109 HR 5682 IH: To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy
U.S. House of Representatives
2006-06-26
text/xml
EN
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1.This Act may be cited as the United
States and India Nuclear Cooperation Promotion Act of 2006
.
2.It is the sense of
Congress that—
(1)preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction, the means
to produce them, and the means to deliver them are critical objectives for
United States foreign policy;
(2)sustaining the NPT
and strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and
compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation policy;
(3)the NPT has been a
significant success in preventing the acquisition of nuclear weapons
capabilities and maintaining a stable international security situation;
(4)countries that
have never become a party to the NPT and remain outside that treaty’s legal
regime pose a potential challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of
global nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the NPT’s
international obligation to prohibit the spread of dangerous nuclear
technologies;
(5)it is in the
interest of the United States to the fullest extent possible to ensure that
those countries that are not NPT members are responsible with any nuclear
technology they develop;
(6)it
may be in the interest of the United States to enter into an agreement for
nuclear cooperation as set forth in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of
1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country that has never been an NPT member with
respect to civilian nuclear technology if—
(A)the country has
demonstrated responsible behavior with respect to the nonproliferation of
technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and the means to
deliver them;
(B)the country has a
functioning and uninterrupted democratic system of government, has a foreign
policy that is congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the
United States in key foreign policy initiatives related to
non-proliferation;
(C)such cooperation
induces the country to implement the highest possible protections against the
proliferation of technology related to weapons of mass destruction programs and
the means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would further the
development of its nuclear weapons program; and
(D)such cooperation
will induce the country to give greater political and material support to the
achievement of United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives,
especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if necessary,
sanctioning and containing states that sponsor terrorism and terrorist groups,
that are seeking to acquire a nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of
mass destruction capability and the means to deliver such weapons; and
(7)(A)India meets the criteria
described in this subsection; and
(B)it is in the national security
interest of the United States to deepen its relationship with India across a
full range of issues, including peaceful nuclear cooperation.
3.
(a)The following shall
be the policies of the United States:
(1)Oppose the development of a capability to
produce nuclear weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of
the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (21 UST 483; commonly
referred to as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
or the
NPT
).
(2)Encourage states party to the NPT to
interpret the right to develop research, production and use of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes
, as described in Article IV of the NPT, as
being a qualified right that is conditioned by the overall purpose of the NPT
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capability,
including by refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any state party that
has not demonstrated that it is in full compliance with its NPT obligations, as
determined by the IAEA.
(3)Strengthen the Nuclear Suppliers Group
guidelines concerning consultation by members regarding violations of supplier
and recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely and
coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, including
termination of nuclear transfers to an involved recipient, that discourages
individual NSG members from continuing cooperation with such recipient until
such time as a consensus regarding a coordinated response has been
achieved.
(b)With respect to
South AsiaThe following shall be the policies of the United
States with respect to South Asia:
(1)Achieve a moratorium on the production of
fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by India, Pakistan, and the
People’s Republic of China at the earliest possible date.
(2)Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the
conclusion and implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile
material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and India become
parties.
(3)Secure India’s—
(A)full participation
in the Proliferation Security Initiative;
(B)formal commitment
to the Statement of Interdiction Principles;
(C)public
announcement of its decision to conform its export control laws, regulations,
and policies with the Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures,
Criteria, and Control Lists of the Wassennaar Arrangement;
(D)demonstration of
satisfactory progress toward implementing the decision described in
subparagraph (C); and
(E)ratification of or accession to the
Convention on Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna on
September 12, 1997.
(4)Secure India’s full and active
participation in United States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary,
sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass
destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability (including the capability
to enrich or process nuclear materials), and the means to deliver weapons of
mass destruction.
(5)Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon
arsenals in South Asia, and to promote their reduction and eventual
elimination.
