[Congressional Bills 108th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Con. Res. 332 Introduced in House (IH)]






108th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. CON. RES. 332

 Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a 
 safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
  the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to 
                        develop nuclear weapons.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 20, 2003

  Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania (for himself, Ms. Harman, Mr. Kirk, Mr. 
Berman, Mr. Souder, Mr. Cardoza, Mr. Wilson of South Carolina, Mr. Meek 
  of Florida, Mr. Nunes, Mr. LaHood, Mr. Jones of North Carolina, Mr. 
  Case, Mr. Deutsch, and Mr. Shaw) submitted the following concurrent 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on International 
                               Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                         CONCURRENT RESOLUTION


 
 Expressing the deep concern of Congress regarding the failure of the 
     Islamic Republic of Iran to adhere to its obligations under a 
 safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
  the engagement by Iran in activities that appear to be designed to 
                        develop nuclear weapons.

Whereas, on January 1, 1968, Iran signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
        Nuclear Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
        and entered into force March 5, 1970 (the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty'');
Whereas by becoming a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as a non-
        nuclear weapons state, Iran has committed itself to permanently 
        abstaining from the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons;
Whereas, in March 2003, the Director of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
        (IAEA) announced that Iran was constructing a facility to enrich 
        uranium, a key component of nuclear weapons;
Whereas environmental sampling by the IAEA at Iran's Natanz nuclear facility 
        revealed the presence of highly enriched uranium that can be used to 
        develop nuclear weapons;
Whereas the traces of highly-enriched uranium detected by the IAEA at the Natanz 
        facility and the Kalaye Electric Company could indicate that Iran has 
        been secretly attempting to produce weapons-grade uranium at these 
        facilities;
Whereas the June 6, 2003, report of the Director General of the IAEA expressed 
        concern over the failure of the Government of Iran to report material, 
        facilities, and activities at its nuclear facilities, including those 
        that have the potential to enrich uranium and develop nuclear weapons, 
        in contravention of its obligations under the safeguards agreement it 
        signed in connection with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas the Board of Governors of the IAEA adopted a resolution on September 12, 
        2003, that called on Iran to provide the IAEA a full declaration of all 
        imported material and components relevant to the uranium enrichment 
        program, to grant unrestricted access, including environmental sampling, 
        to the IAEA, to resolve questions regarding the conclusion of the IAEA 
        experts who tested gas centrifuges in that country, to provide complete 
        information regarding the conduct of uranium conversion experiments, and 
        to provide such other information and explanations and take such other 
        steps as the IAEA determines necessary to resolve by October 31, 2003, 
        all outstanding issues involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear 
        activities;
Whereas on October 21, 2003, the Government of Iran reached an agreement with 3 
        European foreign ministers in which it promised to extend full 
        cooperation to the IAEA, sign the IAEA Additional Protocol and commence 
        ratification procedures, comport itself in accordance with the 
        provisions of the Model Additional Protocol prior to ratification, and 
        voluntarily suspend all uranium enrichment and processing activities;
Whereas the 3 European governments promised a dialogue with Iran to ease Iran's 
        access to a variety of modern technologies and supplies once certain 
        international concerns regarding Iran are fully resolved;
Whereas, even if Iran adheres to its commitment to the European foreign 
        ministers to suspend enriching and processing uranium, Iran has 
        explicitly indicated that it reserves the right to resume this activity 
        at a time of its choosing;
Whereas, although Iran has provided the IAEA with what it claims is a full 
        statement about the nature of its nuclear activities, the IAEA has 
        indicated it may take some months to fully evaluate the Iranian 
        declaration, and IAEA head Mohammed El Baradei has already stated that 
        the documents show that Iran failed to comply with some of its 
        commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty;
Whereas Iran has not yet provided the IAEA unrestricted access to conduct 
        inspections that the IAEA believes are necessary to resolve issues 
        concerning Iran's nuclear program;
Whereas, on October 23, 2003, the Government of Iran provided the IAEA with a 
        declaration that it described as a complete and accurate history of its 
        nuclear program;
Whereas Iran's National Security Council Chief, Hassan Rouhani, stated on 
        October 21, 2003, that Iran was not prepared to abandon its uranium 
        enrichment program, and the Iranian Foreign Ministry indicated on 
        October 26, 2003, that it has not yet suspended uranium enrichment but 
        was merely studying the issue;
Whereas, in June 2003, Iran conducted a successful test of the 800-mile range 
        Shahab-3 missile, and Iran is also seeking to produce a 1,200-mile 
        Shahab-4 missile; and
Whereas the continuation of construction by Iran of unsafeguarded nuclear 
        facilities, coupled with its ties to terrorist groups, will continue to 
        constitute a severe threat to international peace and security and to 
        vital American national interests: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), 
That Congress--
            (1) deplores the development by Iran of a nuclear weapons 
        program and the failure of the Government of Iran for well over 
        a decade to report material, facilities, and activities to the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency in contravention of its 
