[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 6 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. J. RES. 6

     Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the 
                        reconstruction of Iraq.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                           February 13, 2003

Mr. Lieberman introduced the following joint resolution; which was read 
        twice and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                            JOINT RESOLUTION


 
     Expressing the sense of Congress with respect to planning the 
                        reconstruction of Iraq.

Whereas the United States may soon confront the need to defend with military 
        force its national security and the security of its allies from the 
        threat posed by Saddam Hussein and his regime in Iraq;
Whereas such action will serve not only to end Saddam's pernicious threat to 
        peace and security, but also to give the people of Iraq a new dawn of 
        hope, liberated from a disgraceful tyrant who oppresses their liberty, 
        abuses their humanity, and robs them of their future;
Whereas the President's January 20, 2003 report to Congress pursuant to the 
        Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002 
        (P.L. 107-243) provides a brief conceptual overview of the future of 
        Iraq but provides no detail on executive branch planning or legislation 
        that may be necessary and, most importantly, no estimates of the funding 
        and other support from Congress that would be necessary for carrying out 
        the reconstruction of Iraq;
Whereas Congress has become increasingly concerned that the President has not 
        provided adequate information regarding plans for the reconstruction of 
        Iraq following a war, should that eventuality arise;
Whereas United States experience with reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan 
        offers useful lessons for improving future post-war reconstruction 
        efforts;
Whereas the lessons learned during the reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, a 
        far less complex and difficult endeavor, suggest that United States 
        policymakers should give careful attention to planning the task of 
        reconstruction in Iraq following a war;
Whereas with Iraq the United States has the opportunity and the responsibility 
        to avoid the mistakes made during the reconstruction of Afghanistan;
Whereas success in the reconstruction of Iraq will require answers to many 
        critical questions in advance; and
Whereas United States actions in Iraq may well present the opportunity for 
        diplomatic initiatives in the broader Middle East region: Now, 
        therefore, be it
    Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United 
States of America in Congress assembled, That it is the sense of 
Congress that the President should--
            (1) estimate the funds and resources that are necessary for 
        the post-war reconstruction of Iraq and submit those estimates 
        to Congress in order that Congress may as quickly as feasible 
        fulfill its constitutional functions and ensure the timely 
        availability of funds;
            (2) design a transitional security force for Iraq, taking 
        into consideration--
                    (A) the oversight, authority, jurisdiction, and 
                mandate of the security force;
                    (B) the composition of the security force, whether 
                composed of United States military personnel, 
                civilians, or contractors, foreign nationals, personnel 
                or troops contributed by other nations, or other 
                individuals;
                    (C) the utility of asking other nations to 
                contribute to such a security force;
                    (D) plans to assure the personal security of the 
                interim Iraqi leadership; and
                    (E) the additional funds and personnel that may be 
                necessary for support of the security force;
            (3) develop a plan to reconstitute security, law, and 
        justice institutions in Iraq and to restore to Iraqis the 
        responsibility for managing their own affairs as quickly as is 
        practicable, taking into consideration--
                    (A) actions necessary to dismantle Iraq's military 
                forces and its multiple security forces and replace 
                them with reconstituted military, police, law 
                enforcement, and judicial institutions;
                    (B) standards and methods for recruiting Iraqi 
                nationals to those institutions and for purging from 
                the existing forces individuals loyal to Saddam Hussein 
                or guilty of serious human rights abuses;
                    (C) the question of which officials in the 
                executive branch of the United States Government are 
                appropriate to perform United States responsibilities 
                for carrying out the plan; and
                    (D) the additional funds and personnel that may be 
                necessary to carry out the plan;
            (4) develop a plan to respond to the humanitarian needs of 
        an Iraqi population already in humanitarian crisis, taking into 
        consideration--
                    (A) mechanisms and methods for carrying out 
                humanitarian relief efforts;
                    (B) the appointment of a transition coordinator, 
                transitional administrator, or other individual 
                responsible for ensuring coordination of both civilian 
                and military efforts to organize relief;
                    (C) the utility of urging Iraqi opposition groups 
                to appoint individuals to undertake relief 
                coordination, in cooperation with the coordinator, in 
                order to avoid pursuing conflicting purposes, 
                duplicating efforts, or so failing to address issues in 
                a timely fashion that the issues become humanitarian 
                disasters; and
                    (D) any need for a more robust response to calls 
                for pledges toward a relief fund, a fund to which the 
                United States has to date pledged only $15,000,000;
            (5) carefully consider the most crucial security threat, 
        the need to secure Iraq's weapons of mass destruction, 
        including biological and chemical precursors, in order to 
        ensure that they are neither stolen nor transferred to 
        terrorists or other parties inimical to the United States 
        during the immediate aftermath of the collapse of Saddam 
        Hussein's government;
            (6) develop measures necessary to temporarily steward 
        Iraq's natural resources, in order to ensure that--
                    (A) Iraq's oil wealth is preserved so that it may 
                be directed, at long last, not toward constructing 
                palaces and weapons of mass destruction, but instead 
                toward fulfilling the needs and future of the people of 
                Iraq;
                    (B) Iraq's oil fields, particularly those in the 
                southern part of the country, are secured from sabotage 
                by Saddam Hussein as his regime collapses;
                    (C) contingency plans exist to react to and repair 
                any damage Saddam Hussein may choose to inflict in 
                retreat; and
                    (D) mechanisms and systems, including anti-
                corruption measures, are implemented to ensure in the 
                interim that Iraqi oil revenues are properly collected 
                and accounted for and used in accordance with the 
                wishes and best interests of the Iraqi people;
            (7) make provisions to establish an interim government and 
        to ensure that it commands popular legitimacy, much as the Loya 
        Jirga has for President Karzai's government in Afghanistan, in 
        order that the interim government may administer the Iraqi 
        state, draft a constitution, prepare and carry out elections, 
        maintain security, and execute other appropriate functions;
            (8) plan to organize debtor and donor conferences in order 
        to restructure Iraq's debt and post-Persian Gulf War 
        obligations and accumulate sufficient resources to fund the 
        needs of an interim government during transition; and
            (9) develop plans for diplomatic initiatives to take 
        advantage of any opportunity to influence political 
        developments in the Middle East following a conflict in Iraq, 
        including--
                    (A) pressing for a resolution of the Israeli-
                Palestinian conflict;
                    (B) engaging Syria and Lebanon in ending their 
                sponsorship of terrorism; and
                    (C) offering Iran the opportunity to discuss with 
                the United States an end to Iran's support of terrorism 
                and weapons proliferation.
                                 <all>