The term ``UN'' means the United Nations.
            (8) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committees on Appropriations, Foreign 
                Affairs, and Oversight and Government Reform of the 
                House; and
                    (B) the Committees on Appropriations, Foreign 
                Relations, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs 
                of the Senate.

                 TITLE I--FUNDING OF THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) According to the White House Office of Management and 
        Budget, the United States paid over 5,300,000,000 dollars into 
        the United Nations system in 2005, significantly more than was 
        paid by any other nation.
            (2) Under current rules and contribution levels, it is 
        possible to assemble the two-thirds majority needed for 
        important UN budget votes with a group of countries that, taken 
        together, pay less than 1 percent of the total UN regular 
        budget.
            (3) The disconnect between contribution levels and 
        management control creates significant perverse incentives in 
        terms of UN spending, transparency, and accountability.
            (4) The United Nations system suffers from unacceptably 
        high levels of waste, fraud, and abuse, which seriously impair 
        its ability to fulfill the lofty ideals of its founding.
            (5) According to a February 2007 Gallup Poll, 66 percent of 
        Americans think that the United Nations is doing a poor job, 
        the UN's lowest job-approval rating ever in the 54 years that 
        those statistics have been kept. Research polling by another 
        firm in late 2006 found that 71 percent of Americans think that 
        the UN is ``no longer effective'' and needs to be significantly 
        reformed, while 75 percent think that the UN ``needs to be held 
        more accountable.''.
            (6) Significant improvements in UN transparency and 
        accountability are necessary for improving public perceptions 
        of and American support for UN operations.
            (7) Because of their need to justify future contributions 
        from donors, voluntarily funded organizations have more 
        incentive to be responsive and efficient in their operations 
        than organizations funded by compulsory contributions that are 
        not tied to performance.
            (8) Article XVII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
        which states that ``[t]he expenses of the Organization shall be 
        borne by the Members as apportioned by the General Assembly,'' 
        leaves to the discretion of the General Assembly the basis of 
        apportionment, which could be done on the basis of voluntary 
        pledges by Member States.
            (9) Unlike U.S. assessed contributions to the UN regular 
        budget, which are statutorily capped at 22 percent of the 
        total, there is no cap on voluntary contributions.
            (10) The United States, which contributes generously to 
        international organizations whose activities it recognizes as 
        credible, worthwhile, and efficient, contributes more than 22 
        percent of the budget of certain voluntarily funded UN 
        Specialized Agencies.

SEC. 102. APPORTIONMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS REGULAR BUDGET ON A 
              VOLUNTARY BASIS.

    (a) United States Policy.--
            (1) It is the policy of the United States to seek to shift 
        the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the United 
        Nations from an assessed to a voluntary basis.
            (2) The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, 
        and influence of the United States at the United Nations to 
        shift the funding mechanism for the regular budget of the 
        United Nations to a voluntary basis, and to make it a priority 
        to build support for such a transformational change among 
        Member States, particularly key UN donors;
    (b) Certification of Predominantly Voluntary UN Regular Budget 
Finding.--A certification described in this section is a certification 
by the Secretary of State to the Appropriate Congressional Committees 
that at least 80 percent of the total regular budget of the United 
Nations is apportioned on a voluntary basis. Each such certification 
shall be shall be effective for a period of no more than 1 year, and 
shall be promptly revoked by the Secretary, with notice to the 
Appropriate Congressional Committees, if the underlying circumstances 
change so as not to warrant such certification.
    (c) Withholding of Nonvoluntary Contributions.--
            (1) Beginning 2 years after the effective date of this act 
        and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no funds may be 
        obligated or expended for a United States assessed contribution 
        to the regular budget of the United Nations in an amount 
        greater than 50 percent of the United States share of assessed 
        contributions for the regular budget of the United Nations 
        unless there is in effect a certification by the Secretary, as 
        described in paragraph (b).
            (2) For a period of 3 years after appropriation, funds 
        appropriated for use as a United States contribution to the 
        regular budget of the United Nations but withheld from 
        obligation and expenditure pursuant to paragraph (1) may be 
        obligated and expended for that purpose upon the certification 
        described in paragraph (b). After 3 years, in the absence of 
        such certification, those funds shall revert to the United 
        States Treasury.

SEC. 103. BUDGET JUSTIFICATION FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE 
              REGULAR BUDGET OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Detailed Itemization.--The annual congressional budget 
justification shall include a detailed itemized request in support of 
the contribution of the United States to the regular budget of the 
United Nations.
    (b) Contents of Detailed Itemization.--The detailed itemization 
required under subsection (a) shall--
            (1) contain information relating to the amounts requested 
        in support of each of the various sections and titles of the 
        regular budget of the United Nations; and
            (2) compare the amounts requested for the current year with 
        the actual or estimated amounts contributed by the United 
        States in previous fiscal years for the same sections and 
        titles.
    (c) Adjustments and Notification.--If the United Nations proposes 
an adjustment to its regular assessed budget, the Secretary of State 
shall, at the time such adjustment is presented to the Advisory 
Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions (ACABQ), notify and 
consult with the appropriate congressional committees.

      TITLE II--TRANSPARENCY AND ACCOUNTABILITY FOR UNITED STATES 
                  CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 201. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) As underscored by continuing revelations of waste, 
        fraud, and abuse, oversight and accountability mechanisms 
        within the United Nations system remain significantly 
        deficient, despite decades of reform attempts, including those 
        initiated by Secretaries-General of the United Nations.
            (2) Notwithstanding the personal intentions of any 
        Secretary-General of the United Nations to promote 
        institutional transparency and accountability within the United 
        Nations System, the Secretary-General lacks the power to impose 
        far reaching management reforms without the concurrence of the 
        General Assembly.
            (3) Groupings of Member States whose voting power in the 
        General Assembly significantly outpaces their proportional 
        contributions to the UN system, have repeatedly and 
        successfully defeated, delayed, and diluted various reform 
        proposals that would have enabled more detailed oversight and 
        scrutiny of UN system operations and expenditures.
            (4) To an unacceptable degree, major donor states, 
        including the United States, lack access to reasonably 
        detailed, reliable information that would allow them to 
        determine how their contributions have been spent by various UN 
        system entities, further contributing to the lack of 
        accountability within the UN system.

