[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 5682 Enrolled Bill (ENR)]

        H.R.5682

                       One Hundred Ninth Congress

                                 of the

                        United States of America


                          AT THE SECOND SESSION

          Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
             the third day of January, two thousand and six


                                 An Act



 To exempt from certain requirements of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 a 
         proposed nuclear agreement for cooperation with India.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

          TITLE I--UNITED STATES AND INDIA NUCLEAR COOPERATION

SEC. 101. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``Henry J. Hyde United States-India 
Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006''.

SEC. 102. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
        (1) preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons, other 
    weapons of mass destruction, the means to produce them, and the 
    means to deliver them are critical objectives for United States 
    foreign policy;
        (2) sustaining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and 
    strengthening its implementation, particularly its verification and 
    compliance, is the keystone of United States nonproliferation 
    policy;
        (3) the NPT has been a significant success in preventing the 
    acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities and maintaining a 
    stable international security situation;
        (4) countries that have never become a party to the NPT and 
    remain outside that treaty's legal regime pose a potential 
    challenge to the achievement of the overall goals of global 
    nonproliferation, because those countries have not undertaken the 
    NPT obligation to prohibit the spread of nuclear weapons 
    capabilities;
        (5) it is in the interest of the United States to the fullest 
    extent possible to ensure that those countries that are not States 
    Party to the NPT are responsible in the disposition of any nuclear 
    technology they develop;
        (6) it is in the interest of the United States to enter into an 
    agreement for nuclear cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 
    of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) with a country 
    that has never been a State Party to the NPT if--
            (A) the country has demonstrated responsible behavior with 
        respect to the nonproliferation of technology related to 
        nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them;
            (B) the country has a functioning and uninterrupted 
        democratic system of government, has a foreign policy that is 
        congruent to that of the United States, and is working with the 
        United States on key foreign policy initiatives related to 
        nonproliferation;
            (C) such cooperation induces the country to promulgate and 
        implement substantially improved protections against the 
        proliferation of technology related to nuclear weapons and the 
        means to deliver them, and to refrain from actions that would 
        further the development of its nuclear weapons program; and
            (D) such cooperation will induce the country to give 
        greater political and material support to the achievement of 
        United States global and regional nonproliferation objectives, 
        especially with respect to dissuading, isolating, and, if 
        necessary, sanctioning and containing states that sponsor 
        terrorism and terrorist groups that are seeking to acquire a 
        nuclear weapons capability or other weapons of mass destruction 
        capability and the means to deliver such weapons;
        (7) the United States should continue its policy of engagement, 
    collaboration, and exchanges with and between India and Pakistan;
        (8) strong bilateral relations with India are in the national 
    interest of the United States;
        (9) the United States and India share common democratic values 
    and the potential for increasing and sustained economic engagement;
        (10) commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the United 
    States and other countries has the potential to benefit the people 
    of all countries;
        (11) such commerce also represents a significant change in 
    United States policy regarding commerce with countries that are not 
    States Party to the NPT, which remains the foundation of the 
    international nonproliferation regime;
        (12) any commerce in civil nuclear energy with India by the 
    United States and other countries must be achieved in a manner that 
    minimizes the risk of nuclear proliferation or regional arms races 
    and maximizes India's adherence to international nonproliferation 
    regimes, including, in particular, the guidelines of the Nuclear 
    Suppliers Group (NSG); and
        (13) the United States should not seek to facilitate or 
    encourage the continuation of nuclear exports to India by any other 
    party if such exports are terminated under United States law.

SEC. 103. STATEMENTS OF POLICY.

    (a) In General.--The following shall be the policies of the United 
States:
        (1) Oppose the development of a capability to produce nuclear 
    weapons by any non-nuclear weapon state, within or outside of the 
    NPT.
        (2) Encourage States Party to the NPT to interpret the right to 
    ``develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for 
    peaceful purposes'', as set forth in Article IV of the NPT, as 
    being a right that applies only to the extent that it is consistent 
    with the object and purpose of the NPT to prevent the spread of 
    nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons capabilities, including by 
    refraining from all nuclear cooperation with any State Party that 
    the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) determines is not in 
    full compliance with its NPT obligations, including its safeguards 
    obligations.
        (3) Act in a manner fully consistent with the Guidelines for 
    Nuclear Transfers and the Guidelines for Transfers of Nuclear-
    Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software and Related 
    Technology developed by the NSG, and decisions related to the those 
    guidelines, and the rules and practices regarding NSG 
    decisionmaking.
        (4) Strengthen the NSG guidelines and decisions concerning 
    consultation by members regarding violations of supplier and 
    recipient understandings by instituting the practice of a timely 
    and coordinated response by NSG members to all such violations, 
    including termination of nuclear transfers to an involved 
    recipient, that discourages individual NSG members from continuing 
    cooperation with such recipient until such time as a consensus 
    regarding a coordinated response has been achieved.
        (5) Given the special sensitivity of equipment and technologies 
    related to the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent 
    nuclear fuel, and the production of heavy water, work with members 
    of the NSG, individually and collectively, to further restrict the 
    transfers of such equipment and technologies, including to India.
        (6) Seek to prevent the transfer to a country of nuclear 
    equipment, materials, or technology from other participating 
    governments in the NSG or from any other source if nuclear 
    transfers to that country are suspended or terminated pursuant to 
    this title, the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), 
    or any other United States law.
    (b) With Respect to South Asia.--The following shall be the 
policies of the United States with respect to South Asia:
        (1) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, a moratorium on the 
    production of fissile material for nuclear explosive purposes by 
    India, Pakistan, and the People's Republic of China.
        (2) Achieve, at the earliest possible date, the conclusion and 
    implementation of a treaty banning the production of fissile 
    material for nuclear weapons to which both the United States and 
    India become parties.
        (3) Secure India's--
            (A) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative;
            (B) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
        Principles of such Initiative;
            (C) public announcement of its decision to conform its 
        export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
        Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, Criteria, 
        and Control Lists of the Wassenaar Arrangement;
            (D) demonstration of satisfactory progress toward 
        implementing the decision described in subparagraph (C); and
            (E) ratification of or accession to the Convention on 
        Supplementary Compensation for Nuclear Damage, done at Vienna 
        on September 12, 1997.
        (4) Secure India's full and active participation in United 
    States efforts to dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction 
    and contain Iran for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass 
    destruction, including a nuclear weapons capability and the 
    capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel, and the 
    means to deliver weapons of mass destruction.
        (5) Seek to halt the increase of nuclear weapon arsenals in 
    South Asia and to promote their reduction and eventual elimination.
        (6) Ensure that spent fuel generated in India's civilian 
    nuclear power reactors is not transferred to the United States 
    except pursuant to the Congressional review procedures required 
    under section 131 f. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
    2160 (f)).
        (7) Pending implementation of the multilateral moratorium 
    described in paragraph (1) or the treaty described in paragraph 
    (2), encourage India not to increase its production of fissile 
    material at unsafeguarded nuclear facilities.
        (8) Ensure that any safeguards agreement or Additional Protocol 
    to which India is a party with the IAEA can reliably safeguard any 
    export or reexport to India of any nuclear materials and equipment.
        (9) Ensure that the text and implementation of any agreement 
    for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the 
    Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) meet the requirements 
    set forth in subsections a.(1) and a.(3) through a.(9) of such 
    section.
        (10) Any nuclear power reactor fuel reserve provided to the 
    Government of India for use in safeguarded civilian nuclear 
    facilities should be commensurate with reasonable reactor operating 
    requirements.

SEC. 104. WAIVER AUTHORITY AND CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL.

