[Congressional Bills 109th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 133 Introduced in House (IH)]






109th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 133

 Stating the policy of the Congress concerning actions to support the 
    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the 
             occasion of the Seventh NPT Review Conference.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 14, 2005

Mr. Spratt (for himself, Mr. Leach, Mr. Markey, Mr. Skelton, Mr. Shays, 
and Mrs. Tauscher) submitted the following concurrent resolution; which 
        was referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
 Stating the policy of the Congress concerning actions to support the 
    Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) on the 
             occasion of the Seventh NPT Review Conference.

Whereas the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of 1968 (NPT) 
        codifies one of the most important international security agreements of 
        all time, whereby states without nuclear weapons pledge not to acquire 
        them, while states with nuclear weapons commit to eventually eliminate 
        them, and allowances are made for the peaceful use of nuclear technology 
        by non-nuclear-weapon states under strict and verifiable control;
Whereas the NPT has 188 signatory states;
Whereas the NPT has encouraged many countries to officially abandon nuclear 
        weapons and their nuclear weapons programs, including Argentina, 
        Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, 
        and Ukraine;
Whereas at the NPT Review and Extension Conference in 1995, the signatory states 
        agreed to extend the NPT indefinitely, to reaffirm the principles and 
        objectives of the NPT, to strengthen the NPT review process, and to 
        implement further specific and practical steps on nonproliferation and 
        disarmament;
Whereas at the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the parties agreed to specific 
        steps toward nonproliferation and disarmament, including entry into 
        force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, negotiation of a verifiable 
        treaty banning the production of fissile material for weapons purposes, 
        and verifiable reductions of the alert status and number of strategic 
        and substrategic nuclear weapon arsenals;
Whereas President George W. Bush on March 7, 2005, called ``the NPT . . . a key 
        legal barrier to nuclear weapons proliferation and . . . a critical 
        contribution to international security,'' and stated that ``the United 
        States is firmly committed to its obligations under the NPT'';
Whereas in 1995, the United States reaffirmed its negative security assurance to 
        non-nuclear-weapon states of the NPT, stating ``The United States 
        reaffirms that it will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
        weapon state-parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, except in the case of an invasion or any other attack on the 
        United States, its territories, its armed forces or other troops, its 
        allies, or on a state toward which it has a security commitment carried 
        out, or sustained by such a non-nuclear-weapon state in association or 
        alliance with a nuclear-weapon state.'';
Whereas United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 calls upon all states 
        ``to promote the universal adoption and full implementation, and where 
        necessary, strengthening of multilateral treaties to which they are 
        parties, whose aim is to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, 
        biological or chemical weapons'';
Whereas the United Nations Secretary-General's High-Level Panel on Threats, 
        Challenges and Change concluded that ``Almost 60 States currently 
        operate or are constructing nuclear power or research reactors, and at 
        least 40 possess the industrial and scientific infrastructure which 
        would enable them, if they chose, to build nuclear weapons at relatively 
        short notice if the legal and normative constraints of the Treaty regime 
        no longer apply'', and it warned that ``We are approaching a point at 
        which the erosion of the non-proliferation regime could become 
        irreversible and result in a cascade of proliferation.'';
Whereas the threat of terrorists obtaining a nuclear weapon or nuclear materials 
        has grown significantly since the inception of the NPT as a result of 
        inadequate security and accounting at nuclear facilities throughout the 
        former Soviet republics and in dozens of other countries;
Whereas despite the fact that Article IV of the NPT makes clear that access to 
        peaceful nuclear cooperation by non-nuclear-weapon states requires their 
        conduct to be ``in conformity with Articles I and II'' of the Treaty, 
        some parties to the Treaty have nevertheless abused this right by 
        pursuing nuclear weapons capabilities;
Whereas North Korea ejected international inspectors in 2002 and announced its 
        withdrawal from the NPT in 2003, and has declared its possession of 
        nuclear weapons and its intention to bolster its nuclear arsenal;
Whereas Iran continues to assert its right to pursue nuclear power and related 
        technology, its intent to resume enrichment processes that it has 
        temporarily suspended through an agreement with the European Union, and 
        has not fully cooperated with the ongoing investigation by the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) of its nuclear activities;
Whereas the A.Q. Khan network sold nuclear technology, including a weapon 
        design, to states including Iran, Libya, and North Korea, and represents 
        a new and dangerous form of proliferation;
Whereas the Additional Protocol to the NPT would allow inspections of suspected 
        nuclear facilities in addition to declared nuclear facilities;
Whereas on February 13, 2004, President Bush stated ``Nations that are serious 
        about fighting proliferation will approve and implement the Additional 
        Protocol.'';
Whereas the global nuclear threat cannot be reduced without stronger 
        international support and cooperation to achieve universal compliance 
        with tighter nuclear nonproliferation rules and standards;
Whereas sustained leadership from the United States is essential to implement 
        existing legal and political commitments established by the NPT and to 
        realize a more effective global nuclear nonproliferation system; and
Whereas the United States and other countries should pursue a balanced and 
        comprehensive set of initiatives to strengthen the global nuclear 
        nonproliferation system, beginning with the NPT Review Conference in 
        2005: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This concurrent resolution may be cited as the ``Non-Proliferation 
Treaty Enhancement Resolution of 2005''.

