[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 318 Introduced in House (IH)]


109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 318

  Expressing concern regarding nuclear proliferation with respect to 
 proposed full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           December 15, 2005

    Mr. Markey (for himself and Mr. Upton) submitted the following 
concurrent resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Internal 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing concern regarding nuclear proliferation with respect to 
 proposed full civilian nuclear cooperation with India, and for other 
                               purposes.

Whereas the United States is obligated under Article I of the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) ``not to transfer to any 
        recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices 
        or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or 
        indirectly; and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any non-
        nuclear weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons 
        . . .'';
Whereas the United States has long sought to expand the effective application of 
        and compliance with comprehensive, full-scope International Atomic 
        Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards and strengthened safeguards through the 
        1997 Model Additional Protocol, in order to help prevent the diversion 
        of civilian nuclear programs for military purposes;
Whereas the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 prohibits, among other activities, 
        civilian nuclear cooperation with nonnuclear-weapon states, as defined 
        by the NPT, that do not allow full-scope IAEA safeguards;
Whereas the United States proposed and won the support of the Nuclear Suppliers 
        Group (NSG) in 1992 to adopt rules that condition the supply of dual-use 
        or nuclear ``trigger list'' items only to states that allow for full-
        scope IAEA safeguards, in order to prevent diversion of those items to 
        military programs;
Whereas under United Nations Security Council Resolution 1172 (1998) the United 
        States and other states committed ``. . . to prevent the export of 
        equipment, materials or technology that could in any way assist 
        programmes in India or Pakistan for nuclear weapons or for ballistic 
        missiles capable of delivering such weapons . . .'';
Whereas President Bush proposed in 2004 that the guidelines for the supply of 
        NSG-restricted items be strengthened so as to require adherence to the 
        1997 Model Additional Protocol;
Whereas the United States has long supported the negotiation of a global treaty 
        to prohibit the production of fissile material for weapons purposes as a 
        means of limiting the growth of global nuclear weapons stockpiles;
Whereas the United States and the four other original nuclear-weapon states have 
        ceased production of fissile materials for weapons purposes;
Whereas India is not a member of the NPT, has not agreed to full-scope IAEA 
        safeguards, has conducted nuclear test explosions, and has not halted 
        the production of fissile material for weapons purposes; and
Whereas President Bush and Indian Prime Minister Singh issued a joint United 
        States-Indian communique on July 18, 2005, in which President Bush 
        pledged to seek changes in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 to allow for 
        ``full'' civil nuclear cooperation with India and to seek changes to 
        Nuclear Supplier Group guidelines relating to such activities: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That the Congress--
            (1) supports strengthened ties between the United States 
        and India through expanded cooperation in trade and human 
        development, scientific and medical research, energy 
        technology, humanitarian relief, military-to-military contacts, 
        and the struggle against global terrorism;
            (2) believes that the United States and India have a vital 
        common interest in reducing the global dangers posed by nuclear 
        weapons through effective nonproliferation and disarmament 
        endeavors;
            (3) supports efforts by the current Nuclear Supplies Group 
        guidelines regarding the application of full-scope safeguards 
        and the proposal of President Bush to make the 1997 Model 
        Additional Protocol a condition for the supply of nuclear 
        materials and dual-use technology to non-nuclear-weapon states 
        by exporting nations of the Nuclear Suppliers Group;
            (4) finds that the cessation of the production of fissile 
        materials (highly enriched uranium and plutonium) for weapons 
        purposes would enhance the security of the United States and 
        the world;
            (5) expresses its concern that the supply of nuclear fuel 
        to India could result in the availability of India's existing 
        fissile material stockpile, and in India's capacity to produce 
        fissile material, for weapons purposes and thereby compromise 
        the ability of the United States to comply with Article I of 
        the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons;
            (6) finds that the proposal for full civilian nuclear 
        cooperation between the United States and India, as outlined on 
        July 18, 2005, poses far-reaching and potentially adverse 
        implications for the nuclear nonproliferation objectives of the 
        United States and promises to do little in the long-term to 
        bring India into closer alignment with other strategic 
        objectives of the United States;
            (7) reiterates its disapproval of any proposal for nuclear 
        cooperation that would result in the export, re-export, 
        transfer, or retransfer, either directly or indirectly, to any 
        country that--
                    (A) is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-
                Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and has detonated a 
                nuclear explosive device, or
                    (B) is a nonnuclear-weapon state under that Treaty, 
                but has not accepted full-scope International Atomic 
                Energy Agency safeguards over all of its nuclear 
                facilities,
        of nuclear materials, equipment, or technology that could 
        assist, directly or indirectly, in the production or 
        manufacture of nuclear weapons, including--
                    (i) any source material, special nuclear material, 
                byproduct material, production facility, or utilization 
                facility subject to a requirement for an Agreement for 
                Cooperation under section 123 of the Atomic Energy Act 
                of 1954;
                    (ii) any items or assistance authorized under 
                section 57b. of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and any 
                regulations prescribed under part 810 of title 10, Code 
                of Federal Regulations; or
                    (iii) any nuclear-related item on the Commerce 
                Control list maintained under part 774 of title 15, 
                Code of Federal Regulations.
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