[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1183 Introduced in House (IH)]







110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1183

     To require the President to transmit to Congress a report on 
       contingency plans regarding possible developments in Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 16, 2007

Mr. Udall of Colorado introduced the following bill; which was referred 
to the Committee on Armed Services, and in addition to the Committee on 
  Foreign Affairs, for a period to be subsequently determined by the 
  Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall 
           within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
     To require the President to transmit to Congress a report on 
       contingency plans regarding possible developments in Iraq.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE AND PURPOSE.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Iraq Contingency 
Planning Act''.
    (b) Purpose.--The purpose of this Act is to require the President 
to promptly inform Congress regarding what contingency plans are or 
will be in place to respond to three scenarios regarding future 
developments in Iraq as identified by the most recent National 
Intelligence Estimate on Iraq.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds as follows:
            (1) The United States initiated combat operations against 
        the Saddam Hussein regime on March 19, 2003, and concluded 
        those operations in April 2004 with the defeat of the Iraqi 
        military and the collapse of the Hussein regime.
            (2) The Bush Administration had been warned that while 
        military action against the Hussein regime would likely 
        succeed, rebuilding Iraq and winning the peace would be more 
        difficult. In particular, intelligence reports from the Defense 
        Intelligence Agency, the Pentagon's Joint Staff, the Department 
        of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and the Central 
        Intelligence Agency's National Intelligence Council warned that 
        United States troops could face significant postwar resistance. 
        An Army War College report from February 2003 warned that 
        without an ``overwhelming'' effort to prepare for the United 
        States occupation of Iraq, ``The United States may find itself 
        in a radically different world over the next few years, a world 
        in which the threat of Saddam Hussein seems like a pale shadow 
        of new problems of America's own making.''.
            (3) Despite these warnings, the Bush Administration invaded 
        Iraq without a comprehensive plan in place to secure and 
        rebuild the country.
            (4) United States Armed Forces personnel have remained in 
        Iraq since the beginning of combat operations, and in over 
        nearly four years of war, hundreds of thousands of members of 
        the Armed Forces have served with honor and distinction in 
        Iraq, over 3,100 members of the Armed Forces have died, and 
        over 22,500 members of the Armed Forces have been wounded.
            (5) On January 10, 2007, after years of growing sectarian 
        violence in Iraq, President George W. Bush addressed the 
        American people to announce a plan entitled ``The New Way 
        Forward in Iraq'', consisting of the additional deployments of 
        at least 21,500 United States troops in Iraq.
            (6) On January 16, 2007, the Secretary of Defense said that 
        ``we expect in certain areas to be able to see whether the 
        Iraqi government is carrying out the commitments that it has 
        made and that are so critical to the success of this strategy . 
        . . within two or three months.''.
            (7) On February 5, 2007, the President submitted a request 
        for supplemental appropriations for fiscal year 2007, including 
        $5,600,000,000 to increase United States forces in the Iraqi 
        theater of operations to support the Government of Iraq with 
        21,500 United States ground forces and an expanded Naval 
        presence. At the same time, the President also submitted a 
        proposed budget for fiscal year 2008 which did not request 
        funding for these additional troops in Iraq.
            (8) On February 1, 2007, the intelligence community 
        presented to the President the first National Intelligence 
        Estimate (NIE) on Iraq in nearly four years.
            (9) The NIE, the most authoritative written judgment of the 
        Director of National Intelligence with respect to Iraq, states 
        that ``Iraqi society's growing polarization, the persistent 
        weakness of the security forces and the state in general, and 
        all sides' ready recourse to violence are collectively driving 
        an increase in communal and insurgent violence and political 
        extremism. Unless efforts to reverse these conditions show 
        measurable progress during ... the coming 12 to 18 months, we 
        assess that the overall security situation will continue to 
        deteriorate.''.
            (10) The NIE states that as Iraq's security environment 
        worsens, three prospective security paths could emerge--
                    (A) chaos leading to partition;
                    (B) emergence of a Shia strongman; or
                    (C) anarchic fragmentation of power.
            (11) Congress needs to know how the Administration expects 
        to respond to each of those possibilities, and what specific 
        plans are being taken and what specific plans are being 
        developed to be able to respond to such possibilities.

SEC. 3. REPORT ON CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR IRAQ.

    (a) Report Required.--Not later than June 30, 2007, the President 
shall transmit to the Committees on Armed Services of the House of 
Representatives and the Senate a report detailing contingency plans for 
how the Department of Defense and other departments and agencies of the 
Federal Government will respond to the following three prospective 
security paths in Iraq, as outlined in the 2007 National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) on Iraq:
            (1) Chaos leading to partition.--Described by the NIE as 
        follows: ``A rapid deterioration in the capacity of Iraq's 
        central government to function, security services and other 
        aspects of sovereignty would collapse. Resulting widespread 
        fighting could produce de facto partition, dividing Iraq into 
        three mutually antagonistic parts. Collapse of this magnitude 
        would generate fierce violence for at least several years, 
        ranging well beyond the time frame of this estimate, before 
        settling into a partially stable end-state.''.
            (2) Emergence of a shia strongman.--Described by the NIE as 
        follows: ``Instead of a disintegrating central government 
        producing partition, a security implosion could lead Iraq's 
        potentially most powerful group, the Shia, to assert its latent 
        strength.''.
            (3) Anarchic fragmentation of power.--Described by the NIE 
        as follows: ``The emergence of a checkered pattern of local 
        control would present the greatest potential for instability, 
        mixing extreme ethno-sectarian violence with debilitating 
        intra-group clashes.''.
    (b) Additional Information.--The report shall include detailed 
information regarding the proposed role of the United States Armed 
Forces under each of the three prospective security paths referred to 
in subsection (a), including a comprehensive analysis to identify and 
justify the number of United States troops needed in each case, and the 
proposed roles of other departments and agencies of the Federal 
Government.
                                 <all>