1.This Act may be cited as
the Civil Rights Restoration Act of
2006
.
2.Congress finds the following:
(1)For over 30
years, Congress has outlawed employment discrimination by State employers. In
1974, in the face of pervasive age discrimination by State and other employers,
Congress amended the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C.
621 et seq.) (referred to in this Act as the ADEA
) to outlaw age
discrimination by such employers. In 1990, Congress passed the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq.) (referred to in this Act as
the ADA
) to provide a clear and comprehensive national
mandate
, as described in section 2(b)(1) of that Act (42 U.S.C.
12101(b)(1)), to eliminate discrimination against individuals with
disabilities, even when that discrimination came at the hands of States,
including State employers.
(2)(A)Many years have passed
since the enactment of those laws, but discrimination on the basis of age or
disability remains a serious problem in the United States.
(B)Discrimination has invidious effects
on its victims, the workforce, the economy as a whole, and government revenues.
Discrimination on the basis of age or disability—
(i)increases the risk of unemployment
among older workers or individuals with disabilities, who may, as a result of
the discrimination, be forced to depend on government programs;
(ii)adversely affects the morale and
productivity of the workforce;
(iii)perpetuates unwarranted
stereotypes about the abilities of older workers or individuals with
disabilities, thus reducing the effectiveness of government programs promoting
nondiscrimination and integration; and
(iv)prevents the best use of both
public and private resources.
(3)Since the passage
of the ADA and the ADEA, private civil suits by the victims of discrimination
have been an essential tool in combating illegal discrimination. As one witness
explained during hearings on the legislation that became the ADA, civil
rights laws depend heavily on private enforcement
. [D]amages are
essential to provide private citizens a meaningful opportunity to vindicate
their rights. Attempts to weaken the remedies available under the ADA are
attacks on the ADA itself, and their success would make the ADA an empty
promise of equality.
. Field Hearing on Americans with Disabilities Act,
Before the Subcommittee on Select Education of the House Committee on Education
and Labor, 101st Cong. 68 (1989) (statement of Mr. Howard Wolf).
(4)In recent years,
however, the Supreme Court has created a serious loophole in the ADA and the
ADEA, weakening their promise of equality
. In Kimel v. Florida
Board of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000), for instance, the Supreme Court held that
Congress lacked the power to subject States to suit for money damages under the
ADEA. In Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S.
356 (2001), the Court again held that Congress lacked the power to subject
States to suit for money damages, this time under title I of the ADA (42 U.S.C.
12111 et seq.).
(5)As a result of
those decisions, State employees who are victimized by discrimination on the
basis of age or disability cannot sue in Federal court for money damages to
vindicate their Federal rights. Those decisions have, in turn, had 2
unfortunate consequences.
(6)First, they have
undermined the enforcement of the ADA and the ADEA. Lawsuits for money damages
are the primary means for private individuals to obtain redress for
discrimination. In addition, lawsuits for money damages promote deterrence and
provide an important way for the Federal Government to enforce
antidiscrimination laws. By eliminating the ability for State employees to sue
their employers for such damages, the Supreme Court’s Kimel and Garrett
decisions have made enforcement of these civil rights laws more
difficult.
(7)Second, they have
created a legal regime that gives State employees fewer rights than other
employees covered by the ADA and the ADEA. At present, employees of local
governments and employees in the private sector are entitled to sue in Federal
court for money damages for violations of the ADA or the ADEA. For the more
than 2,500,000 individuals who work for the States, however, such relief is no
longer available.
(8)Although most
States have laws in effect that bar discrimination on the basis of age or
disability, those laws are insufficient to provide redress for those
individuals who are subjected to discrimination by State employers or
agencies.
(9)A few States
apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity to completely bar State employees from
suing in State court for age discrimination. In several States, it is still
unclear whether State law claims can proceed in State court for age
discrimination or whether those claims are barred by sovereign immunity.