4.Waiver authority
and congressional approval
(a)Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if the
President makes the determination described in subsection (b), the President
may—
(1)exempt a proposed
agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)) from the requirement in
section 123 a.(2) of such Act, and such agreement for cooperation may only
enter into force in accordance with subsections (f) and (g);
(2)waive the
application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157)
with respect to India, provided that such waiver shall cease to be effective if
the President determines that India has engaged in any activity described
section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158), other than section 129 a.(1)(D) or
section 129 a.(2)(C) of such Act, at any time after the date of the enactment
of this Act; and
(3)with respect to
India—
(A)waive the
restrictions of section 129 a.(1)(A) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42
U.S.C. 2158 a.(1)(A)) for any activity that occurred on or before July 18,
2005; and
(B)section 129
a.(1)(D) of such Act.
(b)Determination by
the PresidentThe determination referred to in subsection (a) is
a determination by the President that the following actions have
occurred:
(1)India has provided
the United States and the International Atomic Energy Agency with a credible
plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and
programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its civil facilities with the
IAEA.
(2)India and the IAEA
have concluded an agreement requiring the application of IAEA safeguards in
perpetuity in accordance with IAEA standards, principles, and practices
(including IAEA Board of Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India’s civil
nuclear facilities, materials, and programs as declared in the plan described
in paragraph (1), including materials used in or produced through the use of
India’s civil nuclear facilities.
(3)India and the IAEA
are making substantial progress toward concluding an Additional Protocol
consistent with IAEA principles, practices, and policies that would apply to
India’s civil nuclear program.
(4)India is working
actively with the United States for the early conclusion of a multilateral
Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty.
(5)India is working
with and supporting United States and international efforts to prevent the
spread of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
(6)India is taking
the necessary steps to secure nuclear and other sensitive materials and
technology, including through—
(A)the enactment and
enforcement of comprehensive export control legislation and regulations;
(B)harmonization of
its export control laws, regulations, policies, and practices with the policies
and practices of the Missile Technology Control Regime and the Nuclear
Suppliers Group; and
(C)adherence to the
MTCR and the NSG in accordance with the procedures of those regimes for
unilateral adherence.
(7)The NSG has
decided by consensus to permit supply to India of nuclear items covered by the
guidelines of the NSG.
(c)
(1)The President shall submit to the Committee on
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the Committee on
Foreign Relations of the Senate information concerning any determination made
pursuant to subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis for the
determination.
(2)Information to
be includedTo the fullest extent available to the United States,
the information referred to in paragraph (1) shall include the
following:
(A)A summary of the
plan provided by India to the United States and the IAEA to separate India’s
civil and military nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the
declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India’s civil facilities to
be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an analysis of the credibility of
such plan and declaration, together with copies of the plan and
declaration.
(B)A summary of the
agreement that has been entered into between India and the IAEA requiring the
application of safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India’s civil
nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in subparagraph (A),
together with a copy of the agreement, and a description of the progress toward
its full implementation.
(C)A summary of the
progress made toward conclusion and implementation of an Additional Protocol
between India and the IAEA, including a description of the scope of such
Additional Protocol.
(D)A description of the steps that India is
taking to work with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral
treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons,
including a description of the steps that the United States has taken and will
take to encourage India to identify and declare a date by which India would be
willing to stop production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally
or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.
(E)A description of
the steps India is taking to prevent the spread of nuclear-related technology,
including enrichment and reprocessing technology or materials that can be used
to acquire a nuclear weapons technology, as well as the support that India is
providing to the United States to further United States objectives to restrict
the spread of such technology.
(F)A description of
the steps that India is taking to secure materials and technology applicable
for the development, acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction
and the means to deliver such weapons through the application of comprehensive
export control legislation and regulations, and through harmonization and
adherence to Missile Technology Control Regime, the Nuclear Suppliers Group,
the Australia Group, Wassennaar guidelines, and United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security
Initiative.
(G)A description of
the decision taken within the Nuclear Suppliers Group relating to nuclear
cooperation with India, including whether nuclear cooperation by the United
States under an agreement for cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the decision,
practices, and policies of the NSG.
(H)A description of
the scope of peaceful cooperation envisioned by the United States and India
that will be implemented under the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation, including
whether such cooperation will include the provision of enrichment and
reprocessing technology.
