

One Hundred Ninth Congress
of the
United States of America

AT THE SECOND SESSION

*Begun and held at the City of Washington on Tuesday,
the third day of January, two thousand and six*

An Act

To impose sanctions against individuals responsible for genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity, to support measures for the protection of civilians and humanitarian operations, and to support peace efforts in the Darfur region of Sudan, and for other purposes.

*Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

(a) **SHORT TITLE.**—This Act may be cited as the “Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006”.

(b) **TABLE OF CONTENTS.**—The table of contents of this Act is as follows:

- Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
- Sec. 2. Definitions.
- Sec. 3. Findings.
- Sec. 4. Sense of Congress.
- Sec. 5. Sanctions in support of peace in Darfur.
- Sec. 6. Additional authorities to deter and suppress genocide in Darfur.
- Sec. 7. Continuation of restrictions.
- Sec. 8. Assistance efforts in Sudan.
- Sec. 9. Reporting requirements.

SEC. 2. DEFINITIONS.

In this Act:

(1) **AMIS.**—The term “AMIS” means the African Union Mission in Sudan.

(2) **APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.**—The term “appropriate congressional committees” means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.

(3) **COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT FOR SUDAN.**—The term “Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan” means the peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A in Nairobi, Kenya, on January 9, 2005.

(4) **DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT.**—The term “Darfur Peace Agreement” means the peace agreement signed by the Government of Sudan and by Minni Minnawi, leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army Faction, in Abuja, Nigeria, on May 5, 2006.

(5) **GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.**—The term “Government of Sudan”—

(A) means—

(i) the government in Khartoum, Sudan, which is led by the National Congress Party (formerly known as the National Islamic Front); or

(ii) any successor government formed on or after the date of the enactment of this Act (including the coalition National Unity Government agreed upon in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan); and (B) does not include the regional government of Southern Sudan.

(6) OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term “official of the Government of Sudan” does not include any individual—

(A) who was not a member of such government before July 1, 2005; or

(B) who is a member of the regional government of Southern Sudan.

(7) SPLM/A.—The term “SPLM/A” means the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army.

SEC. 3. FINDINGS.

Congress makes the following findings:

(1) On July 23, 2004, Congress declared, “the atrocities unfolding in Darfur, Sudan, are genocide”.

(2) On September 9, 2004, Secretary of State Colin L. Powell stated before the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, “genocide has occurred and may still be occurring in Darfur”, and “the Government of Sudan and the Janjaweed bear responsibility”.

(3) On September 21, 2004, in an address before the United Nations General Assembly, President George W. Bush affirmed the Secretary of State’s finding and stated, “[a]t this hour, the world is witnessing terrible suffering and horrible crimes in the Darfur region of Sudan, crimes my government has concluded are genocide”.

(4) On July 30, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling upon the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed militias and to apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and carried out violations of human rights and international humanitarian law, and establishing a ban on the sale or supply of arms and related materiel of all types, including the provision of related technical training or assistance, to all nongovernmental entities and individuals, including the Janjaweed.

(5) On September 18, 2004, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1564 (2004), determining that the Government of Sudan had failed to meet its obligations under Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004), calling for a military flight ban in and over the Darfur region, demanding the names of Janjaweed militiamen disarmed and arrested for verification, establishing an International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to investigate violations of international humanitarian and human rights laws, and threatening sanctions should the Government of Sudan fail to fully comply with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1564 (2004), including such actions as to affect Sudan’s petroleum sector or individual members of the Government of Sudan.

(6) The Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, submitted to the United Nations Secretary-General on January 25, 2005, established that the “Government of

the Sudan and the Janjaweed are responsible for serious violations of international human rights and humanitarian law amounting to crimes under international law,” that “these acts were conducted on a widespread and systematic basis, and therefore may amount to crimes against humanity,” and that officials of the Government of Sudan and other individuals may have acted with “genocidal intent”.

(7) On March 24, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1590 (2005), establishing the United Nations Mission in Sudan (referred to in this section as the “UNMIS”), consisting of up to 10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police tasked with supporting the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and to “closely and continuously liaise and coordinate at all levels with the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS)”, which had been established by the African Union on May 24, 2004, to monitor the implementation of the N’Djamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, signed on April 8, 2004, “with a view towards expeditiously reinforcing the effort to foster peace in Darfur”.

