[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 192 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 192

      To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and 
      reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 26, 2005

   Mr. Lugar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and 
              referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
      To provide for the improvement of foreign stabilization and 
      reconstruction capabilities of the United States Government.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. FINDINGS AND SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Armed Forces of the United States are extremely 
        capable of effectively projecting military force and achieving 
        conventional military victory. However, achieving United States 
        objectives not only requires military success but also 
        successful stabilization and reconstruction operations in 
        countries affected by conflict.
            (2) Without success in the aftermath of large-scale 
        hostilities, the United States will not achieve its objectives. 
        Success in the aftermath follows from success in preparation 
        before hostilities.
            (3) Providing safety, security, and stability is critical 
        to successful reconstruction efforts and for achieving United 
        States objectives. Making progress toward achieving those 
        conditions in a country is difficult when daily life in that 
        country is largely shaped by violence of a magnitude that 
        cannot be managed by indigenous police and security forces.
            (4) Reconstruction activities cannot and should not wait 
        until safety and security has been achieved. Many elements of 
        reconstruction, including restoration of essential public 
        services and creation of sufficient jobs to instill a sense of 
        well-being and self-worth in a population of a country, are 
        necessary precursors to achieving stabilization in a country 
        affected by conflict. Stabilization operations and 
        reconstruction operations are intrinsically intertwined.
            (5) Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
        begun new stabilization and reconstruction operations every 18 
        to 24 months. Because each such operation typically lasts for 
        five to eight years, cumulative requirements for human 
        resources can total three to five times the level needed for a 
        single operation.
            (6) History indicates that--
                    (A) stabilization of societies that are relatively 
                ordered, without ambitious goals, may require five 
                troops per 1,000 indigenous people; and
                    (B) stabilization of disordered societies, with 
                ambitious goals involving lasting cultural change, may 
                require 20 troops per 1,000 indigenous people.
            (7) That need, with the cumulative requirement to maintain 
        human resources for three to five overlapping stabilization 
        operations, presents a formidable challenge. It has become 
        increasingly clear that more people are needed in-theater for 
        stabilization and reconstruction operations than for combat 
        operations.
            (8) Since the end of the Cold War, the United States has 
        spent at least four times more on stabilization and 
        reconstruction activities than on large-scale combat 
        operations.
            (9) One overarching lesson from history is that the 
        quality, quantity, and kind of preparation in peacetime 
        determines success in a stabilization and reconstruction 
        operation before it even begins. If an operation starts badly, 
        it is difficult to recover.
            (10) It is clear from experience in Afghanistan and Iraq 
        that the United States must expect to encounter significant 
        challenges in its future stabilization and reconstruction 
        efforts, including efforts that seek to ensure stability, 
        democracy, human rights, and a productive economy in a nation 
        affected by conflict. Achieving these ends requires effective 
        planning and preparation in the years before the outbreak of 
        hostilities in order for the Armed Forces and civilian agencies 
        of the United States Government to have the capabilities that 
        are necessary to support stabilization and reconstruction. Such 
        capabilities are not traditionally found within those entities.
            (11) The United States can be more effective in meeting the 
        challenges of the transition to and from hostilities, 
        challenges that require better planning, new capabilities, and 
        more personnel with a wider range of skills.
            (12) Orchestration of all instruments of United States 
        power in peacetime would obviate the need for many military 
        expeditions to achieve United States objectives, and better 
        prepare the United States to achieve its objectives during 
        stabilization and reconstruction operations.
            (13) Choosing the priority and sequence of United States 
        objectives, acknowledging that not everything is equally 
        important or urgent, and noting that in other cultures certain 
        social and attitudinal change may take decades, all require 
        explicit management-decisionmaking and planning in the years 
        before stabilization and reconstruction operations might be 
        undertaken in a region.
            (14) To be fully effective, the United States needs to have 
        Federal Government personnel deployed continuously abroad for 
        years-long tours of duty, far longer than the length of 
        traditional assignments, so that they become familiar with the 
        local scene and the indigenous people come to trust them as 
        individuals.
            (15) There is a significant need for skilled personnel to 
        be stationed abroad in support of stabilization and 
        reconstruction activities. The active components of the Armed 
        Forces cannot meet all of these requirements. Personnel from 
other Federal agencies, reserve component forces, contractors, United 
States allies and coalition partners, and indigenous personnel must 
help.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) enhancing United States effectiveness in the transition 
        to and from hostilities will require--
                    (A) management discipline, that is--
                            (i) the extension of the management focus 
                        of the Armed Forces (covering the full gamut of 
                        personnel selection, training, and promotion;
                            (ii) planning, budgeting, and resource 
                        allocation;
                            (iii) education, exercises, games, 
                        modeling, and rehearsal, performance and 
                        readiness measurement; and
                            (iv) development of doctrine (now focused 
                        on combat operations) to include peacetime 
                        activities, stabilization and reconstruction 
                        operations and intelligence activities that 
                        involve multi-agency participation and 
                        coordination; and
                    (B) building and maintaining certain fundamental 
                capabilities that are critical to success in 
                stabilization and reconstruction, including training 
                and equipping sufficient numbers of personnel for 
                stabilization and reconstruction activities, strategic 
                communication, knowledge, understanding, and 
                intelligence, and identification, location, and 
                tracking for asymmetric warfare;
            (2) these capabilities, without management discipline, 
        would lack orchestration and be employed ineffectively, and 
        management discipline without these capabilities would be 
        impotent; and
            (3) the study of transition to and from hostilities, which 
        the Defense Science Board carried out in the summer of 2004 at 
        the request of the Secretary of Defense, provides an 
        appropriate framework within which the Department of Defense 
        and personnel of other departments and agencies of the Federal 
        Government should work to plan and prepare for pre-conflict and 
        post-conflict stability operations.

