[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1888 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1888
To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite,
encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure
full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
November 18, 2003
Mr. Specter (for himself, Mr. Schumer, Mr. Graham of South Carolina,
Mr. Wyden, Ms. Collins, Mr. Graham of Florida, and Mr. Bayh) introduced
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To halt Saudi support for institutions that fund, train, incite,
encourage, or in any other way aid and abet terrorism, and to secure
full Saudi cooperation in the investigation of terrorist incidents.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Saudi Arabia Accountability Act of
2003''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001)
mandates that all states ``refrain from providing any form of
support, active or passive, to entities or persons involved in
terrorist acts'', take ``the necessary steps to prevent the
commission of terrorist acts'', and ``deny safe haven to those
who finance, plan, support, or commit terrorist acts''.
(2) The Council on Foreign Relations concluded in an
October 2002 report on terrorist financing that ``[f]or years,
individuals and charities based in Saudi Arabia have been the
most important source of funds for al-Qaeda, and for years,
Saudi officials have turned a blind eye to this problem''.
(3) The Middle East Media Research Institute concluded in a
July 3, 2003, report on Saudi support for Palestinian
terrorists that ``for decades, the royal family of the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia has been the main financial supporter of
Palestinian groups fighting Israel''. The report notes
specifically that Saudi-sponsored organizations have funneled
over $4,000,000,000 to finance the Palestinian intifada that
began in September 2000.
(4) Much of this Saudi money has been directed to Hamas and
to the families of suicide bombers, directly funding and
rewarding suicide bombers. In December 2000, former Palestinian
Prime Minister Mahmoud Abbas wrote to the Saudis to complain
about their support for Hamas.
(5) The New York Times, citing United States and Israeli
sources, reported on September 17, 2003, that at least 50
percent of the current operating budget of Hamas comes from
``people in Saudi Arabia''.
(6) Many Saudi-funded religious institutions and the
literature they distribute teach a message of hate and
intolerance that provides an ideological basis for anti-Western
terrorism. The effects of these teachings are evidenced by the
fact that Osama bin Laden himself and 15 of the 19 September
11th hijackers were Saudi citizens.
(7) After the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers housing
complex at Dahran, Saudi Arabia, which killed 19 United States
Air Force personnel and wounded approximately 400 people, the
Government of Saudi Arabia refused to allow United States
officials to question individuals held in detention by the
Saudis in connection with the attack.
(8) During an October 2002 hearing on financing of
terrorism before the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate,
the Undersecretary for Enforcement of the Department of the
Treasury testified that the Government of Saudi Arabia had
taken only ``baby steps'' toward stemming the financing of
terrorist activities.
(9) During a July 2003 hearing on terrorism before the
Subcommittee on Terrorism, Technology and Homeland Security of
the Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate, David Aufhauser,
General Counsel of the Treasury Department, stated that Saudi
Arabia is, in many cases, the ``epicenter'' of financing for
terrorism.
(10) A joint committee of the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives issued a report
on July 24, 2003, that quotes various United States Government
personnel who complained that the Saudis refused to cooperate
in the investigation of Osama bin Laden and his network both
before and after the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks.
(11) There are indications that, since the May 12, 2003,
suicide bombings in Riyadh, the Government of Saudi Arabia is
making a more serious effort to combat terrorism.
SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) it is imperative that the Government of Saudi Arabia
immediately and unconditionally--
(A) provide complete, unrestricted, and
unobstructed cooperation to the United States,
including the unsolicited sharing of relevant
intelligence in a consistent and timely fashion, in the
investigation of groups and individuals that are
suspected of financing, supporting, plotting, or
committing an act of terror against United States
citizens anywhere in the world, including within the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;
(B) permanently close all charities, schools, or
other organizations or institutions in the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia that fund, train, incite, encourage, or in
any other way aid and abet terrorism anywhere in the
world (hereafter in this Act referred to as ``Saudi-
based terror organizations''), including by means of
providing support for the families of individuals who
have committed acts of terrorism;
(C) end funding or other support by the Government
of Saudi Arabia for charities, schools, and any other
organizations or institutions outside the Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia that train, incite, encourage, or in any
other way aid and abet terrorism anywhere in the world
(hereafter in this Act referred to as ``offshore terror
organizations''), including by means of providing
support for the families of individuals who have
committed acts of terrorism; and
(D) block all funding from private Saudi citizens
and entities to any Saudi-based terror organization or
offshore terrorism organization; and
(2) the President, in deciding whether to make the
certification under section 4, should judge whether the
Government of Saudi Arabia has continued and sufficiently
expanded the efforts to combat terrorism that it redoubled
after the May 12, 2003, bombing in Riyadh.
SEC. 4. SANCTIONS.
(a) Restrictions on Exports and Diplomatic Travel.--Unless the
President makes the certification described in subsection (c), the
President shall take the following actions:
(1) Prohibit the export to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and
prohibit the issuance of a license for the export to the
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, of--
(A) any defense articles or defense services on the
United States Munitions List under section 38 of the
Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2778) for which
special export controls are warranted under such Act
(22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.); and
(B) any item identified on the Commerce Control
List maintained under part 774 of title 15, Code of
Federal Regulations.
(2) Restrict travel of Saudi diplomats assigned to
Washington, District of Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi
Consulate General in Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los
Angeles to a 25-mile radius of Washington, District of
Columbia, New York, New York, the Saudi Consulate General in
Houston, or the Saudi Consulate in Los Angeles, respectively.
(b) Waiver.--The President may waive the application of subsection
(a) if the President--
(1) determines that it is in the national security interest
of the United States to do so; and
(2) submits to the appropriate congressional committees a
report that contains the reasons for such determination.
(c) Certification.--The President shall transmit to the appropriate
congressional committees a certification of any determination made by
the President after the date of the enactment of this Act that the
Government of Saudi Arabia--
(1) is fully cooperating with the United States in
investigating and preventing terrorist attacks;
(2) has permanently closed all Saudi-based terror
organizations;
(3) has ended any funding or other support by the
Government of Saudi Arabia for any offshore terror
organization; and
(4) has exercised maximum efforts to block all funding from
private Saudi citizens and entities to offshore terrorist
organizations.
SEC. 5. REPORT.
(a) Requirement for Report.--Not later than 6 months after the date
of the enactment of this Act, and every 12 months thereafter until the
President makes the certification described in section 4(c), the
Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional
committees a report on the progress made by the Government of Saudi
Arabia toward meeting the conditions described in paragraphs (1)
through (4) of section 4(c).
(b) Form.--The report submitted under subsection (a) shall be in
unclassified form but may include a classified annex.
SEC. 6. DEFINITION OF APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES.
In this Act, the term ``appropriate congressional committees''
means the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate and the
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives.
<all>