(8) On March 29, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005), extending the military embargo established by Security Council Resolution 1556 (2004) to all the parties to the N’Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and any other belligerents in the states of North Darfur, South Darfur, and West Darfur, calling for an asset freeze and travel ban against those individuals who impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities, are responsible for offensive military overflights, or violate the military embargo, and establishing a Committee of the Security Council and a panel of experts to assist in monitoring compliance with Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005).

(9) On March 31, 2005, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005), referring the situation in Darfur since July 1, 2002, to the prosecutor of the International Criminal Court and calling on the Government of Sudan and all parties to the conflict to cooperate fully with the Court.

(10) On July 30, 2005, Dr. John Garang de Mabior, the newly appointed Vice President of Sudan and the leader of the SPLM/A for the past 21 years, was killed in a tragic helicopter crash in Southern Sudan, sparking riots in Khartoum and challenging the commitment of all Sudanese to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.

(11) On January 12, 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council issued a communique endorsing, in principle, a transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and requested the Chairperson of the Council to initiate consultations with the United Nations and other stakeholders toward this end.

(12) On February 3, 2006, the United Nations Security Council issued a Presidential Statement authorizing the initiation of contingency planning for a transition from AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

(13) On March 10, 2006, the African Union Peace and Security Council extended the mandate of AMIS, which had reached a force size of 7,000, to September 30, 2006, while simultaneously endorsing the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and setting April 30, 2006 as the deadline for reaching an agreement to resolve the crisis in Darfur.

(14) On March 24, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1663 (2006), which—

(A) welcomes the African Peace and Security Council’s March 10, 2006 communique; and

(B) requests that the United Nations Secretary-General, jointly with the African Union and in consultation with the parties to the Abuja Peace Talks, expedite planning for the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation.

(15) On March 29, 2006, during a speech at Freedom House, President Bush called for a transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation and “additional forces with a NATO overlay . . . to provide logistical and command-and-control and airlift capacity, but also to send a clear signal to parties involved that the west is determined to help effect a settlement.”

(16) On April 25, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1672 (2006), unanimously imposing targeted financial sanctions and travel restrictions on 4 individuals who had been identified as those who, among other acts, “impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities”, including the Commander of the Western Military Region for the armed forces of Sudan, the Paramount Chief of the Jalul Tribe in North Darfur, the Commander of the Sudan Liberation Army, and the Field Commander of the National Movement for Reform and Development.

(17) On May 5, 2006, under the auspices of African Union mediation and the direct engagement of the international community, including the United States, the Government of Sudan and the largest rebel faction in Darfur, the Sudan Liberation Movement, led by Minni Minnawi, signed the Darfur Peace Agreement, which addresses security, power sharing, and wealth sharing issues between the parties.

(18) In August 2006, the Sudanese government began to amass military forces and equipment in the Darfur region in contravention of the Darfur Peace Agreement to which they are signatories in what appears to be preliminary to full scale war.

(19) On August 30, 2006, the United Nations Security Council passed Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), without dissent and with abstentions by China, Russian Federation, and Qatar, thereby asserting that the existing United Nations Mission in Sudan “shall take over from AMIS responsibility for supporting the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement upon the expiration of AMIS’ mandate but in any event no later than 31 December 2006”, and that UNMIS “shall be strengthened by up to 17,300 military personnel . . . 3,300

civilian police personnel and up to 16 Formed Police Units”, which “shall begin to be deployed [to Darfur] no later than 1 October 2006”.

(20) Between August 30 and September 3, 2006, President Bashir and other senior members of his administration have publicly rejected United Nations Security Council Resolution 1706 (2006), calling it illegal and a western invasion of his country, despite the current presence of 10,000 United Nations peacekeepers under the UNMIS peacekeeping force.

(21) Since 1993, the Secretary of State has determined, pursuant to section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 App. U.S.C. 2405(j)), that Sudan is a country, the government of which has repeatedly provided support for acts of international terrorism, thereby restricting United States assistance, defense exports and sales, and financial and other transactions with the Government of Sudan.

SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) the genocide unfolding in the Darfur region of Sudan is characterized by acts of terrorism and atrocities directed against civilians, including mass murder, rape, and sexual violence committed by the Janjaweed and associated militias with the complicity and support of the National Congress Party-led faction of the Government of Sudan;

(2) all parties to the conflict in the Darfur region have continued to violate the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement of April 8, 2004, and the Abuja Protocols of November 9, 2004, and violence against civilians, humanitarian aid workers, and personnel of AMIS is increasing;

(3) the African Union should immediately make all necessary preparations for an orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, which will maintain an appropriate level of African participation, with a mandate to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, assist in the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and deter violence in the Darfur region;

(4) the international community, including the United States and the European Union, should immediately act to mobilize sufficient political, military, and financial resources through the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, to support the transition of AMIS to a United Nations peacekeeping operation with the size, strength, and capacity necessary to protect civilians and humanitarian operations, to assist with the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, and to end the continued violence in the Darfur region;

(5) if an expanded and reinforced AMIS or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation fails to stop genocide in the Darfur region, the international community should take additional measures to prevent and suppress acts of genocide in the Darfur region;

(6) acting under article 5 of the Charter of the United Nations, the United Nations Security Council should call for suspension of the Government of Sudan's rights and privileges of membership by the General Assembly until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks

H. R. 3127—6

upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, and grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region;

(7) the President should use all necessary and appropriate diplomatic means to ensure the full discharge of the responsibilities of the Committee of the United Nations Security Council and the panel of experts established pursuant to section 3(a) of Security Council Resolution 1591 (2005);

(8) the President should direct the United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge the adoption of a resolution by the United Nations Security Council that—

(A) extends the military embargo established by United Nations Security Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005) to include a total ban on the sale or supply of offensive military equipment to the Government of Sudan, except for use in an internationally recognized demobilization program or for nonlethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; and

(B) calls upon those member states of the United Nations that continue to undermine efforts to foster peace in Sudan by providing military assistance to the Government of Sudan, government supported militias, or any rebel group operating in Darfur in violation of the embargo on such assistance and equipment, as called for in United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005), to immediately cease and desist.

(9) the United States should not provide assistance to the Government of Sudan, other than assistance necessary for the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement, the support of the regional Government of Southern Sudan, the Transitional Darfur Regional Authority, and marginalized areas in Northern Sudan (including the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, Abyei, Eastern Sudan (Beja), Darfur, and Nubia), or for humanitarian purposes in Sudan, until the Government of Sudan has honored pledges to cease attacks upon civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance in the Darfur region, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

(10) the President should seek to assist members of the Sudanese diaspora in the United States by establishing a student loan forgiveness program for those individuals who commit to return to Southern Sudan for a period of not less than 5 years for the purpose of contributing professional skills needed for the reconstruction of Southern Sudan;

(11) the Presidential Special Envoy for Sudan should be provided with appropriate resources and a clear mandate to—

(A) provide stewardship of efforts to implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement;

(B) seek ways to bring stability and peace to the Darfur region;

(C) address instability elsewhere in Sudan, Chad, and northern Uganda; and

(D) pursue a truly comprehensive peace throughout the region;

(12) the international community should strongly condemn attacks against humanitarian workers and African Union personnel, and the forcible recruitment of refugees and internally displaced persons from camps in Chad and Sudan, and demand that all armed groups in the region, including the forces of the Government of Sudan, the Janjaweed, associated militias, the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army, the Justice and Equality Movement, the National Movement for Reform and Development (NMRD), and all other armed groups refrain from such activities;

(13) the United States should fully support the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement and urge rapid implementation of their terms;

(14) the May 5, 2006 signing of the Darfur Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the Sudan Liberation Movement was a positive development in a situation that has seen little political progress in 2 years and should be seized upon by all sides to begin the arduous process of post-conflict reconstruction, restitution, justice, and reconciliation; and

(15) the new leadership of the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (referred to in this paragraph as "SPLM") should—

(A) seek to transform SPLM into an inclusive, transparent, and democratic body;

(B) reaffirm the commitment of SPLM to—

(i) bring peace to Southern Sudan, the Darfur region, and Eastern Sudan; and

(ii) eliminate safe haven for regional rebel movements, such as the Lord's Resistance Army; and

(C) remain united in the face of efforts to undermine SPLM.

