[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 398 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  2d Session
H. CON. RES. 398


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 6, 2004

      Received and referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
Expressing the concern of Congress over Iran's development of the means 
                      to produce nuclear weapons.

Whereas the United States has for years attempted to alert the international 
        community to Iran's covert nuclear activities in support of an intention 
        to develop a nuclear weapon, contrary to its obligations under the 
        Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT);
Whereas Iran's covert activities to develop the means to produce nuclear weapons 
        are finally beginning to be revealed to the international community;
Whereas Iran did not declare to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
        the existence of the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant and the 
        production-scale Fuel Enrichment Facility under construction at Natanz 
        until February 2003, after the existence of the plant and facility was 
        revealed by an opposition group;
Whereas it is estimated that the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant could produce 
        enough highly enriched uranium for a nuclear weapon every year-and-a-
        half to two years;
Whereas it is estimated that the Natanz Fuel Enrichment Facility could, when 
        completed, produce enough highly enriched uranium for as many as 25-30 
        nuclear weapons per year;
Whereas in his report of June 6, 2003, the Director-General of the IAEA stated 
        that Iran had failed to meet its obligations under its Safeguards 
        Agreement with the IAEA to report all nuclear material imported into 
        Iran--specifically, the importation of uranium hexafluoride from China 
        in 1991--the processing and use of that material, and the facilities 
        involved in the use and processing of the material;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors urged Iran in June 2003 to promptly rectify 
        its failures to meet its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement, not 
        to introduce nuclear material into the Natanz Pilot Fuel Enrichment 
        Plant, and to cooperate fully with the Agency in resolving questions 
        about its nuclear activities;
Whereas the IAEA Director General reported to the Board of Governors in August 
        2003 that, after further investigation, Iran failed to disclose 
        additional nuclear activities as required by its Safeguards Agreement 
        and continued to fail to resolve questions about its undeclared uranium 
        enrichment activities;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors on September 12, 2003, called on Iran to 
        suspend all further uranium enrichment and any plutonium reprocessing 
        activities, disclose all its nuclear activities, and cooperate fully 
        with the Agency, and to sign, ratify, and fully implement the Additional 
        Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the application of safeguards to 
        strengthen investigation of all nuclear activities within Iran, and 
        requested all third countries to cooperate closely and fully with the 
        Agency in resolving questions about Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas IAEA inspectors and officials continued to confront Iran with 
        discrepancies in its explanations of its nuclear activities;
Whereas on October 9, 2003, in a letter to the Director General of the IAEA, 
        Iran finally confirmed that it had conducted research on uranium 
        conversion processes at the Esfahan Nuclear Technology Centre and the 
        Tehran Nuclear Research Centre, despite its earlier denials of such 
        activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, Iran and the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, 
        and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement in which Iran indicated 
        that it had decided to suspend all uranium enrichment and reprocessing 
        activities as defined by the IAEA;
Whereas this statement also foresaw the provision of unspecified nuclear 
        technical cooperation once Iran had satisfied international concerns 
        about its nuclear development program;
Whereas in a subsequent letter on October 23, 2003, Iran further admitted that 
        it had tested uranium enrichment centrifuges at the Kalaye Electric 
        Company between 1998 and 2002 using its previously undeclared imported 
        uranium hexafluoride from China;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran admitted that it had a laser uranium 
        enrichment program, in which it used 30 kg of uranium not previously 
        declared to the IAEA, another violation of its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas in that same letter, Iran also admitted that it had irradiated 7 kg of 
        uranium dioxide targets and reprocessed them to extract plutonium, 
        another violation of its legal obligation to disclose such activities 
        under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas Iran told the IAEA on November 10, 2003, that it would sign and ratify 
        the Additional Protocol agreement for further safeguards, and would act 
        in accordance with the Additional Protocol pending its full entry-into-
        force;
Whereas on November 10, 2003, Iran further informed the IAEA Director General 
        that it had decided to suspend all enrichment and reprocessing 
        activities in Iran, not to produce feed material for enrichment 
        processes, and not to import enrichment related items;
Whereas the IAEA, through its investigative and forensic activities in Iran and 
        elsewhere, has uncovered and confronted Iran in numerous lies about its 
        nuclear activities;
Whereas the Director General of the IAEA reported to the IAEA Board of Governors 
        on November 10, 2003, that Iran has concealed many aspects of its 
        nuclear activities from the IAEA, which constituted breaches of its 
        obligations under its Safeguards Agreement;
Whereas despite Iran's subsequent pledge to, once again, fully disclose all of 
        its nuclear activities to the IAEA, the Director General of the IAEA, in 
        his report of February 24, 2004, found that Iran continued to engage in 
        deception regarding its nuclear activities, including failing to 
        disclose a more sophisticated enrichment program using more advanced 
        enrichment centrifuge technology imported from foreign sources, and 
        noncredible explanations involving experiments to create a highly toxic 
        isotope of polonium that is useful as a neutron initiator in nuclear 
        weapons and a firm indicator of a nuclear weapons development program;
Whereas these deceptions by Iran were continuing violations of Iran's Safeguards 
        Agreement and of Iran's previous assurances to the IAEA and the 
        international community for full transparency;
Whereas despite Iran's commitment to the IAEA and to France, Germany, and the 
        United Kingdom that it would suspend uranium enrichment activities, it 
        has repeatedly emphasized that this suspension is temporary and 
        continued to import and manufacture uranium enrichment centrifuge parts 
        and equipment, allowing it to resume and expand its uranium enrichment 
        activities whenever it chooses;
Whereas the statements on February 25, 2004, of Hassan Rowhani, Secretary of the 
        Supreme National Security Council of Iran, that Iran was not required to 
        reveal to the IAEA its research into more sophisticated ``P2'' uranium 
        enrichment centrifuges, and that Iran has other projects which it has no 
        intention of declaring to the IAEA, are contrary to--