    (a) In General.--If the President makes the determination described 
in subsection (b), the President may--
        (1) exempt a proposed agreement for cooperation with India 
    arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
    (42 U.S.C. 2153) from the requirement of subsection a.(2) of such 
    section;
        (2) waive the application of section 128 of the Atomic Energy 
    Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2157) with respect to exports to India; and
        (3) waive with respect to India the application of--
            (A) section 129 a.(1)(D) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
        (42 U.S.C. 2158(a)(1)(D)); and
            (B) section 129 of such Act (42 U.S.C. 2158) regarding any 
        actions that occurred before July 18, 2005.
    (b) Determination by the President.--The determination referred to 
in subsection (a) is a determination by the President that the 
following actions have occurred:
        (1) India has provided the United States and the IAEA with a 
    credible plan to separate civil and military nuclear facilities, 
    materials, and programs, and has filed a declaration regarding its 
    civil facilities and materials with the IAEA.
        (2) India and the IAEA have concluded all legal steps required 
    prior to signature by the parties of an agreement requiring the 
    application of IAEA safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with 
    IAEA standards, principles, and practices (including IAEA Board of 
    Governors Document GOV/1621 (1973)) to India's civil nuclear 
    facilities, materials, and programs as declared in the plan 
    described in paragraph (1), including materials used in or produced 
    through the use of India's civil nuclear facilities.
        (3) India and the IAEA are making substantial progress toward 
    concluding an Additional Protocol consistent with IAEA principles, 
    practices, and policies that would apply to India's civil nuclear 
    program.
        (4) India is working actively with the United States for the 
    early conclusion of a multilateral treaty on the cessation of the 
    production of fissile materials for use in nuclear weapons or other 
    nuclear explosive devices.
        (5) India is working with and supporting United States and 
    international efforts to prevent the spread of enrichment and 
    reprocessing technology to any state that does not already possess 
    full-scale, functioning enrichment or reprocessing plants.
        (6) India is taking the necessary steps to secure nuclear and 
    other sensitive materials and technology, including through--
            (A) the enactment and effective enforcement of 
        comprehensive export control legislation and regulations;
            (B) harmonization of its export control laws, regulations, 
        policies, and practices with the guidelines and practices of 
        the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the NSG; and
            (C) adherence to the MTCR and the NSG in accordance with 
        the procedures of those regimes for unilateral adherence.
        (7) The NSG has decided by consensus to permit supply to India 
    of nuclear items covered by the guidelines of the NSG.
    (c) Submission to Congress.--
        (1) In general.--The President shall submit to the appropriate 
    congressional committees the determination made pursuant to 
    subsection (b), together with a report detailing the basis for the 
    determination.
        (2) Information to be included.--To the fullest extent 
    available to the United States, the report referred to in paragraph 
    (1) shall include the following information:
            (A) A summary of the plan provided by India to the United 
        States and the IAEA to separate India's civil and military 
        nuclear facilities, materials, and programs, and the 
        declaration made by India to the IAEA identifying India's civil 
        facilities to be placed under IAEA safeguards, including an 
        analysis of the credibility of such plan and declaration, 
        together with copies of the plan and declaration.
            (B) A summary of the agreement that has been entered into 
        between India and the IAEA requiring the application of 
        safeguards in accordance with IAEA practices to India's civil 
        nuclear facilities as declared in the plan described in 
        subparagraph (A), together with a copy of the agreement, and a 
        description of the progress toward its full implementation.
            (C) A summary of the progress made toward conclusion and 
        implementation of an Additional Protocol between India and the 
        IAEA, including a description of the scope of such Additional 
        Protocol.
            (D) A description of the steps that India is taking to work 
        with the United States for the conclusion of a multilateral 
        treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear 
        weapons, including a description of the steps that the United 
        States has taken and will take to encourage India to identify 
        and declare a date by which India would be willing to stop 
        production of fissile material for nuclear weapons unilaterally 
        or pursuant to a multilateral moratorium or treaty.
            (E) A description of the steps India is taking to prevent 
        the spread of nuclear-related technology, including enrichment 
        and reprocessing technology or materials that can be used to 
        acquire a nuclear weapons capability, as well as the support 
        that India is providing to the United States to further United 
        States objectives to restrict the spread of such technology.
            (F) A description of the steps that India is taking to 
        secure materials and technology applicable for the development, 
        acquisition, or manufacture of weapons of mass destruction and 
        the means to deliver such weapons through the application of 
        comprehensive export control legislation and regulations, and 
        through harmonization with and adherence to MTCR, NSG, 
        Australia Group, and Wassenaar Arrangement guidelines, 
        compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 
        1540, and participation in the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative.
            (G) A description and assessment of the specific measures 
        that India has taken to fully and actively participate in 
        United States and international efforts to dissuade, isolate, 
        and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran for its efforts to 
        acquire weapons of mass destruction, including a nuclear 
        weapons capability and the capability to enrich uranium or 
        reprocess nuclear fuel and the means to deliver weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (H) A description of the decision of the NSG relating to 
        nuclear cooperation with India, including whether nuclear 
        cooperation by the United States under an agreement for 
        cooperation arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) is consistent with the 
        decision, practices, and policies of the NSG.
            (I) A description of the scope of peaceful cooperation 
        envisioned by the United States and India that will be 
        implemented under the agreement for nuclear cooperation, 
        including whether such cooperation will include the provision 
        of enrichment and reprocessing technology.
            (J) A description of the steps taken to ensure that 
        proposed United States civil nuclear cooperation with India 
        will not in any way assist India's nuclear weapons program.
    (d) Restrictions on Nuclear Transfers.--
        (1) In general.--Pursuant to the obligations of the United 
    States under Article I of the NPT, nothing in this title 
    constitutes authority to carry out any civil nuclear cooperation 
    between the United States and a country that is not a nuclear-
    weapon State Party to the NPT that would in any way assist, 
    encourage, or induce that country to manufacture or otherwise 
    acquire nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices.
        (2) NSG transfer guidelines.--Notwithstanding the entry into 
    force of an agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant 
    to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
    and pursuant to this title, no item subject to such agreement or 
    subject to the transfer guidelines of the NSG, or to NSG decisions 
    related thereto, may be transferred to India if such transfer would 
    be inconsistent with the transfer guidelines of the NSG in effect 
    on the date of the transfer.
        (3) Termination of nuclear transfers to india.--
            (A) In general.--Notwithstanding the entry into force of an 
        agreement for cooperation with India arranged pursuant to 
        section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) 
        and pursuant to this title, and except as provided under 
        subparagraph (B), exports of nuclear and nuclear-related 
        material, equipment, or technology to India shall be terminated 
        if there is any materially significant transfer by an Indian 
        person of--
                (i) nuclear or nuclear-related material, equipment, or 
            technology that is not consistent with NSG guidelines or 
            decisions, or
                (ii) ballistic missiles or missile-related equipment or 
            technology that is not consistent with MTCR guidelines,
        unless the President determines that cessation of such exports 
        would be seriously prejudicial to the achievement of United 
        States nonproliferation objectives or otherwise jeopardize the 
        common defense and security.
            (B) Exception.--The President may choose not to terminate 
        exports of nuclear and nuclear-related material, equipment, and 
        technology to India under subparagraph (A) if--
                (i) the transfer covered under such subparagraph was 
            made without the knowledge of the Government of India;
                (ii) at the time of the transfer, either the Government 
            of India did not own, control, or direct the Indian person 
            that made the transfer or the Indian person that made the 
            transfer is a natural person who acted without the 
            knowledge of any entity described in subparagraph (B) or 
            (C) of section 110(5); and
                (iii) the President certifies to the appropriate 
            congressional committees that the Government of India has 
            taken or is taking appropriate judicial or other 
            enforcement actions against the Indian person with respect 
            to such transfer.
        (4) Exports, reexports, transfers, and retransfers to india 
    related to enrichment, reprocessing, and heavy water production.--
            (A) In general.--
                (i) Nuclear regulatory commission.--The Nuclear 
            Regulatory Commission may only issue licenses for the 
            export or reexport to India of any equipment, components, 
            or materials related to the enrichment of uranium, the 
            reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel, or the production of 
            heavy water if the requirements of subparagraph (B) are 
            met.
                (ii) Secretary of energy.--The Secretary of Energy may 
            only issue authorizations for the transfer or retransfer to 
            India of any equipment, materials, or technology related to 
            the enrichment of uranium, the reprocessing of spent 
            nuclear fuel, or the production of heavy water (including 
            under the terms of a subsequent arrangement under section 
            131 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2160)) if 
            the requirements of subparagraph (B) are met.
            (B) Requirements for approvals.--Exports, reexports, 
        transfers, and retransfers referred to in subparagraph (A) may 
        only be approved if--
                (i) the end user--