SEC. 202. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
            (1) United nations entity.--The term ``United Nations 
        Entity'' means any UN agency, commission, conference, council, 
        court, department, forum, fund, institute, office, 
        organization, partnership, program, subsidiary body, tribunal, 
        trust, university or academic body, related organization or 
        subsidiary body, wherever located, that flies the UN flag or is 
        authorized to use the UN logo, including but not limited to 
        those UN affiliated agencies and bodies identified as 
        recipients of United States contributions under section 
        1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization 
        Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
            (2) United nations system.--The term ``United Nations 
        System'' means the aggregation of all United Nations Entities, 
        as defined in paragraph (1).
            (3) United states contribution.--The term ``United States 
        Contribution'' means an assessed or voluntary contribution, 
        whether financial, in-kind, or otherwise, from the United 
        States federal government to a United Nations Entity, including 
        contributions passed through other entities for ultimate use by 
        a United Nations Entity. United States Contributions include, 
        but are not limited to, those contributions identified pursuant 
        to section 1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).
            (4) Transparency certification.--The term ``Transparency 
        Certification'' means an annual, written affirmation by the 
        head or authorized designee of a United Nations Entity that the 
        Entity will cooperate with the Inspector General, including by 
        providing the Inspector General, upon request, with full access 
        to Oversight Information as defined in this title.
            (5) Oversight information.--The term ``Oversight 
        Information'' includes--
                    (A) internally and externally commissioned audits, 
                program reviews, performance reports, and evaluations;
                    (B) financial statements, records, and billing 
                systems;
                    (C) program budgets and program budget 
                implications, including revised estimates and reports 
                produced by or provided to the Secretary General and 
                the Secretary General's agents on budget related 
                matters;
                    (D) operational plans, budgets, and budgetary 
                analyses for peacekeeping operations;
                    (E) analyses and reports regarding the scale of 
                assessments;
                    (F) databases and other data systems containing 
                financial or programmatic information;
                    (G) documents or other records alleging or 
                involving improper use of resources, misconduct, 
                mismanagement, or other violations of rules and 
                regulations applicable to the United Nations Entity; 
                and
                    (H) other documentation relevant to the audit and 
                investigative work of the United States Inspector 
                General for Contributions to the United Nations System.

SEC. 203. ESTABLISHMENT AND MANAGEMENT OF THE OFFICE OF THE UNITED 
              STATES INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE UNITED 
              NATIONS SYSTEM.

    (a) Purpose.--The purpose of this section is to make possible the 
independent and objective conduct of audits and investigations relating 
to United States Contributions to the United Nations System and the use 
of those contributions by United Nations Entities, in an effort to 
eliminate and deter waste, fraud, and abuse in the use of those 
contributions, and thereby to contribute to the development of greater 
transparency, accountability, and internal controls throughout the 
United Nations System.
    (b) Establishment.--There is hereby established the Office of the 
United States Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations 
System.
    (c) Inspector General.--
            (1) Appointment.--The head of the Office of the United 
        States Inspector General for Contributions to the United 
        Nations System is the Inspector General for Contributions to 
        the United Nations System, who shall be appointed by the 
        President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, on 
        the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in accounting, 
        auditing, financial analysis, law, management analysis, public 
        administration, or investigations.
            (2) Nomination.--The nomination of an individual as 
        Inspector General shall be made not later than 30 days after 
        the enactment of this Act.
            (3) Removal.--The Inspector General may be removed from 
        office by the President. The President shall communicate the 
        reasons for any such removal to both Houses of Congress.
            (4) Compensation.--The annual rate of basic pay of the 
        Inspector General shall be the annual rate of basic pay 
        provided for positions at level IV of the Executive Schedule 
        under section 5315 of title 5, United States Code.
            (5) Relationship to board.--
                    (A) Except as provided in paragraph (B), the 
                Inspector General shall report directly to and be under 
                the general supervision of, the Board of Directors 
                created in paragraph (d).
                    (B) Neither the Board, any officer of the Board, 
                nor any officer of a federal department or agency shall 
                prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from 
                initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or 
                investigation.
            (6) Duties.--
                    (A) It shall be the duty of the Inspector General 
                to conduct, supervise, and coordinate audits and 
                investigations of--
                            (i) the treatment, handling, expenditure, 
                        and use of United States Contributions by and 
                        to United Nations Entities; and
                            (ii) the adequacy of accounting, oversight, 
                        and internal control mechanisms at United 
                        Nations Entities that receive United States 
                        Contributions.
                    (B) The Inspector General shall establish, 
                maintain, and oversee such systems, procedures, and 
                controls as the Inspector General considers appropriate 
                to discharge the duty under paragraph (A).
                    (C) The Inspector General shall carry out the 
                duties specified in paragraphs (A) and (B) in 
                accordance with section 4(b)(1) of the Inspector 
                General Act of 1978.
                    (D) The Inspector General shall collect and 
                maintain current records regarding Transparency 
                Certifications by all United Nations Entities that 
                receive United States Contributions.
                    (E) The Inspector General shall keep the Board of 
                Directors and the Congress fully and promptly informed 
                of how United Nations Entities are spending United 
                States Contributions by means of reports, testimony, 
                and briefings.
                    (F) Referrals.--
                            (i) The Inspector General shall promptly 
                        report to the U.S. Attorney General when 
                        Inspector General has reasonable grounds to 
                        believe a U.S. federal criminal law has been 
                        violated by a United Nations Entity or one of 
                        its employees, contractors, or representatives.
                            (ii) The Inspector General shall promptly 
                        report, when appropriate, to the Secretary 
                        General or the head of the appropriate United 
                        Nations Entity cases where the Inspector 
                        General reasonably believes that mismanagement, 
                        misfeasance, or malfeasance is likely to have 
                        taken place within a United Nations Entity and 
                        disciplinary proceedings are likely justified.
            (7) Personnel, facilities, and other resources.--
                    (A) The Inspector General may select, appoint, and 
                employ such officers and employees as may be necessary 
                for carrying out the duties of the Inspector General.
                    (B) The Inspector General may obtain services as 
                authorized by section 3109 of title 5, United States 
                Code, at daily rates not to exceed the equivalent rate 
                prescribed for grade GS-15 of the General Schedule by 
                section 5332 of such title.
                    (C) The Inspector General may lease, purchase, or 
                otherwise acquire, improve, and use such real property 
                wherever situated, as may be necessary for carrying out 
                this section.
                    (D) To the extent and in such amounts as may be 
                provided in advance by appropriations Acts, the 
                Inspector General my enter into contracts and other 
                arrangements for audits, studies, analyses, and other 
                services with public agencies and with private persons, 
                and make such payments as may be necessary to carry out 
                the duties of the Inspector General.
                    (E) Upon request by the Inspector General, the head 
                of an agency may detail any employee of such agency to 
                the Office of the United States Inspector General for 
                Contributions to the United Nations System on a 
                reimbursable basis. Any employee so detailed remains, 
                for the purpose of preserving such employee's 
                allowances, privileges, rights, seniority, and other 
                benefits, an employee of the agency from which 
                detailed.
            (8) Cooperation by united states government entities.--
                    (A) In carrying out the duties, responsibilities, 
                and authorities of the Inspector General under this 
                section, the Inspector General shall receive the 
                cooperation of inspectors general of other Federal 
                Government agencies.
                    (B) Upon request of the Inspector General for 
                information or assistance from any department, agency, 
                or other entity of the Federal Government, the head of 
                such entity shall, insofar as is practicable and not in 
                contravention of any existing law, furnish such 
                information or assistance to the Inspector General, or 
                an authorized designee.
                    (C) Whenever information or assistance requested by 
                the Inspector General is, in the judgment of the 
                Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not 
                provided, the Inspector General shall report the 
                circumstances to the Board of Directors and to the 
                Appropriate Congressional Committees without delay.
            (9) Confirmation of transparency by united nations 
        entities.--
                    (A) Prompt notice by inspector general.--Whenever 
                information or assistance requested from a United 
                Nations Entity by the Inspector General pursuant to a 
                Transparency Certification is, in the opinion of the 
                Inspector General, unreasonably refused or not provided 
                in a timely manner, the Inspector General shall notify 
                the Board of Directors, the head of that particular 
                United Nations Entity, and the Secretary General of the 
                circumstances in writing, without delay.
                    (B) Notice of compliance.--If and when the 
                information or assistance being sought by the Inspector 
                General in connection with a notification pursuant to 
                paragraph (A) is provided to the satisfaction of the 
                Inspector General, the Inspector General shall so 
                notify in writing the United Nations Entity, the Board 
                of Directors, and the Appropriate Congressional 
                Committees.
                    (C) Noncompliance.--If the information or 
                assistance being sought by the Inspector General in 
                connection with a notification pursuant to paragraph 
                (A) is not provided to the satisfaction of the 
                Inspector General within 90 days of that notification, 
                then the United Nations Entity that is the subject of 
                the notification is deemed to be noncompliant with its 
                Transparency Certification, and the Inspector General 
                shall provide prompt, written notification of that fact 
                to the Board of Directors, Appropriate Congressional 
                Committees, the head of that United Nations Entity, the 
                Secretary General, and any office or agency of the 
                Federal Government that has provided that United 
                Nations Entity with any United States Contribution 
                during the prior 2 years.
                    (D) Restoration of compliance.--After the situation 
                has been resolved to the satisfaction of the Board of 
                Directors, a finding of Transparency Certification 
                noncompliance pursuant to paragraph (B) may be reversed 
                by an affirmative vote of at least 5 of the 7 members 
                of the Board of Directors. The Board shall promptly 
                provide notification of such restoration, along with a 
                description of the basis for the Board's decision, to 
                the Inspector General, Appropriate Congressional 
                Committees, the head of the affected United Nations 
                Entity, the Secretary General, and the head of any 
                office or agency of the Federal Government that has 
                provided that United Nations Entity with any United 
                States Contribution during the prior 2 years.
                    (E) Cost reimbursement.--The Inspector General may 
                reimburse United Nations Entities for the reasonable 
                cost of providing to the Inspector General information 
                or assistance sought pursuant to a Transparency 
                Certification for the purpose of performing the duties 
                described in paragraph (6).
            (10) Reports.--
                    (A) Audit and investigation reports.--Promptly upon 
                completion, the Inspector General shall provide copies 
                of each audit and investigation report completed 
                pursuant to paragraph (6) to the Board of Directors, 
                the Appropriate Congressional Committees, and, to the 
                extent permissible under United States law, the head of 
                each United Nations Entity that is the subject of that 
                particular report.
                    (B) Semiannual reports.--Not later than May 30, 
                2008, and semiannually thereafter, the Inspector 
                General shall submit to the Appropriate Congressional 
                Committees a report that, among other things--
                            (i) meets the requirements of section 5 of 
                        the Inspector General Act of 1978; and
                            (ii) includes a list of and detailed 
                        description of the circumstances surrounding 
                        any notification of noncompliance issued 
                        pursuant to paragraph 9(C) during the covered 
                        timeframe, and whether and when Board of 
                        Directors has reversed such finding of 
                        noncompliance.
                    (C) Prohibited disclosures.--Nothing in this 
                subsection shall be construed to authorize the public 
                disclosure of information that is--
                            (i) specifically prohibited from disclosure 
                        by any other provision of law;
                            (ii) specifically required by Executive 
                        order to be protected from disclosure in the 
                        interest of national defense or national 
                        security or in the conduct of foreign affairs; 
                        or
                            (iii) a part of an ongoing criminal 
                        investigation.
                    (D) Privacy protections.--The Inspector General 
                shall exempt from public disclosure information 
                received from a United Nations Entity or developed 
                during an audit or investigation that the Inspector 
                General believes--
                            (i) constitutes a trade secret or 
                        privileged and confidential personal financial 
                        information;
                            (ii) accuses a particular person of a 
                        crime;
                            (iii) would, if publicly disclosed, 
                        constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of 
                        personal privacy; and
                            (iv) would compromise an ongoing law 
                        enforcement investigation or judicial trial in 
                        the United States.
                    (E) Publication.--Subject only to the exceptions 
                detailed in paragraphs (C) and (D), the Inspector 
                General shall promptly publish each report under this 
                subsection on a publicly available and searchable 
                Internet website.
    (d) Board of Directors.--
            (1) Establishment.--The Office of the United States 
        Inspector General for Contributions to the United Nations 
        System shall have a Board of Directors.
            (2) Duties.--The Board shall receive information and 
        reports of audits and investigations from the Office and the 
        Inspector General, provide general direction and supervision to 
        the Office and the Inspector General, and determine the 
        restoration of compliance by any United Nations Entity with its 
        Transparency Certification pursuant to paragraph 9(d).
            (3) Membership.--The Board shall consist of the Secretary 
        of State (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Labor 
        (or the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Agriculture (or 
        the Secretary's designee), the Secretary of Defense (or the 
        Secretary's designee), the Administrator of the Environmental 
        Protection Agency (or the Administrator's designee), the 
        Secretary of the Treasury (or the Secretary's designee), and 
        the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (or the 
        Director's designee).
            (4) Chairmanship.--The Board shall be chaired by a board 
        member, and the chairmanship shall rotate among the member 
        departments and agencies on an annual basis. The first chair 
        shall be the Director or designee from the Office of Management 
        and Budget.