SEC. 2. DIRECTION, PLANNING, AND OVERSIGHT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that a new coordination and 
integration mechanism is needed to bring management discipline to the 
continuum of peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction 
operations.
    (b) Presidential Action.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should issue a directive to develop an intensive planning 
process for stabilization and reconstruction activities, and that the 
directive should provide for--
            (1) contingency planning and integration task forces, that 
        is, full-time activities that could continue for months or 
        years, to be staffed by individuals from all involved agencies 
        who have expertise in the countries of interest and in needed 
        functional areas to work under the general guidance of the 
        Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs;
            (2) joint interagency task forces composed of senior 
        Government executives and military officers who operate in a 
        particular country or area of interest and are created to 
        ensure coordination and integration of the activities of all 
        United States personnel in that country or area; and
            (3) a national center for contingency support, that is, a 
        federally funded research and development center with country 
        and functional expertise that would support the contingency 
        planning and integration task forces and joint interagency task 
        forces and would augment skills and expertise of the Government 
        task forces, provide a broad range of in-depth capability, 
        support the planning process, and provide the necessary 
        continuity.
    (c) Actions by Secretary of Defense.--While a directive described 
in subsection (b) is being implemented, the Secretary of Defense 
shall--
            (1) take immediate action to strengthen the role and 
        capabilities of the Department of Defense for carrying out 
        stabilization and reconstruction activities;
            (2) actively support the development of core competencies 
        in planning in other departments and agencies, principally the 
        Department of State;
            (3) instruct regional combatant commanders to maintain a 
        portfolio of operational contingency plans for stabilization 
        and reconstruction activities similar in scope to that 
        currently maintained for combat operations; and
            (4) instruct each regional combatant commander to create a 
        focal point within their command for stabilization and 
        reconstruction planning and execution.

SEC. 3. STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION CAPABILITIES.

