[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1875 Introduced in House (IH)]







108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1875

To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and 
                          for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 30, 2003

 Mr. Lantos (for himself, Mr. Hyde, Mr. Berman, Mr. Bereuter, and Mr. 
  Ackerman) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                  Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To strengthen the missile proliferation laws of the United States, and 
                          for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Missile Threat Reduction Act of 
2003''.

   TITLE I--STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION LAW

SEC. 101. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The spread of offensive ballistic missiles suitable for 
        launching nuclear, chemical, and biological warheads is 
        accelerating across the globe.
            (2) According to the Carnegie Endowment for International 
        Peace, more than 25 countries possess missiles with ranges in 
        excess of 300 kilometers and capable of delivering a nuclear 
        warhead.
            (3)(A) Many of the countries now possessing such missiles, 
        and engaging in the sale and transfer of such missiles and 
        their production technology to other countries, are directly 
        hostile to the United States, its interests, and its allies.
            (B) Of particular concern in this regard is North Korea, 
        which regularly sells ballistic missiles and technology to 
        countries in regions of instability and concern to the United 
        States.
            (4) The Central Intelligence Agency has stated in its most 
        recent report on the foreign ballistic missile threat the 
        following:
                    ``Emerging ballistic missile states continue to 
                increase the range, reliability, and accuracy of the 
                missile systems in their inventories--posing ever 
                greater risks to U.S. forces, interests, and allies 
                throughout the world. A decade ago, U.S. and allied 
                forces abroad faced threats from SRBM's [Short Range 
                Ballistic Missiles]--primarily the Scud and its 
                variants. Today, countries have deployed or are on the 
                verge of deploying MRBM's [Medium Range Ballistic 
                Missiles], placing greater numbers of targets at risk.
                    ``Proliferation of ballistic missile-related 
                technologies, materials, and expertise--especially by 
                Russian, Chinese, and North Korean entities--has 
                enabled emerging missile states to accelerate the 
                development timelines for their existing programs, 
                acquire turnkey systems to gain previously non-existent 
                capabilities--in the case of the Chinese sale of the M-
                11 SRBM to Pakistan--and lay the groundwork for the 
                expansion of domestic infrastructures to potentially 
                accommodate even more capable and longer range future 
                systems.''.
            (5) The same CIA report also noted the following: ``North 
        Korea has assumed the role as the missile and manufacturing 
        technology source for many programs. North Korean willingness 
        to sell complete systems and components has enabled other 
        states to acquire longer range capabilities earlier than 
        otherwise would have been possible--notably the sale of the No 
        Dong MRBM to Pakistan. The North also has helped countries to 
        acquire technologies to serve as the basis for domestic 
        development efforts--as with Iran's reverse-engineering of the 
        No Dong in the Shahab-3 program. Meanwhile, Iran is expanding 
        its efforts to sell missile technology.''.
            (6) Since 1987, 33 countries have committed to abide by a 
        voluntary set of guidelines known as the Missile Technology 
        Control Regime (MTCR), whereby adherents agreed to refrain from 
        the transfer to nonadherents of certain categories of whole 
        missiles, their constituent parts, and the facilities to 
        manufacture them, especially ``Category I'' missiles, which at 
        a range of 300 kilometers or more and a payload capacity of 500 
        kilograms or more are especially suited for delivering nuclear 
        weapons.
            (7) In October 2002, 93 countries committed to observe a 
        nonbinding code of conduct derived from, but less restrictive 
        than, the nonbinding MTCR. While this is a welcome achievement, 
        it does not provide a legal obligation on its adherents to 
        refrain from the trade in missiles or missile technology.
            (8) On December 10, 2002, the White House released its 
        ``National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction'', 
        wherein it is stated that strengthening international 
        nonproliferation controls on weapons of mass destruction (WMD) 
        and upon the missiles that can deliver them is the second of 
        three principal pillars of the National Strategy. The National 
        Strategy also states that ``effective interdiction is a 
        critical part of the U.S. strategy to combat WMD and their 
        delivery means''.
            (9) On December 11, 2002, the United States took control of 
        an unflagged freighter that was attempting clandestinely to 
        ship, from North Korea to Yemen, SCUD missiles of a type that 
        would be generally prohibited from transfer as Category I 
        missiles.
            (10) Neither North Korea nor Yemen is an adherent to the 
        MTCR guidelines, which in any case are not legally binding, and 
        there is no binding international legal instrument that would 
        prohibit shipments of the missiles referred to in paragraph 
        (9).
            (11) At Yemen's request, the United States released the 
        shipment of North Korean Scud missiles to Yemen.
            (12) Also on December 11, 2002, the White House press 
        spokesman stated that existing international law regarding 
        halting the spread of missile proliferation could be 
        strengthened. The new National Strategy to Combat Weapons of 
        Mass Destruction also commits the United States to support 
        those regimes that are currently in force, and to work to 
        improve the effectiveness of, and compliance with, those 
        regimes, and identifies the MTCR as a regime that the United 
        States will seek to strengthen.
            (13) Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, testifying on 
        February 12, 2003, before the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the Senate, stated the following: ``. . . [I]t's pretty clear 
        that the proliferation regimes that exist in the world worked 
        pretty well before, [but] they're not working very well right 
        now. . . . [U]nless the world wakes up and says this is a 
        dangerous thing and creates a set of regimes that will in fact 
        get cooperation to stop those weapons, we're going to be facing 
        a very serious situation in the next five years.''.
            (14) The MTCR has made an invaluable contribution to 
        restraint in the international trade of offensive ballistic 
        missiles. Strengthening international controls on ballistic 
        missiles, however, will require a dramatic expansion of 
        adherents that rigorously abide by the MTCR's guidelines, and a 
        binding legal basis for the United Nations and countries 
        devoted to nonproliferation to prevent, and when necessary act 
        to prevent, further proliferation of offensive ballistic 
        missiles around the world.
            (15) Therefore, it should be the policy of the United 
        States to promote the creation of new international mechanisms 
        that would, in all future circumstances, allow the peace-loving 
        and law-abiding nations of the world the authority to interdict 
        and prevent the transfer of such missiles.

