Short title and purpose

(a)

Short title

This Act may be cited as the Iraq Contingency Planning Act. (b)

Purpose

The purpose of this Act is to require the President to promptly inform Congress regarding what contingency plans are or will be in place to respond to three scenarios regarding future developments in Iraq as identified by the most recent National Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

Findings

Congress finds as follows: (1)The United States initiated combat operations against the Saddam Hussein regime on March 19, 2003, and concluded those operations in April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi military and the collapse of the Hussein regime. (2)The Bush Administration had been warned that while military action against the Hussein regime would likely succeed, rebuilding Iraq and winning the peace would be more difficult. In particular, intelligence reports from the Defense Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon’s Joint Staff, the Department of State’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s National Intelligence Council warned that United States troops could face significant postwar resistance. An Army War College report from February 2003 warned that without an overwhelming effort to prepare for the United States occupation of Iraq, The United States may find itself in a radically different world over the next few years, a world in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow of new problems of America’s own making.. (3)Despite these warnings, the Bush Administration invaded Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and rebuild the country. (4)United States Armed Forces personnel have remained in Iraq since the beginning of combat operations, and in over nearly four years of war, hundreds of thousands of members of the Armed Forces have served with honor and distinction in Iraq, over 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have been wounded. (5)On January 10, 2007, after years of growing sectarian violence in Iraq, President George W. Bush addressed the American people to announce a plan entitled The New Way Forward in Iraq, consisting of the additional deployments of at least 21,500 United States troops in Iraq. (6)On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of Defense said that we expect in certain areas to be able to see whether the Iraqi government is carrying out the commitments that it has made and that are so critical to the success of this strategy . . . within two or three months.. (7)On February 5, 2007, the President submitted a request for supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2007, including $5,600,000,000 to increase United States forces in the Iraqi theater of operations to support the Government of Iraq with 21,500 United States ground forces and an expanded Naval presence. At the same time, the President also submitted a proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 which did not request funding for these additional troops in Iraq. (8)On February 1, 2007, the intelligence community presented to the President the first National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four years. (9)The NIE, the most authoritative written judgment of the Director of National Intelligence with respect to Iraq, states that Iraqi society’s growing polarization, the persistent weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and all sides’ ready recourse to violence are collectively driving an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show measurable progress during … the coming 12 to 18 months, we assess that the overall security situation will continue to deteriorate.. (10)The NIE states that as Iraq’s security environment worsens, three prospective security paths could emerge— (A)chaos leading to partition; (B)emergence of a Shia strongman; or (C)anarchic fragmentation of power. (11)Congress needs to know how the Administration expects to respond to each of those possibilities, and what specific plans are being taken and what specific plans are being developed to be able to respond to such possibilities.

Report on contingency plans for Iraq

(a)

Report required

Not later than June 30, 2007, the President shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate a report detailing contingency plans for how the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the Federal Government will respond to the following three prospective security paths in Iraq, as outlined in the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on Iraq: (1)

Chaos Leading to Partition

Described by the NIE as follows: A rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq’s central government to function, security services and other aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude would generate fierce violence for at least several years, ranging well beyond the time frame of this estimate, before settling into a partially stable end-state.. (2)

Emergence of a Shia Strongman

Described by the NIE as follows: Instead of a disintegrating central government producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq’s potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent strength.. (3)

Anarchic Fragmentation of Power

Described by the NIE as follows: The emergence of a checkered pattern of local control would present the greatest potential for instability, mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating intra-group clashes.. (b)

Additional information

The report shall include detailed information regarding the proposed role of the United States Armed Forces under each of the three prospective security paths referred to in subsection (a), including a comprehensive analysis to identify and justify the number of United States troops needed in each case, and the proposed roles of other departments and agencies of the Federal Government.