    (a) Core Competency.--The Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of 
State shall each--
            (1) make stabilization and reconstruction one of the core 
        competencies of the Department of Defense and the Department of 
        State, respectively;
            (2) achieve a stronger partnership and closer working 
        relationship between the two departments; and
            (3) augment their existing capabilities for stabilization 
        and reconstruction.
    (b) Department of Defense.--
            (1) Mission.--The Secretary of Defense shall designate the 
        planning for stabilization and reconstruction as a mission of 
        the Department of Defense that has the same priority as the 
        mission of the Department of Defense to carry out combat 
        operations.
            (2) Supporting actions.--In administering the planning, 
        training, execution, and evaluation necessary to carry out the 
        stabilization and reconstruction mission, the Secretary of 
        Defense shall--
                    (A) designate the Army as executive agent for 
                stabilization and reconstruction;
                    (B) ensure that stabilization and reconstruction 
                operational plans are fully integrated with combat 
operational plans of the combatant commands;
                    (C) require the Army and the Marine Corps to 
                develop, below the brigade level, modules of 
                stabilization and reconstruction capabilities to 
                facilitate task organization and exercise and 
                experiment with them to determine where combinations of 
                these capabilities can enhance United States 
                effectiveness in stability operations;
                    (D) require the Secretary of the Army to accelerate 
                restructuring of Army Reserve and Army National Guard 
                forces with an emphasis on providing the capability for 
                carrying out the stabilization mission; and
                    (E) ensure that stabilization and reconstruction 
                becomes a core competency of general purpose forces 
                through training, leader development, doctrine 
                development, and use of other force readiness tools 
                and, to do so, shall require that--
                            (i) the Secretaries of the military 
                        departments and the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
                        integrate stabilization and reconstruction 
                        operations into the professional military 
                        education programs of each of the Armed Forces 
                        and the joint professional military education 
                        programs, by including in the curricula courses 
                        to increase understanding of cultural, 
                        regional, ideological, and economic concerns, 
                        and to increase the level of participation by 
                        students from other agencies and departments in 
                        those programs;
                            (ii) stabilization and reconstruction be 
                        integrated into training events and exercises 
                        of the Armed Forces at every level;
                            (iii) the commander of the United States 
                        Joint Forces Command further develop, publish, 
                        and refine joint doctrine for stability and 
                        reconstruction operations;
                            (iv) the Director of Defense Research and 
                        Engineering and the senior acquisition 
                        executive of each of the military departments 
                        develop and implement a process for achieving 
                        more rapid and coherent exploitation of service 
                        and departmental science and technology 
                        programs and increase the investment in force-
                        multiplying technologies, such as language 
                        translation devices and rapid training;
                            (v) the resources for support of stability 
                        operations be increased; and
                            (vi) a force with a modest stabilization 
                        capability of sufficient size to achieve 
                        ambitious objectives in small countries, 
                        regions, or areas, and of sufficient capability 
                        to achieve modest objectives elsewhere be 
                        developed, and consideration be given to the 
                        actual capability of that force in making a 
                        decision to commit the force to a particular 
                        stabilization and reconstruction operation or 
                        to expand the force for that operation.
    (c) Department of State.--
            (1) Policy on reconstruction integration.--It is the policy 
        of the United States that the capabilities to promote political 
        and economic reform that exist in many civilian agencies of the 
        United States Government, in international organizations, in 
        nongovernmental and private voluntary organizations, and in 
        other governments be integrated based upon a common vision and 
        coordinated strategy.
            (2) Responsibilities of the secretary of state.--The 
        Secretary of State shall--
                    (A) be the focus for carrying out the policy on 
                reconstruction integration set forth in paragraph (1); 
                and
                    (B) develop in the Department of State 
                capabilities--
                            (i) to develop, maintain, and execute a 
                        portfolio of detailed and adaptable plans and 
                        capabilities for the civilian roles in 
                        reconstruction operations;
                            (ii) to prepare, deploy, and lead the civil 
                        components of reconstruction missions; and
                            (iii) to incorporate international and 
                        nongovernmental capabilities in planning and 
                        execution.
    (d) Collaboration and Cooperation Between Departments of Defense 
and State.--The Secretary of Defense shall--
            (1) assist in bolstering the development of the Office of 
        Stabilization and Reconstruction of the Department of State and 
        otherwise support that objective through the sharing of the 
        extensive expertise of the Department of Defense in crisis 
        management planning and in the process of deliberate planning;
            (2) work collaboratively with that office and assign to 
        that office at least 10 experts to provide the intellectual 
        capital and guidance on the relevant best practices that have 
        been developed within the Department of Defense; and
            (3) ensure that extensive joint and collaborative planning 
        for stabilization and reconstruction operations occurs before 
        commencement of a conflict that leads to such an operation.

SEC. 4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION.