SEC. 204. TRANSPARENCY FOR UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS.

    (a) Funding Prerequisites.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, no funds made available for use as a United States Contribution to 
any United Nations Entity may be obligated or expended if--
            (1) the intended United Nations Entity recipient has not 
        provided to the Inspector General within the preceding year a 
        Transparency Certification as defined in section 202(4); or
            (2) the intended United Nations Entity recipient is 
        noncompliant with its Transparency Certification as described 
        in section 203(c)(9)(C).
    (b) Treatment of Funds Withheld for Noncompliance.--At the 
conclusion of each fiscal year, any funds that had been appropriated 
for use as a United States Contribution to a United Nations Entity 
during that fiscal year, but could not be obligated or expended because 
of the restrictions of paragraph 1, shall be returned to the United 
States Treasury, and are not subject to reprogramming for any other 
use. Any such funds returned to the Treasury shall not be considered 
arrears to be repaid to any United Nations Entity.
    (c) Presidential Waiver.--The President may waive the limitations 
of this subsection with respect to a particular United States 
Contribution to a particular United Nations Entity within a single 
fiscal year if the President determines that it is required by the 
national security interests of the United States and provides 
notification and explanation of that determination to the Appropriate 
Congressional Committees.

SEC. 205. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as are necessary 
to carry out the activities of this title, provided that such sums be 
not less than one half of 1 percent of the total amount of all assessed 
and voluntary contributions of the United States Government to the 
United Nations and United Nations affiliated agencies and related 
bodies during the prior fiscal year, as identified pursuant to section 
1225(b)(3)(E) of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2007 (Public Law 109-364).

         TITLE III--UNITED STATES POLICY AT THE UNITED NATIONS

SEC. 301. ANNUAL PUBLICATION.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure the 
United Nations publishes annually, including on a publicly searchable 
internet website, a list of all UN subsidiary bodies and their 
functions, budgets, staff, and contributions, both voluntary and 
assessed, sorted by donor.

