[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 665 Introduced in House (IH)]






109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 665

 To prevent access by terrorists to nuclear material, technology, and 
 expertise, to establish an Office of Nonproliferation Programs in the 
       Executive Office of the President, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            February 8, 2005

Mr. Schiff (for himself, Mr. Shays, Mr. Butterfield, Mr. Chandler, Mrs. 
 Davis of California, Mr. Edwards, Mr. Grijalva, Mr. Holt, Mr. Israel, 
   Mrs. Maloney, Mr. Scott of Georgia, Mr. Sherman, and Ms. Watson) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                        International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To prevent access by terrorists to nuclear material, technology, and 
 expertise, to establish an Office of Nonproliferation Programs in the 
       Executive Office of the President, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Omnibus Nonproliferation and Anti-
Nuclear Terrorism Act of 2005''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) Loose nuclear weapons and materials in the former 
        soviet union.--
                    (A) There are in the world today enormous 
                stockpiles of nuclear weapons and the materials 
                required to make them. Counting materials both in 
                assembled warheads and in other forms, worldwide totals 
                are estimated to encompass some 1,900 tons of highly 
                enriched uranium (enough for 143,000 nuclear weapons) 
                and 1,855 tons of plutonium (enough for 330,000 nuclear 
                weapons).
                    (B) The Russian Federation alone is estimated to 
                have over 1,000 tons of highly enriched uranium (enough 
                for over 80,000 nuclear weapons) and 140 tons of 
                plutonium (enough for over 30,000 nuclear weapons).
                    (C) The United States has been working for over a 
                decade to eliminate stockpiles of loose nuclear weapons 
                and materials in the former Soviet Union, but the 
                Department of Energy acknowledges that there is still a 
                need to properly secure about 460 tons of weapons-
                usable Russian nuclear material (outside of warheads), 
                enough for more than 35,000 nuclear weapons.
                    (D) A recent report by the Central Intelligence 
                Agency faulted the security of nuclear arsenal 
                facilities in the Russian Federation and assessed that 
                ``undetected smuggling has occurred.''
                    (E) There are at least 18 documented incidents of 
                ``proliferation significant'' fissile material 
                trafficking from facilities in the former Soviet Union 
                between 1991 and 2001. In one incident in 1998, an 
                inside conspiracy at a Russian nuclear weapons facility 
                attempted to steal 18.5 kilograms of highly enriched 
                uranium. In another incident, 2 kilograms of highly 
                enriched uranium taken from a research facility in 
                Sukhumi, Georgia, has never been recovered.
                    (F) In May 1994, German police found a small but 
                worrisome quantity of supergrade plutonium in the 
                garage of Adolf Jackle. Extremely expensive to produce, 
                this rare item was likely stolen from one of Russia's 
                two premier nuclear weapons laboratories.
                    (G) Comprehensive security upgrades are not yet 
                completed at 90 percent of Russian nuclear warhead 
                bunkers for Russia's Strategic Rocket Forces.
                    (H) Border security in the former Soviet Union is 
                inconsistent at best. Existing infrastructure helps at 
                the outer borders of the former Soviet Union but many 
                borders internal to the former Soviet Union, such as 
                the border between Kazakhstan and the Russian 
                Federation, exist only on a map.
            (2) Loose nuclear materials around the globe.--
                    (A) Dangerous caches of weapons-usable nuclear 
                materials, much of it poorly secured and vulnerable to 
                theft, exist in a multitude of facilities around the 
                world. For example, there are over 130 research 
                reactors in over 40 countries that house highly 
                enriched uranium, some with enough to manufacture an 
                atomic bomb. In total, about 40 tons of highly enriched 
                uranium, enough for over 1,000 nuclear weapons, is 
                estimated to remain in civilian research reactors.
                    (B) Over the last 50 years, the United States is 
                known to have exported about 27.5 tons of highly 
                enriched uranium to 43 countries to help develop 
                nuclear power production or bolster scientific 
                initiatives. In 1996, the United States began an effort 
                to recover the more than 17.5 tons of the nuclear 
                material that was still overseas, but has recovered 
                only about 1 ton, according to the Department of Energy 
                and the Government Accountability Office.
                    (C) It is especially important to keep highly 
                enriched uranium out of terrorists' hands because, with 
                minimal expertise, they could use it to make the 
                simplest, gun-type nuclear weapon--a device in which a 
                high explosive is used to blow one subcritical piece of 
                highly enriched uranium from one end of a tube into 
                another subcritical piece held at the opposite end of 
                the tube.
                    (D) To Osama bin Laden, acquiring weapons of mass 
                destruction is a ``religious duty''. Al Qaeda and more 
                than two dozen other terrorist groups are pursuing 
                capability to use weapons of mass destruction.
                    (E) Osama bin Laden's press spokesman, Sulaiman Abu 
                Ghaith, has announced that the group aspires ``to kill 
                4 million Americans, including 1 million children,'' in 
                response to casualties supposedly inflicted on Muslims 
                by the United States and Israel.
                    (F) Al Qaeda documents recovered in Afghanistan 
                reveal a determined research effort focused on nuclear 
                weapons.
            (3) Security standards for all nuclear weapons and 
        materials.--
                    (A) There are no international binding standards 
                for the secure handling and storage of nuclear weapons 
                and materials.
                    (B) Making a nuclear weapon requires only 4 to 5 
                kilograms of plutonium or 12 to 15 kilograms of highly 
                enriched uranium.
                    (C) In October 2001, the United States Government 
                became very concerned that Al Qaeda may have smuggled a 
                10-kiloton Russian nuclear warhead into New York City. 
                If placed in lower Manhattan, such a device would 
                probably kill 100,000 people instantly, seriously 
                injure tens of thousands more, and render the entire 
                area uninhabitable for decades to come.
            (4) Russia's nuclear expertise.--
                    (A) Employment at the large nuclear facilities in 
                the Russian Federation's 10 closed nuclear cities is 
                estimated to be in the range of 120,000 to 130,000 
                people, of whom approximately 75,000 were employed on 
                nuclear weapons-related work.
                    (B) Poor wages and living conditions in Russian 
                ``nuclear cities'' have inspired protests and strikes 
                among the employees working in them.
                    (C) Insiders have been caught attempting to smuggle 
                nuclear materials out of these facilities, presumably 
                to sell on the lucrative black market.

SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF OFFICE OF NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS IN THE 
              EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT.

    (a) Establishment.--There is established in the Executive Office of 
the President an Office of Nonproliferation Programs (in this section 
referred to as the ``Office'').
    (b) Director; Associate Directors.--There shall be at the head of 
the Office a Director who shall be appointed by the President, by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate, and who shall be compensated 
at the rate provided for level II of the Executive Schedule in section 
5313 of title 5. The President is authorized to appoint not more than 
four Associate Directors, by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate, who shall be compensated at a rate not to exceed that provided 
for level III of the Executive Schedule in section 5314 of such title. 
Associate Directors shall perform such functions as the Director may 
prescribe.
    (c) Primary Functions of Director.--
            (1) In general.--The primary function of the Director is to 
        coordinate and lead--
                    (A) efforts by the United States to curb terrorist 
                access to nuclear technology, materials, or expertise; 
                and
                    (B) other United States nonproliferation 
                activities, including nuclear nonproliferation 
                activities and activities to counter other weapons of 
                mass destruction.
            (2) Specific functions.--In addition to such other 
        functions and activities as the President may assign, the 
        Director shall--
                    (A) advise the President, and others within the 
                Executive Office of the President, on the role and 
                effect of such nonproliferation activities on national 
                security and international relations;
                    (B) lead the development and implementation of a 
                plan (including appropriate budgets, other resources, 
                goals, and metrics for assessing progress) to ensure 
                that all the highest-priority actions to prevent 
                terrorists from getting and using nuclear weapons are 
                taken in the shortest possible time, including but not 
                limited to a fast-paced global effort to ensure that 
                every nuclear warhead and every kilogram of weapons-
                usable nuclear material worldwide is secured and 
                accounted for, to standards sufficient to defeat 
                demonstrated terrorist and criminal threats, as rapidly 
                as that objective can be accomplished;
                    (C) identify obstacles to accelerating and 
                strengthening efforts to prevent terrorists from 
                getting and using nuclear weapons, and raise approaches 
                to overcoming these ostacles for action by the 
                President or other appropriate officials;
                    (D) lead an effort, to be carried out jointly by 
                the various Federal agencies responsible for carrying 
                out such nonproliferation activities, to establish 
                priorities among those activities and to develop and 
                implement strategies and budgets that reflect those 
                priorities;
                    (E) build strong partnerships with respect to such 
                nonproliferation activities among Federal, State, and 
                local governments, foreign governments, international 
                organizations, and nongovernmental organizations; and
                    (F) evaluate the scale, quality, and effectiveness 
                of the Federal effort with respect to such 
                nonproliferation activities and advise on appropriate 
                actions.