SEC. 5. SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.

(a) **BLOCKING OF ASSETS AND RESTRICTION ON VISAS.**—Section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–497; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) in the heading of subsection (b), by inserting "OF APPROPRIATE SENIOR OFFICIALS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN" after "ASSETS";

(2) by redesignating subsections (c) through (e) as subsections (d) through (f), respectively; and

(3) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

"(c) **BLOCKING OF ASSETS AND RESTRICTION ON VISAS OF CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS IDENTIFIED BY THE PRESIDENT.**—

"(1) **BLOCKING OF ASSETS.**—Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the President shall, consistent with the authorities granted under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 et seq.), block the assets of any individual who the President determines is complicit in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family members

or any associates of such individual to whom assets or property of such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.

“(2) RESTRICTION ON VISAS.—Beginning on the date that is 30 days after the date of the enactment of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, and in the interest of contributing to peace in Sudan, the President shall deny a visa and entry to any individual who the President determines to be complicit in, or responsible for, acts of genocide, war crimes, or crimes against humanity in Darfur, including the family members or any associates of such individual to whom assets or property of such individual was transferred on or after July 1, 2002.”.

(b) WAIVER.—Section 6(d) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, as redesignated by subsection (a), is amended by adding at the end the following: “The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) or (2) of subsection (c) with respect to any individual if the President determines that such a waiver is in the national interests of the United States and, before exercising the waiver, notifies the appropriate congressional committees of the name of the individual and the reasons for the waiver.”.

(c) SANCTIONS AGAINST JANJAWOOD COMMANDERS AND COORDINATORS OR OTHER INDIVIDUALS.—It is the sense of Congress, that the President should immediately impose the sanctions described in section 6(c) of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, as added by subsection (a), against any individual, including the Janjawood commanders and coordinators, identified as those who, among other acts, “impede the peace process, constitute a threat to stability in Darfur and the region, commit violations of international humanitarian or human rights law or other atrocities”.

SEC. 6. ADDITIONAL AUTHORITIES TO DETER AND SUPPRESS GENOCIDE IN DARFUR.

(a) PRESIDENTIAL ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT AMIS.—Subject to subsection (b) and notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide AMIS with—

(1) assistance for any expansion of the mandate, size, strength, and capacity to protect civilians and humanitarian operations in order to help stabilize the Darfur region of Sudan and dissuade and deter air attacks directed against civilians and humanitarian workers; and

(2) assistance in the areas of logistics, transport, communications, material support, technical assistance, training, command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence.

(b) CONDITIONS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Assistance provided under subsection

(a)—

(A) shall be used only in the Darfur region; and

(B) shall not be provided until AMIS has agreed not to transfer title to, or possession of, any such assistance to anyone not an officer, employee or agent of AMIS (or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation), and not to use or to permit the use of such assistance for any purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished, unless the consent of the President has first been obtained, and written assurances reflecting all

of the forgoing have been obtained from AMIS by the President.

(2) CONSENT.—If the President consents to the transfer of such assistance to anyone not an officer, employee, or agent of AMIS (or subsequent United Nations peacekeeping operation), or agrees to permit the use of such assistance for any purposes other than those for which such assistance was furnished, the President shall immediately notify the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1).

(c) NATO ASSISTANCE TO SUPPORT AMIS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President should continue to instruct the United States Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (referred to in this section as “NATO”) to use the voice, vote, and influence of the United States at NATO to—

(1) advocate NATO reinforcement of the AMIS and its orderly transition to a United Nations peacekeeping operation, as appropriate;

(2) provide assets to help dissuade and deter air strikes directed against civilians and humanitarian workers in the Darfur region of Sudan; and

(3) provide other logistical, transportation, communications, training, technical assistance, command and control, aerial surveillance, and intelligence support.

(d) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.—Nothing in this Act, or any amendment made by this Act, shall be construed as a provision described in section 5(b)(1) or 8(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution (Public Law 93–148; 50 U.S.C. 1544(b), 1546(a)(1)).

