109 HR 5682 RH: United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006 U.S. House of Representatives 2006-07-21 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain.

IB Union Calendar No. 341 109th CONGRESS 2d Session H. R. 5682 [Report No. 109–590, Part I] IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES June 26, 2006 Mr. Hyde (for himself, Mr. Lantos, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Engel, Mr. Crowley, and Mr. Etheridge) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition to the Committee on Rules, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned July 21, 2006 Additional sponsors: Mr. Price of North Carolina, Mr. Miller of North Carolina, Ms. Millender-McDonald, Mr. Strickland, Mr. McDermott, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Delahunt, Mr. Boustany, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Conaway, Mr. Hall, Mr. Smith of Texas, Mr. Neugebauer, Mr. Carter, Mr. Bonilla, Mr. Foley, Mr. Sam Johnson of Texas, Mr. Linder, Mr. Culberson, Mr. Hensarling, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. Kolbe, Ms. Granger, Mr. Marchant, Mr. Lewis of Kentucky, and Mr. Miller of Florida July 21, 2006 Reported from the Committee on International Relations with an amendment Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic July 21, 2006 Committee on Rules discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed For text of introduced bill, see copy of bill as introduced on June 26, 2006 A BILL To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

1.

Short title

This Act may be cited as the United States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006.

2.

Sense of Congress

It is the sense of Congress that— (1)preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States foreign policy; (2)sustaining the NPT and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy; (3)the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation; (4)countries that have never become a party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the NPT’s international obligation to prohibit the spread of dangerous nuclear technologies; (5)it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear technology they develop; (6)it may be in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for nuclear cooperation as set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has never been an NPT member with respect to civilian nuclear technology if— (A)the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver them; (B)the country has a functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the United States in key foreign policy initiatives related to non-proliferation; (C)such cooperation induces the country to implement the highest possible protections against the proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and (D)such cooperation will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups, that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons; and (7) (A)India meets the criteria described in this subsection; and (B)it is in the national security interest of the United States to deepen its relationship with India across a full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.

3.

Statements of policy

(a)

In general

The following shall be the policies of the United States: (1)Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the NPT). (2)Encourage states party to the NPT to interpret the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, as described in Article IV of the NPT, as being a qualified right that is conditioned by the overall purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability, including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations, as determined by the IAEA. (3)Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been achieved. (b)

With respect to South Asia

The following shall be the policies of the United States with respect to South Asia: (1)Achieve a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the People’s Republic of China at the earliest possible date. (2)Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become parties. (3)Secure India’s— (A)full participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative; (B)formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction Principles; (C)public announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement; (D)demonstration of satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and (E)ratification of or accession to the Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on September 12, 1997. (4)Secure India’s full and active participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability to enrich or process nuclear materials), and the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction. (5)Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination. (6)To ensure that spent fuel generated in India’s civilian nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160 f.). (7)Pending implementation of a multilateral moratorium, encourage India not to increase its production of fissile material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.

4.

Waiver authority and congressional approval

(a)

In general

Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the President makes the determination described in subsection (b), the President may— (1)exempt a proposed agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for cooperation may only enter into force in accordance with subsections (f) and (g); (2)waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to India, provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if the President determines that India has engaged in any activity described section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than section 129 a.(1)(D) or section 129 a.(2)(C) of such Act, at any time after the date of the enactment of this Act; and (3)with respect to India— (A)waive the restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any activity that occurred on or before July 18, 2005; and (B)section 129 a.(1)(D) of such Act. (b)

Determination by the President

The determination referred to in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the following actions have occurred: (1)India has provided the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the IAEA. (2)India and the IAEA have concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared in the plan described in paragraph (1), including materials used in or produced through the use of India’s civil nuclear facilities. (3)India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to India’s civil nuclear program. (4)India is working actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. (5)India is working with and supporting United States and international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology. (6)India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and technology, including through— (A)the enactment and enforcement of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations; (B)harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the policies and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear Suppliers Group; and (C)adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence. (7)The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG and such decision does not permit civil nuclear commerce with any other non-nuclear weapon state that does not have IAEA safeguards on all nuclear materials within its territory, under its jurisdiction, or carried out under its control anywhere. (c)