SEC. 2. STATEMENT OF POLICY.

    The Congress--
            (1) reaffirms its support for the objectives of the Treaty 
        on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and expresses 
        its support for appropriate measures to strengthen the NPT;
            (2) calls on all parties participating in the Seventh 
        Review Conference on the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons to make good faith efforts to--
                    (A) establish more effective controls on critical 
                technologies that can be used to produce materials for 
                nuclear weapons;
                    (B) ensure universal adoption of the Additional 
                Protocol to the NPT and support the authority and 
                ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency to 
                inspect and monitor compliance with nonproliferation 
                rules and standards;
                    (C) conduct vigorous diplomacy and use collective 
                economic leverage to halt uranium enrichment and other 
                nuclear fuel cycle activities in Iran, and verifiably 
                dismantle North Korea's nuclear weapons capacity;
                    (D) conduct diplomacy to address the underlying 
                regional security problems in Northeast Asia, South 
                Asia, and the Middle East, which would facilitate 
                nuclear nonproliferation efforts in those regions;
                    (E) accelerate programs to eliminate nuclear 
                weapons, including their fissile material, and to 
                safeguard nuclear weapons-grade fissile materials to 
                the highest standards in order to prevent access by 
                terrorists or other states, decrease and ultimately end 
                the use of highly enriched uranium in civilian 
                reactors, and strengthen national and international 
                export controls and material security measures as 
                required by United Nations Resolution 1540;
                    (F) establish procedures to ensure that a state 
                cannot retain access to controlled nuclear materials, 
                equipment, technology, and components acquired for 
                peaceful purposes or avoid sanctions imposed by the 
                United Nations for violations of the NPT by withdrawing 
                from the NPT, whether or not such withdrawal is 
                consistent with Article X of the NPT;
                    (G) implement the disarmament obligations and 
                commitments of the parties that are related to the NPT 
                by--
                            (i) further reducing the size of their 
                        nuclear stockpiles (including reserves);
                            (ii) taking all steps to improve command 
                        and control of nuclear weapons in order to 
                        eliminate the chances of an accidental or 
                        unauthorized use of nuclear weapons;
                            (iii) continuing the moratorium on nuclear 
                        test explosions, and, for those parties who 
                        have not already done so, taking steps to 
                        ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty;
                            (iv) pursuing an agreement to verifiably 
                        halt the production of fissile materials for 
                        weapons;
                            (v) reaffirming existing pledges to non-
                        nuclear-weapon state members of the NPT that 
                        they will not be subjected to nuclear attack or 
                        threats of attack; and
                            (vi) undertaking a rigorous and accurate 
                        accounting of substrategic nuclear weapons and 
                        negotiating an agreement to verifiably reduce 
                        such stockpiles; and
            (3) affirms its support for the Proliferation Security 
        Initiative, and urges additional nations to join the 
        Initiative.
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