[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 341 Introduced in House (IH)]
109th CONGRESS
2d Session
H. CON. RES. 341
Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
February 15, 2006
Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Ackerman, Mr.
Mack, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Ms. Harris, Mr. Wilson of South
Carolina, Mr. Pence, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr.
Issa, Mr. Poe, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Berman, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr.
Tancredo, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Engel, Mr.
McCotter, Mr. Cardoza, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of
Florida, and Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida) submitted the
following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on
International Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts
to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow
July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty''), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the
Treaty, ``not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over
such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to
manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'';
Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the
Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June
19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), which
requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to
declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear
materials and activities to ensure that such materials and activities
are not diverted to any military purpose and are used for peaceful
purposes and activities;
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003
that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program
for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment,
carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal,
separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear
facilities and activities;
Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on
November 10, 2003, of its decision to suspend enrichment-related and
reprocessing activities, and stated that the suspension would cover all
activities at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed
material for enrichment, and the importation of any enrichment-related
items;
Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the Government of Iran
specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing
activities, which the IAEA was invited to verify, including the
suspension of the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with
or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at
Natanz, the suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into
any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new centrifuges
at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges
at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent practicable,
the withdrawal of nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment
facility;
Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its
decision to expand the scope and clarify the nature of its decision to
suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of
centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components,
including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that
any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that
cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited
the IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the suspension of
enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was
adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious concern that the declarations
made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final
picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered
essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that
the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge
associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass
spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot
cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern that Iran has not
resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment
technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions
remain unresolved'';
Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and
Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran's nuclear program
(commonly referred to as the ``Paris Agreement''), securing a formal
commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium
enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic,
technological, political, and security issues;
Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced it has
mastered the technique of using biotechnology to extract purer uranium,
adding that this method ``substantially decreases the cost . . . in the
process that leads to the production of yellowcake'', which is a part of
the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;
Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of
Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its
IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security Council
and General Assembly of the United Nations;
Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that ``if in
connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise
questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the
Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security'';
Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution
finding that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to
comply with the Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the
context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters
concerning Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are
within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the
primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security;
Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in an October 26, 2005,
speech, his hope for ``a world without America'' and his desire ``to
wipe Israel off the map'' and has subsequently denied the existence of
the Holocaust;
Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to
restart its nuclear research efforts;
Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence of IAEA inspectors,
began to remove IAEA seals from the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ``[i]t is obvious that if
Iran cannot be brought to live up to its international obligations, in
fact, the IAEA Statute would indicate that Iran would have to be
referred to the U.N. Security Council'';
Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ``The Iranian government and nation has no
fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear programs with
decisiveness and wisdom.'';
Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of Britain, France, and
Germany in calling for a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to
discuss Iran's noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations;
Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the IAEA Board of
Governors relayed an ``absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear
programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the
history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those
activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of
declarations made by Iran since September 2002'';
Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed ``serious concern that the
Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues
relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has
in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal
hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is
related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components'';
Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's
noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations to the Security
Council;
Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional steps confirming its
unwillingness to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations;
and
Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism for over two
decades and the Department of State has declared in its most recent
Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran ``remained the most active state
sponsor of terrorism'': Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That Congress--
(1) condemns in the strongest possible terms the many
breaches and failures of the Government of Iran to comply
faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations,
including its obligations under the Agreement Between Iran and
the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of
Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973
(commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), as
reported by the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board
of Governors since 2003;
(2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and
credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-
related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address
the non-compliance of the Government of Iran with its
obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear
nonproliferation;
(3) calls on all members of the United Nations Security
Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's
Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in
response to the report of Iran's noncompliance in fulfillment
of the mandate of the Security Council to respond to and deal
with situations bearing on the maintenance of international
peace and security;
(4) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for
almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards
Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a
nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and
enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment,
and facilities;
(5) calls on all responsible members of the international
community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran
the ability to develop nuclear weapons; and
(6) urges the President to keep Congress fully and
currently informed concerning Iran's violation of its
international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
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