(d)Restrictions on
nuclear transfers to India
(1)Notwithstanding the entry into force of an agreement for
cooperation with India pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2153) and approved pursuant to this Act, no item subject to such
agreement or subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG may be transferred
to India if such transfer would violate the transfer guidelines of the NSG as
in effect on the date of the transfer.
(2)Termination of
nuclear transfers to IndiaNotwithstanding the entry into force of an
agreement for nuclear cooperation with India (arranged pursuant to section 123
of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153)), exports of nuclear and
nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated
if India makes any materially significant transfer of—
(A)nuclear or
nuclear-related material, equipment, or technology that does not conform to NSG
guidelines, or
(B)ballistic missiles
or missile-related equipment or technology that does not conform to MTCR
guidelines,
unless the
President determines that cessation of such exports would be seriously
prejudicial to the achievement of United States nonproliferation objectives or
otherwise jeopardize the common defense and security.(3)Prohibition on
nuclear transfers to IndiaIf nuclear transfers to India are
restricted pursuant to this Act, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, or the Arms
Export Control Act, the President should seek to prevent the transfer to India
of nuclear equipment, materials, or technology from other participating
governments in the NSG or from any other source.
(e)Approval of
agreement for nuclear cooperation required
(1)Subject to subsection (m), an agreement for nuclear
cooperation between the United States and India submitted pursuant to this
section may become effective only if—
(A)the President submits to Congress the
agreement concluded between the United States and India, including a copy of
the safeguards agreement entered into between the IAEA and India relating to
India’s declared civilian nuclear facilities, in accordance with the
requirements and procedures of section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(other than section 123 a.(2) of such Act) that are otherwise not inconsistent
with the provisions of this Act; and
(B)after the
submission under subparagraph (A), the agreement is approved by a joint
resolution that is enacted into law.
(2)Beginning one month after the date of the
enactment of this Act and every month thereafter until the President submits to
Congress the agreement referred to in paragraph (1), the President should
consult with the Committee on International Relations of the House of
Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate regarding
the status of the negotiations between the United States and India with respect
to civilian nuclear cooperation and between the IAEA and India with respect to
the safeguards agreement described in subsection (b)(2).
(f)For purposes of
this section, a joint resolution referred to in subsection (e)(1)(B) is a joint
resolution of the two Houses of Congress—
(1)the matter after
the resolving clause of which is as follows: That the Congress hereby
approves the Agreement for Nuclear Cooperation Between the United States of
America and the Republic of India submitted by the President on
___________.
, with the blank space being filled with the appropriate
date;
(2)which does not
have a preamble; and
(3)the title of which
is as follows: Joint Resolution Approving an Agreement for Nuclear
Cooperation Between the United States and India
.
(g)Introduction and
referral
(1)A
joint resolution shall, on the day on which the submissions under subsection
(e)(1)(A) are made (or, if either House of Congress is not in session on that
day, the first day thereafter when that House is in session)—
(A)be introduced in the House of
Representatives by the majority leader, for himself and the minority leader of
the House, or by Members of the House designated by the majority leader and
minority leader of the House; and
(B)be introduced in the Senate by the majority
leader, for himself and the minority leader of the Senate, or by Members of the
Senate designated by the majority leader and minority leader of the
Senate.
If either
House of Congress is not in session on that day, the joint resolution shall be
introduced on the first day thereafter when both Houses are in session.(2)The
joint resolution shall be referred to the Committee on International Relations
of the House of Representatives and to the Committee on Foreign Relations of
the Senate.
(h)If a committee to which a joint resolution is referred
has not reported such joint resolution by the end of 60 days beginning on the
date of its introduction, or the date of the submission of the nonproliferation
assessment statement described in section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2153), whichever is later, such committee shall be discharged from
further consideration of such joint resolution, and such joint resolution shall
be placed on the appropriate calendar of the House involved.
(i)Floor
consideration in the House of Representatives
(1)On or after the third calendar day (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, or legal holidays, except when the House of Representatives is in
session on such a day) after the date on which the committee to which a joint
resolution is referred has reported, or has been discharged from further
consideration of, such a joint resolution, it shall be in order for any Member
of the House to move to proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution. A
Member of the House may make the motion only on the day after the calendar day
on which the Member announces to the House the Member’s intention to do so.
