[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 1719 Introduced in House (IH)]







108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 1719

  To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United 
States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that 
will increase the national security of the United States, and for other 
                               purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                             April 10, 2003

 Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. Edwards, Mr. McHugh, Mr. 
Spratt, Mr. Souder, Mrs. Tauscher, Mr. Shays, Mr. Ortiz, Mr. Leach, Ms. 
Corrine Brown of Florida, Mr. Hastings of Florida, Mr. Wilson of South 
  Carolina, Mr. Bereuter, Mr. Reyes, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Abercrombie, Mr. 
   Taylor of North Carolina, Mr. Smith of Michigan, Mr. Bartlett of 
Maryland, Mr. Stearns, Mr. Hoyer, Mr. Sherwood, Mr. Cox, and Mr. Farr) 
 introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on 
                        International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
  To promote enhanced nonproliferation cooperation between the United 
States and the Russian Federation and foster various other actions that 
will increase the national security of the United States, and for other 
                               purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.

    (a) Short Title.--This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Security 
Initiative Act of 2003''.
    (b) Table of Contents.--The table of contents for this Act is as 
follows:

Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
             TITLE I--NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS

Sec. 101. Acceleration and expansion of International Nuclear Materials 
                            Protection and Cooperation program.
Sec. 102. Funding for efforts to close nuclear weapons production 
                            facilities in Russia.
Sec. 103. Funding to improve security at facilities in the former 
                            Soviet Union containing nuclear materials 
                            that could be used in radiological 
                            dispersal devices.
Sec. 104. Enhanced funding for accelerated disposition for highly 
                            enriched uranium.
Sec. 105. Improving measures to track and intercept illicit transfers 
                            of weapons of mass destruction and the 
                            materials and technologies for developing 
                            and producing such weapons.
Sec. 106. Enhanced funding for Russian Transition Initiative.
Sec. 107. Silk Road Initiative.
Sec. 108. NATO Science for Peace program.
    TITLE II--ADMINISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THREAT REDUCTION AND 
                       NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

Sec. 201. Analysis of effect on threat reduction and nonproliferation 
                            programs of congressional oversight 
                            measures with respect to such programs.
Sec. 202. Annual report on the use of funds appropriated for threat 
                            reduction and nonproliferation in states of 
                            the former Soviet Union.
Sec. 203. Plan for and coordination of chemical and biological weapons 
                            nonproliferation programs with states of 
                            the former Soviet Union.
               TITLE III--UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS

Sec. 301. Comprehensive inventories and data exchanges on nuclear 
                            weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons.
Sec. 302. Establishment of Duma-Congress nuclear threat reduction 
                            working group.
Sec. 303. Joint United States/North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
                            cooperation with Russia on theater-level 
                            ballistic missile defenses.
Sec. 304. Encouragement of enhanced collaboration to achieve more 
                            reliable Russian early warning systems.
Sec. 305. Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace.
Sec. 306. Nonproliferation fellowships.
                            TITLE IV--OTHER

Sec. 401. Promotion of discussions on nuclear and radiological security 
                            and safety between the International Atomic 
                            Energy Agency and the Organization for 
                            Economic Cooperation and Development.

             TITLE I--NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAM ENHANCEMENTS

SEC. 101. ACCELERATION AND EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
              PROTECTION AND COOPERATION PROGRAM.