Submission to Congress

(1)

In general

The President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate information concerning any determination made pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis for the determination. (2)

Information to be included

To the fullest extent available to the United States, the information referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the following: (A)A summary of the plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate India’s civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and declaration. (B)A summary of the agreement that has been entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India’s civil nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and a description of the progress toward its full implementation. (C)A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such Additional Protocol. (D)A description of the steps that India is taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, including a description of the steps that the United States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty. (E)A description of the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can be used to acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well as the support that India is providing to the United States to further United States objectives to restrict the spread of such technology. (F)A description of the steps that India is taking to secure materials and technology applicable for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and the means to deliver such weapons through the application of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization and adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, and United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security Initiative. (G)A description of the decision taken within the Nuclear Suppliers Group relating to nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the United States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the decision, practices, and policies of the NSG. (H)A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by the United States and India that will be implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, including whether such cooperation will include the provision of enrichment and reprocessing technology. (I)A description of the steps taken to ensure that proposed United States civil nuclear assistance to India will not directly, or in any other way, assist India’s nuclear weapons program, including— (i)the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex; (ii)the replication and subsequent use of any United States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and (iii)the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. (d)

Restrictions on nuclear transfers to India

(1)

In general

Pursuant to the obligations of the United States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this Act, or any agreement pursuant to this Act, shall be interpreted as permitting any civil nuclear cooperation between the United States and India that would in any way assist, encourage, or induce India to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. (2)

NSG Transfer guidelines

Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for cooperation with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item subject to such agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred to India if such transfer would violate the transfer guidelines of the NSG as in effect on the date of the transfer. (3)

Termination of nuclear transfers to India

Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated if India makes any materially significant transfer of— (A)nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that does not conform to NSG guidelines, or (B)ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or technology that does not conform to MTCR guidelines,unless the President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security. (4)

Prohibition on nuclear transfers to India

If nuclear transfers to India are restricted pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms Export Control Act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating governments in the NSG or from any other source. (e)

Approval of agreement for nuclear cooperation required

(1)

In general

Subject to subsection (m), an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India submitted pursuant to this section may become effective only if— (A)the President submits to Congress the agreement concluded between the United States and India, including a copy of the safeguards agreement entered into between the IAEA and India relating to India’s declared civilian nuclear facilities, in accordance with the requirements and procedures of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (other than section 123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act; and (B)after the submission under subparagraph (A), the agreement is approved by a joint resolution that is enacted into law. (2)

Consultation

Beginning one month after the date of the enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until the President submits to Congress the agreement referred to in paragraph (1), the President should consult with the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding the status of the negotiations between the United States and India with respect to civilian nuclear cooperation and between the IAEA and India with respect to the safeguards agreement described in subsection (b)(2). (f)

Joint resolution

For purposes of this section, a joint resolution referred to in subsection (e)(1)(B) is a joint resolution of the two Houses of Congress— (1)the matter after the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the Congress hereby approves the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of America and the Republic of India submitted by the President on ___________., with the blank space being filled with the appropriate date; (2)which does not have a preamble; and (3)the title of which is as follows: Joint Resolution Approving an Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States and India. (g)

Introduction and referral

(1)

Introduction

A joint resolution shall, on the day on which the submissions under subsection (e)(1)(A) are made (or, if either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the first day thereafter when that House is in session)— (A)be introduced in the House of Representatives by the majority leader, for himself and the minority leader of the House, or by Members of the House designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the House; and (B)be introduced in the Senate by the majority leader, for himself and the minority leader of the Senate, or by Members of the Senate designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the Senate.If either House of Congress is not in session on that day, the joint resolution shall be introduced on the first day thereafter when both Houses are in session. (2)

Referral

The joint resolution shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate. (h)

Discharge of committees

If a committee to which a joint resolution is referred has not reported such joint resolution by the end of 60 days beginning on the date of its introduction, or the date of the submission of the nonproliferation assessment statement described in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), whichever is later, such committee shall be discharged from further consideration of such joint resolution, and such joint resolution shall be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved. (i)