SEC. 302. ANNUAL FINANCIAL DISCLOSURE.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to implement a 
system for the required filing of individual annual financial 
disclosure forms by each employee of the United Nations and its 
specialized agencies, programs, and funds at the P-5 level and above, 
which shall be made available to the Office of Internal Oversight 
Services and, upon request, to Member States and their publics.

SEC. 303. POLICY WITH RESPECT TO EXPANSION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to use the voice, vote, 
and influence of the United States at the United Nations to oppose any 
proposals on expansion of the Security Council if such expansion 
would--
            (1) diminish the influence of the United States on the 
        Security Council;
            (2) include veto rights for any new members of the Security 
        Council; or
            (3) undermine the effectiveness of the Security Council.

SEC. 304. ACCESS TO REPORTS AND AUDITS.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that 
Member States may, upon request, have access to all reports and audits 
completed by the Board of External Auditors.

SEC. 305. WAIVER OF IMMUNITY.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to ensure that the 
Secretary General exercises the right and duty of the Secretary General 
under section 20 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations to waive the immunity of any United Nations official 
in any case in which such immunity would impede the course of justice. 
In exercising such waiver, the Secretary General is urged to interpret 
the interests of the United Nations as favoring the investigation or 
prosecution of a United Nations official who is credibly under 
investigation for having committed a serious criminal offense or who is 
credibly charged with a serious criminal offense.

SEC. 306. TERRORISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to work toward 
adoption by the general assembly of--
            (1) a definition of terrorism that builds upon the 
        recommendations of the December 2004 report of the High-Level 
        Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, and includes as an 
        essential component of such definition any action that is 
        intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians 
        with the purpose of intimidating a population or compelling a 
        government or an international organization to do, or abstain 
        from doing, any act; and
            (2) a comprehensive convention on terrorism that includes 
        the definition described in paragraph (1).

SEC. 307. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS REFORM.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 180 days after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually for each of the next 3 years, the 
Secretary shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on United Nations reform.
    (b) Contents.--The report required under paragraph (a) shall 
describe--
            (1) progress toward the goal of shifting the funding for 
        the United Nations Regular Budget to a voluntary basis as 
        identified in section 102 above, and a detailed description of 
        efforts and activities by United States diplomats and officials 
        toward that end;
            (2) progress toward each of the policy goals identified in 
        the prior sections of this Title, and a detailed, goal-specific 
        description of efforts and activities by United States 
        diplomats and officials toward those ends;
            (3) the status of the implementation of management reforms 
        within the United Nations and its specialized agencies;
            (4) the number of outputs, reports, or other mandates 
        generated by General Assembly resolutions that have been 
        eliminated;
            (5) the progress of the General Assembly to modernize and 
        streamline the committee structure and its specific 
        recommendations on oversight and committee outputs, consistent 
        with the March 2005 report of the Secretary General entitled 
        ``In larger freedom: towards development, security and human 
        rights for all'';
            (6) the status of the review by the General Assembly of all 
        mandates older than 5 years and how resources have been 
        redirected to new challenges, consistent with such March 2005 
        report of the Secretary General;
            (7) the continued utility and relevance of the Economic and 
        Financial Committee and the Social, Humanitarian, and Cultural 
        Committee, in light of the duplicative agendas of those 
        committees and the Economic and Social Council; and
            (8) whether the United Nations or any of its specialized 
        agencies has contracted with any party included on the Lists of 
        Parties Excluded from Federal Procurement and Nonprocurement 
        Programs.

SEC. 308. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS PERSONNEL.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 1 year after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report--
            (1) concerning the progress of the General Assembly to 
        modernize human resource practices, consistent with the March 
        2005 report of the Secretary General entitled ``In larger 
        freedom: towards development, security and human rights for 
        all''; and
            (2) containing the information described in subsection (b).
    (b) Contents.--The report shall include--
            (1) a comprehensive evaluation of human resources reforms 
        at the United Nations, including an evaluation of--
                    (A) tenure;
                    (B) performance reviews;
                    (C) the promotion system;
                    (D) a merit-based hiring system and enhanced 
                regulations concerning termination of employment of 
                employees; and
                    (E) the implementation of a code of conduct and 
                ethics training;
            (2) the implementation of a system of procedures for filing 
        complaints and protective measures for work-place harassment, 
        including sexual harassment;
            (3) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a rotation requirement for nonadministrative positions;
            (4) policy recommendations relating to the establishment of 
        a prohibition preventing personnel and officials assigned to 
        the mission of a Member State to the United Nations from 
        transferring to a position within the United Nations 
        Secretariat that is compensated at the P-5 level and above;
            (5) policy recommendations relating to a reduction in 
        travel allowances and attendant oversight with respect to 
        accommodations and airline flights; and
            (6) an evaluation of the recommendations of the Secretary 
        General relating to greater flexibility for the Secretary 
        General in staffing decisions to accommodate changing 
        priorities.

SEC. 309. LIMITATIONS ON UNITED STATES CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNRWA.

    The Secretary of State may not contribute annually to the United 
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 
(UNRWA) in an amount--
            (1) greater than the highest annual contribution to UNRWA 
        made by a member country of the League of Arab States;
            (2) that, as a proportion of the total UNRWA budget, 
        exceeds the proportion of the total budget for the United 
        Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) paid by the 
        United States; or
            (3) that exceeds 22 percent of the total budget of UNRWA.

SEC. 310. UNITED NATIONS TREATY BODIES.

    The United States shall withhold from United States contributions 
to the regular assessed budget of the United Nations for a biennial 
period amounts that are proportional to the percentage of such budget 
that are expended with respect to a United Nations human rights treaty 
monitoring body or committee that was established by--
            (1) a convention (without any protocols) or an 
        international covenant (without any protocols) to which the 
        United States is not party; or
            (2) a convention, with a subsequent protocol, if the United 
        States is a party to neither.

SEC. 311. EQUALITY AT THE UNITED NATIONS.

    (a) Department of State Review and Report.--
            (1) In general.--To avoid duplicative efforts and funding 
        with respect to Palestinian interests and to ensure balance in 
        the approach to Israeli-Palestinian issues, the Secretary 
        shall, not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment 
        of this Act--
                    (A) complete an audit of the functions of the 
                entities listed in paragraph (2); and
                    (B) submit to the appropriate congressional 
                committees a report containing audit findings and 
                conclusions, and recommendations for the elimination of 
                such duplicative entities and efforts.
            (2) Entities.--The entities referred to in paragraph (1) 
        are the following:
                    (A) The United Nations Division for Palestinian 
                Rights.
                    (B) The Committee on the Exercise of the 
                Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People.
                    (C) The United Nations Special Coordinator for the 
                Middle East Peace Process and Personal Representative 
                to the Palestine Liberation Organization and the 
                Palestinian Authority.
                    (D) The NGO Network on the Question of Palestine.
                    (E) The Special Committee to Investigate Israeli 
                Practices Affecting the Human Rights of the Palestinian 
                People and Other Arabs of the Occupied Territories.
                    (F) Any other entity the Secretary determines 
                results in duplicative efforts or funding or fails to 
                ensure balance in the approach to Israeli-Palestinian 
                issues.
    (b) Implementation by Permanent Representative.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the 
        United Nations to seek the implementation of the 
        recommendations contained in the report required under 
        subsection (b)(1).
            (2) Withholding of funds.--Until such recommendations have 
        been implemented, the United States shall withhold from United 
        States contributions to the regular assessed budget of the 
        United Nations for a biennial period amounts that are 
        proportional to the percentage of such budget that are expended 
        for such entities.
    (c) GAO Audit.--The Comptroller General of the United States of the 
Government Accountability Office shall conduct an audit of--
            (1) the status of the implementation of the recommendations 
        contained in the report required under subsection (b)(1); and
            (2) United States actions and achievements under subsection 
        (c).