    (a) Policy With Respect to Former Soviet Union.--It is the policy 
of the United States to seek to cooperate with the Russian Federation 
and each other independent state of the former Soviet Union to effect 
as quickly as is reasonably practical basic security measures (such as 
the replacement of doors, the bricking of or placement of bars in 
windows, the clearing of underbrush from facility perimeters, and the 
erection of fences) at each facility in the Russian Federation and each 
such state that is used for storing nuclear weapons or nuclear 
materials and is not yet protected by such measures.
    (b) Policy Worldwide.--It is the policy of the United States to 
seek to cooperate with all appropriate nations--
            (1) to attempt to ensure that all nuclear weapons and 
        nuclear materials worldwide are secure and accounted for 
        according to stringent standards; and
            (2) to minimize the number of facilities worldwide at which 
        separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium are present, so 
        as to achieve the highest and most sustainable levels of 
security for such facilities in the most cost-effective manner.
    (c) Expansion of Program to Additional Countries Authorized.--(1) 
The Secretary of Energy may expand the International Nuclear Materials 
Protection and Cooperation program of the Department of Energy to 
encompass countries other than the Russian Federation and the other 
independent states of the former Soviet Union.
    (2) In carrying out such program with respect to countries other 
than the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the 
former Soviet Union, the Secretary of Energy may provide such funds as 
are needed to remove nuclear materials from potentially vulnerable 
facilities, including funds to cover the costs of--
            (A) transporting such materials from those facilities to 
        secure facilities;
            (B) purchasing such materials;
            (C) converting those facilities to a use that no longer 
        requires nuclear materials; and
            (D) providing incentives to facilitate the removal of such 
        materials from such facilities.
    (3)(A) In carrying out such program with respect to countries other 
than the Russian Federation and the other independent states of the 
former Soviet Union, the Secretary of Energy may provide technical 
assistance to the Secretary of State in the efforts of the Secretary of 
State to assist such countries to review and improve their security 
programs with respect to nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.
    (B) The technical assistance provided under subparagraph (A) may, 
where consistent with the treaty obligations of the United States, 
include the sharing of technology or methodologies to the countries 
referred to in that subparagraph. Any such sharing shall take into 
account the sovereignty of the country concerned and the nuclear 
weapons programs of such country, as well as the sensitivity of any 
information involved regarding United States nuclear weapons or nuclear 
weapons systems.
    (C) The Secretary of Energy may include the Russian Federation in 
activities under this paragraph if the Secretary determines that the 
experience of the Russian Federation under the International Nuclear 
Materials Protection and Cooperation program would make the 
participation of the Russian Federation in those activities useful in 
providing technical assistance under subparagraph (A).
    (d) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy 
for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation 
program a total of $40,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the 
policies specified in subsections (a) and (b) and the expansion of the 
program authorized by subsection (c).

SEC. 102. FUNDING FOR EFFORTS TO CLOSE NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION 
              FACILITIES IN RUSSIA.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to 
cooperate with the Russian Federation to accelerate, to the maximum 
extent feasible, the closure of facilities in the Russian Federation 
used for the production of nuclear weapons.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy 
for the Russian Transition Initiatives program a total of $35,000,000 
for the purpose of carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a).

SEC. 103. FUNDING TO IMPROVE SECURITY AT FACILITIES IN THE FORMER 
              SOVIET UNION CONTAINING NUCLEAR MATERIALS THAT COULD BE 
              USED IN RADIOLOGICAL DISPERSAL DEVICES.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to 
cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other independent state 
of the former Soviet Union to improve the security at facilities, in 
the Russian Federation and each such state, that contain radioactive 
materials that could be used in radiological dispersal devices.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy 
for the National Nuclear Security Administration a total of $60,000,000 
for the purpose of carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a).

SEC. 104. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR ACCELERATED DISPOSITION FOR HIGHLY 
              ENRICHED URANIUM.

    There is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 
2005, in addition to any sums otherwise authorized to be appropriated, 
to the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear Security 
Administration a total of $40,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out 
section 3157 of the Bob Stump National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-314; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note), to remain 
available until expended.

SEC. 105. IMPROVING MEASURES TO TRACK AND INTERCEPT ILLICIT TRANSFERS 
              OF WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND THE MATERIALS AND 
              TECHNOLOGIES FOR DEVELOPING AND PRODUCING SUCH WEAPONS.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to seek to--
            (1) cooperate with the Russian Federation and each other 
        independent state of the former Soviet Union to improve border 
        controls and other measures to track and intercept illicit 
        transfers of weapons of mass destruction and the materials and 
        technologies for developing and producing such weapons; and
            (2) work with international partners to install, at 
        critical international ports, appropriate devices to detect and 
        intercept illicit transfers of weapons of mass destruction that 
        are nuclear or radiological in nature and the materials and 
        technologies for developing and producing such weapons.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums 
otherwise authorized to be appropriated, to the Department of Energy 
for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation 
program a total of $60,000,000 for the purpose of carrying out the 
policy specified in subsection (a) with respect to weapons of mass 
destruction that are nuclear or radiological in nature.