                    (I) is a multinational facility participating in an 
                IAEA-approved program to provide alternatives to 
                national fuel cycle capabilities; or
                    (II) is a facility participating in, and the 
                export, reexport, transfer, or retransfer is associated 
                with, a bilateral or multinational program to develop a 
                proliferation-resistant fuel cycle;

                (ii) appropriate measures are in place at any facility 
            referred to in clause (i) to ensure that no sensitive 
            nuclear technology, as defined in section 4(5) of the 
            Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3203(5)), 
            will be diverted to any person, site, facility, location, 
            or program not under IAEA safeguards; and
                (iii) the President   determines that the export, 
            reexport, transfer, or retransfer will not assist in the 
            manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices or 
            the production of fissile material for military purposes.
        (5) Nuclear export accountability program.--
            (A) In general.--The President shall ensure that all 
        appropriate measures are taken to maintain accountability with 
        respect to nuclear materials, equipment, and technology sold, 
        leased, exported, or reexported to India so as to ensure--
                (i) full implementation of the protections required 
            under section 123 a.(1) of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
            (42 U.S.C. 2153 (a)(1)); and
                (ii) United States compliance with Article I of the 
            NPT.
            (B) Measures.--The measures taken pursuant to subparagraph 
        (A) shall include the following:
                (i) Obtaining and implementing assurances and 
            conditions pursuant to the export licensing authorities of 
            the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and the Department of 
            Commerce and the authorizing authorities of the Department 
            of Energy, including, as appropriate, conditions regarding 
            end-use monitoring.
                (ii) A detailed system of reporting and accounting for 
            technology transfers, including any retransfers in India, 
            authorized by the Department of Energy pursuant to section 
            57 b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2077(b)). 
            Such system shall be capable of providing assurances that--

                    (I) the identified recipients of the nuclear 
                technology are authorized to receive the nuclear 
                technology;
                    (II) the nuclear technology identified for transfer 
                will be used only for peaceful safeguarded nuclear 
                activities and will not be used for any military or 
                nuclear explosive purpose; and
                    (III) the nuclear technology identified for 
                transfer will not be retransferred without the prior 
                consent of the United States, and facilities, 
                equipment, or materials derived through the use of 
                transferred technology will not be transferred without 
                the prior consent of the United States.

                (iii) In the event the IAEA is unable to implement 
            safeguards as required by an agreement for cooperation 
            arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
            of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153), appropriate assurance that 
            arrangements will be put in place expeditiously that are 
            consistent with the requirements of section 123 a.(1) of 
            such Act (42 U.S.C. 2153(a)(1)) regarding the maintenance 
            of safeguards as set forth in the agreement regardless of 
            whether the agreement is terminated or suspended for any 
            reason.
            (C) Implementation.--The measures described in subparagraph 
        (B) shall be implemented to provide reasonable assurances that 
        the recipient is complying with the relevant requirements, 
        terms, and conditions of any licenses issued by the United 
        States regarding such exports, including those relating to the 
        use, retransfer, safe handling, secure transit, and storage of 
        such exports.
    (e) Joint Resolution of Approval Requirement.--Section 123 d. of 
the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153(d)) is amended in the 
second proviso by inserting after ``that subsection'' the following: 
``, or an agreement exempted pursuant to section 104(a)(1) of the Henry 
J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 
2006,''.
    (f) Sunset.--The authority provided under subsection (a)(1) to 
exempt an agreement shall terminate upon the enactment of a joint 
resolution under section 123 d. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 
U.S.C. 2153(d)) approving such an agreement.
    (g) Reporting to Congress.--
        (1) Information on nuclear activities of india.--The President 
    shall keep the appropriate congressional committees fully and 
    currently informed of the facts and implications of any significant 
    nuclear activities of India, including--
            (A) any material noncompliance on the part of the 
        Government of India with--
                (i) the nonproliferation commitments undertaken in the 
            Joint Statement of July 18, 2005, between the President of 
            the United States and the Prime Minister of India;
                (ii) the separation plan presented in the national 
            parliament of India on March 7, 2006, and in greater detail 
            on May 11, 2006;
                (iii) a safeguards agreement between the Government of 
            India and the IAEA;
                (iv) an Additional Protocol between the Government of 
            India and the IAEA;
                (v) an agreement for cooperation between the Government 
            of India and the United States Government arranged pursuant 
            to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
            2153) or any subsequent arrangement under section 131 of 
            such Act (42 U.S.C. 2160);
                (vi) the terms and conditions of any approved licenses 
            regarding the export or reexport of nuclear material or 
            dual-use material, equipment, or technology; and
                (vii) United States laws and regulations regarding such 
            licenses;
            (B) the construction of a nuclear facility in India after 
        the date of the enactment of this title;
            (C) significant changes in the production by India of 
        nuclear weapons or in the types or amounts of fissile material 
        produced; and
            (D) changes in the purpose or operational status of any 
        unsafeguarded nuclear fuel cycle activities in India.
        (2) Implementation and compliance report.--Not later than 180 
    days after the date on which an agreement for cooperation with 
    India arranged pursuant to section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act of 
    1954 (42 U.S.C. 2153) enters into force, and annually thereafter, 
    the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
    committees a report including--
            (A) a description of any additional nuclear facilities and 
        nuclear materials that the Government of India has placed or 
        intends to place under IAEA safeguards;
            (B) a comprehensive listing of--
                (i) all licenses that have been approved by the Nuclear 
            Regulatory Commission and the Secretary of Energy for 
            exports and reexports to India under parts 110 and 810 of 
            title 10, Code of Federal Regulations;
                (ii) any licenses approved by the Department of 
            Commerce for the export or reexport to India of 
            commodities, related technology, and software which are 
            controlled for nuclear nonproliferation reasons on the 
            Nuclear Referral List of the Commerce Control List 
            maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of Federal 
            Regulation, or any successor regulation;
                (iii) any other United States authorizations for the 
            export or reexport to India of nuclear materials and 
            equipment; and
                (iv) with respect to each such license or other form of 
            authorization described in clauses (i), (ii), and (iii)--

                    (I) the number or other identifying information of 
                each license or authorization;
                    (II) the name or names of the authorized end user 
                or end users;
                    (III) the name of the site, facility, or location 
                in India to which the export or reexport was made;
                    (IV) the terms and conditions included on such 
                licenses and authorizations;
                    (V) any post-shipment verification procedures that 
                will be applied to such exports or reexports; and
                    (VI) the term of validity of each such license or 
                authorization;