(e) DENIAL OF ENTRY AT UNITED STATES PORTS TO CERTAIN CARGO SHIPS OR OIL TANKERS.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—The President should take all necessary and appropriate steps to deny the Government of Sudan access to oil revenues, including by prohibiting entry at United States ports to cargo ships or oil tankers engaged in business or trade activities in the oil sector of Sudan or involved in the shipment of goods for use by the armed forces of Sudan until such time as the Government of Sudan has honored its commitments to cease attacks on civilians, demobilize and demilitarize the Janjaweed and associated militias, grant free and unfettered access for deliveries of humanitarian assistance, and allow for the safe and voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons.

(2) EXCEPTION.—Paragraph (1) shall not apply with respect to cargo ships or oil tankers involved in—

(A) an internationally-recognized demobilization program;

(B) the shipment of non-lethal assistance necessary to carry out elements of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan or the Darfur Peace Agreement; or

(C) the shipment of military assistance necessary to carry out elements of an agreement referred to in subparagraph (B) if the President has made the determination set forth in section 8(c)(2).

(f) PROHIBITION ON ASSISTANCE TO COUNTRIES IN VIOLATION OF UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTIONS 1556 AND 1591.—

(1) PROHIBITION.—Amounts made available to carry out the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151 et seq.) may not be used to provide assistance (other than humanitarian assistance) to the government of a country that is in violation of the embargo on military assistance with respect to Sudan imposed pursuant to United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004) and 1591 (2005).

(2) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of paragraph (1) if the President determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 7. CONTINUATION OF RESTRICTIONS.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Restrictions against the Government of Sudan that were imposed pursuant to Executive Order No. 13067 of November 3, 1997 (62 Federal Register 59989), title III and sections 508, 512, 527, and 569 of the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2006 (Public Law 109–102), or any other similar provision of law, shall remain in effect, and shall not be lifted pursuant to such provisions of law, until the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the Government of Sudan is acting in good faith to—

- (1) implement the Darfur Peace Agreement;
- (2) disarm, demobilize, and demilitarize the Janjaweed and all militias allied with the Government of Sudan;
- (3) adhere to all associated United Nations Security Council Resolutions, including Security Council Resolutions 1556 (2004), 1564 (2004), 1591 (2005), 1593 (2005), 1663 (2006), 1665 (2006), and 1706 (2006);
- (4) negotiate a peaceful resolution to the crisis in eastern Sudan;
- (5) fully cooperate with efforts to disarm, demobilize, and deny safe haven to members of the Lord's Resistance Army in Sudan; and
- (6) fully implement the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan without manipulation or delay, by—
 - (A) implementing the recommendations of the Abyei Boundaries Commission Report;
 - (B) establishing other appropriate commissions and implementing and adhering to the recommendations of such commissions consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan;
 - (C) adhering to the terms of the Wealth Sharing Agreement; and
 - (D) withdrawing government forces from Southern Sudan consistent with the terms of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan.

(b) WAIVER.—The President may waive the application of subsection (a) if the President determines, and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees, that such waiver is in the national interests of the United States.

SEC. 8. ASSISTANCE EFFORTS IN SUDAN.

(a) ASSISTANCE FOR INTERNATIONAL MALARIA CONTROL ACT.—Section 501 of the Assistance for International Malaria Control Act (Public Law 106–570; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed.

(b) COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN SUDAN ACT.—Section 7 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004 (Public Law 108–497; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is repealed.

(c) ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the President is authorized to provide economic assistance for Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, Abyei, Darfur, and marginalized areas in and around Khartoum, in an effort to provide emergency relief, to promote economic self-sufficiency, to build civil authority, to provide education, to enhance rule of law and the development of judicial and legal frameworks, and to support people to people reconciliation efforts, or to implement any nonmilitary program in support of any viable peace agreement in Sudan, including the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan and the Darfur Peace Agreement.

(2) CONGRESSIONAL NOTIFICATION.—Assistance may not be obligated under this subsection until 15 days after the date on which the Secretary of State notifies the congressional committees specified in section 634A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394–1) of such obligation in accordance with the procedures applicable to reprogramming notifications under such section.