SEC. 102. POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES.

    It shall be the policy of the United States to seek a binding 
international instrument or instruments to restrict the trade in 
offensive ballistic missiles with ranges of 300 kilometers or more that 
have a payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more. Such a binding 
international instrument may take the form of a multilateral treaty, a 
United Nations Security Council resolution, or other instrument of 
international law, and should provide for enforcement measures 
including interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of illicit shipments 
of offensive ballistic missiles and related technology, equipment, and 
components.

SEC. 103. SENSE OF CONGRESS.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should 
immediately introduce a resolution in the United Nations Security 
Council to prohibit all members of the United Nations from purchasing, 
receiving, assisting or allowing the transfer of, and to authorize the 
subsequent interdiction, seizure, and impoundment of, any missile, 
missile-related equipment, means of producing missiles, or missile-
related technology from North Korea.

   TITLE II--STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE NONPROLIFERATION LAW

SEC. 201. PROBATIONARY PERIOD FOR FOREIGN PERSONS.

    (a) In General.--Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon 
the expiration, or the granting of a waiver, on or after January 1, 
2003, of sanctions against a foreign person imposed under section 73(a) 
of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) or under section 
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the International Emergency 
Economic Powers Act, a license shall be required, for a period of not 
less than 3 years, for the export to that foreign person of all items 
controlled for export under section 5 or 6 of the Export Administration 
Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2404, 2405), as continued in effect under 
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, in accordance with the 
Export Administration Regulations.
    (b) Termination.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to a foreign 
person 30 days after the President notifies the Committee on 
International Relations of the House of Representatives and the 
Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and the Committee on 
Foreign Relations of the Senate that he has determined that--
            (1) the foreign person has--
                    (A) ceased all activity related to the original 
                imposition of sanctions under section 73(a) of the Arms 
                Export Control Act or section 11B(b)(A) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979, as the case may be; and
                    (B) has instituted a program of transparency 
                measures whereby the United States will be able to 
                verify for at least a period of 3 years that the 
                foreign person is not engaging in prohibited activities 
under those provisions of law referred to in paragraph (1); and
            (2) there has been an appropriate resolution of the 
        original violation or violations, such as financial penalties, 
        incarceration, destruction of prohibited items, or other 
        appropriate measures taken to prevent a recurrence of the 
        violation or violations.