SEC. 106. ENHANCED FUNDING FOR RUSSIAN TRANSITION INITIATIVE.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to prevent the 
proliferation, from the Russian Federation and the other independent 
states of the former Soviet Union to countries of proliferation 
concern, of scientists, engineers, and technicians possessing the 
expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass destruction.
    (b) Findings Regarding the Former IPP Program and Nuclear Cities 
Initiative Program.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention program 
        (hereinafter in this section referred to as ``IPP'') has been a 
        very successful nonproliferation program.
            (2) Through cost-sharing partnerships between companies in 
        the United States and scientists employed at nuclear, 
        biological, and chemical weapons facilities in the independent 
        states of the former Soviet Union, IPP has supported the 
        creation of sustainable commercial jobs that reduce incentives 
        for the proliferation, to countries of proliferation concern, 
        of expertise to develop and produce weapons of mass 
        destruction.
            (3) More than 125 companies, actively engaged in the part 
        of the Russian Transition Initiative program that derives from 
        IPP, are developing high-technology commercial products and 
        creating new jobs in the United States and the independent 
        states of the former Soviet Union.
            (4) The Nuclear Cities Initiative has also been successful 
        in helping to prevent the proliferation of scientists and 
        others with weapons expertise from the Russian Federation and 
        other independent states of the former Soviet Union.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005, in addition to any sums 
otherwise appropriated, to the Department of Energy for the Russian 
Transition Initiative program a total of $60,000,000 for the purpose of 
carrying out the policy specified in subsection (a) in a manner 
consistent with the practices described in subsection (b).

SEC. 107. SILK ROAD INITIATIVE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) a number of independent states of the former Soviet 
        Union have been helpful to the United States in the war on 
        terrorism; and
            (2) these states are new and struggling democracies and 
        would benefit considerably from assistance to create 
        sustainable jobs for their underemployed or unemployed 
        scientists, engineers, and technicians who were formerly 
        engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass 
        destruction for the Russian Federation or another independent 
        state of the former Soviet Union.
    (b) Policies.--(1) It is the policy of the United States to seek to 
establish and promote programs to prevent the proliferation, from 
scientists, engineers, and technicians of the Russian Federation and 
other independent states of the former Soviet Union to countries of 
proliferation concern, of expertise to develop and produce weapons of 
mass destruction.
    (2) It is also the policy of the United States to seek to assist 
independent states of the former Soviet Union that have been helpful to 
the United States in the war on terrorism so as to promote the creation 
of jobs that foster economic stability and democracy.
    (c) Program Required.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall carry out 
a program, to be known as the Silk Road Initiative, to develop 
sustainable employment opportunities in the United States and in Silk 
Road nations for scientists, engineers, and technicians formerly 
engaged in activities to develop and produce weapons of mass 
destruction in the Silk Road nations. The program shall--
            (A) incorporate best practices under the former Initiatives 
        for Proliferation Prevention program; and
            (B) facilitate commercial partnerships between private 
        entities in the United States and scientists, engineers, and 
        technicians in the Silk Road nations.
    (2) Before implementing the program with respect to multiple Silk 
Road nations, the Secretary of Energy shall carry out a pilot program 
with respect to one Silk Road nation selected by the Secretary. It is 
the sense of Congress that the Secretary should select the Republic of 
Georgia.
    (d) Silk Road Nations Defined.--In this section, the Silk Road 
nations are Armenia, Azerbaijan, the Republic of Georgia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.-- There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of Energy 
a total of $30,000,000 to carry out the Silk Road Initiative under 
subsection (c).