            (C) a description of any significant nuclear commerce 
        between India and other countries, including any such trade 
        that--
                (i) is not consistent with applicable guidelines or 
            decisions of the NSG; or
                (ii) would not meet the standards applied to exports or 
            reexports of such material, equipment, or technology of 
            United States origin;
            (D) either--
                (i) an assessment that India is in full compliance with 
            the commitments and obligations contained in the agreements 
            and other documents referenced in clauses (i) through (vi) 
            of paragraph (1)(A); or
                (ii) an identification and analysis of all compliance 
            issues arising with regard to the adherence by India to its 
            commitments and obligations, including--

                    (I) the measures the United States Government has 
                taken to remedy or otherwise respond to such compliance 
                issues;
                    (II) the responses of the Government of India to 
                such measures;
                    (III) the measures the United States Government 
                plans to take to this end in the coming year; and
                    (IV) an assessment of the implications of any 
                continued noncompliance, including whether nuclear 
                commerce with India remains in the national security 
                interest of the United States;

            (E)(i) an assessment of whether India is fully and actively 
        participating in United States and international efforts to 
        dissuade, isolate, and, if necessary, sanction and contain Iran 
        for its efforts to acquire weapons of mass destruction, 
        including a nuclear weapons capability (including the 
        capability to enrich uranium or reprocess nuclear fuel), and 
        the means to deliver weapons of mass destruction, including a 
        description of the specific measures that India has taken in 
        this regard; and
            (ii) if India is not assessed to be fully and actively 
        participating in such efforts, a description of--
                (I) the measures the United States Government has taken 
            to secure India's full and active participation in such 
            efforts;
                (II) the responses of the Government of India to such 
            measures; and
                (III) the measures the United States Government plans 
            to take in the coming year to secure India's full and 
            active participation;
            (F) an analysis of whether United States civil nuclear 
        cooperation with India is in any way assisting India's nuclear 
        weapons program, including through--
                (i) the use of any United States equipment, technology, 
            or nuclear material by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
            facility or nuclear-weapons related complex;
                (ii) the replication and subsequent use of any United 
            States technology by India in an unsafeguarded nuclear 
            facility or unsafeguarded nuclear weapons-related complex, 
            or for any activity related to the research, development, 
            testing, or manufacture of nuclear explosive devices; and
                (iii) the provision of nuclear fuel in such a manner as 
            to facilitate the increased production by India of highly 
            enriched uranium or plutonium in unsafeguarded nuclear 
            facilities;
            (G) a detailed description of--
                (i) United States efforts to promote national or 
            regional progress by India and Pakistan in disclosing, 
            securing, limiting, and reducing their fissile material 
            stockpiles, including stockpiles for military purposes, 
            pending creation of a worldwide fissile material cut-off 
            regime, including the institution of a Fissile Material 
            Cut-off Treaty;
                (ii) the responses of India and Pakistan to such 
            efforts; and
                (iii) assistance that the United States is providing, 
            or would be able to provide, to India and Pakistan to 
            promote the objectives in clause (i), consistent with its 
            obligations under international law and existing 
            agreements;
            (H) an estimate of--
                (i) the amount of uranium mined and milled in India 
            during the previous year;
                (ii) the amount of such uranium that has likely been 
            used or allocated for the production of nuclear explosive 
            devices; and
                (iii) the rate of production in India of--

                    (I) fissile material for nuclear explosive devices; 
                and
                    (II) nuclear explosive devices;

            (I) an estimate of the amount of electricity India's 
        nuclear reactors produced for civil purposes during the 
        previous year and the proportion of such production that can be 
        attributed to India's declared civil reactors;
            (J) an analysis as to whether imported uranium has affected 
        the rate of production in India of nuclear explosive devices;
            (K) a detailed description of efforts and progress made 
        toward the achievement of India's--
                (i) full participation in the Proliferation Security 
            Initiative;
                (ii) formal commitment to the Statement of Interdiction 
            Principles of such Initiative;
                (iii) public announcement of its decision to conform 
            its export control laws, regulations, and policies with the 
            Australia Group and with the Guidelines, Procedures, 
            Criteria, and Controls List of the Wassenaar Arrangement; 
            and
                (iv) effective implementation of the decision described 
            in clause (iii); and
            (L) the disposal during the previous year of spent nuclear 
        fuel from India's civilian nuclear program, and any plans or 
        activities relating to future disposal of such spent nuclear 
        fuel.
        (3) Submittal with other annual reports.--
            (A) Report on proliferation prevention.--Each annual report 
        submitted under paragraph (2) after the initial report may be 
        submitted together with the annual report on proliferation 
        prevention required under section 601(a) of the Nuclear Non-
        Proliferation Act of 1978 (22 U.S.C. 3281(a)).
            (B) Report on progress toward regional nonproliferation.--
        The information required to be submitted under paragraph (2)(F) 
        after the initial report may be submitted together with the 
        annual report on progress toward regional nonproliferation 
        required under section 620F(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 
        1961 (22 U.S.C. 2376(c)).
        (4) Form.--Each report submitted under this subsection shall be 
    submitted in unclassified form, but may contain a classified annex.

SEC. 105. UNITED STATES COMPLIANCE WITH ITS NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION 
              TREATY OBLIGATIONS.

    Nothing in this title constitutes authority for any action in 
violation of an obligation of the United States under the NPT.

SEC. 106. INOPERABILITY OF DETERMINATION AND WAIVERS.

    A determination and any waiver under section 104 shall cease to be 
effective if the President determines that India has detonated a 
nuclear explosive device after the date of the enactment of this title.

SEC. 107. MTCR ADHERENT STATUS.

    Congress finds that India is not an MTCR adherent for the purposes 
of section 73 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b).

SEC. 108. TECHNICAL AMENDMENT.

    Section 1112(c)(4) of the Arms Control and Nonproliferation Act of 
1999 (title XI of the Admiral James W. Nance and Meg Donovan Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 2000 and 2001 (as enacted 
into law by section 1000(a)(7) of Public Law 106-113 and contained in 
appendix G of that Act; 113 Stat. 1501A-486)) is amended--
        (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking ``and'' after the 
    semicolon at the end;
        (2) by redesignating subparagraph (C) as subparagraph (D); and
        (3) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following new 
    subparagraph:
            ``(C) so much of the reports required under section 104 of 
        the Henry J. Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy 
        Cooperation Act of 2006 as relates to verification or 
        compliance matters; and''.

SEC. 109. UNITED STATES-INDIA SCIENTIFIC COOPERATIVE NUCLEAR 
              NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Establishment.--The Secretary of Energy, acting through the 
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration, is 
authorized to establish a cooperative nuclear nonproliferation program 
to pursue jointly with scientists from the United States and India a 
program to further common nuclear nonproliferation goals, including 
scientific research and development efforts, with an emphasis on 
nuclear safeguards (in this section referred to as ``the program'').
    (b) Consultation.--The program shall be carried out in consultation 
with the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense.
    (c) National Academies Recommendations.--
        (1) In general.--The Secretary of Energy shall enter into an 
    agreement with the National Academies to develop recommendations 
    for the implementation of the program.
        (2) Recommendations.--The agreement entered into under 
    paragraph (1) shall provide for the preparation by qualified 
    individuals with relevant expertise and knowledge and the 
    communication to the Secretary of Energy each fiscal year of--
            (A) recommendations for research and related programs 
        designed to overcome existing technological barriers to nuclear 
        nonproliferation; and
            (B) an assessment of whether activities and programs funded 
        under this section are achieving the goals of the activities 
        and programs.
        (3) Public availability.--The recommendations and assessments 
    prepared under this subsection shall be made publicly available.
    (d) Consistency With Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.--All United 
States activities related to the program shall be consistent with 
United States obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There are authorized to be 
appropriated such sums as may be necessary to carry out this section 
for each of fiscal years 2007 through 2011.

