[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 341 Introduced in House (IH)]







109th CONGRESS
  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 341

   Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international 
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts 
         to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           February 15, 2006

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen (for herself, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Lantos, Mr. Ackerman, Mr. 
 Mack, Mrs. Jo Ann Davis of Virginia, Ms. Harris, Mr. Wilson of South 
 Carolina, Mr. Pence, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. McCaul of Texas, Mr. 
Issa, Mr. Poe, Mr. Chabot, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Berman, Ms. Schakowsky, Mr. 
  Tancredo, Mr. Crowley, Mr. Faleomavaega, Mr. Schiff, Mr. Engel, Mr. 
 McCotter, Mr. Cardoza, Mr. King of New York, Mr. Mario Diaz-Balart of 
    Florida, and Mr. Lincoln Diaz-Balart of Florida) submitted the 
following concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on 
                        International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
   Condemning the Government of Iran for violating its international 
nuclear nonproliferation obligations and expressing support for efforts 
         to report Iran to the United Nations Security Council.

Whereas Iran is a non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow 
        July 1, 1968 (commonly referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty''), under which Iran is obligated, pursuant to Article II of the 
        Treaty, ``not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of 
        nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over 
        such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to 
        manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
        explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the 
        manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'';
Whereas Iran signed the Agreement Between Iran and the International Atomic 
        Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the 
        Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 
        19, 1973 (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), which 
        requires Iran to report the importation and use of nuclear material, to 
        declare nuclear facilities, and to accept safeguards on nuclear 
        materials and activities to ensure that such materials and activities 
        are not diverted to any military purpose and are used for peaceful 
        purposes and activities;
Whereas the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) reported in November 2003 
        that Iran had been developing an undeclared nuclear enrichment program 
        for 18 years and had covertly imported nuclear material and equipment, 
        carried out over 110 unreported experiments to produce uranium metal, 
        separated plutonium, and concealed many other aspects of its nuclear 
        facilities and activities;
Whereas the Government of Iran informed the Director General of the IAEA on 
        November 10, 2003, of its decision to suspend enrichment-related and 
        reprocessing activities, and stated that the suspension would cover all 
        activities at the Natanz enrichment facility, the production of all feed 
        material for enrichment, and the importation of any enrichment-related 
        items;
Whereas in a Note Verbale dated December 29, 2003, the Government of Iran 
        specified the scope of suspension of its enrichment and reprocessing 
        activities, which the IAEA was invited to verify, including the 
        suspension of the operation or testing or any centrifuges, either with 
        or without nuclear material, at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at 
        Natanz, the suspension of further introduction of nuclear material into 
        any centrifuges, the suspension of the installation of new centrifuges 
        at the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the installation of centrifuges 
        at the Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz, and, to the extent practicable, 
        the withdrawal of nuclear material from any centrifuge enrichment 
        facility;
Whereas on February 24, 2004, the Government of Iran informed the IAEA of its 
        decision to expand the scope and clarify the nature of its decision to 
        suspend to the furthest extent possible the assembly and testing of 
        centrifuges and the domestic manufacture of centrifuge components, 
        including those related to existing contracts, informed the IAEA that 
        any components that are manufactured under existing contracts that 
        cannot be suspended will be stored and placed under IAEA seal, invited 
        the IAEA to verify these measures, and confirmed that the suspension of 
        enrichment activities applied to all facilities in Iran;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was 
        adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious concern that the declarations 
        made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final 
        picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered 
        essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that 
        the IAEA has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge 
        associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities, two mass 
        spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program, and designs for hot 
        cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern that Iran has not 
        resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment 
        technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions 
        remain unresolved'';
Whereas in November 2004, the Governments of the United Kingdom, France, and 
        Germany entered into an agreement with Iran on Iran's nuclear program 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Paris Agreement''), securing a formal 
        commitment from the Government of Iran to voluntarily suspend uranium 
        enrichment operations in exchange for discussions on economic, 
        technological, political, and security issues;
Whereas on August 29, 2005, Iran's Atomic Energy Organization announced it has 
        mastered the technique of using biotechnology to extract purer uranium, 
        adding that this method ``substantially decreases the cost . . . in the 