Finally, there are many States that severely limit or restrict the kinds of
remedies or monetary relief available to State employees who bring suits for
discrimination on the basis of age.
(10)The same
problems exist with State laws regarding disability discrimination. In fact,
one recent analysis has shown that there are significant gaps in the coverage
and remedies available under State laws outlawing discrimination.
(11)Thus, while
State laws are important in trying to stem discrimination on the basis of age
or disability, they are currently inadequate to close the loophole created by
the Kimel and Garrett decisions.
(12)In the years
since the Kimel and Garrett decisions, many States have also challenged the
constitutionality of title II of the ADA (42 U.S.C. 12131 et seq.). These
challenges have forced individuals with disabilities into extensive litigation
about sovereign immunity when they seek redress for disability discrimination
in such fundamental areas as access to the courts, access to community-based
services, access to State-sponsored health insurance, access to public
transportation, access to handicapped parking, access to mental health
services, and access to public education. The Supreme Court has issued several
decisions that invite even more litigation. In Tennessee v. Lane, for instance,
the Court held that, under the particular facts of that case, a plaintiff could
sue the State for money damages under title II of the ADA, even though the
Court, in the Garrett case, had barred a claim for such damages under title I
of that Act (42 U.S.C. 12111 et seq.) Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509
(2004).
(13)After the Lane
decision, some claims against States are permitted to proceed under the ADA,
while others are not. This has made it extremely difficult for the victims of
discrimination, States, and Congress to determine precisely when States are
subject to suit under the ADA and when they are not. The confusion has spawned
a significant amount of litigation in the lower Federal courts. This
jurisprudence has even caused the Chairman of the Committee on the Judiciary of
the Senate, Senator Arlen Specter, to condemn the Court’s recent decisions as
inexplicable
.
(14)The Constitution
provides Congress with the power to enact legislation—
(A)to clarify that,
despite the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Kimel and Garrett cases, the
States are subject to suit just like other entities when the States violate the
ADA and the ADEA; and
(B)to end the
confusion created by the Court’s decision in the Lane case.
(15)Under section 8
of article I of the Constitution, The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide
for the common defense and general welfare of the United States
.
(16)Congress’ power
under this language, known as the Spending Clause, is well-established. Under
this Clause, Congress has the power to require the States to abide by certain
conditions in exchange for receiving Federal financial assistance. This
authority has been recognized by the Supreme Court repeatedly through the years
and reaffirmed recently. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (declaring
that Congress may exert authority through its spending power); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding condition requiring the establishment of a
drinking age of 21 years in exchange for the receipt of Federal highway
dollars). In fact, the Supreme Court has specifically held that Congress may
require a State, as a condition of receiving Federal financial assistance, to
waive its immunity from suit for violations of Federal law. College Savings
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
(17)Congress has
previously used its spending power to require States to waive their immunity
from suit in exchange for receiving Federal financial assistance. For instance,
the provisions of section 1003 of the Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986 (42
U.S.C. 2000d–7) provide that a State shall not be immune from suit under the
11th amendment for violations of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(29 U.S.C. 794), title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681
et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), and
title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.). At least
one court, however, has suggested that those provisions do not apply to the ADA
or the ADEA. Brown v. Washington Metro Area Transit Authority, No. DKC
2005–0052, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16881 (D. Md. 2005).