Floor consideration in the House of Representatives

(1)

In general

On or after the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays, Sundays, or legal holidays, except when the House of Representatives is in session on such a day) after the date on which the committee to which a joint resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged from further consideration of, such a joint resolution, it shall be in order for any Member of the House to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution. A Member of the House may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day on which the Member announces to the House the Member’s intention to do so. Such motion shall be privileged and shall not be debatable. The motion shall not be subject to amendment or to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the motion is agreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the House shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution which shall remain the unfinished business until disposed of. (2)

Debate

Debate on a joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection therewith, shall be limited to not more than six hours, which shall be divided equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. An amendment to the joint resolution shall not be in order. A motion to further limit debate shall be in order and shall not be debatable. A motion to table, a motion to postpone, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution shall not be in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order. (3)

Appeals

Appeals from the decisions of the Chair to the procedure relating to a joint resolution shall be decided without debate. (j)

Floor consideration in the Senate

Any joint resolution shall be considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b)(4) of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976. (k)

Consideration by the other house

If, before the passage by one House of a joint resolution of that House, that House receives a joint resolution from the other House, then the following procedures shall apply: (1)The joint resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as provided in paragraph (2)(B). (2)With respect to a joint resolution of the House receiving the joint resolution— (A)the procedure in that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from the other House; but (B)the vote on final passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House. (3)Upon disposition of the joint resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in order to consider the joint resolution that originated in the receiving House. (l)

Computation of days

In the computation of the period of 60 days referred to in subsection (h), there shall be excluded the days on which either House of Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a day certain or because of an adjournment of the Congress sine die. (m)

Section 123 of Atomic Energy Act of 1954 not affected

Notwithstanding subsection (e)(1), this section does not preclude the approval, under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of an agreement for cooperation in which India is the cooperating party. (n)

Sunset

The procedures under this section shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of a joint resolution under this section. (o)

Reports

(1)

Policy objectives

The President shall, not later than January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each year thereafter, submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report on— (A)the extent to which each policy objective in section 3(b) has been achieved; (B)the steps taken by the United States and India in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those objectives; (C)the extent of cooperation by other countries in achieving those objectives; and (D)the steps the United States will take in the current calendar year to accomplish those objectives. (2)

Nuclear exports to India

(A)

In general

Not later than one year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing United States exports to India for the preceding year pursuant to such agreement and the anticipated exports to India for the next year pursuant to such agreement. (B)

Nuclear fuel

The report described in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified form if necessary)— (i)an estimate for the previous year of the amount of uranium mined in India; (ii)the amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive devices; (iii)the rate of production of— (I)fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; and (II)nuclear explosive devices; and (iv)an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production of nuclear explosive devices. (C)

Unsafeguarded nuclear facilities

The report described in subparagraph (A) shall also include (in a classified form if necessary) a description of whether United States civil nuclear assistance to India is directly, or in any other way, assisting India’s nuclear weapons program, including— (i)the use of any United States equipment, technology, or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or nuclear-weapons related complex; (ii)the replication and subsequent use of any United States technology in an unsafeguarded nuclear facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, or for any activity related to the research, development, testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and (iii)the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as to facilitate the increased production of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. (3)

New nuclear reactors or facilities

Not later than one year after the date of the enactment of this Act and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing any new nuclear reactors or nuclear facilities that the Government of India has designated as civilian and placed under inspections or has designated as military. (4)

Disposal of spent nuclear fuel

Not later than one year after the date on which an agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India is approved by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a report describing the disposal of spent nuclear fuel from India’s civilian nuclear program. (p)

Definitions

In this Act: (1)

IAEA

The term IAEA means the International Atomic Energy Agency. (2)

MTCR

The term MTCR means the Missile Technology Control Regime. (3)

NPT

The term NPT means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. (4)

NPT member

The term NPT member means a country that is a party to the NPT. (5)

NSG

The term NSG means the Nuclear Suppliers Group.

July 21, 2006 Committee on Rules discharged; committed to the Committee of the Whole House on the State of the Union and ordered to be printed