        process that leads to the production of yellowcake'', which is a part of 
        the early stages of the nuclear fuel cycle;
Whereas Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA requires the IAEA Board of 
        Governors to report the noncompliance of any member of the IAEA with its 
        IAEA safeguards obligations to all members and to the Security Council 
        and General Assembly of the United Nations;
Whereas Article III.B-4 of the Statute of the IAEA specifies that ``if in 
        connection with the activities of the Agency there should arise 
        questions that are within the competence of the Security Council, the 
        Agency shall notify the Security Council, as the organ bearing the main 
        responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
        security'';
Whereas on September 24, 2005, the IAEA Board of Governors adopted a resolution 
        finding that Iran's many failures and breaches of its obligations to 
        comply with the Safeguards Agreement constitute noncompliance in the 
        context of Article XII.C of the Statute of the IAEA and that matters 
        concerning Iran's nuclear program have given rise to questions that are 
        within the competence of the Security Council as the organ bearing the 
        primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and 
        security;
Whereas President of Iran Mahmoud Ahmadinejad expressed, in an October 26, 2005, 
        speech, his hope for ``a world without America'' and his desire ``to 
        wipe Israel off the map'' and has subsequently denied the existence of 
        the Holocaust;
Whereas on January 3, 2006, the Government of Iran announced that it planned to 
        restart its nuclear research efforts;
Whereas in January 2006, Iranian officials, in the presence of IAEA inspectors, 
        began to remove IAEA seals from the enrichment facility in Natanz, Iran;
Whereas Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice stated, ``[i]t is obvious that if 
        Iran cannot be brought to live up to its international obligations, in 
        fact, the IAEA Statute would indicate that Iran would have to be 
        referred to the U.N. Security Council'';
Whereas President Ahmadinejad stated, ``The Iranian government and nation has no 
        fear of the Western ballyhoo and will continue its nuclear programs with 
        decisiveness and wisdom.'';
Whereas the United States joined with the Governments of Britain, France, and 
        Germany in calling for a meeting of the IAEA Board of Governors to 
        discuss Iran's noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations;
Whereas on February 4, 2006, Resolution GOV/2006/14 of the IAEA Board of 
        Governors relayed an ``absence of confidence that Iran's nuclear 
        programme is exclusively for peaceful purposes resulting from the 
        history of concealment of Iran's nuclear activities, the nature of those 
        activities and other issues arising from the Agency's verification of 
        declarations made by Iran since September 2002'';
Whereas Resolution GOV/2006/14 further expressed ``serious concern that the 
        Agency is not yet in a position to clarify some important issues 
        relating to Iran's nuclear programme, including the fact that Iran has 
        in its possession a document on the production of uranium metal 
        hemispheres, since, as reported by the Secretariat, this process is 
        related to the fabrication of nuclear weapon components'';
Whereas on February 4, 2006, the IAEA Board of Governors reported Iran's 
        noncompliance with its IAEA safeguards obligations to the Security 
        Council;
Whereas Iran has, since February 4, 2006, taken additional steps confirming its 
        unwillingness to comply with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations; 
        and
Whereas Iran has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism for over two 
        decades and the Department of State has declared in its most recent 
        Country Reports on Terrorism that Iran ``remained the most active state 
        sponsor of terrorism'': Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) condemns in the strongest possible terms the many 
        breaches and failures of the Government of Iran to comply 
        faithfully with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations, 
        including its obligations under the Agreement Between Iran and 
        the International Atomic Energy Agency for the Application of 
        Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non- 
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, done at Vienna June 19, 1973 
        (commonly referred to as the ``Safeguards Agreement''), as 
        reported by the Director General of the IAEA to the IAEA Board 
        of Governors since 2003;
            (2) commends the efforts of the Governments of France, 
        Germany, and the United Kingdom to seek a meaningful and 
        credible suspension of Iran's enrichment- and reprocessing-
        related activities and to find a diplomatic means to address 
        the non-compliance of the Government of Iran with its 
        obligations, requirements, and commitments related to nuclear 
        nonproliferation;
            (3) calls on all members of the United Nations Security 
        Council, in particular the Russian Federation and the People's 
        Republic of China, to expeditiously consider and take action in 
        response to the report of Iran's noncompliance in fulfillment 
        of the mandate of the Security Council to respond to and deal 
        with situations bearing on the maintenance of international 
        peace and security;
            (4) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 
        almost 20 years of its obligations under the Safeguards 
        Agreement, has forfeited the right to develop any aspect of a 
        nuclear fuel cycle, especially with uranium conversion and 
        enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, 
        and facilities;
            (5) calls on all responsible members of the international 
        community to impose economic sanctions designed to deny Iran 
        the ability to develop nuclear weapons; and
            (6) urges the President to keep Congress fully and 
        currently informed concerning Iran's violation of its 
        international nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
                                 <all>