SEC. 312. ANTI-SEMITISM AND THE UNITED NATIONS.

    The President shall direct the United States permanent 
representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to make every 
effort to--
            (1) ensure the issuance and implementation of a directive 
        by the Secretary General or the Secretariat, as appropriate, 
        that--
                    (A) requires all employees of the United Nations 
                and its specialized agencies to officially and publicly 
                condemn anti-Semitic statements made at any session of 
                the United Nations or its specialized agencies, or at 
                any other session sponsored by the United Nations;
                    (B) requires employees of the United Nations and 
                its specialized agencies, programs, and funds to be 
                subject to punitive action, including immediate 
                dismissal, for making anti-Semitic statements or 
                references;
                    (C) proposes specific recommendations to the 
                General Assembly for the establishment of mechanisms to 
                hold accountable employees and officials of the United 
                Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and 
                funds, or Member States, that make such anti-Semitic 
                statements or references in any forum of the United 
                Nations or of its specialized agencies;
                    (D) continues to develop and implements education 
                awareness programs about the Holocaust and anti-
                Semitism throughout the world, as part of an effort to 
                combat intolerance and hatred; and
                    (E) requires the Office of the United Nations High 
                Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) to develop 
                programming and other measures that address anti-
                Semitism;
            (2) secure the adoption of a resolution by the General 
        Assembly that establishes the mechanisms described in paragraph 
        (1)(C); and
            (3) continue working toward further reduction of anti-
        Semitic language and anti-Israel resolutions in the United 
        Nations and its specialized agencies, programs, and funds.

SEC. 313. REGIONAL GROUP INCLUSION OF ISRAEL.

    The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and 
influence of the United States at the United Nations to expand the 
Western European and Others Group (WEOG) in the United Nations to 
include Israel as a permanent member with full rights and privileges.

             TITLE IV--UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL

SEC. 401. FINDINGS.

    The Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The United Nations Human Rights Council, established in 
        2006 to replace the problematic UN Human Rights Commission, has 
        failed to meaningfully promote the protection of 
        internationally recognized human rights during its first year 
        of operation.
            (2) The UN Human Rights Council suffers from significant 
        structural flaws, such as the fact that it draws its members 
        from the General Assembly without any substantive membership 
        criteria, with the perverse result that a number of the world's 
        worst human rights abusers are members of the council.
            (3) The structure and composition of the UN Human Rights 
        Council has made it subject to gross political manipulation, 
        with the result that, during its first year of operation, the 
        Council passed 9 resolutions censuring the democratic state of 
        Israel, while failing to condemn any severe, ongoing human 
        rights abuses, such as in Sudan, North Korea, China, Cuba, 
        Zimbabwe, Belarus, or elsewhere.

SEC. 402. HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP AND FUNDING.

    (a) In General.--For each and every fiscal year subsequent to the 
effective date of this Act, until the Secretary of State submits to 
Congress a certification that the requirements described in subsection 
(b) have been satisfied--
            (1) the Secretary of State shall withhold from a United 
        States contribution each fiscal year to a regularly assessed 
        biennial budget of the United Nations an amount that is equal 
        to the percentage of such contribution that the Secretary 
        determines would be allocated by the United Nations to support 
        the United Nations Human Rights Council;
            (2) the Secretary of State shall not make a voluntary 
        contribution to the United Nations Human Rights Council; and
            (3) the United States shall not run for a seat on the 
        United Nations Human Rights Council.
    (b) Certification.--The annual certification referred to in 
subsection (a) is a certification made by the Secretary to Congress 
that the United Nations Human Rights Council does not include a Member 
State--
            (1) subject to sanctions by the Security Council;
            (2) under a Security Council-mandated investigation for 
        human rights abuses;
            (3) subject, within the prior 5 years, to a country-
        specific resolution passed under Agenda Item 9 by the former UN 
        Human Rights Commission;
            (4) which the Secretary of State has determined, for 
        purposes of section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 
        1979 (as continued in effect pursuant to the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act), section 40 of the Arms Export 
        Control Act, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961, or other provision of law, is a government that has 
        repeatedly provided support for acts of international 
        terrorism; or
            (5) which the President has designated as a country of 
        particular concern for religious freedom under section 402(b) 
        of the International Religious Freedom Act of 1998.

              TITLE V--INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

SEC. 501. INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY.