    (1) Iran's commitment to the IAEA in a letter on October 16, 2003, by 
the Vice President of Iran and President of Iran's Atomic Energy 
Organization that Iran would present a ``full picture of its nuclear 
activities'' and ``full transparency'';

    (2) its commitment to the foreign ministers of the United Kingdom, 
France, and Germany of October 21, 2003, to full transparency and to 
resolve all outstanding issues; and

    (3) its statement to the IAEA's Board of Governors of September 12, 
2003, of its commitment to full transparency and to ``leave no stone 
unturned'' to assure the IAEA of its peaceful objectives;

Whereas it is abundantly clear that Iran remains committed to a nuclear weapons 
        program;
Whereas Libya received enrichment equipment and technology, and a nuclear 
        weapons design, from the same nuclear black market that Iran has used, 
        raising the question of whether Iran, as well, received a nuclear weapon 
        design that it has refused to reveal to international inspectors;
Whereas the Ministry of the Atomic Energy of the Russian Federation has recently 
        announced that it will soon conclude an agreement to supply Iran with 
        enriched nuclear fuel for the Bushehr nuclear power reactor, ignoring 
        the need to sanction Iran to persuade it to cease its nuclear weapons 
        development program;
Whereas the IAEA Board of Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, which was 
        adopted unanimously, noted with ``serious concern that the declarations 
        made by Iran in October 2003 did not amount to the complete and final 
        picture of Iran's past and present nuclear programme considered 
        essential by the Board's November 2003 resolution'', and also noted that 
        the Agency has discovered that Iran had hidden more advanced centrifuge 
        associated research, manufacturing, and testing activities; two mass 
        spectrometers used in the laser enrichment program; and designs for hot 
        cells to handle highly radioactive materials;
Whereas the same resolution also noted ``with equal concern that Iran has not 
        resolved all questions regarding the development of its enrichment 
        technology to its current extent, and that a number of other questions 
        remain unresolved, including the sources of all HEU contamination in 
        Iran; the location, extent and nature of work undertaken on the basis of 
        the advanced centrifuge design; the nature, extent, and purpose of 
        activities involving the planned heavy-water reactor; and evidence to 
        support claims regarding the purpose of polonium-210 experiments'';
Whereas Hassan Rowhani on March 13, 2004, declared that IAEA inspections would 
        be indefinitely suspended as a protest against the IAEA Board of 
        Governors' resolution of March 13, 2004, and while Iran subsequently 
        agreed to readmit inspectors by March 27, 2004, this suspension calls 
        into serious question Iran's commitment to full transparency about its 
        nuclear activities; and
Whereas Iran's pattern of deception and concealment in dealing with the IAEA, 
        the Foreign Ministers of France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and 
        the international community, its receipt from other countries of the 
        means to enrich uranium, and its repeated breaches of its IAEA 
        Safeguards Agreement, indicate that Iran has also violated its legal 
        obligation under article II of the NPT not to acquire or seek assistance 
        in acquiring nuclear weapons: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That the Congress--
            (1) condemns in the strongest possible terms Iran's 
        continuing deceptions and falsehoods to the International 
        Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the international community 
        about its nuclear programs and activities;
            (2) calls upon all State Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
        Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), including the United 
        States, to use all appropriate means to deter, dissuade, and 
        prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including ending 
        all nuclear and other cooperation with Iran (including the 
        provision of dual use items), until Iran fully implements the 
        Additional Protocol between Iran and the IAEA for the 
        application of safeguards;
            (3) declares that Iran, through its many breaches for 18 
        years of its Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA, has forfeited 
        the right to be trusted with development of a nuclear fuel 
        cycle, especially with uranium conversion and enrichment and 
        plutonium reprocessing technology, equipment, and facilities;
            (4) declares that the recent revelations of Iran's 
        nondisclosure of additional enrichment and nuclear-weapons-
        applicable research activities, as detailed in the report of 
        February 24, 2004, by the Director General of the IAEA, along 
        with the statement by the Government of Iran that it will not 
        disclose other research programs, constitute ample evidence of 
        Iran's continuing policy of noncompliance with the letter and 
        spirit of its obligations under its Safeguards Agreement and 
        the Additional Protocol;
            (5) demands that Iran immediately and permanently cease all 
        efforts to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to 