SEC. 4. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
              PROGRAMS.

    (a) Repeal of Restrictions.--
            (1) Restrictions on assistance in destroying former soviet 
        weapons.--Section 211(b) of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction 
        Act of 1991 (22 U.S.C. 2551 note) is repealed.
            (2) Restrictions on authority to carry out ctr programs.--
        Section 1203(d) of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 
        (title XII of Public Law 103-160; 22 U.S.C. 5952(d)) is 
        repealed.
            (3) Limitation on use of funds for chemical weapons 
        destruction.--Section 1305 of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (22 U.S.C. 5952 note) is 
        repealed.
    (b) Exemption From Limitations.--Cooperative Threat Reduction 
programs may be carried out notwithstanding any other provision of law, 
subject to congressional notification and reporting requirements that 
apply to the use of funds available for Cooperative Threat Reduction 
programs or the carrying out of projects or activities under such 
programs.
    (c) Inapplicability of Other Restrictions.--Section 502 of the 
Freedom for Russia and Emerging Eurasian Democracies and Open Markets 
Support Act of 1992 (22 U.S.C. 5852) shall not apply to any Cooperative 
Threat Reduction program.

SEC. 5. REMOVAL OF RESTRICTIONS ON DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 
              NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS.

    Section 4301 of the Atomic Energy Defense Act (50 U.S.C. 2561) is 
repealed.

SEC. 6. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO USE COOPERATIVE THREAT REDUCTION 
              PROGRAM FUNDS OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

    Section 1308 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1662; 22 U.S.C. 5963) is 
amended--
            (1) by striking ``President'' each place it appears and 
        inserting ``Secretary of Defense'';
            (2) in subsection (a), by striking ``each of the 
        following'' and all that follows through the period at the end 
        and inserting the following: ``that such project or activity 
        will--
            ``(1) assist the United States in the resolution of a 
        critical emerging proliferation threat; or
            ``(2) permit the United States to take advantage of 
        opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation 
        goals.'';
            (3) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
            (4) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (c).

SEC. 7. MODIFICATIONS OF AUTHORITY TO USE INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR 
              MATERIALS PROTECTION AND COOPERATION PROGRAM FUNDS 
              OUTSIDE THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.

    Section 3124 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2004 (Public Law 108-136; 117 Stat. 1747) is amended--
            (1) by striking ``President'' each place it appears and 
        inserting ``Secretary of Energy'';
            (2) in subsection (a), by striking ``each of the 
        following'' and all that follows through the period at the end 
        and inserting the following: ``that such project or activity 
        will--
            ``(1) assist the United States in the resolution of a 
        critical emerging proliferation threat; or
            ``(2) permit the United States to take advantage of 
        opportunities to achieve long-standing nonproliferation 
        goals.'';
            (3) by striking subsections (c) and (d); and
            (4) by redesignating subsection (e) as subsection (c).

SEC. 8. SPECIAL REPORTS ON ADHERENCE TO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS AND 
              NONPROLIFERATION COMMITMENTS.

    (a) Reports Required.--At least annually, the Secretary of State 
shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on 
each country in which a Cooperative Threat Reduction program is being 
carried out. The report shall describe that country's commitments to--
            (1) making substantial national investments in 
        infrastructure to secure, safeguard, and destroy weapons of 
        mass destruction;
            (2) forgoing any military modernization exceeding 
        legitimate defense requirements, including replacement of 
        weapons of mass destruction;
            (3) forgoing any use of fissionable materials or any other 
        components of deactivated nuclear weapons in a new nuclear 
        weapons program;
            (4) complying with all relevant arms control agreements;
            (5) adopting and enforcing national and international 
        export controls over munitions and dual-use items; and
            (6) facilitating the verification by the United States and 
        international community of that country's compliance with such 
        commitments.
    (b) Form.--The report required under subsection (a) may be 
submitted with the report required under section 403 of the Arms 
Control and Disarmament Act (22 U.S.C. 2593a).

SEC. 9. PRESIDENTIAL REPORT ON IMPEDIMENTS TO CERTAIN NONPROLIFERATION 
              ACTIVITIES.

    Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees 
a report identifying impediments (including liability concerns, 
taxation issues, access rights, and other impediments) to--
            (1) the ongoing renegotiation of the umbrella agreement 
        relating to Cooperative Threat Reduction; and
            (2) the ongoing negotiations for the implementation of the 
        Plutonium Disposition Program, the Nuclear Cities Initiative, 
        and other defense nuclear nonproliferation programs.