    (a) Enforcement and Compliance.--
            (1) Office of compliance.--
                    (A) Establishment.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to International 
                Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to use the voice, vote, and 
                influence of the United States at the IAEA to establish 
                an Office of Compliance in the Secretariat of the IAEA.
                    (B) Operation.--The Office of Compliance shall--
                            (i) function as an independent body 
                        composed of technical experts who shall work in 
                        consultation with IAEA inspectors to assess 
                        compliance by IAEA Member States and provide 
                        recommendations to the IAEA Board of Governors 
                        concerning penalties to be imposed on IAEA 
                        Member States that fail to fulfill their 
                        obligations under IAEA Board resolutions;
                            (ii) base its assessments and 
                        recommendations on IAEA inspection reports; and
                            (iii) shall take into consideration 
                        information provided by IAEA Board Members that 
                        are 1 of the 5 nuclear weapons states as 
                        recognized by the Treaty on the Non-
                        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483) 
                        (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear 
                        Nonproliferation Treaty'' or the ``NPT'').
                    (C) Staffing.--The Office of Compliance shall be 
                staffed from existing personnel in the Department of 
                Safeguards of the IAEA or the Department of Nuclear 
                Safety and Security of the IAEA.
            (2) Committee on safeguards and verification.--The 
        President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that the 
        Committee on Safeguards and Verification established in 2005 
        shall develop and seek to put into force a workplan of concrete 
        measures that will--
                    (A) improve the ability of the IAEA to monitor and 
                enforce compliance by Member States of the IAEA with 
                the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty and the Statute of 
                the International Atomic Energy Agency; and
                    (B) enhance the ability of the IAEA, beyond the 
                verification mechanisms and authorities contained in 
                the Additional Protocol to the Safeguards Agreements 
                between the IAEA and Member States of the IAEA, to 
                detect with a high degree of confidence undeclared 
                nuclear activities by a Member State.
            (3) Penalties with respect to the iaea.--
                    (A) In general.--The President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to 
                use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States 
                at the IAEA to ensure that a Member State of the IAEA 
                that is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations has 
                its privileges suspended, including--
                            (i) limiting its ability to vote on its 
                        case;
                            (ii) being prevented from receiving any 
                        technical assistance; and
                            (iii) being prevented from hosting 
                        meetings.
                    (B) Termination of penalties.--The penalties 
                specified under subparagraph (A) shall be terminated 
                when such investigation is concluded and such Member 
                State is no longer in such breach or noncompliance.
            (4) Penalties with respect to the nuclear nonproliferation 
        treaty.--The President shall direct the United States Permanent 
        Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, vote, and 
        influence of the United States at the IAEA to ensure that a 
        Member State of the IAEA that is found to be in breach of, in 
        noncompliance with, or has withdrawn from the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty shall return to the IAEA all nuclear 
        materials and technology received from the IAEA, any Member 
        State of the IAEA, or any Member State of the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty.
    (b) United States Contributions.--
            (1) Voluntary contributions.--Voluntary contributions of 
        the United States to the IAEA should primarily be used to fund 
        activities relating to Nuclear Safety and Security or 
        activities relating to Nuclear Verification.
            (2) Limitation on use of funds.--The President shall direct 
        the United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use 
        the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA 
        to--
                    (A) ensure that funds for safeguards inspections 
                are prioritized for countries that have newly 
                established nuclear programs or are initiating nuclear 
                programs; and
                    (B) block the allocation of funds for any other 
                IAEA development, environmental, or nuclear science 
                assistance or activity to a country--
                            (i) the government of which the Secretary 
                        of State has determined, for purposes of 
                        section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act 
                        of 1979, section 620A of the Foreign Assistance 
                        Act of 1961, section 40 of the Arms Export 
                        Control Act, or other provision of law, is a 
                        government that has repeatedly provided support 
                        for acts of international terrorism and the 
                        government of which the Secretary has 
                        determined has not dismantled and surrendered 
                        its weapons of mass destruction programs under 
                        international verification;
                            (ii) that is under investigation for a 
                        breach of or noncompliance with its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations; or
                            (iii) that is in violation of its IAEA 
                        obligations or the purposes and principles of 
                        the Charter of the United Nations.
            (3) Detail of expenditures.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        secure, as part of the regular budget presentation of the IAEA 
        to Member States of the IAEA, a detailed breakdown by country 
        of expenditures of the IAEA for safeguards inspections and 
        nuclear security activities.
    (c) Membership.--
            (1) In general.--The President shall direct the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
        vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to block 
        the membership on the Board of Governors of the IAEA for a 
        Member State of the IAEA that has not signed and ratified the 
        Additional Protocol and--
                    (A) is under investigation for a breach of or 
                noncompliance with its IAEA obligations or the purposes 
                and principles of the Charter of the United Nations; or
                    (B) that is in violation of its IAEA obligations or 
                the purposes and principles of the Charter of the 
                United Nations.
            (2) Criteria.--The United States Permanent Representative 
        to the IAEA shall make every effort to modify the criteria for 
        Board membership to reflect the principles described in 
        paragraph (1).
    (d) Small Quantities Protocol.--The President shall direct the 
United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the voice, 
vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to make every 
effort to ensure that the IAEA changes the policy regarding the Small 
Quantities Protocol in order to--
            (1) rescind and eliminate the Small Quantities Protocol;
            (2) require that any IAEA Member State that has previously 
        signed a Small Quantities Protocol to sign, ratify, and 
        implement the Additional Protocol, provide immediate access for 
        IAEA inspectors to its nuclear-related facilities, and agree to 
        the strongest inspections regime of its nuclear efforts; and
            (3) require that any IAEA Member State that does not comply 
        with paragraph (2) to be ineligible to receive nuclear 
        material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
        Member State and subject to the penalties described in 
        subsection (a)(3).
    (e) Nuclear Program of Iran.--
            (1) United states action.--The President shall direct the 
        United States Permanent Representative to the IAEA to use the 
        voice, vote, and influence of the United States at the IAEA to 
        make every effort to ensure the adoption of a resolution by the 
        IAEA Board of Governors that, in addition to the restrictions 
        already imposed, makes Iran ineligible to receive any nuclear 
        material, technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA 
        Member State and ineligible for any IAEA assistance not related 
        to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until the IAEA 
        Board of Governors determines that Iran--
                    (A) is providing full access to IAEA inspectors to 
                its nuclear-related facilities;
                    (B) has fully implemented and is in compliance with 
                the Additional Protocol; and
                    (C) has permanently ceased and dismantled all 
                activities and programs related to nuclear-enrichment 
                and reprocessing.
            (2) Penalties.--If an IAEA Member State is determined to 
        have violated the prohibition on assistance to Iran described 
        in paragraph (1) before the IAEA Board of Governors determines 
        that Iran has satisfied the conditions described in 
        subparagraphs (A) through (C) of such paragraph, such Member 
        State shall be subject to the penalties described in subsection 
        (a)(3), shall be ineligible to receive nuclear material, 
        technology, equipment, or assistance from any IAEA Member 
        State, and shall be ineligible to receive any IAEA assistance 
        not related to safeguards inspections or nuclear security until 
        such time as the IAEA Board of Governors makes such 
        determination with respect to Iran.
    (f) Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act and annually for 2 years thereafter, the 
President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a 
report on the implementation of this section.

SEC. 502. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE NUCLEAR SECURITY ACTION PLAN 
              OF THE IAEA.

    It is the sense of Congress that the national security interests of 
the United States are enhanced by the Nuclear Security Action Plan of 
the IAEA and the Board of Governors should recommend, and the General 
Conference should adopt, a resolution incorporating the Nuclear 
Security Action Plan into the regular budget of the IAEA.

                         TITLE VI--PEACEKEEPING

SEC. 601. REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) although United Nations peacekeeping operations have 
        contributed greatly toward the promotion of peace and stability 
        for nearly 6 decades and the majority of peacekeeping personnel 
        who have served under the United Nations flag have done so with 
        honor and courage, the record of United Nations peacekeeping 
        has been severely tarnished by operational failures and 
        unconscionable acts of misconduct;
            (2) in response to such failures, in 2000 and 2005, 
        respectively, the Secretary General charged the high-level 
        Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, led by former Foreign 
        Minister of Algeria Lakhdar Brahimi, and his Special Advisor on 
        the Prevention of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, His Royal 
        Highness Prince Zeid Ra'ad Zeid Al-Hussein of Jordan, to 
        provide honest assessments of the United Nations' shortcomings 
        and make recommendations that would help restore the confidence 
        of the international community in United Nations peacekeeping 
        operations;
            (3) despite the fact that the United Nations has had nearly 
        7 years to implement the reforms contained in the Brahimi 
        Report and more than 2 years to implement the reforms in the 
        Zeid Report, and the fact that both the former Secretary-
        General Kofi Annan and the Special Committee on Peacekeeping 
        Operations repeatedly have expressed their commitment ``to 
        implementing fundamental, systematic changes as a matter of 
        urgency,'' a number of critical reforms continue to be blocked 
        or delayed by Members States who arguably benefit from 
        maintenance of the status quo; and
            (4) if the reputation of and confidence in United Nations 
        peacekeeping operations is to be restored, fundamental and far-
        reaching reforms, particularly in the areas of planning, 
        management, training, conduct, and discipline, must be 
        implemented without further delay.

