Whereas members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are
currently engaged in a round of trade negotiations known as the Doha
Development Agenda (Doha Round);
Whereas the Doha Round includes negotiations aimed at
clarifying and improving disciplines under the Agreement on Implementation of
Article VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping
Agreement) and the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures
(Subsidies Agreement);
Whereas the WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on
November 14, 2001 (WTO Paper No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1) specifically provides that
the Doha Round negotiations are to preserve the basic concepts,
principles and effectiveness
of the Antidumping Agreement and the
Subsidies Agreement;
Whereas in section 2102(b)(14)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade
Promotion Authority Act of 2002, the Congress mandated that the principal
negotiating objective of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws
was to preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously
its trade laws . . . and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of
domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially dumping and
subsidies
;
Whereas the countries that have been the most persistent
and egregious violators of international fair trade rules are engaged in an
aggressive effort to significantly weaken the disciplines provided in the
Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement and undermine the ability of
the United States to effectively enforce its trade remedy laws;
Whereas chronic violators of fair trade disciplines have
put forward proposals that would substantially weaken United States trade
remedy laws and practices, including mandating that unfair trade orders
terminate after a set number of years even if unfair trade and injury are
likely to recur, mandating that trade remedy duties reflect less than the full
margin of dumping or subsidization, mandating higher de minimis levels of
unfair trade, making cumulation of the effects of imports from multiple
countries more difficult in unfair trade investigations, outlawing the critical
practice of zeroing
in antidumping investigations, mandating the
weighing of causes, and mandating other provisions that make it more difficult
to prove injury;
Whereas United States trade remedy laws have already been
significantly weakened by numerous unjust and activist WTO dispute settlement
decisions which have created new obligations to which the United States never
agreed;
Whereas trade remedy laws remain a critical resource for
American manufacturers, agricultural producers, and aquacultural producers in
responding to closed foreign markets, subsidized imports, and other forms of
unfair trade, particularly in the context of the challenges currently faced by
these vital sectors of the United States economy;
Whereas the United States had a current account trade
deficit of approximately $668,000,000,000 in 2004, including a trade deficit of
almost $162,000,000,000 with China alone, as well as a trade deficit of
$40,000,000,000 in advanced technology;
Whereas United States manufacturers have lost over
3,000,000 jobs since June 2000, and United States manufacturing employment is
currently at its lowest level since 1950;
Whereas many industries critical to United States national
security are at severe risk from unfair foreign competition; and
Whereas the Congress strongly believes that the proposals
put forward by countries seeking to undermine trade remedy disciplines in the
Doha Round would result in serious harm to the United States economy, including
significant job losses and trade disadvantages: Now, therefore, be it
That it is the sense of the Congress
that—
(1)the United States
should not be a signatory to any agreement or protocol with respect to the Doha
Development Round of the World Trade Organization negotiations, or any other
bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, that—
(A)adopts any
proposal to lessen the effectiveness of domestic and international disciplines
on unfair trade or safeguard provisions, including proposals—
(i)mandating that
unfair trade orders terminate after a set number of years even if unfair trade
and injury are likely to recur;
(ii)mandating that
trade remedy duties reflect less than the full margin of dumping or
subsidization;
(iii)mandating
higher de minimis levels of unfair trade;
(iv)making
cumulation of the effects of imports from multiple countries more difficult in
unfair trade investigations;
(v)outlawing the
critical practice of zeroing
in antidumping investigations;
or
(vi)mandating the
weighing of causes or other provisions making it more difficult to prove injury
in unfair trade cases; and
(B)would lessen in
any manner the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its trade
laws, including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and safeguard
laws;
(2)the United States
trade laws and international rules appropriately serve the public interest by
offsetting injurious unfair trade, and that further balancing
modifications
or other similar provisions are unnecessary and would add
to the complexity and difficulty of achieving relief against injurious unfair
trade practices; and
(3)the United States
should ensure that any new agreement relating to international disciplines on
unfair trade or safeguard provisions fully rectifies and corrects decisions by
WTO dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body that have unjustifiably and
negatively impacted, or threaten to negatively impact, United States law or
practice, including a law or practice with respect to foreign dumping or
subsidization.