[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 34 Introduced in Senate (IS)]








109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 34

                Expressing United States policy on Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 25, 2006

   Mr. Levin (for himself, Ms. Collins, and Mr. Reed) introduced the 
 following joint resolution; which was read twice and referred to the 
                     Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION


 
                Expressing United States policy on Iraq.

Whereas there has been a strong consensus among the senior United States 
        military commanders that a broad-based political settlement involving 
        the three main Iraqi groups is essential for defeating the insurgency;
Whereas the two parts of that political settlement are (1) agreement on a 
        national unity government that serves the interests of all Iraqis, and 
        (2) compromises to amend the Iraq Constitution to make it an inclusive 
        document;
Whereas such a two-part political settlement is also essential to prevent all-
        out civil war and is a critical element of our exit strategy for United 
        States military forces in Iraq;
Whereas the Iraqi Council of Representatives' approval on April 22, 2006, of the 
        Presidency Council consisting of Jalal Talabani as President and two 
        Vice Presidents, and the election of a Speaker and two Deputy Speakers 
        is a significant step, as is the decision by the Iraqi political 
        leadership to select Jawad al-Maliki as the Prime Minister designate;
Whereas the Council of Representatives still needs to consider the nomination of 
        Jawad al-Maliki and his still-to-be-chosen Cabinet, including an 
        Interior Minister and a Defense Minister, and still needs to form a 
        committee to recommend changes to the Iraq Constitution;
Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, Prime Minister designate Jawad al-Maliki 
        has 30 days from April 22, 2006, to choose and present a Cabinet to the 
        Council of Representatives for its approval;
Whereas under the Iraq Constitution, the Council of Representatives, at the 
        start of its functioning, is required to appoint a committee from its 
        members which will have four months to present recommendations to the 
        Council for necessary amendments to the Iraq Constitution;
Whereas while the three main Iraqi groups have differing views about the 
        duration of the presence in Iraq of the United States-led Coalition 
        forces, none of them favor the immediate withdrawal of United States 
        military forces from Iraq;
Whereas section 1227 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
        2006 (Public Law 109-163; 119 Stat. 3465; 50 U.S.C. 1541 note) provides 
        in part that ``[t]he Administration should tell the leaders of all 
        groups and political parties in Iraq that they need to make the 
        compromises necessary to achieve the broad-based and sustainable 
        political settlement that is essential for defeating the insurgency in 
        Iraq, within the timetable they set for themselves'';
Whereas the United States Ambassador to Iraq, Zalmay Khalilzad, has done an 
        exceptional job in working with Iraqi political, religious, and tribal 
        leaders in an effort to achieve consensus on the prompt formation of a 
        national unity government; and
Whereas the American public has become increasingly and understandably impatient 
        with the failure of the Iraqis to form a national unity government: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of 
Congress that the Iraqi political, religious, and tribal leaders should 
be told by the Administration that--
            (1) the continued presence of United States military forces 
        in Iraq is not unconditional;
            (2) whether the Iraqis avoid all-out civil war and have a 
        future as a nation is in their hands;
            (3) the Iraqis need to seize that opportunity and only they 
        can be responsible for their own future; and
            (4) completing the formation of a government of national 
        unity and subsequent agreement to modifications to the Iraq 
        Constitution to make it more inclusive, within the deadlines 
        the Iraqis have set for themselves in the Iraq Constitution, 
        is--
                    (A) essential to defeating the insurgency and 
                avoiding all-out civil war; and
                    (B) a condition of the continued presence of United 
                States military forces in Iraq.
                                 <all>