SEC. 202. STRENGTHENING UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS 
              ON FOREIGN PERSONS.

    (a) Arms Export Control Act.--Section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)(2)) is amended by striking ``2 years'' 
each place it appears and inserting ``4 years''.
    (b) Public Information.--Section 73(e)(2) of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(e)(2)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new sentence: ``Such report may be classified only to the 
extent necessary to protect intelligence sources and methods. If the 
report is so classified, the President shall make every effort to 
acquire sufficient alternative information that would allow a 
subsequent unclassified version of the report to be issued.''.
    (c) Export Administration Act of 1979.--Any sanction imposed on a 
foreign person under section 11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act 
of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)(1)), as continued in effect under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act, shall be in effect for a 
period of 4 years beginning on the date on which the sanction was 
imposed.
    (d) Applicability.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) 
and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply to all sanctions 
imposed under section 73(a) of the Arms Export Control Act or section 
11B(b)(1) of the Export Administration Act of 1979, as continued in 
effect under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, by reason 
of acts giving rise to such sanctions that were committed by foreign 
persons on or after January 1, 2003.

SEC. 203. COMPREHENSIVE UNITED STATES MISSILE PROLIFERATION SANCTIONS 
              ON ALL RESPONSIBLE PERSONS.

    (a) Arms Export Control Act.--Section 73(a) of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797b(a)) is amended by adding at the end the 
following new paragraph:
    ``(3)(A) Sanctions imposed upon a foreign person under paragraph 
(2) shall also be imposed on any governmental entity that the President 
determines exercises effective control over, benefits from, or directly 
or indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
    ``(B) When a sanction is imposed on a foreign person under 
paragraph (2), the President may also impose that sanction on any other 
person or entity that the President has reason to believe has or may 
acquire items that may not be exported to that foreign person on 
account of the sanction imposed on that foreign person, with the intent 
to transfer to that foreign person, or provide to that foreign person 
access to, such items.
    ``(C) The President may also prohibit, for such period of time as 
he may determine, any transaction or dealing, by a United States person 
or within the United States, with any foreign person on whom sanctions 
have been imposed under this subsection.
    ``(D) The President shall report on an annual basis to the 
Committee on International Relations of the House of Representatives 
and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate the identity of 
any foreign person that engages in any transaction or activity with a 
foreign person on whom sanctions have been imposed under this 
subsection that either--
            ``(i) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under 
        subparagraph (B) but for which sanctions have not been imposed; 
        or
            ``(ii) would be the basis for imposing sanctions under 
        subparagraph (C) if the transaction or activity had been 
        carried out by a United States person or by a person in the 
        United States.
Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent feasible, but 
may include a classified annex.''.
    (b) Definition of Person.--Section 74(a)(8)(A) of the Arms Export 
Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2797c(a)(8)(A)) is amended to read as follows:
            ``(8)(A) the term `person' means--
                    ``(i) a natural person;
                    ``(ii) a corporation, business association, 
                partnership, society, trust, transnational corporation, 
                or transnational joint venture, any other 
                nongovernmental entity, organization, or group, and any 
                governmental entity;
                    ``(iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent entity 
                of any business enterprise or other organization or 
                entity listed in clause (ii); and
                    ``(iv) any successor of any business enterprise or 
                other organization or entity listed in clause (ii) or 
                (iii); and''.
    (c) Export Administration Act of 1979.--
            (1) Sanctions imposed on government entities.--Any sanction 
        imposed on a foreign person under section 11B(b)(1)(B) of the 
        Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 
        2410b(b)(1)(B)), as continued in effect under the International 
        Emergency Economic Powers Act (in this subsection referred to 
        as a ``dual use sanction''), shall also be imposed on any 
        governmental entity that the President determines exercises 
        effective control over, benefits from, or directly or 
        indirectly facilitates the activities of that foreign person.
            (2) Other entities.--When a dual use sanction is imposed on 
        a foreign person, the President may also impose that sanction 
        on any other person or entity that the President has reason to 
        believe has or may acquire items that may not be exported to 
        that foreign person on account of the dual use sanction imposed 
        on that foreign person, with the intent to transfer to that 
        foreign person, or provide to that foreign person access to, 
        such items.
            (3) Transactions by third parties.--The President may also 
        prohibit, for such period of time as he may determine, any 
        transaction or dealing, by a United States person or within the 
        United States, with any foreign person on whom dual use 
        sanctions have been imposed.
            (4) Report.--The President shall submit on an annual basis 
        to the appropriate congressional committees a report that 
        contains the identity of any foreign person that engages in any 
        transaction or activity with a foreign person on whom dual use 
        sanctions have been imposed that either--
                    (A) would be the basis for imposing dual use 
                sanctions under paragraph (2) but for which such 
                sanctions have not been imposed; or
                    (B) would be the basis for imposing dual use 
                sanctions under paragraph (3) if the transaction or 
                activity had been carried out by a United States person 
                or by a person in the United States.
        Such report shall be unclassified to the maximum extent 
        feasible, but may include a classified annex.
            (5) Definitions.--In this subsection:
                    (A) Person.--The term ``person'' means--
                            (i) a natural person;
                            (ii) a corporation, business association, 
                        partnership, society, trust, transnational 
                        corporation, or transnational joint venture, 
                        any other nongovernmental entity, organization, 
                        or group, and any governmental entity;
                            (iii) any subsidiary, subunit, or parent 
                        entity of any business enterprise or other 
                        organization or entity listed in clause (ii); 
                        and
                            (iv) any successor of any business 
                        enterprise or other organization or entity 
                        listed in clause (ii) or (iii).
                    (B) In the case of countries where it may be 
                impossible to identify a specific governmental entity 
                referred to in subparagraph (A), the term ``person'' 
                means--
                            (i) all activities of that government 
                        relating to the development or production of 
                        any missile equipment or technology; and
                            (ii) all activities of that government 
                        affecting the development or production of 
                        aircraft, electronics, and space systems or 
                        equipment.
                    (B) United states person.--The term ``United States 
                person'' has the meaning given that term in section 
                16(2) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (50 
                U.S.C. App. 2415(2)).
                    (C) Missile equipment or technology.--The term 
                ``missile equipment or technology'' has the meaning 
                given that term in section 11B(c) of the Export 
                Administration Act of 1979 (50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(c)).
    (d) Effective Date.--The amendments made by subsections (a) and (b) 
shall apply with respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 
2003, on foreign persons under section 73(a)(2) of the Arms Export 
Control Act, and the provisions of subsection (c) shall apply with 
respect to sanctions imposed on or after January 1, 2003, on foreign 
persons under section 11B(b) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 
(50 U.S.C. App. 2410b(b)), as continued in effect under the 
International Emergency Economic Powers Act.

