[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 332 Introduced in House (IH)]
108th CONGRESS
1st Session
H. CON. RES. 332
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to
develop nuclear weapons.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
November 20, 2003
Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. Harman, Mr. Kirk, Mr.
Berman, Mr. Souder, Mr. Cardoza, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Meek
of Florida, Mr. Nunes, Mr. LaHood, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Mr.
Case, Mr. Deutsch, and Mr. Shaw) submitted the following concurrent
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International
Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION
Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the
Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a
safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and
the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to
develop nuclear weapons.
Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968,
and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty'');
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-
nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed itself to permanently
abstaining from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich
uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility
revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium that can be used to
develop nuclear weapons;
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz
facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has
been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these
facilities;
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed
concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material,
facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those
that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons,
in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it
signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12,
2003, that called on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all
imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment
program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling,
to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA
experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete
information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and
to provide such other information and explanations and take such other
steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003,
all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear
activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached an agreement with 3
European foreign ministers in which it promised to extend full
cooperation to the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence
ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with the
provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and
voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities;
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's
access to a variety of modern technologies and supplies once certain
international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the European foreign
ministers to suspend enriching and processing uranium, Iran has
explicitly indicated that it reserves the right to resume this activity
at a time of its choosing;
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it claims is a full
statement about the nature of its nuclear activities, the IAEA has
indicated it may take some months to fully evaluate the Iranian
declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that
the documents show that Iran failed to comply with some of its
commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct
inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary to resolve issues
concerning Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a
declaration that it described as a complete and accurate history of its
nuclear program;
Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on
October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared to abandon its uranium
enrichment program, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on
October 26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but
was merely studying the issue;
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range
Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile
Shahab-4 missile; and
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear
facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, will continue to
constitute a severe threat to international peace and security and to
vital American national interests: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring),
That Congress--
(1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons
program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well over
a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the
International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its
obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in
connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear
Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968,
and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this
resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty'');
(2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as
delivered in testimony to the U.S.--Israel Joint Parliamentary
Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of
State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations
provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear activities
are not credible;
(3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department
of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with
Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments
that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
(4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the
Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany,
France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it
signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of
Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program;
(5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with
its obligations;
(6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
(A) urging the Government of Iran to end its
nuclear weapons program and comply fully and
unconditionally with the terms of the resolution
adopted by the Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter
in this resolution referred to as the ``IAEA
resolution''), that calls on Iran to--
(i) provide the Agency a full declaration
of all imported material and components
relevant to the uranium enrichment program;
(ii) grant unrestricted access, including
environmental sampling, to the Agency;
(iii) resolve questions regarding the
conclusion of the Agency experts who tested gas
centrifuges in that country;
(iv) provide complete information regarding
the conduct of uranium conversion experiments;
and
(v) provide such other information and
explanations and take such other steps as the
Agency determines necessary to resolve by
October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues
involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear
activities; and
(B) taking such diplomatic measures as are
necessary to encourage other nations, especially
Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to
urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately
comply with the such resolution;
(7) calls on Russia to--
(A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to
accept in full the IAEA resolution;
(B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran,
particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear
reactor and the delivery of fuel for that reactor,
until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA
resolution and fully implements the Model Additional
Protocol;
(C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the
Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent
fuel to Russia; and
(D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran
cannot divert any spent fuel;
(8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent
the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop
programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons
program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including
the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with
the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional
Protocol;
(9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and
commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran
with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to
stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such
agreements will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with
the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire
nuclear weapons;
(10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own
regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003,
board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations
Security Council for further action;
(11) calls on the United Nations Security Council,
immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA,
to address the threat to international peace and security posed
by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council
resolution, or take such other action that may be necessary to
impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against
Iran; and
(12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts
to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the
enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to
provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged
in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
(A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance
with its obligations under the IAEA resolution,
including the prompt and unconditional implementation
of the Model Additional Protocol; and
(B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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