SEC. 108. NATO SCIENCE FOR PEACE PROGRAM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter in 
        this section referred to as ``NATO'') has been successful in 
        sponsoring scientific research in the states of the former 
        Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union through the program referred to as 
        the ``NATO Science for Peace program''.
            (2) As operated as of the the date of the enactment of this 
        Act, the NATO Science for Peace program does not lead to 
        commercialization of results and the creation of sustainable 
        technical jobs.
            (3) The NATO Science for Peace program could be improved--
                    (A) through the use of appropriate private entities 
                and industrial NATO members to select current projects 
                of that program that offer prospects of 
                commercialization with United States companies; and
                    (B) through assistance in developing future Science 
                for Peace projects with commercial potential.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of 
Defense a total of $1,500,000 for the purpose of providing assistance 
to the NATO Science for Peace program consistent with subsection 
(a)(3).

    TITLE II--ADMINISTRATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THREAT REDUCTION AND 
                       NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS

SEC. 201. ANALYSIS OF EFFECT ON THREAT REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION 
              PROGRAMS OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT MEASURES WITH RESPECT 
              TO SUCH PROGRAMS.

    (a) Analysis of and Report on Congressional Oversight Measures.--
(1) The Secretary of Energy, in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense, shall carry out an analysis of the effect on threat reduction 
and nonproliferation programs of applicable congressional oversight 
measures. The analysis shall take into account--
            (A) the national security interests of the United States;
            (B) the need for accountability in the expenditure of funds 
        by the United States;
            (C) the effect of such congressional oversight measures on 
        the continuity and effectiveness of such programs; and
            (D) the oversight responsibilities of Congress with respect 
        to such programs.
    (2) In carrying out the analysis, the Secretary of Energy shall 
consult with the chairs and ranking minority members of the Committees 
on Armed Services of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
    (b) Report.--Not later than November 1, 2004, the Secretary of 
Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the analysis required by 
subsection (a). The report shall--
            (1) identify, and describe the purpose of, each 
        congressional oversight measure; and
            (2) set forth such recommendations as the Secretary 
        considers appropriate as to whether the measure should be 
        retained, amended, or repealed, together with the reasoning 
        underlying that determination.
    (c) Definitions.--In this section:
            (1) the term ``congressional oversight measure'' means--
                    (A) the restrictions in subsection (d) of section 
                1203 of the Cooperative Threat Reduction Act of 1993 
                (22 U.S.C. 5952);
                    (B) the eligibility requirements in paragraphs (1) 
                through (4) of section 502 of the FREEDOM Support Act 
                (22 U.S.C. 5852);
                    (C) the prohibition in section 1305 of the National 
                Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 (Public 
                Law 106-65; 113 Stat. 512; 22 U.S.C. 5952 note); and
                    (D) any restriction or prohibition on the use of 
                funds otherwise available for threat reduction and 
                nonproliferation programs that applies absent the 
                submission to Congress (or any one or more officers or 
                committees of Congress) of a report, certification, or 
                other matter.
            (2) The term ``threat reduction and nonproliferation 
        programs'' means--
                    (A) the programs specified in section 1501(b) of 
                the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
                1997 (Public Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2731; 50 U.S.C. 
                2362 note); and
                    (B) any programs for which funds are made available 
                under the defense nuclear nonproliferation account of 
                the Department of Energy.

SEC. 202. ANNUAL REPORT ON THE USE OF FUNDS APPROPRIATED FOR THREAT 
              REDUCTION AND NONPROLIFERATION IN STATES OF THE FORMER 
              SOVIET UNION.

    (a) Report.--Not later than December 31 of each year, the Secretary 
of Energy shall submit to Congress a report on the use, during the 
fiscal year ending September 30 of that year, of funds appropriated for 
threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in the Russian 
Federation and the other independent states of the former Soviet Union. 
The report shall be prepared in consultation with the Secretary of 
Defense and shall include the following:
            (1) A description of the use of such funds and the manner 
        in which such funds are being monitored and accounted for, 
        including--
                    (A) the amounts obligated, and the amounts 
                expended, for such activities;
                    (B) the purposes for which such amounts were 
                obligated and expended;
                    (C) the forms of assistance provided, and the 
                justification for each form of assistance provided;
                    (D) the success of each such activity, including 
                the purposes achieved for each such activity;
                    (E) a description of the participation in such 
                activities by private sector entities in the United 
                States and by Federal agencies; and
                    (F) any other information that the Secretary of 
                Energy considers appropriate to provide a complete 
                description of the operation and success of such 
                activities.
            (2) An accounting of the financial commitment made by the 
        Russian Federation, as of the date of the end of the fiscal 
        year covered by the report, to the destruction of its weapons 
        of mass destruction and to threat reduction and 
        nonproliferation programs.
            (3) A description of the efforts made by the United States 
        to encourage the Russian Federation to continue to maintain its 
        current level of financial commitment at a level not less than 
        the level of its commitment for fiscal year 2003, and the 
        response of the Russian Federation to such efforts.
            (4) A description of the access provided by the Russian 
        Federation to the United States during the fiscal year covered 
        by the report to the facilities with respect to which the 
        United States is providing assistance under threat reduction 
        and nonproliferation programs.
    (b) Consultation Required.--In preparing the report, the Secretary 
of Energy shall consult with the chairs and ranking minority members of 
the following congressional committees:
            (1) The Committee on Armed Services, Committee on 
        Appropriations, and Committee on International Relations of the 
        House of Representatives.
            (2) The Committee on Armed Services, Committee on 
        Appropriations, and Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
        Senate.
    (c) Information From Russian Federation.--In the case of activities 
covered by the report that are carried out in the Russian Federation, 
the Secretary of Energy shall, in preparing the report, include 
information provided by the Russian Federation with respect to those 
activities.
    (d) Definition.--In this section, the term ``threat reduction and 
nonproliferation programs'' has the meaning given such term in section 
201.

SEC. 203. PLAN FOR AND COORDINATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS 
              NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH STATES OF THE FORMER 
              SOVIET UNION.

    (a) Chemical and Biological Weapons Plan.--Section 1205 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 
107-107; 115 Stat. 1247), as amended by section 1205 of the Bob Stump 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 
107-314; 116 Stat. 2664) is amended--
            (1) by redesignating subsection (d) as subsection (e); and
            (2) by inserting after subsection (c) the following new 
        subsection (d):
    ``(d) Chemical and Biological Weapons.--(1) Not later than June 1, 
2004, the President shall prepare and submit to Congress a 
comprehensive, detailed plan--
            ``(A) to secure and destroy all chemical and biological 
        weapons, and the chemical and biological materials designed for 
        use in such weapons, that are located in Russia and the 
        independent states of the former Soviet Union; and
            ``(B) to prevent the outflow from those states of the 
        technology and scientific expertise that could be used for 
        developing those weapons, including delivery systems.
    ``(2) The plan required by paragraph (1) shall include the 
following:
            ``(A) Specific goals and measurable objectives for the 
        programs that are designed to carry out the objectives 
        specified in subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
            ``(B) Identification of all significant obstacles to 
        achieving those objectives and the means for overcoming those 
        obstacles.
            ``(C) Criteria for success for those programs and a 
        strategy for eventual termination of United States 
        contributions to those programs and assumption of the ongoing 
        support of those programs by the Russian Federation.
            ``(D) Specification of the fiscal and other resources 
        necessary in each of the eight fiscal years after fiscal year 
        2003 to achieve those objectives.
            ``(E) Recommendations for any changes--
                    ``(i) in the structure or organization of the 
                programs for carrying out those objectives; and
                    ``(ii) in regulations or legislation that would 
                increase the efficiency and coordination of those 
                programs or would otherwise contribute to the 
                achievement of those objectives.
    ``(3) In developing the plan required by paragraph (1), the 
President shall consult with--
            ``(A) the majority and minority leadership of the 
        appropriate committees of Congress; and
            ``(B) appropriate officials of the states of the former 
        Soviet Union.
    ``(4)(A) The President, after consultation with the majority and 
minority leadership of the appropriate committees of Congress, shall 
designate a senior official of the Executive Branch, and provide that 
official with sufficient authority and staffing and other resources, to 
coordinate the programs referred to in paragraph (2)(A).
    ``(B) The President shall designate that official not later than 12 
months after the date of the enactment of this subsection.''.
    (b) Report Required To Cover Both Plans.--Subsection (e) of section 
1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 
(Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1247), as redesignated by subsection 
(a), is amended--
            (1) in the subsection heading, by striking ``Plan.--'' and 
        inserting ``Plans.--'';
            (2) in paragraph (1)--
                    (A) by striking ``January 31, 2003,'' and inserting 
                ``January 31, 2005,''; and
                    (B) by striking ``plan required by subsection (a)'' 
                and inserting ``plans required by subsections (a) and 
                (d)(1)''; and
            (3) in paragraph (2)--
                    (A) in subparagraph (A), by striking ``plan 
                required by subsection (a)'' and inserting ``plans 
                required by subsections (a) and (d)(1)''; and
                    (B) in subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) by striking 
                ``plan'' each place it appears and inserting ``plans''.
    (c) Conforming Amendment.--The heading of section 1205 of the 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002 (Public Law 
107-107; 115 Stat. 1247) is amended to read as follows:

``SEC. 1205. PLANS FOR SECURING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, MATERIAL, AND 
              EXPERTISE OF, AND FOR COORDINATING CHEMICAL AND 
              BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS NONPROLIFERATION PROGRAMS WITH, STATES 
              OF THE FORMER SOVIET UNION.''.

    (d) Effective Date for First Report Covering Both Plans.--The 
amendments made by subsection (b) shall apply with respect to the first 
report due after January 31, 2004.

               TITLE III--UNITED STATES-RUSSIA RELATIONS

SEC. 301. COMPREHENSIVE INVENTORIES AND DATA EXCHANGES ON NUCLEAR 
              WEAPONS-GRADE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that inventories of nuclear weapons-
grade material and nuclear weapons should be tracked in order, among 
other things--
            (1) to make it more likely that the Russian Federation can 
        fully account for its entire inventory of nuclear weapons-grade 
        material and nuclear weapons; and
            (2) to make it more likely that the sources of any such 
        material or weapons possessed or used by any foreign state or 
        terrorist organization can be identified.
    (b) Statement of Policy.--It is the policy of the United States to 
seek to establish jointly with the Russian Federation comprehensive 
inventories and data exchanges of Russian Federation and United States 
nuclear weapons-grade material and nuclear weapons, with particular 
attention to tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer 
operationally deployed.
    (c) Assistance in Developing Comprehensive Inventories.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the United States should 
seek to work with the Russian Federation to develop comprehensive 
inventories of Russian highly enriched uranium, weapons-grade 
plutonium, and assembled warheads, with special attention to be focused 
on tactical warheads and warheads that are no longer operationally 
deployed.
    (d) Data Exchanges.--As part of the development of inventories 
under subsection (c), to the maximum extent practicable and without 
jeopardizing United States national security interests, the United 
States may exchange data with the Russian Federation on categories of 
material and weapons described in subsection (c).
    (e) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter until a comprehensive 
inventory is created and the information collected from the inventory 
is exchanged between the United States and the Russian Federation, the 
President shall submit to Congress a report, in both classified and 
unclassified form as necessary, describing the progress that has been 
made toward creating an inventory and exchanging the information.

SEC. 302. ESTABLISHMENT OF DUMA-CONGRESS NUCLEAR THREAT REDUCTION 
              WORKING GROUP.

    (a) Establishment of Working Group.--There is hereby established a 
working group to be known as the ``Nuclear Threat Reduction Working 
Group'' as an interparliamentary group of the United States and the 
Russian Federation.
    (b) Purpose of Working Group.--The purpose of the Working Group 
established by subsection (a) shall be to explore means to enhance 
cooperation between the United States and the Russian Federation with 
respect to nuclear nonproliferation and security, and such other issues 
related to reducing nuclear weapons dangers as the delegations from the 
two legislative bodies may consider appropriate.
    (c) Membership.--(1) The majority leader of the Senate, after 
consultation with the minority leader of the Senate, shall appoint 10 
Senators to the Working Group established by subsection (a).
    (2) The Speaker of the House of Representatives, after consultation 
with the minority leader of the House of Representatives, shall appoint 
30 Representatives to the Working Group.

SEC. 303. JOINT UNITED STATES/NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION 
              COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA ON THEATER-LEVEL BALLISTIC 
              MISSILE DEFENSES.