           TITLE III--Incentives for Missile Threat Reduction

SEC. 301. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE.

    (a) Types of Assistance.--The President is authorized to provide, 
on such terms as the President deems appropriate, the following 
assistance to countries that agree to destroy their ballistic missiles, 
and their facilities for producing ballistic missiles, that have a 
payload capacity of 500 kilograms or more over a distance of 300 
kilometers or more:
            (1) Assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control 
        Act (22 U.S.C. 2763).
            (2) Assistance under chapter 4 of part II of the Foreign 
        Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2346 et seq.), 
        notwithstanding section 531(e) or 660(a) of that Act (22 U.S.C. 
        2346(e) or 2420(a)).
            (3) Drawdown of defense articles, defense services, and 
        military education and training under section 506 of the 
        Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2318).
    (b) Congressional Notification.--Assistance authorized under 
subsection (a) may not be provided until 30 days after the date on 
which the President has provided notice thereof to the appropriate 
congressional committees in accordance with the procedures applicable 
to reprogramming notifications under section 634A(a) of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2394-1(a)).
    (c) Limitation.--Any assistance provided to a country under 
subsection (a) may not be provided in more than 3 fiscal years.

SEC. 302. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.

    (a) Authorization.--There is authorized to be appropriated to the 
President to carry out section 301 the sum of $250,000,000.
    (b) Availability.--Amounts appropriated pursuant to the 
authorization of appropriations under subsection (a) are authorized to 
remain available until expended.

SEC. 303. AUTHORIZATION OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE IN MISSILE DISARMAMENT.

    The President is authorized to provide technical assistance in the 
destruction of any missile or facility for producing ballistic 
missiles, in any country that requests such assistance.
                                 <all>