[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Con. Res. 36 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. CON. RES. 36

  Expressing the sense of Congress concerning actions to support the 
  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the occasion of the Seventh NPT 
                           Review Conference.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 23, 2005

Mrs. Feinstein (for herself, Mr. Hagel, Mr. Lautenberg, Mr. Durbin, Mr. 
     Corzine, Mr. Feingold, and Mr. Levin) submitted the following 
 concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing the sense of Congress concerning actions to support the 
  Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty on the occasion of the Seventh NPT 
                           Review Conference.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at 
        Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into force 
        March 5, 1970 (in this resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty''), codifies one of the most important 
        international security arrangements in the history of arms control, the 
        arrangement by which states without nuclear weapons pledge not to 
        acquire them, states with nuclear weapons commit to eventually eliminate 
        them, and nonnuclear states are allowed to use for peaceful purposes 
        nuclear technology under strict and verifiable control;
Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is one of the most widely supported 
        multilateral agreements, with 188 countries adhering to the Treaty;
Whereas the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has encouraged many countries to 
        officially abandon nuclear weapons or nuclear weapons programs, 
        including Argentina, Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, 
        South Korea, Ukraine, and Taiwan;
Whereas, at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, the states-parties 
        agreed to extend the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty indefinitely, to 
        reaffirm the principles and objectives of the Treaty, to strengthen the 
        Treaty review process, and to implement further specific and practical 
        steps on non-proliferation and disarmament;
Whereas, at the 2000 NPT Review Conference, the states-parties agreed to further 
        practical steps on non-proliferation and disarmament;
Whereas President George W. Bush stated on March 7, 2005, that ``the NPT 
        represents a key legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and 
        makes a critical contribution to international security,'' and that 
        ``the United States is firmly committed to its obligations under the 
        NPT'';
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is responsible for 
        monitoring compliance with safeguard agreements pursuant to the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty and reporting safeguard violations to the 
        United Nations Security Council;
Whereas Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin stated on February 24, 
        2005, that ``[w]e bear a special responsibility for the security of 
        nuclear weapons and fissile material in order to ensure that there is no 
        possibility such weapons or materials would fall into terrorist hands'';
Whereas Article IV of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty calls for the fullest 
        possible exchange of equipment and materials for peaceful nuclear 
        endeavors and allows states to acquire sensitive technologies to produce 
        nuclear fuel for energy purposes but also recognizes that such fuel 
        could be used to secretly produce fissile material for nuclear weapons 
        programs or quickly produce such material if the state were to decide to 
        withdraw from the Treaty;
Whereas the Government of North Korea ejected international inspectors from that 
        country in 2002, announced its withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Treaty in 2003, has recently declared its possession of 
        nuclear weapons, and is in possession of facilities capable of producing 
        additional nuclear weapons-usable material;
Whereas the Government of Iran has pursued an undeclared program to develop a 
        uranium enrichment capacity, repeatedly failed to fully comply with and 
        provide full information to the IAEA regarding its nuclear activities, 
        and stated that it will not permanently abandon its uranium enrichment 
        program which it has temporarily suspended through an agreement with the 
        European Union;
Whereas the network of arms traffickers associated with A.Q. Khan has 
        facilitated black-market nuclear transfers involving several countries, 
        including Iran, Libya, and North Korea, and represents a new and 
        dangerous form of proliferation;
Whereas governments should cooperate to control exports of and interdict illegal 
        transfers of sensitive nuclear and missile-related technologies to 
        prevent their proliferation;
Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, 
        Challenges and Change concluded that ``[a]lmost 60 States currently 
        operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at 
        least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which 
        would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively 
        short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime 
        no longer apply,'' and warned that ``[w]e are approaching a point at 
        which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
        irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation'';
Whereas stronger international support and cooperation to achieve universal 
        compliance with tighter nuclear non-proliferation rules and standards 
        constitute essential elements of nuclear non-proliferation efforts;
Whereas sustained leadership by the United States Government is essential to 
        help implement existing legal and political commitments established by 
        the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to realize a more robust and 
        effective global nuclear non-proliferation system; and
Whereas the governments of the United States and other countries should pursue a 
        comprehensive and balanced approach to strengthen the global nuclear 
        non-proliferation system, beginning with the Seventh NPT Review 
        Conference of 2005: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate (the House of Representatives concurring),

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This resolution may be cited as the ``Reinforce the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON SUPPORT OF THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION 
              TREATY.

    Congress--
            (1) reaffirms its support for the objectives of the Nuclear 
        Non-Proliferation Treaty and expresses its support for all 
        appropriate measures to strengthen the Treaty and to attain its 
        objectives; and
            (2) calls on all parties participating in the Seventh 
        Nuclear NPT Review Conference--
                    (A) to insist on strict compliance with the non-
                proliferation obligations of the Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Treaty and to undertake effective 
                enforcement measures against states that are in 
                violation of their Article I or Article II obligations 
                under the Treaty;
                    (B) to agree to establish more effective controls 
                on sensitive technologies that can be used to produce 
                materials for nuclear weapons;
                    (C) to expand the ability of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency to inspect and monitor compliance 
                with non-proliferation rules and standards to which all 
                states should adhere through existing authority and the 
                additional protocols signed by the states party to the 
                Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
                    (D) to demonstrate the international community's 
                unified opposition to a nuclear weapons program in Iran 
                by--
                            (i) supporting the efforts of the United 
                        States and the European Union to prevent the 
                        Government of Iran from acquiring a nuclear 
                        weapons capability; and
                            (ii) using all appropriate diplomatic and 
                        other means at their disposal to convince the 
                        Government of Iran to abandon its uranium 
                        enrichment program;
                    (E) to strongly support the ongoing United States 
                diplomatic efforts in the context of the six-party 
                talks that seek the verifiable and incontrovertible 
                dismantlement of North Korea's nuclear weapons programs 
                and to use all appropriate diplomatic and other means 
                to achieve this result;
                    (F) to pursue diplomacy designed to address the 
                underlying regional security problems in Northeast 
                Asia, South Asia, and the Middle East, which would 
                facilitate non-proliferation and disarmament efforts in 
                those regions;
                    (G) to accelerate programs to safeguard and 
                eliminate nuclear weapons-usable material to the 
                highest standards to prevent access by terrorists and 
                governments;
                    (H) to halt the use of highly enriched uranium in 
                civilian reactors;
                    (I) to strengthen national and international export 
                controls and relevant security measures as required by 
                United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540;
                    (J) to agree that no state may withdraw from the 
                Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and escape 
                responsibility for prior violations of the Treaty or 
                retain access to controlled materials and equipment 
                acquired for ``peaceful'' purposes;
                    (K) to accelerate implementation of disarmament 
                obligations and commitments under the Nuclear Non-
                Proliferation Treaty for the purpose of reducing the 
                world's stockpiles of nuclear weapons and weapons-grade 
                fissile material; and
                    (L) to strengthen and expand support for the 
                Proliferation Security Initiative.
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