        immediately, unconditionally, and permanently cease all nuclear 
        enrichment activities, including manufacturing and importing 
        related equipment;
            (6) demands that Iran honor its stated commitments and 
        legal obligations to grant the IAEA inspectors full 
        unrestricted access and cooperate fully with the investigation 
        of its nuclear activities and demonstrate a new openness and 
        honesty about all its nuclear programs;
            (7) contrasts Iran's behavior with Libya's, in which 
        Libya's decision to renounce and dismantle its nuclear weapons 
        program and to provide full, complete, and transparent 
        disclosure of all its nuclear activities has enabled the IAEA 
        to rapidly understand and verify with high confidence the 
        extent and scope of Libya's program;
            (8) calls upon the members of the European Union not to 
        resume discussions with Iran on multilateral trade agreements 
        until such time that Iran has verifiably and permanently ceased 
        all nuclear weapons development activity, including a permanent 
        cessation of uranium conversion and enrichment and plutonium 
        reprocessing activities;
            (9) further calls upon the European Union to consider what 
        further measures, including sanctions, may be necessary to 
        persuade Iran to fulfill its obligations and commitments to the 
        IAEA;
            (10) in light of ongoing revelations of the noncompliance 
        of the Government of Iran regarding its obligations under the 
        NPT and pledges to the IAEA, and in light of the consequent and 
        ongoing questions and concerns of the IAEA, the United States, 
        and the international community regarding Iran's military 
        nuclear activities--
                    (A) urges Japan to ensure that Japanese commercial 
                entities not proceed with the development of Iran's 
                Azadegan oil field;
                    (B) urges France and Malaysia to ensure that French 
                and Malaysian commercial entities not proceed with 
                their agreement for further cooperation in expanding 
                Iran's liquid natural gas production field;
                    (C) calls on all countries to intercede with their 
                commercial entities to ensure that these entities 
                refrain from or cease all investment and investment-
                related activities that support Iran's energy industry; 
                and
                    (D) calls on the President to enforce the 
                provisions of the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996 
                to discourage foreign commercial entities from 
                investing in Iran's energy industry;
            (11) deplores any effort by any country to provide any 
        nuclear power-related assistance whatsoever to Iran, and calls 
        upon Russia to suspend nuclear cooperation with Iran and not 
        conclude a nuclear fuel supply agreement for the Bushehr 
        reactor, until the conditions of paragraph (8) are satisfied;
            (12) calls upon the governments of the countries whose 
        nationals and corporations are implicated in assisting Iranian 
        nuclear activities, especially Pakistan, Malaysia, the United 
        Arab Emirates, and Germany, to fully investigate such 
        assistance, to grant the IAEA full access to individuals, 
        sites, and all information related to the investigations, and 
        to immediately review and rectify their export control laws, 
        regulations, and practices in order to prevent further 
        assistance to countries seeking to develop nuclear programs 
        that could support the development of nuclear weapons;
            (13) urges the IAEA Board of Governors, at its earliest 
        opportunity, to report to the United Nations Security Council 
        that Iran is in noncompliance with its agreements with the 
        IAEA;
            (14) urges the President of the United States to provide 
        whatever financial, material, or intelligence resources are 
        necessary to the IAEA to enable it to fully investigate Iran's 
        nuclear activities;
            (15) urges the United Nations Security Council, the Nuclear 
        Suppliers Group, the Zangger Committee, and other relevant 
        international entities to declare that non-nuclear-weapon 
        states under the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons (NPT), who commit violations of their safeguards 
        agreements regarding uranium enrichment or plutonium 
        reprocessing, or engage in activities which could support a 
        military nuclear program, thereby forfeit their right under the 
        NPT to engage in nuclear fuel-cycle activities;
            (16) further urges the United Nations Security Council to 
        consider measures necessary to support the inspection efforts 
        by the IAEA and to prevent Iran from further engaging in 
        clandestine nuclear activities; and
            (17) urges the President to keep the Congress fully and 
        currently informed concerning the matters addressed in this 
        resolution.

            Passed the House of Representatives May 6, 2004.

            Attest:

                                                 JEFF TRANDAHL,

                                                                 Clerk.