(18)By requiring
States to waive their immunity from suit under the ADA and the ADEA in exchange
for receiving Federal assistance, the Federal government can ensure that
Federal dollars are not frittered away
on unlawful
discrimination. Such a conditional waiver will help Congress protect the
integrity of the vast sums of money distributed through Federal
programs
. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004). Simple
justice requires that public funds, to which all taxpayers . . . contribute,
not be spent in any fashion which encourages, entrenches, subsidizes, or
results in . . . discrimination
. Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
This simple principle applies whether the discrimination is based on race, as
in the Lau case, or age, or disability, as in Barbour v. Washington Metro Area
Transit Authority, 374 F.3d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
(19)Such a
conditional waiver does not coerce a State in any way. The Supreme Court has
recognized that a State’s voluntary waiver of its 11th amendment right is
constitutional. College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education
Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (citing Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436
(1883)). The Court has explicitly recognized that a State’s acceptance of
Federal funds constitutes a knowing agreement to a congressionally-imposed
condition on the funds. Thus, while Congress may not compel States to waive
their immunity granted under the 11th amendment, a voluntary State waiver
condition is wholly permissible. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
(20)The Kimel and
Garrett decisions frustrate the ability of the ADA and the ADEA to protect
individual rights and remedy violations of Federal law. In the wake of those
decisions, and in recognition that State laws may be insufficient to protect
against discrimination on the basis of age or disability, it is essential to
require that States waive their immunity from suit under the ADA and the ADEA
for those programs or activities receiving Federal financial assistance.
3.The purposes of this Act are—
(1)to provide to any
State employee or person aggrieved by any program or activity that receives
Federal financial assistance the right to sue the State for money damages for
any violation of the ADA or the ADEA; and
(2)to provide that a
State’s receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or
activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the
11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by any
employee or person aggrieved by that program or activity for any violation of
the ADA or the ADEA.
4.Abrogation of
State sovereign immunity
(a)Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967Section 7 of the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626) is amended by adding at the end the
following:
(g)Waiver of
sovereign immunity
(1)A
State’s receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or
activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the
11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by any
employee or person aggrieved by that program or activity for equitable, legal,
or other relief authorized by or through this Act.
(2)Abrogation for
constitutional violationIn
addition to the abrogation of sovereign immunity already accomplished by this
Act, a State's sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution
or otherwise, is abrogated for any suit brought by any employee or person for
equitable, legal, or other relief authorized by or through this Act, for
conduct that violates the 14th amendment (including the constitutional rights
incorporated in the 14th amendment) and that also violates this Act.
(3)In
this subsection:
(A)
(i)The term program or activity has the meaning
given the term in section 309 of the Age
Discrimination Act of 1975 (42 U.S.C. 6107).
(ii)The term includes any operation carried out, funded, or
arranged by an entity described in clause (i) or (ii) of section 309(4)(A) of
such Act (42 U.S.C. 6107(4)(A)) that receives Federal financial assistance,
even if the entity does not use the Federal financial assistance for the
operation.
(B)A
State shall be considered to receive Federal financial assistance for a program
or activity if the program or activity—
(i)receives the
assistance from an intermediary; and
(ii)is the intended
recipient under the statutory provision through which the intermediary receives
the assistance.
(C)Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed to suggest that, for purposes of this
subsection or title III of such Act—
(i)the term
program or activity
would not include the operation described in
subparagraph (A)(ii), in the absence of this paragraph; or
(ii)a State
described in subparagraph (B) would not be considered to receive Federal
financial assistance for a program or activity, in the absence of this
paragraph.
.
(b)Title I of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990Section 107 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117) is amended by adding
at the end the following:
(c)Waiver of
sovereign immunity
(1)A
State’s receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or
activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the
11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by any
employee or person alleging a violation of this title (including regulations
promulgated under section 106) or section 503, or otherwise aggrieved, by that
program or activity for equitable, legal, or other relief authorized by or
through this Act or section 1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C.
1981a).
(2)Abrogation for
constitutional violationIn
addition to the abrogation of sovereign immunity already accomplished by
section 502, a State's sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the
Constitution or otherwise, is abrogated for any suit brought by any employee or
person for equitable, legal, or other relief authorized by or through this Act
or section 1977A of the Revised Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981a), for conduct that
violates the 14th amendment (including the constitutional rights incorporated
in the 14th amendment) and that also violates this title (including regulations
promulgated under section 106) or section 503.
(3)In
this subsection:
(A)
(i)The term program or activity has the meaning
given the term in section 504(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
794(b)).