SEC. 110. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
        (1) The term ``Additional Protocol'' means a protocol 
    additional to a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, as negotiated 
    between a country and the IAEA based on a Model Additional Protocol 
    as set forth in IAEA information circular (INFCIRC) 540.
        (2) The term ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the 
    Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on 
    International Relations of the House of Representatives.
        (3) The term ``dual-use material, equipment, or technology'' 
    means material, equipment, or technology that may be used in 
    nuclear or nonnuclear applications.
        (4) The term ``IAEA safeguards'' has the meaning given the term 
    in section 830(3) of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 
    1994 (22 U.S.C. 6305(3)).
        (5) The term ``Indian person'' means--
            (A) a natural person that is a citizen of India or is 
        subject to the jurisdiction of the Government of India;
            (B) a corporation, business association, partnership, 
        society, trust, or any other nongovernmental entity, 
        organization, or group, that is organized under the laws of 
        India or has its principal place of business in India; and
            (C) any Indian governmental entity, including any 
        governmental entity operating as a business enterprise.
        (6) The terms ``Missile Technology Control Regime'', ``MTCR'', 
    and ``MTCR adherent'' have the meanings given the terms in section 
    74 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c).
        (7) The term ``nuclear materials and equipment'' means source 
    material, special nuclear material, production and utilization 
    facilities and any components thereof, and any other items or 
    materials that are determined to have significance for nuclear 
    explosive purposes pursuant to subsection 109 b. of the Atomic 
    Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2139(b)).
        (8) The terms ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty'' and ``NPT'' 
    mean the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done 
    at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, and entered into 
    force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
        (9) The terms ``Nuclear Suppliers Group'' and ``NSG'' refer to 
    a group, which met initially in 1975 and has met at least annually 
    since 1992, of Participating Governments that have promulgated and 
    agreed to adhere to Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (currently 
    IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.8/Part 1) and Guidelines for Transfers of 
    Nuclear-Related Dual-Use Equipment, Materials, Software, and 
    Related Technology (currently IAEA INFCIRC/254/Rev.7/Part 2).
        (10) The terms ``nuclear weapon'' and ``nuclear explosive 
    device'' mean any device designed to produce an instantaneous 
    release of an amount of nuclear energy from special nuclear 
    material that is greater than the amount of energy that would be 
    released from the detonation of one pound of trinitrotoluene (TNT).
        (11) The term ``process'' includes the term ``reprocess''.
        (12) The terms ``reprocessing'' and ``reprocess'' refer to the 
    separation of irradiated nuclear materials and fission products 
    from spent nuclear fuel.
        (13) The term ``sensitive nuclear technology'' means any 
    information, including information incorporated in a production or 
    utilization facility or important component part thereof, that is 
    not available to the public and which is important to the design, 
    construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of a uranium 
    enrichment or nuclear fuel reprocessing facility or a facility for 
    the production of heavy water.
        (14) The term ``source material'' has the meaning given the 
    term in section 11 z. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 
    2014(z)).
        (15) The term ``special nuclear material'' has the meaning 
    given the term in section 11 aa. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 
    (42 U.S.C. 2014(aa)).
        (16) The term ``unsafeguarded nuclear fuel-cycle activity'' 
    means research on, or development, design, manufacture, 
    construction, operation, or maintenance of--
            (A) any existing or future reactor, critical facility, 
        conversion plant, fabrication plant, reprocessing plant, plant 
        for the separation of isotopes of source or special fissionable 
        material, or separate storage installation with respect to 
        which there is no obligation to accept IAEA safeguards at the 
        relevant reactor, facility, plant, or installation that 
        contains source or special fissionable material; or
            (B) any existing or future heavy water production plant 
        with respect to which there is no obligation to accept IAEA 
        safeguards on any nuclear material produced by or used in 
        connection with any heavy water produced therefrom.

       TITLE II--UNITED STATES ADDITIONAL PROTOCOL IMPLEMENTATION

SEC. 201. SHORT TITLE.

    This title may be cited as the ``United States Additional Protocol 
Implementation Act''.

SEC. 202. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
        (1) The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other nuclear 
    explosive devices poses a grave threat to the national security of 
    the United States and its vital national interests.
        (2) The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has proven critical to 
    limiting such proliferation.
        (3) For the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to be effective, 
    each of the non-nuclear-weapon State Parties must conclude a 
    comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA, and such 
    agreements must be honored and enforced.
        (4) Recent events emphasize the urgency of strengthening the 
    effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards 
    system. This can best be accomplished by providing IAEA inspectors 
    with more information about, and broader access to, nuclear 
    activities within the territory of non-nuclear-weapon State 
    Parties.
        (5) The proposed scope of such expanded information and access 
    has been negotiated by the member states of the IAEA in the form of 
    a Model Additional Protocol to its existing safeguards agreements, 
    and universal acceptance of Additional Protocols by non-nuclear 
    weapons states is essential to enhancing the effectiveness of the 
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
        (6) On June 12, 1998, the United States, as a nuclear-weapon 
    State Party, signed an Additional Protocol that is based on the 
    Model Additional Protocol, but which also contains measures, 
    consistent with its existing safeguards agreements with its 
    members, that protect the right of the United States to exclude the 
    application of IAEA safeguards to locations and activities with 
    direct national security significance or to locations or 
    information associated with such activities.
        (7) Implementation of the Additional Protocol in the United 
    States in a manner consistent with United States obligations under 
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty may encourage other parties to 
    the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, especially non-nuclear-weapon 
    State Parties, to conclude Additional Protocols and thereby 
    strengthen the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty safeguards system 
    and help reduce the threat of nuclear proliferation, which is of 
    direct and substantial benefit to the United States.
        (8) Implementation of the Additional Protocol by the United 
    States is not required and is completely voluntary given its status 
    as a nuclear-weapon State Party, but the United States has acceded 
    to the Additional Protocol to demonstrate its commitment to the 
    nuclear nonproliferation regime and to make United States civil 
    nuclear activities available to the same IAEA inspections as are 
    applied in the case of non-nuclear-weapon State Parties.
        (9) In accordance with the national security exclusion 
    contained in Article 1.b of its Additional Protocol, the United 
    States will not allow any inspection activities, nor make any 
    declaration of any information with respect to, locations, 
    information, and activities of direct national security 
    significance to the United States.
        (10) Implementation of the Additional Protocol will conform to 
    the principles set forth in the letter of April 30, 2002, from the 
    United States Permanent Representative to the International Atomic 
    Energy Agency and the Vienna Office of the United Nations to the 
    Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

SEC. 203. DEFINITIONS.

