[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 33 Introduced in Senate (IS)]








109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
S. J. RES. 33

   To provide for a strategy for successfully empowering a new unity 
                          government in Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             April 6, 2006

  Mr. Kerry introduced the following joint resolution; which was read 
        twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION


 
   To provide for a strategy for successfully empowering a new unity 
                          government in Iraq.

Whereas the men and women of the Armed Forces have performed with valor, honor, 
        and courage in Iraq;
Whereas Iraq can only achieve stability with a national unity government 
        embraced by Sunnis, Shias, and Kurds;
Whereas the President stated on March 21, 2006, that a national unity government 
        ``is necessary to achieve our objective'' in Iraq;
Whereas on December 15, 2005, the people of Iraq elected their first permanent 
        government since the 2003 invasion by choosing a representative 
        assembly;
Whereas the newly elected leaders in Iraq have yet to form a government of 
        national unity which is necessary for a sustainable political solution;
Whereas the creation of a government of national unity will constitute an 
        important benchmark in transferring political responsibilities to the 
        people of Iraq;
Whereas former Prime Minister of Iraq, Iyad Allawi, stated on March 19, 2006, 
        that there is currently a civil war taking place in Iraq;
Whereas in order to find a political solution that is necessary to undermine the 
        insurgency, end sectarian violence, and bring stability to Iraq, the 
        people of Iraq must reach a comprehensive agreement that includes 
        forming a unity government, security guarantees, disbanding the 
        militias, and a process for reviving the reconstruction efforts and 
        securing the borders of Iraq;
Whereas reaching a comprehensive agreement that will help bring stability to 
        Iraq is in the best interests of our allies, members of the Arab League, 
        the neighbors of Iraq, and the international community;
Whereas our allies, members of the Arab League, the neighbors of Iraq, and the 
        international community, represented by the five permanent members of 
        the United Nations Security Council, can assist in the process of 
        bringing about such a comprehensive agreement;
Whereas bringing the leaders of the factions in Iraq together at a summit that 
        includes our allies, members of the Arab League, the neighbors of Iraq, 
        and representatives of the five permanent members of the United Nations 
        Security Council would provide a necessary and appropriate forum for 
        reaching such a comprehensive agreement;
Whereas the commander of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, General George Casey, 
        testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on 
        September 29, 2005, that ``[i]ncreased coalition presence feeds the 
        notion of occupation ... contributes to the dependency of Iraqi security 
        forces on the coalition ... [and] ... extends the amount of time that it 
        will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant'';
Whereas General Casey also said that ``[r]educing the visibility and, 
        ultimately, the presence of coalition forces as we transition to Iraqi 
        security self-reliance remains a key element of our overall 
        counterinsurgency strategy'';
Whereas the overwhelming majority of Iraqis want United States forces to 
        withdraw from Iraq;
Whereas the Armed Forces have established a training program for the security 
        forces of Iraq that continues to make possible the assumption of 
        security responsibilities by such security forces; and
Whereas the withdrawal of United States forces under a schedule agreed upon with 
        the new government of Iraq would strengthen and legitimize that 
        government, enable the people of Iraq to become more self-reliant, and 
        undermine support for the insurgency in Iraq: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That--
            (1) the President should immediately convene a summit that 
        includes leaders in Iraq, the allies of the United States, 
        members of the Arab League, the neighbors of Iraq, and 
        representatives of the five permanent members of the United 
        Nations Security Council to reach a comprehensive political 
        agreement for Iraq that includes forming a unity government, 
        security guarantees, disbanding the militias, and a process for 
        reviving reconstruction efforts and securing the borders of 
        Iraq;
            (2) United States forces shall be withdrawn from Iraq at 
        the earliest practicable date if Iraqis fail to form a national 
        unity government by May 15, 2006;
            (3) if Iraqis form a national unity government by May 15, 
        2006--
                    (A) the United States should reach agreement as 
                soon as possible with such government on a schedule for 
                the withdrawal of United States forces from Iraq, 
                leaving only forces critical to completing the mission 
                of standing up security forces of Iraq; and
                    (B) the President shall--
                            (i) consult with Congress on the schedule 
                        referred to in subparagraph (A); and
                            (ii) present such withdrawal agreement to 
                        Congress immediately upon its completion; and
            (4) redeployment of United States forces to rear guard, 
        garrisoned status in Iraq for security back-up, training, and 
        emergency response in Iraq should be accelerated.
                                 <all>