Short title

This Act may be cited as the

Strategy for Success in Iraq Act

Findings

The Senate makes the following findings: (1)The men and women of the Armed Forces have performed with valor, honor, and courage in Iraq. (2)United States military commanders and intelligence community personnel agree that the insurgency in Iraq draws substantial support from disaffected Iraqi Sunnis. (3)The new Iraq constitution was adopted in a national referendum on October 15, 2005, despite the opposition of a great majority of Iraqi Sunnis. (4)Iraq cannot be stable without a sustainable political solution embraced by the Sunni minority as well as the majority Shias and Kurds. (5)Senior United States military commanders and Administration officials have acknowledged that the insurgency cannot be defeated without a political solution. (6)The commander of the Multinational Forces-Iraq, General George Casey, told the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate on September 29, 2005, that [i]ncreased coalition presence feeds the notion of occupation … contributes to the dependency of Iraqi security forces on the coalition … [ and ] … extends the amount of time that it will take for Iraqi security forces to become self-reliant. (7)General Casey also said that [r]educing the visibility and, ultimately, the presence of coalition forces as we transition to Iraqi security self-reliance remains a key element of our overall counterinsurgency strategy. (8)The United States Armed Forces have established a training program for the security forces of Iraq that continues to make possible the assumption of security responsibilities by such security forces. (9)The number of members of the United States Armed Forces in Iraq has risen to more than 160,000 to provide protection for the recent constitutional referendum and the upcoming December elections in Iraq. (10)The people of Iraq will elect their first permanent government since the 2003 invasion on December 15, 2005. (11)The success of the December elections will constitute an important benchmark in transferring political responsibilities to the people of Iraq. (12)The phased redeployment of United States Armed Forces based on achieving benchmarks for the transfer of political and security responsibilities to Iraq is a critical part of a successful strategy in Iraq.

Strategy for Success

To complete the mission in Iraq and bring our troops home, the President must implement a comprehensive new strategy for success in Iraq that simultaneously pursues a sustainable political solution and the redeployment of United States forces tied to specific political and military benchmarks.

Implementation of Strategy

To implement the strategy under section 3, the President must undertake aggressive diplomatic, political, military and economic measures, including actions to achieve the following: (1)Reduce the sense of United States occupation of Iraq by— (A)committing publicly not to establish permanent United States military bases in Iraq, or to maintain a large United States combat force on Iraq soil indefinitely; (B)drawing-down at least 20,000 United States troops upon the successful completion of the December 2005 elections as the first step in the process of reducing the United States force presence in Iraq as political and military benchmarks are met; and (C)reducing the visibility of United States forces by placing as many as possible in rear guard, garrisoned status for security backup purposes. (2)Give Sunnis a real stake in the future of Iraq by— (A)convincing Iraqi Shias and Kurds to address legitimate Sunni concerns about regional autonomy and the allocation of oil revenues; (B)hosting a conference of the neighbors of Iraq, the United Kingdom, other key members of the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance, and the Russian Federation, immediately after the December elections, to develop a collective strategy to bring the parties in Iraq to a sustainable political compromise that also includes mutual security guarantees among the peoples of Iraq; and (C)urging the Sunni neighbors of Iraq to immediately set up a reconstruction fund targeted to the majority Sunni areas to show Iraqi Sunnis the benefits of participating in the political process. (3)Appoint a high-level presidential envoy to strengthen United States diplomatic efforts with respect to Iraq. (4)Develop a new regional security structure with United States participation to enlist the support of the Sunni neighbors of Iraq. (5)Accelerate reconstruction efforts in Iraq by providing the necessary civilian personnel to do the job, establishing civil-military reconstruction teams throughout Iraq, streamlining the disbursement of funds to the provinces of Iraq, expanding job creation programs in Iraq, and strengthening the capacity of Iraqi government ministries. (6)Create the military conditions for the redeployment of United States forces by— (A)intensifying the training of Iraqi security forces through expanded in-country training and the acceptance of outstanding offers from other countries to do more training; (B)transferring military and police responsibilities on a phased basis to Iraqi security forces as their capabilities increase; and (C)working with the new Iraq government to secure international support for a multinational force to help protect the borders of Iraq until a capable national army is formed.

Reports to Congress

(a)

Reports required

Not later than June 30, 2006, and every six months thereafter, the President shall submit to the appropriate committees of Congress a report the actions taken to implement the strategy set forth in section 3 including the actions specified in section 4. (b)

Appropriate committees of Congress defined

In this section, the term appropriate committees of Congress means— (1)the Committees on Foreign Relations and Appropriations of the Senate; and (2)the Committees on International Relations and Appropriations of the House of Representatives.