[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 577 Introduced in House (IH)]







109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 577

  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the 
     conditions for the United States to become a signatory to any 
    multilateral agreement on trade resulting from the World Trade 
             Organization's Doha Development Agenda Round.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 18, 2005

 Mr. English of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. Reynolds, and Ms. Hart) 
submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee 
                           on Ways and Means

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives regarding the 
     conditions for the United States to become a signatory to any 
    multilateral agreement on trade resulting from the World Trade 
             Organization's Doha Development Agenda Round.

Whereas members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) are currently engaged in a 
        round of trade negotiations known as the Doha Development Agenda (Doha 
        Round);
Whereas the Doha Round includes negotiations aimed at clarifying and improving 
        disciplines under the Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the 
        General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (Antidumping Agreement) and 
        the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (Subsidies 
        Agreement);
Whereas the WTO Ministerial Declaration adopted on November 14, 2001 (WTO Paper 
        No. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1), specifically provides that the Doha Round 
        negotiations are to preserve the ``basic concepts, principles and 
        effectiveness'' of the Antidumping Agreement and the Subsidies 
        Agreement;
Whereas in section 2102(b)(14)(A) of the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority 
        Act of 2002, the Congress mandated that the principal negotiating 
        objective of the United States with respect to trade remedy laws was to 
        ``preserve the ability of the United States to enforce rigorously its 
        trade laws . . . and avoid agreements that lessen the effectiveness of 
        domestic and international disciplines on unfair trade, especially 
        dumping and subsidies'';
Whereas the countries that have been the most persistent and egregious violators 
        of international fair trade rules are engaged in an aggressive effort to 
        significantly weaken the disciplines provided in the Antidumping 
        Agreement and the Subsidies Agreement and undermine the ability of the 
        United States to effectively enforce its trade remedy laws;
Whereas chronic violators of fair trade disciplines have put forward proposals 
        that would substantially weaken United States trade remedy laws and 
        practices, including mandating that unfair trade orders terminate after 
        a set number of years even if unfair trade and injury are likely to 
        recur, mandating that trade remedy duties reflect less than the full 
        margin of dumping or subsidization, mandating higher de minimis levels 
        of unfair trade, making cumulation of the effects of imports from 
        multiple countries more difficult in unfair trade investigations, 
        outlawing the critical practice of ``zeroing'' in antidumping 
        investigations, mandating the weighing of causes, and mandating other 
        provisions that make it more difficult to prove injury;
Whereas United States trade remedy laws have already been significantly weakened 
        by numerous unjust and activist WTO dispute settlement decisions which 
        have created new obligations to which the United States never agreed;
Whereas trade remedy laws remain a critical resource for American manufacturers, 
        agricultural producers, and aquacultural producers in responding to 
        closed foreign markets, subsidized imports, and other forms of unfair 
        trade, particularly in the context of the challenges currently faced by 
        these vital sectors of the United States economy;
Whereas the United States had a current account trade deficit of approximately 
        $668,000,000,000 in 2004, including a trade deficit of almost 
        $162,000,000,000 with China alone, as well as a trade deficit of 
        $40,000,000,000 in advanced technology;
Whereas United States manufacturers have lost over 3,000,000 jobs since June 
        2000, and United States manufacturing employment is currently at its 
        lowest level since 1950;
Whereas many industries critical to United States national security are at 
        severe risk from unfair foreign competition; and
Whereas the House of Representatives strongly believes that the proposals put 
        forward by countries seeking to undermine trade remedy disciplines in 
        the Doha Round would result in serious harm to the United States 
        economy, including significant job losses and trade disadvantages: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives 
that--
            (1) the United States should not be a signatory to any 
        agreement or protocol with respect to the Doha Development 
        Round of the World Trade Organization negotiations, or any 
        other bilateral or multilateral trade negotiations, that--
                    (A) adopts any proposal to lessen the effectiveness 
                of domestic and international disciplines on unfair 
                trade or safeguard provisions, including proposals--
                            (i) mandating that unfair trade orders 
                        terminate after a set number of years even if 
                        unfair trade and injury are likely to recur;
                            (ii) mandating that trade remedy duties 
                        reflect less than the full margin of dumping or 
                        subsidization;
                            (iii) mandating higher de minimis levels of 
                        unfair trade;
                            (iv) making cumulation of the effects of 
                        imports from multiple countries more difficult 
                        in unfair trade investigations;
                            (v) outlawing the critical practice of 
                        ``zeroing'' in antidumping investigations; or
                            (vi) mandating the weighing of causes or 
                        other provisions making it more difficult to 
                        prove injury in unfair trade cases; or
                    (B) would lessen in any manner the ability of the 
                United States to enforce rigorously its trade laws, 
                including the antidumping, countervailing duty, and 
                safeguard laws;
            (2) the United States trade laws and international rules 
        appropriately serve the public interest by offsetting injurious 
        unfair trade, and further ``balancing modifications'' or other 
        similar provisions are unnecessary and would add to the 
        complexity and difficulty of achieving relief against injurious 
        unfair trade practices; and
            (3) the United States should ensure that any new agreement 
        relating to international disciplines on unfair trade or 
        safeguard provisions fully rectifies and corrects decisions by 
        WTO dispute settlement panels or the Appellate Body that have 
        unjustifiably and negatively impacted, or threaten to 
        negatively impact, United States law or practice, including a 
        law or practice with respect to foreign dumping or 
        subsidization.
                                 <all>