    (a) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States that the 
President should seek to ensure that the United States takes the lead 
in arranging for the United States, in conjunction with the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization, to enter into appropriate cooperative 
relationships with the Russian Federation with respect to the 
development and deployment of theater-level ballistic missile defenses.
    (b) Purpose of Cooperative Relationships.--It is the policy of the 
United States--
            (1) that the purpose of the cooperative relationships 
        described in subsection (a) is to increase transparency and 
        confidence with the Russian Federation;
            (2) that United States defense and security cooperation 
        with the Russian Federation should contribute to defining a new 
        bilateral strategic framework that is not rooted in the concept 
        of ``mutual assured destruction''; and
            (3) that that new bilateral strategic framework should be 
        based upon improving the security of the United States and the 
        Russian Federation by promoting transparency and confidence 
        between the two countries.
    (c) Report to Congress.--Not later than one year after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress a 
report (in unclassified or classified form as necessary) on the 
feasibility of increasing cooperation with the Russian Federation on 
the subject of theater-level ballistic missile defenses and on the 
purposes and objectives set forth in subsection (b). The report shall 
include--
            (1) recommendations from the Department of Defense and 
        Missile Defense Agency;
            (2) a threat assessment; and
            (3) an assessment of possible benefits to missile defense 
        programs of the United States.

SEC. 304. ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENHANCED COLLABORATION TO ACHIEVE MORE 
              RELIABLE RUSSIAN EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) the innovative United States-Russian space-based remote 
        sensor research and development program known as the Russian-
        American Observation Satellite (RAMOS) program addresses a 
        variety of defense concerns while promoting enhanced 
        transparency and confidence between the United States and the 
        Russian Federation; and
            (2) an initial concept of co-orbiting United States and 
        Russian satellites for simultaneous stereo observations is 
        complete and should be continued.
    (b) Policy.--It is the policy of the United States--
            (1) to encourage joint efforts by the United States and the 
        Russian Federation to reduce the chances of a Russian nuclear 
        attack anywhere in the world as the result of misinformation or 
        miscalculation by developing the capabilities and increasing 
        the reliability of Russian ballistic missile early-warning 
        systems, including the Russian-American Observation Satellite 
        (RAMOS) program; and
            (2) to encourage other United States-Russian programs to 
        ensure that the Russia Federation has reliable information, 
        including real-time data, regarding launches of ballistic 
        missiles anywhere in the world.
    (c) Interim RAMOS Funding.--The Secretary of Defense shall ensure 
that, pending the execution of a new agreement between the United 
States and the Russian Federation providing for the conduct of the 
RAMOS program, sufficient amounts of funds appropriated for that 
program are used in order to ensure the satisfactory continuation of 
that program during fiscal years 2004 and 2005.

SEC. 305. TELLER-KURCHATOV ALLIANCE FOR PEACE.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) Edward Teller of the United States and Igor Kurchatov 
        of the former Soviet Union were architects of the nuclear 
        weapons programs in their respective countries;
            (2) these outstanding individuals both expressed a longing 
        for peace and opposition to war; and
            (3) as the United States and the Russian Federation work 
        together to redirect the nations of the world towards the 
        peaceful use of nuclear energy, seeking to improve the quality 
        of life for all human beings, it is appropriate to establish an 
        alliance for peace in the names of Edward Teller and Igor 
        Kurchatov.
    (b) Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace.--(1) The Secretary of 
Energy shall seek to enter into an agreement with the Minister of 
Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation to carry out a cooperative 
venture, to be known as the Teller-Kurchatov Alliance for Peace, to 
develop and promote peaceful, safe, and environmentally sensitive uses 
of nuclear energy.
    (2) The cooperative venture referred to in paragraph (1) shall 
involve the national security laboratories of the National Nuclear 
Security Administration and the laboratories of the Ministry of Atomic 
Energy and the Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation.
    (3) The cooperative venture shall be directed by two co-chairs, one 
each from the United States and the Russian Federation. The co-chair 
from the United States shall serve for a term of two years and shall be 
designated by the Administrator for Nuclear Security from among 
officials of the three national security laboratories, with each 
laboratory represented on a rotating basis.
    (c) Authorization of Appropriations.-- There is authorized to be 
appropriated for fiscal years 2004 and 2005 to the Department of Energy 
a total of $5,000,000 to carry out the cooperative venture referred to 
in subsection (b).