    In this title:
        (1) Additional protocol.--The term ``Additional Protocol'', 
    when used in the singular form, means the Protocol Additional to 
    the Agreement between the United States of America and the 
    International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
    Safeguards in the United States of America, with Annexes, signed at 
    Vienna June 12, 1998 (T. Doc. 107-7).
        (2) Appropriate congressional committees.--The term 
    ``appropriate congressional committees'' means the Committee on 
    Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the 
    Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 
    Armed Services, the Committee on International Relations, the 
    Committee on Science, and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
    House of Representatives.
        (3) Complementary access.--The term ``complementary access'' 
    means the exercise of the IAEA's access rights as set forth in 
    Articles 4 to 6 of the Additional Protocol.
        (4) Executive agency.--The term ``executive agency'' has the 
    meaning given such term in section 105 of title 5, United States 
    Code.
        (5) Facility.--The term ``facility'' has the meaning set forth 
    in Article 18i. of the Additional Protocol.
        (6) IAEA.--The term ``IAEA'' means the International Atomic 
    Energy Agency.
        (7) Judge of the united states.--The term ``judge of the United 
    States'' means a United States district judge, or a United States 
    magistrate judge appointed under the authority of chapter 43 of 
    title 28, United States Code.
        (8) Location.--The term ``location'' means any geographic point 
    or area declared or identified by the United States or specified by 
    the International Atomic Energy Agency.
        (9) Nuclear non-proliferation treaty.--The term ``Nuclear Non-
    Proliferation Treaty'' means the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
    Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 
    1968, and entered into force March 5, 1970 (21 UST 483).
        (10) Nuclear-weapon state party and non-nuclear-weapon state 
    party.--The terms ``nuclear-weapon State Party'' and ``non-nuclear-
    weapon State Party'' have the meanings given such terms in the 
    Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
        (11) Person.--The term ``person'', except as otherwise 
    provided, means any individual, corporation, partnership, firm, 
    association, trust, estate, public or private institution, any 
    State or any political subdivision thereof, or any political entity 
    within a State, any foreign government or nation or any agency, 
    instrumentality, or political subdivision of any such government or 
    nation, or other entity located in the United States.
        (12) Site.--The term ``site'' has the meaning set forth in 
    Article 18b. of the Additional Protocol.
        (13) United states.--The term ``United States'', when used as a 
    geographic reference, means the several States of the United 
    States, the District of Columbia, and the commonwealths, 
    territories, and possessions of the United States and includes all 
    places under the jurisdiction or control of the United States, 
    including--
            (A) the territorial sea and the overlying airspace;
            (B) any civil aircraft of the United States or public 
        aircraft, as such terms are defined in paragraphs (17) and 
        (41), respectively, of section 40102(a) of title 49, United 
        States Code; and
            (C) any vessel of the United States, as such term is 
        defined in section 3(b) of the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement 
        Act (46 U.S.C. App. 1903(b)).
        (14) Wide-area environmental sampling.--The term ``wide-area 
    environmental sampling'' has the meaning set forth in Article 18g. 
    of the Additional Protocol.

SEC. 204. SEVERABILITY.

    If any provision of this title, or the application of such 
provision to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder 
of this title, or the application of such provision to persons or 
circumstances other than those as to which it is held invalid, shall 
not be affected thereby.

                     Subtitle A--General Provisions

SEC. 211. AUTHORITY.

    (a) In General.--The President is authorized to implement and carry 
out the provisions of this title and the Additional Protocol and shall 
designate through Executive order which executive agency or agencies of 
the United States, which may include but are not limited to the 
Department of State, the Department of Defense, the Department of 
Justice, the Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, shall issue or amend and enforce 
regulations in order to implement this title and the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol.
    (b) Included Authority.--For any executive agency designated under 
subsection (a) that does not currently possess the authority to conduct 
site vulnerability assessments and related activities, the authority 
provided in subsection (a) includes such authority.
    (c) Exception.--The authority described in subsection (b) does not 
supersede or otherwise modify any existing authority of any Federal 
department or agency already having such authority.

                    Subtitle B--Complementary Access

SEC. 221. REQUIREMENT FOR AUTHORITY TO CONDUCT COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) Prohibition.--No complementary access to any location in the 
United States shall take place pursuant to the Additional Protocol 
without the authorization of the United States Government in accordance 
with the requirements of this title.
    (b) Authority.--
        (1) In general.--Complementary access to any location in the 
    United States subject to access under the Additional Protocol is 
    authorized in accordance with this title.
        (2) United states representatives.--
            (A) Restrictions.--In the event of complementary access to 
        a privately owned or operated location, no employee of the 
        Environmental Protection Agency or of the Mine Safety and 
        Health Administration or the Occupational Safety and Health 
        Administration of the Department of Labor may participate in 
        the access.
            (B) Number.--The number of designated United States 
        representatives accompanying IAEA inspectors shall be kept to 
        the minimum necessary.

SEC. 222. PROCEDURES FOR COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--Each instance of complementary access to a 
location in the United States under the Additional Protocol shall be 
conducted in accordance with this subtitle.
    (b) Notice.--
        (1) In general.--Complementary access referred to in subsection 
    (a) may occur only upon the issuance of an actual written notice by 
    the United States Government to the owner, operator, occupant, or 
    agent in charge of the location to be subject to complementary 
    access.
        (2) Time of notification.--The notice under paragraph (1) shall 
    be submitted to such owner, operator, occupant, or agent as soon as 
    possible after the United States Government has received 
    notification that the IAEA seeks complementary access. Notices may 
    be posted prominently at the location if the United States 
    Government is unable to provide actual written notice to such 
    owner, operator, occupant, or agent.
        (3) Content of notice.--
            (A) In general.--The notice required by paragraph (1) shall 
        specify--
                (i) the purpose for the complementary access;
                (ii) the basis for the selection of the facility, site, 
            or other location for the complementary access sought;
                (iii) the activities that will be carried out during 
            the complementary access;
                (iv) the time and date that the complementary access is 
            expected to begin, and the anticipated period covered by 
            the complementary access; and
                (v) the names and titles of the inspectors.
        (4) Separate notices required.--A separate notice shall be 
    provided each time that complementary access is sought by the IAEA.
    (c) Credentials.--The complementary access team of the IAEA and 
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 
display appropriate identifying credentials to the owner, operator, 
occupant, or agent in charge of the location before gaining entry in 
connection with complementary access.
    (d) Scope.--
        (1) In general.--Except as provided in a warrant issued under 
    section 223, and subject to the rights of the United States 
    Government under the Additional Protocol to limit complementary 
    access, complementary access to a location pursuant to this title 
    may extend to all activities specifically permitted for such 
    locations under Article 6 of the Additional Protocol.
        (2) Exception.--Unless required by the Additional Protocol, no 
    inspection under this title shall extend to--
            (A) financial data (other than production data);
            (B) sales and marketing data (other than shipment data);
            (C) pricing data;
            (D) personnel data;
            (E) patent data;
            (F) data maintained for compliance with environmental or 
        occupational health and safety regulations; or
            (G) research data.
    (e) Environment, Health, Safety, and Security.--In carrying out 
their activities, members of the IAEA complementary access team and 
representatives or designees of the United States Government shall 
observe applicable environmental, health, safety, and security 
regulations established at the location subject to complementary 
access, including those for protection of controlled environments 
within a facility and for personal safety.

