[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2631 Engrossed Amendment Senate (EAS)]

  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  

                  In the Senate of the United States,

                    September 26 (legislative day, September 17), 2008.
    Resolved, That the bill from the House of Representatives (H.R. 
2631) entitled ``An Act to strengthen efforts in the Department of 
Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit 
attribution of the source of nuclear material, and for other 
purposes.'', do pass with the following

                               AMENDMENT:

            Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert:

SECTION 1. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American 
        interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious 
        threats to the national security of the United States. In the 
        wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of 
        utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of the 
        weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the 
        radioactive material in the bomb itself.
            (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing 
        techniques and those under development, it may be possible to 
        identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after 
        it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted 
        smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 
        forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-
        detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the 
        challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints 
        of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.
            (3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the 
        source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used 
        in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. 
        Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel 
        improved security at material storage facilities, preventing 
        the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.
            (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and 
        other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to 
        have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, 
        analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against 
        known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.
            (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of 
        a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely 
        acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the 
        past several decades, the ability of the United States to 
        gather atmospheric samples, often the preferred method of 
        sample acquisition, has diminished. This ability must be 
        restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace 
        existing techniques should be pursued.
            (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a 
        relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a 
        nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics 
        techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, 
        radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis 
        and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
        programs and radiochemists in United States National 
        Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over 
        the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified 
        people into this critical field is a serious impediment to 
        maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.
            (5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it 
        is necessary to compare the results against samples of known 
        material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and 
        from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities 
        containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
        samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
        through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain 
        internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries 
        is limited by national security concerns.
            (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
        necessary to have the capability to positively identify the 
        source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential 
        traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware 
        of that capability. International cooperation may be essential 
        to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological 
        material.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR FORENSICS 
              COOPERATION.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
            (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international 
        agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the 
        auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an 
        international framework for determining--
                    (A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or 
                radiological material or weapon; and
                    (B) the source of any detonated weapon and the 
                nuclear or radiological material used in such a weapon;
            (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
        dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or 
        radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or 
        radiological materials, to the extent required by the 
        agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and
            (3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and 
        dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly 
        identify the source of a nuclear detonation.

SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE.

    (a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``(a) Mission'';
            (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' at the end;
            (3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph (14); and
            (4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
            ``(10) develop and implement, with the approval of the 
        Secretary, and in consultation with the Attorney General, the 
        Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of 
        State, the Director of National Intelligence, and the heads of 
        appropriate departments and agencies, a `National Strategy and 
        Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the Nuclear 
        Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the United States 
        Government' and the methods, capabilities, and capacity for 
        nuclear materials forensics and attribution, including--
                    ``(A) an investment plan to support nuclear 
                materials forensics and attribution;
                    ``(B) the allocation of roles and responsibilities 
                for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-detonation 
                activities; and
                    ``(C) the attribution of nuclear or radiological 
                material to its source when such material is 
                intercepted by the United States, foreign governments, 
                or international bodies or is dispersed in the course 
                of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or radiological 
                explosion;
            ``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
        Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to 
        provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap 
        analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all 
        Federal nuclear forensics and attribution activities--
                    ``(A) to ensure an enduring national technical 
                nuclear forensics capability to strengthen the 
                collective response of the United States to nuclear 
                terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and
                    ``(B) to coordinate and implement the national 
                strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve national 
                forensics and attribution capabilities for all Federal 
                nuclear and radiological forensics capabilities;
            ``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise 
        Development Program, which--
                    ``(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a 
                vibrant and enduring academic pathway from 
                undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and 
                geochemical science specialties directly relevant to 
                technical nuclear forensics, including radiochemistry, 
                geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, 
                materials science, and analytical chemistry; and
                    ``(B) shall--
                            ``(i) make available for undergraduate 
                        study student scholarships, with a duration of 
                        up to 4 years per student, which shall include, 
                        if possible, at least 1 summer internship at a 
                        national laboratory or appropriate Federal 
                        agency in the field of technical nuclear 
                        forensics during the course of the student's 
                        undergraduate career;
                            ``(ii) make available for graduate study 
                        student fellowships, with a duration of up to 5 
                        years per student, which shall--
                                    ``(I) include, if possible, at 
                                least 2 summer internships at a 
                                national laboratory or appropriate 
                                Federal agency in the field of 
                                technical nuclear forensics during the 
                                course of the student's graduate 
                                career; and
                                    ``(II) require each recipient to 
                                commit to serve for 2 years in a post-
                                doctoral position in a technical 
                                nuclear forensics-related specialty at 
                                a national laboratory or appropriate 
                                Federal agency after graduation;
                            ``(iii) make available to faculty awards, 
                        with a duration of 3 to 5 years each, to ensure 
                        faculty and their graduate students have a 
                        sustained funding stream; and
                            ``(iv) place a particular emphasis on 
                        reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 
                        programs; and''.
    (b) Joint Interagency Annual Reporting Requirement to Congress and 
the President.--
            (1) In general.--Section 1907(a)(1) of the Homeland 
        Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) is amended--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking ``and'' at 
                the end;
                    (B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking the 
                period at the end and inserting ``; and''; and
                    (C) by adding at the end the following:
                    ``(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 
                Detection Office and each of the relevant Departments 
                that are partners in the National Technical Forensics 
                Center--
                            ``(i) includes, as part of the assessments, 
                        evaluations, and reviews required under this 
                        paragraph, each relevant agency's activities 
                        and investments in support of nuclear forensics 
                        and attribution activities;
                            ``(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the 
                        Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most 
                        current version of the plan required under 
                        section 1902(a)(10); and
                            ``(iii) after March 31 of each year, funds 
                        allocated for activities authorized under 
                        section 1902 are not spent until the submission 
                        to Congress of the report required under 
                        subsection (b).''.

            Attest:

                                                             Secretary.
110th CONGRESS

  2d Session

                               H.R. 2631

_______________________________________________________________________

                               AMENDMENT