Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Change the Course in Iraq Act

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)members of the United States Armed Forces have shown great valor and courage in Iraq in the performance of their duties; and (2)the sacrifice of the members of the Armed Forces and the sacrifice of their families are recognized and appreciated.

Repeal of Public Law 107–243

The Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 (Public Law 107–243) is hereby repealed.

Redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq

(a)

Plan required

Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan for the phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces from Iraq. (b)

Requirements

The plan required by subsection (a) shall limit the presence of the Armed Forces in Iraq to the following missions: (1)Defeating Al-Qaeda and other foreign terrorists. (2)Training Iraqi security forces. (3)Protecting United States forces.

Diplomatic initiative for stability in Iraq and the region

It is the sense of Congress that the United States should increase its diplomatic efforts with the Government of Iraq to help stabilize Iraq and the region.

Coordinator for Iraq Stabilization

(a)

Establishment

Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall appoint a Coordinator for Iraq Stabilization (hereinafter in this section referred to as the Coordinator). (b)

Duties

The Coordinator shall have a robust mandate to develop and coordinate United States initiatives with respect to Iraq, and shall report regularly to the President and the Secretary of State. (c)

Statement of policy

In carrying out the duties specified in subsection (b), Congress strongly urges the Coordinator to pursue efforts with the Government of Iraq to include the following: (1)Supporting the unity and territorial integrity of Iraq. (2)Preventing destabilizing actions and interventions by Iraq’s neighbors. (3)Securing Iraq’s borders, including the use of joint patrols with neighboring countries. (4)Preventing the expansion of the instability and conflict beyond Iraq’s borders. (5)Promoting economic assistance, commerce, trade, political support, and if possible, military assistance for the Iraqi Government from non-neighboring Muslim nations. (6)Energizing countries to support national political reconciliation in Iraq. (7)Validating Iraq’s legitimacy by resuming diplomatic relations, where appropriate, and reestablishing embassies in Baghdad. (8)Assisting Iraq in establishing active working embassies in key capitals in the region. (9)Helping Iraq reach a mutually acceptable agreement on Kirkuk. (10)Assisting the Iraqi Government in achieving certain security, political, and economic milestones, including national reconciliation, equitable distribution of oil revenues, and the dismantling of militias. (11)Supporting the holding of a conference or meeting in Baghdad of the League of Arab League States or the Organization of the Islamic Conference both to assist the Iraqi Government in promoting national reconciliation in Iraq and to reestablish the diplomatic presence of such organizations in Iraq. (12)Creating an Iraq International Support Group consisting of all countries that border Iraq as well as other key countries in the region and the world. The five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council and the European Union should also be members. The Support Group should develop specific approaches to neighboring countries to take into account the interests, perspectives, and potential contributions such countries can make.

Limitation on assistance to the Government of Iraq

(a)

Findings

Congress makes the following findings: (1)The Iraq Study Group Report advised, Sustained increases in U.S. troop levels would not solve the fundamental cause of violence in Iraq, which is the absence of national reconciliation . . . Past experience indicates that the violence would simply rekindle as soon as U.S. forces are moved.. (2)The goal of United States policy in Iraq, as stated by President George W. Bush, is an Iraq that can govern itself, sustain itself, and defend itself. (3)In accordance with Recommendation 21 of the Iraq Study Group Report, if the Iraqi Government does not make substantial progress toward the achievement of milestones on national reconciliation, security, and governance, the United States should reduce its political, military, or economic support for the Iraqi Government. There must be consequences if Iraq does not perform. (4)In a November 2006 Department of Defense report to Congress regarding the status of security in Iraq, 91 of 118 battalions, 30 of 36 brigades, and six of ten divisions were in the lead when conducting operations, with the United States in supporting roles. The Iraqi Ground Forces Command had command and control of two of the ten Iraqi Army divisions and only two of Iraq’s 18 provinces were in Provincial Iraqi Control, operating independently of Coalition forces. Thus, there is an urgent, near-term need for putting a time-table on when Iraqi forces need to be trained, equipped, and in the lead of security operations, tied to conditional funding, which may give the Iraqi Government the incentive it needs to take control of its security. (5)The Iraq Study Group’s recommendations for Iraq’s goals for national reconciliation, security, and governance include— (A)the reintegration of Baathists and Arab nationalists into the government; (B)disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating militia members into civilian society; (C)the accruing of oil revenues to the central government to be shared on the basis of population; and (D)amending the Iraq Constitution. (6)The Iraq Study Group estimated the United States has appropriated $34 billion to support the reconstruction of Iraq, of which $21 billion has been appropriated for the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. (7)As part of the comprehensive strategy supported by the Iraq Study Group, the United States should embark on a robust diplomatic effort to establish an international support structure intended to stabilize Iraq and ease tensions in other countries of the region. (8)In his address to the Nation on the Iraq War on January 10, 2007, President Bush stated America would hold the Government of Iraq to the benchmarks it has announced—the Iraqi Government plans to take responsibility for security in all of Iraq’s provinces by November 2007, Iraq will pass legislation to share oil revenues among all Iraqis, the Iraqi Government will spend $10 billion of its own money on reconstruction and infrastructure projects that will create new jobs, Iraqis plan to hold provincial elections later in 2007, and the Iraqi Government will reform de-Baathification laws and establish a fair process for considering amendments to the Iraq Constitution. (9)In the State of the Union Address on January 23, 2007, President Bush stated Iraq’s leaders know that our commitment is not open-ended. They have promised to deploy more of their own troops to secure Baghdad, and they must do so. They have pledged that they will confront violent radicals of any faction or political party. And they need to follow through and lift needless restrictions on Iraqi and coalition forces, so these troops can achieve their mission of bringing security to all of the people of Baghdad. Iraq’s leaders have committed themselves to a series of benchmarks to achieve reconciliation—to share oil revenues among all of Iraq's citizens, to put the wealth of Iraq into the rebuilding of Iraq, to allow more Iraqis to re-enter their nation's civic life, to hold local elections, and to take responsibility for security in every Iraqi province.. (b)

Limitation on assistance

(1)

In general

Beginning on December 31, 2007, assistance described in paragraph (2) may be provided to the Government of Iraq only if the President certifies to the congressional defense committees that— (A)the Iraqi Government has approved laws to— (i)reintegrate Baathists and Arab nationalists into the government; (ii)disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate militia members into civilian society; and (iii)provide for the accruing of oil revenues to the central government to be shared on the basis of population; (B)the Iraqi Government has amended the Iraq Constitution as appropriate to guarantee the rights of all Iraqi citizens; (C)the Iraqi Government is making significant progress to control its security forces, including significant progress to ensure that the security forces are able to take the lead in security operations; and (D)each of Iraq’s provinces is under the control of provincial Iraqi governmental authorities. (2)

Assistance described

Assistance referred to in paragraph (1) is assistance provided under any provision of law for the Iraqi security forces or for the relief and reconstruction of Iraq.

Definitions

As used in this Act: (1)

Armed forces

The term Armed Forces has the meaning given the term in section 101(a)(4) of title 10, United States Code. (2)

Congressional defense committees

The term congressional defense committees means— (A)the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives; and (B)the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate.