III 109th CONGRESS 1st Session S. CON. RES. 36 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES May 23, 2005 Mrs. Feinstein (for herself, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Corzine, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Levin) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress concerning actions to support the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the occasion of the Seventh NPT Review Conference.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (in this resolution referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty), codifies one of the most important international security arrangements in the history of arms control, the arrangement by which states without nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire them, states with nuclear weapons commit to eventually eliminate them, and nonnuclear states are allowed to use for peaceful purposes nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control; Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the most widely supported multilateral agreements, with 188 countries adhering to the Treaty; Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has encouraged many countries to officially abandon nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs, including Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Ukraine, and Taiwan; Whereas, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the states-parties agreed to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely, to reaffirm the principles and objectives of the Treaty, to strengthen the Treaty review process, and to implement further specific and practical steps on non-proliferation and disarmament; Whereas, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the states-parties agreed to further practical steps on non-proliferation and disarmament; Whereas President George W. Bush stated on March 7, 2005, that the NPT represents a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and makes a critical contribution to international security, and that the United States is firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT; Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for monitoring compliance with safeguard agreements pursuant to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and reporting safeguard violations to the United Nations Security Council; Whereas Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin stated on February 24, 2005, that [w]e bear a special responsibility for the security of nuclear weapons and fissile material in order to ensure that there is no possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands; Whereas Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for the fullest possible exchange of equipment and materials for peaceful nuclear endeavors and allows states to acquire sensitive technologies to produce nuclear fuel for energy purposes but also recognizes that such fuel could be used to secretly produce fissile material for nuclear weapons programs or quickly produce such material if the state were to decide to withdraw from the Treaty; Whereas the Government of North Korea ejected international inspectors from that country in 2002, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003, has recently declared its possession of nuclear weapons, and is in possession of facilities capable of producing additional nuclear weapons-usable material; Whereas the Government of Iran has pursued an undeclared program to develop a uranium enrichment capacity, repeatedly failed to fully comply with and provide full information to the IAEA regarding its nuclear activities, and stated that it will not permanently abandon its uranium enrichment program which it has temporarily suspended through an agreement with the European Union; Whereas the network of arms traffickers associated with A.Q. Khan has facilitated black-market nuclear transfers involving several countries, including Iran, Libya, and North Korea, and represents a new and dangerous form of proliferation; Whereas governments should cooperate to control exports of and interdict illegal transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile-related technologies to prevent their proliferation; Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change concluded that [a]lmost 60 States currently operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime no longer apply, and warned that [w]e are approaching a point at which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation; Whereas stronger international support and cooperation to achieve universal compliance with tighter nuclear non-proliferation rules and standards constitute essential elements of nuclear non-proliferation efforts; Whereas sustained leadership by the United States Government is essential to help implement existing legal and political commitments established by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to realize a more robust and effective global nuclear non-proliferation system; and Whereas the governments of the United States and other countries should pursue a comprehensive and balanced approach to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation system, beginning with the Seventh NPT Review Conference of 2005: Now, therefore, be it

1.

Short title

This resolution may be cited as the Reinforce the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Act of 2005.

2.

Sense of Congress on support of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty

Congress— (1)reaffirms its support for the objectives of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and expresses its support for all appropriate measures to strengthen the Treaty and to attain its objectives; and (2)calls on all parties participating in the Seventh Nuclear NPT Review Conference— (A)to insist on strict compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to undertake effective enforcement measures against states that are in violation of their Article I or Article II obligations under the Treaty; (B)to agree to establish more effective controls on sensitive technologies that can be used to produce materials for nuclear weapons; (C)to expand the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compliance with non-proliferation rules and standards to which all states should adhere through existing authority and the additional protocols signed by the states party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; (D)to demonstrate the international community’s unified opposition to a nuclear weapons program in Iran by— (i)supporting the efforts of the United States and the European Union to prevent the Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapons capability; and (ii)using all appropriate diplomatic and other means at their disposal to convince the Government of Iran to abandon its uranium enrichment program; (E)to strongly support the ongoing United States diplomatic efforts in the context of the six-party talks that seek the verifiable and incontrovertible dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear weapons programs and to use all appropriate diplomatic and other means to achieve this result; (F)to pursue diplomacy designed to address the underlying regional security problems in Northeast Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, which would facilitate non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in those regions; (G)to accelerate programs to safeguard and eliminate nuclear weapons-usable material to the highest standards to prevent access by terrorists and governments; (H)to halt the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian reactors; (I)to strengthen national and international export controls and relevant security measures as required by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540; (J)to agree that no state may withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and escape responsibility for prior violations of the Treaty or retain access to controlled materials and equipment acquired for peaceful purposes; (K)to accelerate implementation of disarmament obligations and commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty for the purpose of reducing the world’s stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade fissile material; and (L)to strengthen and expand support for the Proliferation Security Initiative.