    (a) Presidential Directive.--Recognizing an increase in anti-
American attitudes around the world, particularly in Islamic and 
Middle-Eastern countries, the use of terrorism, and the implications of 
terrorism for national security issues, it is the sense of Congress 
that the President should issue a directive to strengthen the United 
States Government's ability--
            (1) to better understand global public opinion about the 
        United States, and to communicate with global audiences;
            (2) to coordinate all components of strategic 
        communication, including public diplomacy, public affairs, and 
        international broadcasting; and
            (3) to provide a foundation for new legislation on the 
        planning, coordination, conduct, and funding of strategic 
        communication.
    (b) NSC Organization.--It is, further, the sense of Congress that 
the President should establish a permanent organizational structure 
within the National Security Council to oversee the efforts undertaken 
pursuant to a directive described in subsection (a) and that such 
structure should include--
            (1) a deputy national security advisor for strategic 
        communication to serve as the President's principal advisor on 
        all matters relating to strategic communication;
            (2) a strategic communication committee, chaired by the 
        deputy national security advisor for strategic communication 
        and with a membership drawn from officers serving at the under 
        secretary level of departments and agencies, to develop an 
        overarching framework for strategic communication (including 
        brand identity, themes, messages, and budget priorities) and to 
        direct and coordinate interagency programs to maintain focus, 
        consistency, and continuity; and
            (3) an independent, nonprofit, nonpartisan center for 
        strategic communication to serve as a source of independent, 
        objective expertise to support the National Security Council 
        and the strategic communication committee, by (among other 
        actions) providing information and analysis, developing and 
        monitoring the effectiveness of themes, messages, products, and 
        programs, determining target audiences, contracting with 
        commercial sector sources for products and programs, and 
        fostering cross-cultural exchanges of ideas, people, and 
        information.
    (c) Actions by Departments of State and Defense.--
            (1) In general.--The Secretary of State and the Secretary 
        of Defense shall each allocate substantial funding to strategic 
        communication.
            (2) Department of state.--Within the Department of State, 
        the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public 
        Affairs shall be the principal policy advisor and manager for 
        strategic communication.
            (3) Department of defense.--Within the Department of 
        Defense, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy shall serve 
        as that department's focal point for strategic communication.

SEC. 5. KNOWLEDGE, UNDERSTANDING, AND INTELLIGENCE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The knowledge necessary to be effective in conducting 
        stabilization and reconstruction operations is different from 
        the military knowledge required to prevail during hostilities, 
        but is no less important.
            (2) To successfully achieve United States political and 
        military objectives, knowledge of culture and development of 
        language skills must be taken as seriously as development of 
        combat skills.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the collection, analysis, and integration of cultural 
        knowledge and intelligence should be ongoing to ensure its 
        availability far in advance of stabilization and reconstruction 
        operations for which such knowledge and intelligence are 
        needed; and
            (2) a new approach is needed to establish systematic ways 
        to access and coordinate the vast amount of knowledge available 
        within the United States Government.
    (c) Commanders of Combatant Commands.--
            (1) Intelligence plans.--The Secretary of Defense shall 
        require the commanders of the combatant commands to develop 
        intelligence plans as a required element of their planning 
        process. Each such plan shall satisfy information needs for 
        peacetime, combat, and stabilization and reconstruction 
        (including support to other departments and agencies) and be 
        developed by use of the same kinds of tools that are useful in 
        traditional pre-conflict and conflict planning.
            (2) Resources.--The Secretary of Defense shall provide 
        resources to the regional combatant commands for the 
        establishment of offices for regional expertise outreach to 
        support country and regional planning and operations, and to 
        provide continuity, identify experts, and build relationships 
        with outside experts and organizations.
            (3) Area experts.--In order to increase the number of 
        competent area experts, the Under Secretary of Defense for 
        Personnel and Readiness shall lead a process to set 
        requirements and develop career paths for foreign area officers 
        and a new cadre of enlisted area specialists, a process based 
        on a more formal, structured definition of requirements by the 
        commanders of the combatant commands.
            (4) Military education.--The Secretaries of the military 
        departments shall improve the regional and cultural studies 
        curricula in the joint professional military education system, 
        as well as in online regional and cultural self-study 
        instruction, in order to broaden cultural knowledge and 
        awareness.
    (d) Intelligence Reform.--
            (1) Sense of congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
        the United States should shift the focus of intelligence reform 
        from reorganization to the solving of substantive problems in 
        intelligence.
            (2) Actions.--The Director of National Intelligence, in 
        consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall--
                    (A) establish a human resource coordination office 
                charged with the responsibility to develop a 
                comprehensive human resource strategy for planning, 
                management, and deployment of personnel that would 
                serve as the basis for optimizing the allocation of 
                resources against critical problems;
                    (B) adopt a new counterintelligence and security 
                approach that puts the analyst in the role of 
                determining the balance between need-to-share and need-
                to-know that will enable the intelligence community to 
enlarge its circle of trust from which to draw information and skills;
                    (C) improve integration between networks and data 
                architectures across the intelligence community to 
                facilitate enterprise-wide collaboration;
                    (D) harmonize special operations forces, covert 
                action, and intelligence, and ensure that sufficient 
                capabilities in these specialized areas are developed;
                    (E) accelerate the reinvention of defense human 
                intelligence and ensure that there are enough such 
                personnel assigned and sustained for a sufficient 
                number of years in advance of the nation's need for 
                their services; and
                    (F) enhance the analysis of intelligence collected 
                from all sources, including by improving the selection, 
                recruitment, training, and continuing education of 
                analysts, producing regular and continuous assessment 
                and post-operation appraisal of intelligence products, 
                and creating incentives to promote the creativity and 
                independence of analysts.
    (e) Foreign Language Proficiency.--
            (1) Finding.--Congress finds that the utilization of 
        individuals with foreign language skills is critical to 
        understanding a country or a region, yet the Department of 
        Defense lacks sufficient personnel with critical foreign 
        language skills.
            (2) Actions by secretary of defense.--The Secretary of 
        Defense shall--
                    (A) prescribe the specific foreign language and 
                regional specialist requirements that must be met in 
                order to meet the needs of the Department of Defense, 
                including the needs of the commander of the United 
                States Joint Forces Command and the commanders of the 
                other combatant commands and the needs of the Armed 
                Forces generally, and shall provide the resources for 
                meeting these requirements in the annual budget 
                submissions; and
                    (B) develop a more comprehensive system for 
                identifying, testing, tracking, and accessing personnel 
                with critical foreign language skills.
    (f) Exploitation of Open Sources of Information.--
            (1) Findings.--Congress finds that open sources of 
        information--
                    (A) can provide much of the information needed to 
                support peacetime needs and stabilization and 
                reconstruction needs; and
                    (B) can be used to develop a broad range of 
                products needed for stabilization and reconstruction 
                operations, including such products as genealogical 
                trees, electricity generation and transmission grids, 
                cultural materials in support of strategic 
                communication plans, and background information for 
                noncombatant evacuation operations.
            (2) Executive agent for department of defense.--The 
        Secretary of Defense shall designate the Director of the 
        Defense Intelligence Agency to serve as executive agent of the 
        Department of Defense for the development and administration of 
        a robust and coherent program for the exploitation of open 
        sources of information.