(d) AUTHORIZED MILITARY ASSISTANCE.—

(1) IN GENERAL.—If the President has not made a certification under section 12(a)(3) of the Sudan Peace Act (50 U.S.C. 1701 note) regarding the noncompliance of the SPLM/A or the Government of Southern Sudan with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement for Sudan, the President, notwithstanding any other provision of law, may authorize, for each of fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008, the provision of the following assistance to the Government of Southern Sudan for the purpose of constituting a professional military force—

(A) non-lethal military equipment and related defense services, including training, controlled under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 C.F.R. 120.1 et seq.) if the President—

(i) determines that the provision of such items is in the national security interest of the United States; and

(ii) not later than 15 days before the provision of any such items, notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives of such determination; and

(B) small arms and ammunition under categories I and III of the United States Munitions List (22 C.F.R. 121.1 et seq.) if the President—

(i) determines that the provision of such equipment is essential to the national security interests of the United States; and

(ii) consistent with the procedures set forth in section 614(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961

(22 U.S.C. 2364(a)(3)), notifies the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives of such determination.

(2) **END USE ASSURANCES.**—For each item exported pursuant to this subsection or subsection (c), the President shall include with the notification to Congress under subparagraphs (A)(ii) and (B)(ii) of paragraph (1)—

(A) an identification of the end users to which the provision of assistance is being made;

(B) the dollar value of the items being provided;

(C) a description of the items being provided; and

(D) a description of the end use verification procedures that will be applied to such items, including—

(i) any special assurances obtained from the Government of Southern Sudan or other authorized end users regarding such equipment; and

(ii) the end use or retransfer controls that will be applied to any items provided under this subsection.

(3) **WAIVER AUTHORITY.**—Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780) shall not apply to assistance provided under paragraph (1).

(e) **EXCEPTION TO PROHIBITIONS IN EXECUTIVE ORDER NUMBER 13067.**—Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the prohibitions set forth with respect to Sudan in Executive Order No. 13067 (62 Fed. Reg. 59989) shall not apply to activities or related transactions with respect to Southern Sudan, Southern Kordofan/Nuba Mountains State, Blue Nile State, Abyei, Darfur, or marginalized areas in and around Khartoum.

SEC. 9. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS.

Section 8 of the Sudan Peace Act (Public Law 107–245; 50 U.S.C. 1701 note) is amended—

(1) by redesignating subsection (c) as subsection (g); and

(2) by inserting after subsection (b) the following:

“(c) **REPORT ON AFRICAN UNION MISSION IN SUDAN.**—Until such time as AMIS concludes its mission in Darfur, in conjunction with the other reports required under this section, the Secretary of State, in consultation with all relevant Federal departments and agencies, shall prepare and submit a report, to the appropriate congressional committees, regarding—

“(1) a detailed description of all United States assistance provided to the African Union Mission in Sudan (referred to in this subsection as ‘AMIS’) since the establishment of AMIS, reported by fiscal year and the type and purpose of such assistance; and

“(2) the level of other international assistance provided to AMIS, including assistance from countries, regional and international organizations, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations, reported by fiscal year and the type and purpose of such assistance, to the extent possible.

“(d) **REPORT ON SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACE IN DARFUR.**—In conjunction with the other reports required under this section, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees regarding sanctions imposed under section 6 of the Comprehensive Peace in Sudan Act of 2004, including—

H. R. 3127—13

“(1) a description of each sanction imposed under such provision of law;

“(2) the name of the individual or entity subject to the sanction, if applicable; and

“(3) whether or not such individual has been identified by the United Nations panel of experts.

“(e) REPORT ON UNITED STATES MILITARY ASSISTANCE.—In conjunction with the other reports required under this section, the Secretary of State shall submit a report to the appropriate congressional committees describing the effectiveness of any assistance provided under section 8 of the Darfur Peace and Accountability Act of 2006, including—

“(1) a detailed annex on any military assistance provided in the period covered by this report;

“(2) the results of any review or other monitoring conducted by the Federal Government with respect to assistance provided under that Act; and

“(3) any unauthorized retransfer or use of military assistance furnished by the United States.”.

Speaker of the House of Representatives.

*Vice President of the United States and
President of the Senate.*