SEC. 223. CONSENTS, WARRANTS, AND COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    (a) In General.--
        (1) Procedure.--
            (A) Consent.--Except as provided in paragraph (2), an 
        appropriate official of the United States Government shall seek 
        or have the consent of the owner, operator, occupant, or agent 
        in charge of a location prior to entering that location in 
        connection with complementary access pursuant to sections 221 
        and 222. The owner, operator, occupant, or agent in charge of 
        the location may withhold consent for any reason or no reason.
            (B) Administrative search warrant.--In the absence of 
        consent, the United States Government may seek an 
        administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States 
        under subsection (b). Proceedings regarding the issuance of an 
        administrative search warrant shall be conducted ex parte, 
        unless otherwise requested by the United States Government.
        (2) Expedited access.--For purposes of obtaining access to a 
    location pursuant to Article 4b.(ii) of the Additional Protocol in 
    order to satisfy United States obligations under the Additional 
    Protocol when notice of two hours or less is required, the United 
    States Government may gain entry to such location in connection 
    with complementary access, to the extent such access is consistent 
    with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 
    without obtaining either a warrant or consent.
    (b) Administrative Search Warrants for Complementary Access.--
        (1) Obtaining administrative search warrants.--For 
    complementary access conducted in the United States pursuant to the 
    Additional Protocol, and for which the acquisition of a warrant is 
    required, the United States Government shall first obtain an 
    administrative search warrant from a judge of the United States. 
    The United States Government shall provide to such judge all 
    appropriate information regarding the basis for the selection of 
    the facility, site, or other location to which complementary access 
    is sought.
        (2) Content of affidavits for administrative search warrants.--
    A judge of the United States shall promptly issue an administrative 
    search warrant authorizing the requested complementary access upon 
    an affidavit submitted by the United States Government--
            (A) stating that the Additional Protocol is in force;
            (B) stating that the designated facility, site, or other 
        location is subject to complementary access under the 
        Additional Protocol;
            (C) stating that the purpose of the complementary access is 
        consistent with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
            (D) stating that the requested complementary access is in 
        accordance with Article 4 of the Additional Protocol;
            (E) containing assurances that the scope of the IAEA's 
        complementary access, as well as what it may collect, shall be 
        limited to the access provided for in Article 6 of the 
        Additional Protocol;
            (F) listing the items, documents, and areas to be searched 
        and seized;
            (G) stating the earliest commencement and the anticipated 
        duration of the complementary access period, as well as the 
        expected times of day during which such complementary access 
        will take place; and
            (H) stating that the location to which entry in connection 
        with complementary access is sought was selected either--
                (i) because there is probable cause, on the basis of 
            specific evidence, to believe that information required to 
            be reported regarding a location pursuant to regulations 
            promulgated under this title is incorrect or incomplete, 
            and that the location to be accessed contains evidence 
            regarding that violation; or
                (ii) pursuant to a reasonable general administrative 
            plan based upon specific neutral criteria.
        (3) Content of warrants.--A warrant issued under paragraph (2) 
    shall specify the same matters required of an affidavit under that 
    paragraph. In addition, each warrant shall contain the identities 
    of the representatives of the IAEA on the complementary access team 
    and the identities of the representatives or designees of the 
    United States Government required to display identifying 
    credentials under section 222(c).

SEC. 224. PROHIBITED ACTS RELATING TO COMPLEMENTARY ACCESS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse to 
permit, or to disrupt, delay, or otherwise impede, a complementary 
access authorized by this subtitle or an entry in connection with such 
access.

               Subtitle C--Confidentiality of Information

SEC. 231. PROTECTION OF CONFIDENTIALITY OF INFORMATION.

    Information reported to, or otherwise acquired by, the United 
States Government under this title or under the Additional Protocol 
shall be exempt from disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United 
States Code.

                        Subtitle D--Enforcement

SEC. 241. RECORDKEEPING VIOLATIONS.

    It shall be unlawful for any person willfully to fail or refuse--
        (1) to establish or maintain any record required by any 
    regulation prescribed under this title;
        (2) to submit any report, notice, or other information to the 
    United States Government in accordance with any regulation 
    prescribed under this title; or
        (3) to permit access to or copying of any record by the United 
    States Government in accordance with any regulation prescribed 
    under this title.

SEC. 242. PENALTIES.

    (a) Civil.--
        (1) Penalty amounts.--Any person that is determined, in 
    accordance with paragraph (2), to have violated section 224 or 
    section 241 shall be required by order to pay a civil penalty in an 
    amount not to exceed $25,000 for each violation. For the purposes 
    of this paragraph, each day during which a violation of section 224 
    continues shall constitute a separate violation of that section.
        (2) Notice and hearing.--
            (A) In general.--Before imposing a penalty against a person 
        under paragraph (1), the head of an executive agency designated 
        under section 211(a) shall provide the person with notice of 
        the order. If, within 15 days after receiving the notice, the 
        person requests a hearing, the head of the designated executive 
        agency shall initiate a hearing on the violation.
            (B) Conduct of hearing.--Any hearing so requested shall be 
        conducted before an administrative judge. The hearing shall be 
        conducted in accordance with the requirements of section 554 of 
        title 5, United States Code. If no hearing is so requested, the 
        order imposed by the head of the designated agency shall 
        constitute a final agency action.
            (C) Issuance of orders.--If the administrative judge 
        determines, upon the preponderance of the evidence received, 
        that a person named in the complaint has violated section 224 
        or section 241, the administrative judge shall state the 
        findings of fact and conclusions of law, and issue and serve on 
        such person an order described in paragraph (1).
            (D) Factors for determination of penalty amounts.--In 
        determining the amount of any civil penalty, the administrative 
        judge or the head of the designated agency shall take into 
        account the nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the 
        violation or violations and, with respect to the violator, the 
        ability to pay, effect on ability to continue to do business, 
        any history of such violations, the degree of culpability, the 
        existence of an internal compliance program, and such other 
        matters as justice may require.
            (E) Content of notice.--For the purposes of this paragraph, 
        notice shall be in writing and shall be verifiably served upon 
        the person or persons subject to an order described in 
        paragraph (1). In addition, the notice shall--
                (i) set forth the time, date, and specific nature of 
            the alleged violation or violations; and
                (ii) specify the administrative and judicial remedies 
            available to the person or persons subject to the order, 
            including the availability of a hearing and subsequent 
            appeal.
        (3) Administrative appellate review.--The decision and order of 
    an administrative judge shall be the recommended decision and order 
    and shall be referred to the head of the designated executive 
    agency for final decision and order. If, within 60 days, the head 
    of the designated executive agency does not modify or vacate the 
    decision and order, it shall become a final agency action under 
    this subsection.
        (4) Judicial review.--A person adversely affected by a final 
    order may, within 30 days after the date the final order is issued, 
    file a petition in the Court of Appeals for the District of 
    Columbia Circuit or in the Court of Appeals for the district in 
    which the violation occurred.
        (5) Enforcement of final orders.--
            (A) In general.--If a person fails to comply with a final 
        order issued against such person under this subsection and--
                (i) the person has not filed a petition for judicial 
            review of the order in accordance with paragraph (4), or
                (ii) a court in an action brought under paragraph (4) 
            has entered a final judgment in favor of the designated 
            executive agency,
        the head of the designated executive agency shall commence a 
        civil action to seek compliance with the final order in any 
        appropriate district court of the United States.
            (B) No review.--In any such civil action, the validity and 
        appropriateness of the final order shall not be subject to 
        review.
            (C) Interest.--Payment of penalties assessed in a final 
        order under this section shall include interest at currently 
        prevailing rates calculated from the date of expiration of the 
        60-day period referred to in paragraph (3) or the date of such 
        final order, as the case may be.
    (b) Criminal.--Any person who violates section 224 or section 241 
may, in addition to or in lieu of any civil penalty which may be 
imposed under subsection (a) for such violation, be fined under title 
18, United States Code, imprisoned for not more than five years, or 
both.

SEC. 243. SPECIFIC ENFORCEMENT.

    (a) Jurisdiction.--The district courts of the United States shall 
have jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the head of an 
executive agency designated under section 211(a)--
        (1) to restrain any conduct in violation of section 224 or 
    section 241; or
        (2) to compel the taking of any action required by or under 
    this title or the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Civil Actions.--
        (1) In general.--A civil action described in subsection (a) may 
    be brought--
            (A) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
        (1) of such subsection, in the United States district court for 
        the judicial district in which any act, omission, or 
        transaction constituting a violation of section 224 or section 
        241 occurred or in which the defendant is found or transacts 
        business; or
            (B) in the case of a civil action described in paragraph 
        (2) of such subsection, in the United States district court for 
        the judicial district in which the defendant is found or 
        transacts business.
        (2) Service of process.--In any such civil action, process 
    shall be served on a defendant wherever the defendant may reside or 
    may be found.

