III 109th CONGRESS 2d Session S. J. RES. 34 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES April 25, 2006 Mr. Levin (for himself, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Reed) introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations JOINT RESOLUTION Expressing United States policy on Iraq.

Whereas there has been a strong consensus among the senior United States military commanders that a broad-based political settlement involving the three main Iraqi groups is essential for defeating the insurgency; Whereas the two parts of that political settlement are (1) agreement on a national unity government that serves the interests of all Iraqis, and (2) compromises to amend the Iraq Constitution to make it an inclusive document; Whereas such a two-part political settlement is also essential to prevent all-out civil war and is a critical element of our exit strategy for United States military forces in Iraq; Whereas the Iraqi Council of Representatives' approval on April 22, 2006, of the Presidency Council consisting of Jalal Talabani as President and two Vice Presidents, and the election of a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers is a significant step, as is the decision by the Iraqi political leadership to select Jawad al-Maliki as the Prime Minister designate; Whereas the Council of Representatives still needs to consider the nomination of Jawad al-Maliki and his still-to-be-chosen Cabinet, including an Interior Minister and a Defense Minister, and still needs to form a committee to recommend changes to the Iraq Constitution; Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, Prime Minister designate Jawad al-Maliki has 30 days from April 22, 2006, to choose and present a Cabinet to the Council of Representatives for its approval; Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, the Council of Representatives, at the start of its functioning, is required to appoint a committee from its members which will have four months to present recommendations to the Council for necessary amendments to the Iraq Constitution; Whereas while the three main Iraqi groups have differing views about the duration of the presence in Iraq of the United States-led Coalition forces, none of them favor the immediate withdrawal of United States military forces from Iraq; Whereas section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2006 (Public Law 109–163; 119 Stat. 3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) provides in part that [t]he Administration should tell the leaders of all groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make the compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in Iraq, within the timetable they set for themselves; Whereas the United States Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, has done an exceptional job in working with Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders in an effort to achieve consensus on the prompt formation of a national unity government; and Whereas the American public has become increasingly and understandably impatient with the failure of the Iraqis to form a national unity government: Now, therefore, be it

That it is the sense of Congress that the Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders should be told by the Administration that— (1)the continued presence of United States military forces in Iraq is not unconditional; (2)whether the Iraqis avoid all-out civil war and have a future as a nation is in their hands; (3)the Iraqis need to seize that opportunity and only they can be responsible for their own future; and (4)completing the formation of a government of national unity and subsequent agreement to modifications to the Iraq Constitution to make it more inclusive, within the deadlines the Iraqis have set for themselves in the Iraq Constitution, is— (A)essential to defeating the insurgency and avoiding all-out civil war; and (B)a condition of the continued presence of United States military forces in Iraq.