SEC. 306. NONPROLIFERATION FELLOWSHIPS.

    (a) In General.--(1) From amounts made available to carry out this 
section, the Administrator for Nuclear Security may carry out a program 
under which the Administrator awards, to scientists employed at the 
Kurchatov Institute of the Russian Federation and Lawrence Livermore 
National Laboratory, international exchange fellowships, to be known as 
Teller-Kurchatov Fellowships, in the nuclear nonproliferation sciences.
    (2) The purpose of the program shall be to provide opportunities 
for advancement in the field of nuclear nonproliferation to scientists 
who, as demonstrated by their academic or professional achievements, 
show particular promise of making significant contributions in that 
field.
    (3) A fellowship awarded to a scientist under the program shall be 
for study and training at (and, where appropriate, at an institution of 
higher education in the vicinity of)--
            (A) the Kurchatov Institute, in the case of a scientist 
        employed at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory; and
            (B) Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, in the case of 
        a scientist employed at the Kurchatov Institute.
    (4) The duration of a fellowship under the program may not exceed 
two years. The Administrator may provide for a longer duration in an 
individual case to the extent warranted by extraordinary circumstances, 
as determined by the Administrator.
    (5) In a calendar year, the Administrator may not award more than--
            (A) one fellowship to a scientist employed at the Kurchatov 
        Institute; and
            (B) one fellowship to a scientist employed at Lawrence 
        Livermore National Laboratory.
    (6) A fellowship under the program shall include--
            (A) travel expenses;
            (B) any tuition and fees at an institution of higher 
        education for study or training under the fellowship; and
            (C) any other expenses that the Administrator considers 
        appropriate, such as room and board.
    (b) Funding.--Amounts available to the Department of Energy for 
defense nuclear nonproliferation activities shall be available for the 
fellowships authorized by subsection (a).
    (c) Definitions.--In this section--
            (1) the term ``institution of higher education'' means a 
        college, university, or other educational institution that is 
        empowered by an appropriate authority, as determined by the 
        Administrator, to award degrees higher than the baccalaureate 
        level;
            (2) the term ``nuclear nonproliferation sciences'' means 
        bodies of scientific knowledge relevant to developing or 
        advancing the means to prevent or impede the proliferation of 
        nuclear weaponry; and
            (3) the term ``scientist'' means an individual who has a 
        degree from an institution of higher education in a science 
        that has practical application in the field of nuclear 
        nonproliferation.

                            TITLE IV--OTHER

SEC. 401. PROMOTION OF DISCUSSIONS ON NUCLEAR AND RADIOLOGICAL SECURITY 
              AND SAFETY BETWEEN THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 
              AND THE ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND 
              DEVELOPMENT.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds that--
            (1) cooperative programs to control potential threats from 
        any fissile and radiological materials, whatever and wherever 
        their sources, should be expanded to include additional states 
        and international organizations; and
            (2) addressing issues of nuclear weapons and materials, as 
        well as the issue of radiological dispersal bombs, in new 
        forums around the world is crucial to the generation of 
        innovative mechanisms directed at addressing the threats.
    (b) Sense of Congress Regarding Initiation of Dialogue Between the 
IAEA and the OECD.--It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United States should seek to initiate discussions 
        between the International Atomic Energy Agency and the 
        Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development for the 
        purpose of exploring issues of nuclear and radiological 
        security and safety, including the creation of new sources of 
        revenue (including debt reduction) for states to provide 
        nuclear security; and
            (2) the discussions referred to in paragraph (1) should 
        also provide a forum to explore possible sources of funds in 
        support of the G-8 Global Partnership Against the Spread of 
        Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 12 months after the date of the 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to Congress a report 
on--
            (1) the efforts made by the United States to initiate the 
        discussions described in subsection (b);
            (2) the results of those efforts; and
            (3) any plans for further discussions and the purposes of 
        such discussions.
                                 <all>