SEC. 602. POLICY RELATING TO REFORM OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING 
              OPERATIONS.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to pursue reform of 
United Nations peacekeeping operations in the following areas:
            (1) Planning and management.--
                    (A) Global audit.--As the size, cost, and number of 
                United Nations peacekeeping operations have increased 
                substantially over the past decade, an independent 
                audit of each such operation, with a view toward 
                ``right-sizing'' operations and ensuring that such 
                operations are cost effective, should be conducted and 
                its findings reported to the Security Council.
                    (B) Review of mandates and closing operations.--In 
                conjunction with the audit described in subparagraph 
                (A), the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations should conduct a comprehensive review of all 
                United Nations peacekeeping operation mandates, with a 
                view toward identifying objectives that are practical 
                and achievable, and report its findings to the Security 
                Council. In particular, the review should consider the 
                following:
                            (i) Except in extraordinary cases, 
                        including genocide, the United Nations 
                        Department of Peacekeeping Operations should 
                        not be tasked with activities that are 
                        impractical or unachievable without the 
                        cooperation of the Member State(s) hosting a 
                        United Nations peacekeeping operation, or which 
                        amount to de-facto Trusteeship outside of the 
                        procedures established for such under Chapter 
                        XII of the UN Charter, thereby creating 
                        unrealistic expectations and obfuscating the 
                        primary responsibility of the Member States 
                        themselves in creating and maintaining 
                        conditions for peace.
                            (ii) Long-standing operations that are 
                        static and cannot fulfill their mandate should 
                        be downsized or closed.
                            (iii) Where there is legitimate concern 
                        that the withdrawal from a country of an 
                        otherwise static United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operation would result in the resumption of 
                        major conflict, a burden-sharing arrangement 
                        that reduces the level of assessed 
                        contributions, similar to that currently 
                        supporting the United Nations Peacekeeping 
                        Force in Cyprus, should be explored and 
                        instituted.
                    (C) Leadership.--As peacekeeping operations become 
                larger and increasingly complex, the Secretariat should 
                adopt a minimum standard of qualifications for senior 
                leaders and managers, with particular emphasis on 
                specific skills and experience, and current senior 
                leaders and managers who do not meet those standards 
                should be removed.
                    (D) Pre-deployment training.--Pre-deployment 
                training on interpretation of the mandate of the 
                operation, specifically in the areas of use of force, 
                civilian protection and field conditions, the Code of 
                Conduct, HIV/AIDS, and human rights should be 
                mandatory, and all personnel, regardless of category or 
                rank, should be required to sign an oath that each has 
                received and understands such training as a condition 
                of participation in the operation.
                    (E) Gratis military personnel.--The General 
                Assembly should seek to strengthen the capacity the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and ease the extraordinary burden currently placed upon 
                the limited number of headquarters staff by lifting 
                restrictions on the utilization of gratis military 
                personnel by the Department so that the Department may 
                accept secondments from Member States of military 
                personnel with expertise in mission planning, 
                logistics, and other operational specialties.
            (2) Conduct and discipline.--
                    (A) Adoption of a uniform code of conduct.--A 
                single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the status of 
                a binding rule and applies equally to all personnel 
                serving in United Nations peacekeeping operations, 
                regardless of category or rank, including military 
                personnel, should be adopted and incorporated into 
                legal documents governing participation in such an 
                operation, including all contracts and Memorandums of 
                Understanding, promulgated and effectively enforced.
                    (B) Understanding the code of conduct.--All 
                personnel, regardless of category or rank, should 
                receive training on the Code of Conduct prior to 
                deployment with a peacekeeping operation, in addition 
                to periodic follow-on training. In particular--
                            (i) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should be provided with a personal 
                        copy of the Code of Conduct that has been 
                        translated into the national language of such 
                        personnel, regardless of whether such language 
                        is an official language of the United Nations;
                            (ii) all personnel, regardless of category 
                        or rank, should sign an oath that each has 
                        received a copy of the Code of Conduct, that 
                        each pledges to abide by the Code of Conduct, 
                        and that each understands the consequences of 
                        violating the Code of Conduct, including 
                        immediate termination of participation in and 
                        permanent exclusion from all current and future 
                        peacekeeping operations , as well as the 
                        assumption of personal liability for victims 
                        compensation, as a condition of appointment to 
                        any such operation; and
                            (iii) peacekeeping operations should 
                        conduct educational outreach programs to reach 
                        local communities where peacekeeping personnel 
                        of such operations are based, including 
                        explaining prohibited acts on the part of 
                        United Nations peacekeeping personnel and 
                        identifying the individual to whom the local 
                        population may direct complaints or file 
                        allegations of exploitation, abuse, or other 
                        acts of misconduct.
                    (C) Monitoring mechanisms.--Dedicated monitoring 
                mechanisms, such as the Personnel Conduct Units already 
                deployed to support United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations in Haiti, Liberia, Burundi, and the 
                Democratic Republic of Congo, should be present in each 
                operation to monitor compliance with the Code of 
                Conduct, and--
                            (i) should report simultaneously to the 
                        Head of Mission, the United Nations Department 
                        of Peacekeeping Operations, and the Associate 
                        Director of OIOS for Peacekeeping Operations 
                        (established under section 1114(b)(9)); and
                            (ii) should be tasked with designing and 
                        implementing mission-specific measures to 
                        prevent misconduct, conduct follow-on training 
                        for personnel, coordinate community outreach 
                        programs, and assist in investigations, as OIOS 
                        determines necessary and appropriate.
                    (D) Investigations.--A permanent, professional, and 
                independent investigative body should be established 
                and introduced into United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations. In particular--
                            (i) the investigative body should include 
                        professionals with experience in investigating 
                        sex crimes, as well as experts who can provide 
                        guidance on standards of proof and evidentiary 
                        requirements necessary for any subsequent legal 
                        action;
                            (ii) provisions should be included in all 
                        Memorandums of Understanding, including a Model 
                        Memorandum of Understanding, that obligate 
                        Member States that contribute troops to a 
                        peacekeeping operation to designate a military 
                        prosecutor who will participate in any 
                        investigation into credible allegations of 
                        misconduct brought against an individual of 
                        such Member State, so that evidence is 
                        collected and preserved in a manner consistent 
                        with the military law of such Member State;
                            (iii) the investigative body should be 
                        regionally based to ensure rapid deployment and 
                        should be equipped with modern forensics 
                        equipment for the purpose of positively 
                        identifying perpetrators and, where necessary, 
                        for determining paternity; and
                            (iv) the investigative body should report 
                        directly to the Associate Director of OIOS for 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, while providing copies 
                        of any reports to the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations, the Head of Mission, 
                        and the Member State concerned.
                    (E) Follow-up.--A dedicated unit, similar to the 
                Personnel Conduct Units, staffed and funded through 
                existing resources, should be established within the 
                headquarters of the United Nations Department of 
                Peacekeeping Operations and tasked with--
                            (i) promulgating measures to prevent 
                        misconduct;
                            (ii) receiving reports by field personnel 
                        and coordinating the Department's response to 
                        allegations of misconduct; and
                            (iii) gathering follow-up information on 
                        completed investigations, particularly by 
                        focusing on disciplinary actions against the 
                        individual concerned taken by the United 
                        Nations or by the Member State that is 
                        contributing troops to which such individual 
                        belongs, and sharing such information with the 
                        Security Council, the Head of Mission, and the 
                        community hosting the peacekeeping operation.
                    (F) Financial liability and victims assistance.--
                Although peacekeeping operations should provide 
                immediate medical assistance to victims of sexual abuse 
                or exploitation, the responsibility for providing 
                longer-term treatment, care, or restitution lies solely 
                with the individual found guilty of the misconduct. In 
                particular, the following reforms should be 
                implemented:
                            (i) The United Nations should not assume 
                        responsibility for providing long-term 
                        treatment or compensation by creating a 
                        ``Victims Trust Fund'', or any other such 
                        similar fund, financed through assessed 
                        contributions to United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operations, thereby shielding individuals from 
                        personal liability and reinforcing an 
                        atmosphere of impunity.
                            (ii) If an individual responsible for 
                        misconduct has been repatriated, reassigned, 
                        redeployed, or is otherwise unable to provide 
                        assistance, responsibility for providing 
                        assistance to a victim should be assigned to 
                        the Member State that contributed the 
                        contingent to which such individual belonged or 
                        to the manager concerned.
                            (iii) In the case of misconduct by a member 
                        of a military contingent, appropriate funds 
                        shall be withheld from the troop contributing 
                        country concerned.
                            (iv) In the case of misconduct by a 
                        civilian employee or contractor of the United 
                        Nations, appropriate wages shall be garnished 
                        from such individual or fines shall be imposed 
                        against such individual, consistent with 
                        existing United Nations Staff Rules, and 
                        retirement funds shall not be shielded from 
                        liability.
                    (G) Managers and commanders.--The manner in which 
                managers and commanders handle cases of misconduct by 
                those serving under them should be included in their 
                individual performance evaluations, so that managers 
                and commanders who take decisive action to deter and 
                address misconduct are rewarded, while those who create 
                a permissive environment or impede investigations are 
                penalized or relieved of duty, as appropriate.
                    (H) Data base.--A centralized data base, including 
                personnel photos and fingerprints, should be created 
                and maintained within the United Nations Department of 
                Peacekeeping Operations without further delay to track 
                cases of misconduct, including the outcome of 
                investigations and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure 
                that personnel who have engaged in misconduct or other 
                criminal activities, regardless of category or rank, 
                are permanently barred from participation in future 
                peacekeeping operations.
                    (I) Cooperation of member states.--If a Member 
                State routinely refuses to cooperate with the 
                directives contained herein or acts to shield its 
                nationals from personal liability, that Member State 
                should be barred from contributing troops or personnel 
                to future peacekeeping operations.
                    (J) Welfare.--Peacekeeping operations should 
                continue to seek to maintain a minimum standard of 
                welfare for mission personnel to ameliorate conditions 
                of service, while adjustments are made to the 
                discretionary welfare payments currently provided to 
                Member States that contribute troops to offset the cost 
                of operation-provided recreational facilities, as 
                necessary and appropriate.

