[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 78 Engrossed in Senate (ES)]
109th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. CON. RES. 78
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty''), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the
Treaty, ``not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'';
Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June
19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), which
requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to
declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear
materials and activities to ensure that such materials and activities
are not diverted to any military purpose and are used for peaceful
purposes and activities;
Whereas Iran signed the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between Iran and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards
in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons at Vienna on December 18, 2003 (commonly referred to as the
``Additional Protocol'');
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003
that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program
for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment,
carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal,
separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear
facilities and activities;
Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on
November 10, 2003, of its decision to suspend enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities, and stated that the suspension would cover all
activities at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed
material for enrichment, and the importation of any enrichment-related
items;
Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the Government of Iran
specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing
activities, which the IAEA was invited to verify, including the
suspension of the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with
or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz, the suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into
any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new centrifuges
at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges
at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent practicable,
the withdrawal of nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment
facility;
Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its
decision to expand the scope and clarify the nature of its decision to
suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of
centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components,
including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that
any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that
cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited
the IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the suspension of
enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran;
Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran's nuclear program
(commonly referred to as the ``Paris Agreement''), securing a formal
commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium
enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic,
technological, political, and security issues;
Whereas the Department of State has reported for a decade on Iran's state
sponsorship of terrorism and has declared in its most recent Country
Reports on Terrorism that Iran ``remained the most active state sponsor
of terrorism in 2004'';
Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in an October 26, 2005,
speech, his hope for ``a world without America'' and his desire ``to
wipe Israel off the map'' and has subsequently denied the existence of
the holocaust;
Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of
Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its
IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security Council
and General Assembly of the United Nations;
Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that ``if in
connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the
Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security'';
Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
finding that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to
comply with the Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the
context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters
concerning Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are
within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security;
Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to
restart its nuclear research efforts, nullifying the Paris Agreement;
Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence of IAEA inspectors,
began to remove IAEA seals from the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas Foreign Secretary of the United Kingdom Jack Straw warned Iranian
officials that they were ``pushing their luck'' by removing the United
Nations seals that were placed on the Natanz facility by the IAEA 2
years earlier;
Whereas President of France Jacques Chirac said that the Governments of Iran and
North Korea risk making a ``serious error'' by pursuing nuclear
activities in defiance of international agreements;
Whereas Foreign Minister of Germany Frank-Walter Steinmeier said that the
Government of Iran had ``crossed lines which it knew would not remain
without consequences'';
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ``It is obvious that if Iran
cannot be brought to live up to its international obligations, in fact,
the IAEA Statute would indicate that Iran would have to be referred to
the U.N. Security Council.'';
Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ``The Iranian government and nation has no
fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear programs with
decisiveness and wisdom.''; and
Whereas the United States has joined with the Governments of Britain, France,
and Germany in calling for a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to
discuss Iran's non-compliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),
That Congress--
(1) condemns the many failures of the Government of Iran to
comply faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation
obligations, including its obligations under the Safeguards
Agreement (as reported by the Director General of the IAEA to
the IAEA Board of Governors since 2003), its suspension
commitments under the Paris Agreement, and prior commitments to
the EU-3 to suspend all enrichment- and reprocessing-related
activities;
(2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and
credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-
related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address
the noncompliance of the Government of Iran with its
obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear
non-proliferation;
(3) strongly urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its
special meeting on February 2, 2006, to order that Iran's
noncompliance with its safeguards obligations be reported to
the United Nations Security Council; and
(4) calls on all members of the United Nations Security
Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China, to act expeditiously to consider any report
of Iran's noncompliance in fulfillment of the mandate of the
Security Council to respond to and deal with situations bearing
on the maintenance of international peace and security.
Passed the Senate January 27, 2006.
Attest:
Secretary.
109th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. CON. RES. 78
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.