                   Subtitle E--Environmental Sampling

SEC. 251. NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS OF IAEA BOARD APPROVAL OF WIDE-AREA 
              ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    (a) In General.--Not later than 30 days after the date on which the 
Board of Governors of the IAEA approves wide-area environmental 
sampling for use as a safeguards verification tool, the President shall 
notify the appropriate congressional committees.
    (b) Content.--The notification under subsection (a) shall contain--
        (1) a description of the specific methods and sampling 
    techniques approved by the Board of Governors that are to be 
    employed for purposes of wide-area sampling;
        (2) a statement as to whether or not such sampling may be 
    conducted in the United States under the Additional Protocol; and
        (3) an assessment of the ability of the approved methods and 
    sampling techniques to detect, identify, and determine the conduct, 
    type, and nature of nuclear activities.

SEC. 252. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO WIDE-AREA 
              ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 
United States shall not permit any wide-area environmental sampling 
proposed by the IAEA to be conducted at a specified location in the 
United States under Article 9 of the Additional Protocol unless the 
President has determined and reported to the appropriate congressional 
committees with respect to that proposed use of environmental sampling 
that--
        (1) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling is 
    necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to detect 
    undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-nuclear-
    weapon State Party;
        (2) the proposed use of wide-area environmental sampling will 
    not result in access by the IAEA to locations, activities, or 
    information of direct national security significance; and
        (3) the United States--
            (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
        consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
        complementary access involving wide-area environmental 
        sampling; or
            (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
        Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
        United States that involves the use of wide-area environmental 
        sampling.

SEC. 253. APPLICATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY EXCLUSION TO LOCATION-
              SPECIFIC ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLING.

    In accordance with Article 1(b) of the Additional Protocol, the 
United States shall not permit any location-specific environmental 
sampling in the United States under Article 5 of the Additional 
Protocol unless the President has determined and reported to the 
appropriate congressional committees with respect to that proposed use 
of environmental sampling that--
        (1) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
    sampling is necessary to increase the capability of the IAEA to 
    detect undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of a non-
    nuclear-weapon State Party;
        (2) the proposed use of location-specific environmental 
    sampling will not result in access by the IAEA to locations, 
    activities, or information of direct national security 
    significance; and
        (3) with respect to the proposed use of environmental sampling, 
    the United States--
            (A) has been provided sufficient opportunity for 
        consultation with the IAEA if the IAEA has requested 
        complementary access involving location-specific environmental 
        sampling; or
            (B) has requested under Article 8 of the Additional 
        Protocol that the IAEA engage in complementary access in the 
        United States that involves the use of location-specific 
        environmental sampling.

SEC. 254. RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.

    As used in this subtitle, the term ``necessary to increase the 
capability of the IAEA to detect undeclared nuclear activities in the 
territory of a non-nuclear-weapon State Party'' shall not be construed 
to encompass proposed uses of environmental sampling that might assist 
the IAEA in detecting undeclared nuclear activities in the territory of 
a non-nuclear-weapon State Party by--
        (1) setting a good example of cooperation in the conduct of 
    such sampling; or
        (2) facilitating the formation of a political consensus or 
    political support for such sampling in the territory of a non-
    nuclear-weapon State Party.

 Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information and Activities

SEC. 261. PROTECTION OF CERTAIN INFORMATION.

    (a) Locations and Facilities of Direct National Security 
Significance.--No current or former Department of Defense or Department 
of Energy location, site, or facility of direct national security 
significance shall be declared or be subject to IAEA inspection under 
the Additional Protocol.
    (b) Information of Direct National Security Significance.--No 
information of direct national security significance regarding any 
location, site, or facility associated with activities of the 
Department of Defense or the Department of Energy shall be provided 
under the Additional Protocol.
    (c) Restricted Data.--Nothing in this title shall be construed to 
permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees of 
restricted data controlled by the provisions of the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2011 et seq.), including in particular ``Restricted 
Data'' as defined under paragraph (1) of section 11 y. of such Act (42 
U.S.C. 2014(y)).
    (d) Classified Information.--Nothing in this Act shall be construed 
to permit the communication or disclosure to the IAEA or IAEA employees 
of national security information and other classified information.

SEC. 262. IAEA INSPECTIONS AND VISITS.

    (a) Certain Individuals Prohibited From Obtaining Access.--No 
national of a country designated by the Secretary of State under 
section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2371) as 
a government supporting acts of international terrorism shall be 
permitted access to the United States to carry out an inspection 
activity under the Additional Protocol or a related safeguards 
agreement.
    (b) Presence of United States Government Personnel.--IAEA 
inspectors shall be accompanied at all times by United States 
Government personnel when inspecting sites, locations, facilities, or 
activities in the United States under the Additional Protocol.
    (c) Vulnerability and Related Assessments.--The President shall 
conduct vulnerability, counterintelligence, and related assessments not 
less than every 5 years to ensure that information of direct national 
security significance remains protected at all sites, locations, 
facilities, and activities in the United States that are subject to 
IAEA inspection under the Additional Protocol.

                          Subtitle G--Reports

SEC. 271. REPORT ON INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting the initial United States 
declaration to the IAEA under the Additional Protocol, the President 
shall submit to Congress a list of the sites, locations, facilities, 
and activities in the United States that the President intends to 
declare to the IAEA, and a report thereon.

SEC. 272. REPORT ON REVISIONS TO INITIAL UNITED STATES DECLARATION.

    Not later than 60 days before submitting to the IAEA any revisions 
to the United States declaration submitted under the Additional 
Protocol, the President shall submit to Congress a list of any sites, 
locations, facilities, or activities in the United States that the 
President intends to add to or remove from the declaration, and a 
report thereon.

SEC. 273. CONTENT OF REPORTS ON UNITED STATES DECLARATIONS.

    The reports required under section 271 and section 272 shall 
present the reasons for each site, location, facility, and activity 
being declared or being removed from the declaration list and shall 
certify that--
        (1) each site, location, facility, and activity included in the 
    list has been examined by each agency with national security 
    equities with respect to such site, location, facility, or 
    activity; and
        (2) appropriate measures have been taken to ensure that 
    information of direct national security significance will not be 
    compromised at any such site, location, facility, or activity in 
    connection with an IAEA inspection.

SEC. 274. REPORT ON EFFORTS TO PROMOTE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF ADDITIONAL 
              PROTOCOLS.

    Not later than 180 days after the entry into force of the 
Additional Protocol, the President shall submit to the appropriate 
congressional committees a report on--
        (1) measures that have been or should be taken to achieve the 
    adoption of additional protocols to existing safeguards agreements 
    signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties; and
        (2) assistance that has been or should be provided by the 
    United States to the IAEA in order to promote the effective 
    implementation of additional protocols to existing safeguards 
    agreements signed by non-nuclear-weapon State Parties and the 
    verification of the compliance of such parties with IAEA 
    obligations, with a plan for providing any needed additional 
    funding.

SEC. 275. NOTICE OF IAEA NOTIFICATIONS.

    The President shall notify Congress of any notifications issued by 
the IAEA to the United States under Article 10 of the Additional 
Protocol.

              Subtitle H--Authorization of Appropriations

SEC. 281. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    There are authorized to be appropriated such sums as may be 
necessary to carry out this title.

                               Speaker of the House of Representatives.

                            Vice President of the United States and    
                                               President of the Senate.