(ii)The term includes any operation carried out, funded, or
arranged by an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 504(b)(1)
of such Act (29 U.S.C. 794(b)(1)) that receives Federal financial assistance,
even if the entity does not use the Federal financial assistance for the
operation.
(B)A
State shall be considered to receive Federal financial assistance for a program
or activity if the program or activity—
(i)receives the
assistance from an intermediary; and
(ii)is the intended
recipient under the statutory provision through which the intermediary receives
the assistance.
(C)Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed to suggest that, for purposes of this
subsection or such section 504—
(i)the term
program or activity
would not include the operation described in
subparagraph (A)(ii), in the absence of this paragraph; or
(ii)a State
described in subparagraph (B) would not be considered to receive Federal
financial assistance for a program or activity, in the absence of this
paragraph.
.
(c)Title II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990Section 203 of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12133) is amended—
(1)by inserting
(a) In
general.—
before The
; and
(2)by adding at the
end the following:
(b)Waiver of
sovereign immunity
(1)A
State’s receipt or use of Federal financial assistance for any program or
activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign immunity, under the
11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit brought by any
employee or person alleging a violation of this title (including regulations
promulgated under section 204, 229, or 244) or section 503, or otherwise
aggrieved, by that program or activity for equitable, legal, or other relief
authorized by or through this Act.
(2)Abrogation for
constitutional violationIn
addition to the abrogation of sovereign immunity already accomplished by
section 502, a State's sovereign immunity, under the 11th amendment to the
Constitution or otherwise, is abrogated for any suit brought by any employee or
person for equitable, legal, or other relief authorized by or through this Act,
for conduct that violates the 14th amendment (including the constitutional
rights incorporated in the 14th amendment) and that also violates this title
(including regulations promulgated under section 204, 229, or 244) or section
503.
(3)In
this subsection:
(A)
(i)The term program or activity has the meaning
given the term in section 504(b) of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C.
794(b)).
(ii)The term includes any operation carried out, funded, or
arranged by an entity described in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 504(b)(1)
of such Act (29 U.S.C. 794(b)(1)) that receives Federal financial assistance,
even if the entity does not use the Federal financial assistance for the
operation.
(B)A
State shall be considered to receive Federal financial assistance for a program
or activity if the program or activity—
(i)receives the
assistance from an intermediary; and
(ii)is the intended
recipient under the statutory provision through which the intermediary receives
the assistance.
(C)Nothing
in this paragraph shall be construed to suggest that, for purposes of this
subsection or such section 504—
(i)the term
program or activity
would not include the operation described in
subparagraph (A)(ii), in the absence of this paragraph; or
(ii)a State
described in subparagraph (B) would not be considered to receive Federal
financial assistance for a program or activity, in the absence of this
paragraph.
.
5.
(a)Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
(1)With respect to a particular program or activity,
paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 7(g) of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(g)) apply to conduct occurring on or after the day,
after the date of enactment of this Act, on which a State first receives or
uses Federal financial assistance for that program or activity. Section 7(g)(2)
of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (29 U.S.C. 626(g)(2))
applies to all civil actions pending on that date of enactment or filed
thereafter.
(2)Program or
activity; receives Federal financial assistanceThe definition
and rule specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 7(g)(3) of such Act
(29 U.S.C. 626(g)(2)) shall apply for purposes of this subsection.
(b)Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990
(1)With respect to a particular program or activity,
paragraphs (1) and (3) of section 107(c) and paragraphs (1) and (3) of section
203(b) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 12117(c),
12133(b)) apply to conduct occurring on or after the day, after the date of
enactment of this Act, on which a State first receives or uses Federal
financial assistance for that program or activity. Sections 107(c)(2) and
203(b)(2) of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C.
12117(c)(2), 12133(b)(2)) apply to all civil actions pending on that date of
enactment or filed thereafter.
(2)Program or
activity; receives Federal financial assistanceThe definition
and rule specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of section 107(c)(3) of such
Act (42 U.S.C. 12117(c)(3)) shall apply for purposes of this subsection.