SEC. 10. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO LIABILITY PROTECTIONS FOR UNITED 
              STATES NONPROLIFERATION EFFORTS IN RUSSIA.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The Administration has failed to negotiate an 
        acceptable solution for the continued impasse between the 
        United States and Russia on negotiations over liability 
        protections for United States companies and personnel 
        conducting nonproliferation work in Russia.
            (2) Because Congress requires that both the United States 
        and Russian plutonium disposition programs proceed in rough 
        parallel, the protracted liability negotiations have already 
        resulted in a one-year delay in the planned construction start 
        in Russia and the United States from summer 2004 to summer 
        2005.
            (3) As a result, another construction season will be missed 
        in Russia, and Congress notes that the projected start of 
        construction has now slipped five years since the project began 
        in fiscal year 2000.
            (4) Not only does this raise serious concern from a 
        national security standpoint, but also it will have serious 
        repercussions here in the United States as a result of 
        maintaining general parity of the two construction schedules.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--Based on the foregoing, it is the sense of 
Congress that the Administration should find an acceptable solution in 
the near term for the impasse referred to in subsection (a)(1), in 
order to successfully complete negotiations and allow construction to 
begin on mixed oxide fuel fabrication facilities in both the United 
States and Russia.

SEC. 11. ENHANCEMENT OF GLOBAL THREAT REDUCTION INITIATIVE.

    Section 3132 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2166; 50 U.S.C. 
2569) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (b)--
                    (A) in the subsection heading, by striking 
                ``Program Authorized'' and inserting ``Program 
                Required''; and
                    (B) by striking ``The Secretary of Energy may'' and 
                inserting ``The President, acting through the Secretary 
                of Energy, shall''; and
            (2) in subsection (c)(1), by adding at the end the 
        following new subparagraph:
            ``(N) Take such other actions as may be necessary to 
        effectively implement the Global Threat Reduction 
        Initiative.''.

SEC. 12. EXPANSION OF PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE.

    (a) Sense of Congress Relating to Proliferation Security 
Initiative.--It is the sense of the Congress that--
            (1) the President should strive to expand and strengthen 
        the Proliferation Security Initiative announced by the 
        President on May 31, 2003, placing particular emphasis on 
        including countries outside of NATO; and
            (2) the United States should engage the United Nations to 
        develop a Security Council Resolution to authorize the 
        Proliferation Security Initiative under international law, 
        including by providing legal authority to stop shipments of 
        weapons of mass destruction, their delivery systems, and 
        related materials.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations Relating to Proliferation 
Security Initiative.--There are authorized to be appropriated for 
fiscal year 2006, $50,000,000 to conduct joint training exercises 
regarding interdiction of weapons of mass destruction under the 
Proliferation Security Initiative. Particular emphasis should be given 
to allocating funds from such amount--
            (1) to invite other countries that do not participate in 
        the Proliferation Security Initiative to observe the joint 
        training exercises; and
            (2) to conduct training exercises with countries that 
        openly join the Proliferation Security Initiative after the 
        date of the enactment of this Act.

SEC. 13. SENSE OF CONGRESS RELATING TO INTERNATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS 
              FOR NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND MATERIALS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President should seek to 
devise and implement standards to improve the security of nuclear 
weapons and materials by--
            (1) establishing with other willing nations a set of 
        performance-based standards for the security of nuclear weapons 
        and weapons;
            (2) negotiating with those nations an agreement to adopt 
        the standards and implement appropriate verification measures 
        to assure ongoing compliance; and
            (3) coordinating with those nations and the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency to strongly encourage other states to 
        adopt and verifiably implement the standards.

SEC. 14. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS RELATING TO INVENTORY OF 
              RUSSIAN TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DATA EXCHANGES.

    In addition to any other amounts authorized to be appropriated for 
such purposes, there are authorized to be appropriated to the 
Administrator for Nuclear Security for fiscal year 2006, $5,000,000 for 
assistance to Russia to facilitate the conduct of a comprehensive 
inventory of the stockpile of Russia of--
            (1) non-strategic nuclear weapons; and
            (2) nuclear weapons, whether strategic or non-strategic, 
        that are not secured by PALs or other electronic means.