        obligations under the safeguards agreement it signed in 
        connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
        Weapons, done at Washington, London, and Moscow July 1, 1968, 
        and entered into force March 5, 1970 (hereafter in this 
        resolution referred to as the ``Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
        Treaty'');
            (2) concurs with the view of the Department of State, as 
        delivered in testimony to the U.S.--Israel Joint Parliamentary 
        Committee on September 17, 2003, by the Assistant Secretary of 
        State for Verification and Compliance that the explanations 
        provided by the Government of Iran for its nuclear activities 
        are not credible;
            (3) concurs with the conclusion reached in the Department 
        of State's Annual Report on Adherence to and Compliance with 
        Arms Control and Non-Proliferation Agreements and Commitments 
        that Iran is pursuing a program to develop nuclear weapons;
            (4) acknowledges the agreement reached between the 
        Government of Iran and the foreign ministers of Germany, 
        France, and the United Kingdom, but questions whether it 
        signifies a sincere and lasting decision by the Government of 
        Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program;
            (5) believes that Iran must come into full compliance with 
        its obligations;
            (6) calls on the President to use all appropriate means to 
        prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons, including--
                    (A) urging the Government of Iran to end its 
                nuclear weapons program and comply fully and 
                unconditionally with the terms of the resolution 
                adopted by the Board of Governors of the International 
                Atomic Energy Agency on September 12, 2003 (hereafter 
                in this resolution referred to as the ``IAEA 
                resolution''), that calls on Iran to--
                            (i) provide the Agency a full declaration 
                        of all imported material and components 
                        relevant to the uranium enrichment program;
                            (ii) grant unrestricted access, including 
                        environmental sampling, to the Agency;
                            (iii) resolve questions regarding the 
                        conclusion of the Agency experts who tested gas 
                        centrifuges in that country;
                            (iv) provide complete information regarding 
                        the conduct of uranium conversion experiments; 
                        and
                            (v) provide such other information and 
                        explanations and take such other steps as the 
                        Agency determines necessary to resolve by 
                        October 31, 2003, all outstanding issues 
                        involving Iran's nuclear materials and nuclear 
                        activities; and
                    (B) taking such diplomatic measures as are 
                necessary to encourage other nations, especially 
                Russia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to 
                urge the Government of Iran to fully and immediately 
                comply with the such resolution;
            (7) calls on Russia to--
                    (A) use all appropriate means to urge Iran to 
                accept in full the IAEA resolution;
                    (B) suspend all nuclear cooperation with Iran, 
                particularly the completion of the Bushehr nuclear 
                reactor and the delivery of fuel for that reactor, 
                until Iran fully and completely complies with the IAEA 
                resolution and fully implements the Model Additional 
                Protocol;
                    (C) insist that no fuel will be supplied to the 
                Bushehr reactor unless Iran agrees to return all spent 
                fuel to Russia; and
                    (D) put into effect procedures to ensure that Iran 
                cannot divert any spent fuel;
            (8) calls on member states of the United Nations to prevent 
        the Government of Iran from continuing to pursue and develop 
        programs or facilities that could be used in a nuclear weapons 
        program and end all nuclear cooperation with Iran, including 
        the provision of dual use items, until Iran complies fully with 
        the IAEA resolution and fully implements the Model Additional 
        Protocol;
            (9) calls on the European Union to condition economic and 
        commercial agreements with Iran on the full compliance by Iran 
        with its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons and to 
        stipulate that any rights that Iran obtains under such 
        agreements will be immediately revoked if Iran interferes with 
        the work of the IAEA or takes any other steps to acquire 
        nuclear weapons;
            (10) calls on the IAEA, in accordance with its own 
        regulations, to formally declare Iran in violation of the 
        Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty at its November 20, 2003, 
        board meeting and refer the matter to the United Nations 
        Security Council for further action;
            (11) calls on the United Nations Security Council, 
        immediately upon receiving any violations report from the IAEA, 
        to address the threat to international peace and security posed 
        by Iran's nuclear weapons program by passing a Security Council 
        resolution, or take such other action that may be necessary to 
        impose stringent diplomatic and economic sanctions against 
        Iran; and
            (12) calls on the Government of Iran to cease all efforts 
        to acquire nuclear fuel cycle capabilities and to end the 
        enrichment and processing of uranium until it is able to 
        provide specific, verifiable assurances that it is not engaged 
        in a clandestine nuclear weapons program by--
                    (A) coming into complete and verifiable compliance 
                with its obligations under the IAEA resolution, 
                including the prompt and unconditional implementation 
                of the Model Additional Protocol; and
                    (B) fully meeting its obligations under the Nuclear 
                Non-Proliferation Treaty.
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