SEC. 603. CERTIFICATION.

    (a) New or Expanded Peacekeeping Operations Contingent Upon 
Presidential Certification of Peacekeeping Operations Reforms.--
            (1) No new or expanded peacekeeping operations.--
                    (A) Certification.--Except as provided in 
                subparagraph (B), until the Secretary of State 
                certifies that the requirements described in paragraph 
                (2) have been satisfied, the President shall direct the 
                United States Permanent Representative to the United 
                Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the 
                United States at the United Nations to oppose the 
                creation of new, or expansion of existing, United 
                Nations peacekeeping operations.
                    (B) Exception and notification.--The requirements 
                described under paragraph (2) may be waived with 
                respect to a particular peacekeeping operation if the 
                President determines that failure to deploy new or 
                additional peacekeepers in such situation will create a 
                significant possibility of the widespread loss of human 
                life, genocide, or the endangerment of a vital national 
                security interest of the United States. If the 
                President makes such a determination, the President 
                shall, not later than 15 days before the exercise of 
                such waiver, notify the appropriate congressional 
                committees of such determination and resulting waiver.
            (2) Certification of peacekeeping operations reforms.--The 
        certification referred to in paragraph (1) is a certification 
        made by the Secretary to the appropriate congressional 
        committees that the following reforms, or an equivalent set of 
        reforms, related to peacekeeping operations have been adopted 
        by the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations or 
        the General Assembly, as appropriate:
                    (A) A single, uniform Code of Conduct that has the 
                status of a binding rule and applies equally to all 
                personnel serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations, regardless of category or rank, has been 
                adopted by the General Assembly and duly incorporated 
                into all contracts and a Model Memorandum of 
                Understanding, and mechanisms have been established for 
                training such personnel concerning the requirements of 
                the Code and enforcement of the Code.
                    (B) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                serving in a peacekeeping operation have been trained 
                concerning the requirements of the Code of Conduct and 
                each has been given a personal copy of the Code, 
                translated into the national language of such 
                personnel.
                    (C) All personnel, regardless of category or rank, 
                are required to sign an oath that each has received a 
                copy of the Code of Conduct, that each pledges to abide 
                by the Code, and that each understands the consequences 
                of violating the Code, including immediate termination 
                of participation in and permanent exclusion from all 
                current and future peacekeeping operations, as well as 
                the assumption of personal liability for victims 
                compensation as a condition of the appointment to such 
                operation.
                    (D) All peacekeeping operations have designed and 
                implemented educational outreach programs to reach 
                local communities where peacekeeping personnel of such 
                operations are based to explain prohibited acts on the 
                part of United Nations peacekeeping personnel and to 
                identify the individual to whom the local population 
                may direct complaints or file allegations of 
                exploitation, abuse, or other acts of misconduct.
                    (E) The creation of a centralized data base, 
                including personnel photos and fingerprints, has been 
                completed and is being maintained in the United Nations 
                Department of Peacekeeping Operations that tracks cases 
                of misconduct, including the outcomes of investigations 
                and subsequent prosecutions, to ensure that personnel, 
                regardless of category or rank, who have engaged in 
                misconduct or other criminal activities are permanently 
                barred from participation in future peacekeeping 
                operations.
                    (F) A Model Memorandum of Understanding between the 
                United Nations and each Member State that contributes 
                troops to a peacekeeping operation has been adopted by 
                the United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
                Operations that specifically obligates each such Member 
                State to--
                            (i) uphold the uniform Code of Conduct 
                        which shall apply equally to all personnel 
                        serving in United Nations peacekeeping 
                        operations, regardless of category or rank;
                            (ii) designate a competent legal authority, 
                        preferably a prosecutor with expertise in the 
                        area of sexual exploitation and abuse where 
                        appropriate, to participate in any 
                        investigation into an allegation of misconduct 
                        brought against an individual of such Member 
                        State;
                            (iii) refer to its competent national or 
                        military authority for possible prosecution, if 
                        warranted, any investigation of a violation of 
                        the Code of Conduct or other criminal activity 
                        by an individual of such Member State;
                            (iv) report to the Department of 
                        Peacekeeping Operations on the outcome of any 
                        such investigation;
                            (v) undertake to conduct on-site court 
                        martial proceedings, where practical and 
                        appropriate, relating to allegations of 
                        misconduct alleged against an individual of 
                        such Member State; and
                            (vi) assume responsibility for the 
                        provision of appropriate assistance to a victim 
                        of misconduct committed by an individual of 
                        such Member State.
                    (G) A professional and independent investigative 
                and audit function has been established within the 
                United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
                and the OIOS to monitor United Nations peacekeeping 
                operations.
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