Such motion shall be privileged and shall not be debatable. The motion shall
not be subject to amendment or to a motion to postpone. A motion to reconsider
the vote by which the motion is agreed to shall not be in order. If a motion to
proceed to the consideration of the joint resolution is agreed to, the House
shall immediately proceed to consideration of the joint resolution which shall
remain the unfinished business until disposed of.
(2)Debate
on a joint resolution, and on all debatable motions and appeals in connection
therewith, shall be limited to not more than six hours, which shall be divided
equally between those favoring and those opposing the joint resolution. An
amendment to the joint resolution shall not be in order. A motion to further
limit debate shall be in order and shall not be debatable. A motion to table, a
motion to postpone, or a motion to recommit the joint resolution shall not be
in order. A motion to reconsider the vote by which the joint resolution is
agreed to or disagreed to shall not be in order.
(3)Appeals
from the decisions of the Chair to the procedure relating to a joint resolution
shall be decided without debate.
(j)Floor
consideration in the SenateAny joint resolution shall be
considered in the Senate in accordance with the provisions of section 601(b)(4)
of the International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of
1976.
(k)Consideration by
the other houseIf, before the passage by one House of a joint
resolution of that House, that House receives a joint resolution from the other
House, then the following procedures shall apply:
(1)The joint
resolution of the other House shall not be referred to a committee and may not
be considered in the House receiving it except in the case of final passage as
provided in paragraph (2)(B).
(2)With respect to a
joint resolution of the House receiving the joint resolution—
(A)the procedure in
that House shall be the same as if no joint resolution had been received from
the other House; but
(B)the vote on final
passage shall be on the joint resolution of the other House.
(3)Upon disposition
of the joint resolution received from the other House, it shall no longer be in
order to consider the joint resolution that originated in the receiving
House.
(l)In the computation of the period of 60 days referred to in
subsection (h), there shall be excluded the days on which either House of
Congress is not in session because of an adjournment of more than 3 days to a
day certain or because of an adjournment of the Congress sine die.
(m)Section 123 of
Atomic Energy Act Not affectedNotwithstanding subsection (e)(1),
this section does not preclude the approval, under section 123 of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), of an agreement for cooperation in which
India is the cooperating party.
(n)The
procedures under this section shall cease to be effective upon the enactment of
a joint resolution under this section.
(o)
(1)The President
shall, not later than January 31, 2007, and not later than January 31 of each
year thereafter, submit to the Committee on International Relations of the
House of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report on—
(A)the extent to
which each policy objective in section 3(b) has been achieved;
(B)the steps taken by
the United States and India in the preceding calendar year to accomplish those
objectives;
(C)the extent of
cooperation by other countries in achieving those objectives; and
(D)the steps the
United States will take in the current calendar year to accomplish those
objectives.
(2)
(A)Not later than one year after the date on which an
agreement for nuclear cooperation between the United States and India is
approved by Congress under section 4(f) and every year thereafter, the
President shall submit to the Committee on International Relations of the House
of Representatives and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate a
report describing United States exports to India for the preceding year
pursuant to such agreement and the anticipated exports to India for the next
year pursuant to such agreement.
(B)The report described in subparagraph (A) shall also include
(in a classified form if necessary)—
(i)an
estimate for the previous year of the amount of uranium mined in India;
(ii)the
amount of such uranium that has likely been used or allocated for the
production of nuclear explosive devices;
(iii)the rate of
production of—
(I)fissile material
for nuclear explosive devices; and
(II)nuclear explosive
devices; and
(iv)an
analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected such rate of production of
nuclear explosive devices.
(p)In
this Act:
(1)The
term IAEA
means the International Atomic Energy Agency.
(2)The term MTCR
means the
Missile Technology Control Regime.
(3)The
term NPT
means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons.
(4)The term NPT member
means a country that is
a party to the NPT.
(5)The term NSG
means the
Nuclear Suppliers Group.