SEC. 6. IDENTIFICATION, LOCATION, AND TRACKING IN ASYMMETRIC WARFARE.

    The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Director of 
National Intelligence, shall immediately develop a program administered 
by a new organization established by those officers to provide--
            (1) an overall technical approach to--
                    (A) the identification, location, and tracking of 
                asymmetric warfare operations carried out against the 
                Armed Forces of the United States or allied or 
                coalition armed forces; and
                    (B) tracking targets in asymmetric warfare in which 
                the Armed Forces of the United States, or allied or 
                coalition armed forces may be engaged;
            (2) the systems and technology to implement the approach;
            (3) the analysis techniques for translating sensor data 
        into useful identification, location, and tracking information;
            (4) the field operations to employ, utilize, and support 
        the hardware and software produced; and
            (5) feedback to the Secretary of Defense and the Director 
        of National Intelligence on the impact of related policy 
        decisions and directives on the creation of a robust 
        identification, location, and tracking capability.

SEC. 7. MANAGEMENT IMPLEMENTATION PLANS.

    (a) Requirement for Plans.--Not later than 90 days after the date 
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Defense and the 
Secretary of State shall each submit to Congress a management plan for 
carrying out the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense (and the 
duties of other officials of the Department of Defense) and the 
responsibilities of the Secretary of State (and the duties of other 
officials of the Department of State), respectively, under this Act.
    (b) Content.--Each plan submitted under this section shall include 
objectives, schedules, and estimates of costs, together with a 
discussion of the means for defraying the costs.

SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATIONS OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Department of Defense.--There is authorized to be appropriated 
to the Department of Defense for the Office for Stability Operations 
such sums as may be necessary to enable that office to carry out the 
planning, oversight, and related stabilization and reconstruction 
activities required of the Department of Defense under this Act.
    (b) Department of State.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
the Department of State such sums as may be necessary for carrying out 
the planning, oversight, and related stabilization and reconstruction 
activities required of the Department of State under this Act.

                                 <all>