SEC. 15. REPORT ON ACCOUNTING FOR AND SECURING OF RUSSIA'S NON-
              STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    Not later than 120 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on Russia's non-strategic nuclear 
weapons. The report shall--
            (1) detail past and current efforts of the United States to 
        encourage a proper accounting for and securing of Russia's non-
        strategic nuclear weapons and Russia's nuclear weapons, whether 
        strategic or non-strategic, that are not secured by PALs or 
        other electronic means;
            (2) detail the actions that are most likely to lead to 
        progress in improving the accounting for and securing or 
        dismantlement of such weapons; and
            (3) detail the feasibility of enhancing the national 
        security of the United States by developing increased 
        transparency between the United States and Russia with respect 
        to the numbers, locations, and descriptions of such weapons and 
        of the corresponding weapons of the United States.

SEC. 16. RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT INVOLVING ALTERNATIVE USE OF WEAPONS 
              OF MASS DESTRUCTION EXPERTISE.

    (a) Authority to Use Funds.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law and subject to subsection (c), any funds available to a department 
or agency of the Federal Government may be used to conduct non-defense 
research and development in Russia and the states of the former Soviet 
Union on technologies specified in subsection (b) utilizing scientists 
in Russia and the states of the former Soviet Union who have expertise 
in--
            (1) nuclear weapons; or
            (2) chemical or biological weapons, but only if such 
        scientists no longer engage, or have never engaged, in 
        activities supporting prohibited chemical or biological 
        capabilities.
    (b) Technologies.--The technologies specified in this subsection 
are technologies on the following:
            (1) Environmental restoration and monitoring.
            (2) Proliferation detection.
            (3) Health and medicine, including research.
            (4) Energy.
    (c) Limitation.--Funds may not be used under subsection (a) for 
research and development if the Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy, determines 
that such research and development will--
            (1) pose a threat to the security interests of the United 
        States; or
            (2) further materially any defense technology.
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--
            (1) In general.--There is authorized to be appropriated to 
        the Department of State $20,000,000 for fiscal year 2006 for 
        the following purposes:
                    (A) To make determinations under subsection (c).
                    (B) To defray any increase in costs incurred by the 
                Department of State, or any other department or agency 
                of the Federal Government, for research and 
                development, or demonstration, as a result of research 
                and development conducted under this section.
            (2) Availability.--(A) Amounts authorized to be 
        appropriated by paragraph (1) are authorized to remain 
        available until expended.
            (B) Any amount transferred to a department or agency of the 
        Federal Government pursuant to paragraph (1)(B) shall be merged 
        with amounts available to such department or agency to cover 
        costs concerned, and shall be available for the same purposes, 
        and for the same period, as amounts with which merged.

SEC. 17. STRENGTHENING THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) Article IV of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons (commonly referred to as the Nuclear 
        Nonproliferation Treaty or NPT) (21 UST 483) states that 
        countries that are parties to the treaty have the ``inalienable 
        right . . . to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
        energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in 
        conformity with articles I and II of this treaty.''.
            (2) The rights outlined under article IV include all fuel 
        cycle activities, despite the fact that uranium enrichment and 
        plutonium production potentially put a country in a position to 
        produce weapons usable material.
            (3) David Bergmann, former chairman of the Israeli Atomic 
        Energy Commission, stated: ``. . . by developing atomic energy 
        for peaceful uses, you reach the nuclear weapon option. There 
        are not two atomic energies''.
            (4) The wording of article IV has made it possible for 
        countries that are parties to the NPT treaty to use peaceful 
        nuclear programs as a cover for weapons programs. In 
        particular, the misuse by North Korea and Iran of these 
        provisions threatens to undercut the viability of the nuclear 
        nonproliferation regime and the entire system of international 
        nuclear commerce.
            (5) If the international community fails to devise 
        effective measures to deal with the ``loophole'' in article IV, 
        then there is a great likelihood that the ranks of countries 
        possessing nuclear weapons will increase markedly in the next 
        decade.
    (b) Presidential Report on Control of Nuclear Fuel Cycle 
Technologies and Material.--Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the 
appropriate congressional committees a report identifying ways to more 
effectively control nuclear fuel cycle technologies and material, 
including ways that the United States can mobilize the international 
community to close the ``loophole'' of article IV of the NPT, without 
undermining the treaty itself.

SEC. 18. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
        ``appropriate congressional committees'' means--
                    (A) the Committee on International Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland 
                Security, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
                House of Representatives; and
                    (B) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the 
                Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Homeland 
                Security and Governmental Affairs, and the Committee on 
                Appropriations of the Senate.
            (2) Cooperative threat reduction programs.--The term 
        ``Cooperative Threat Reduction programs'' means programs and 
        activities specified in section 1501(b) of the National Defense 
        Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 
        Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 2362 note).
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