[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2545 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







107th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 2545

 To extend and improve United States programs on the proliferation of 
               nuclear materials, and for other purposes.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                              May 22, 2002

  Mr. Domenici (for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Lugar, Ms. Landrieu, Mr. 
 Hagel, Mr. Bingaman, Mr. Murkowski, and Ms. Mikulski) introduced the 
 following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on 
                             Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
 To extend and improve United States programs on the proliferation of 
               nuclear materials, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Nonproliferation Act of 
2002''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) Whereas the focus on the security of radioactive 
        materials before the events of September 11, 2001, was on 
        fissile materials, it is now widely recognized that the United 
        States must expand its concerns to the safety and security of 
        nuclear facilities, and the radioactive materials in use or 
        stored at such facilities, that may be attractive to terrorists 
        for use in radiological dispersal devices as well as in crude 
        nuclear weapons. Such materials include all radioactive 
        materials in the nuclear fuel cycle (such as nuclear waste and 
        spent fuel) as well as industrial and medical radiation 
        sources. Steps must be taken not only to prevent the 
        acquisition of such materials by terrorists, but also to 
        rapidly mitigate the consequences of the use of such devices 
        and weapons on public health and safety, facilities, and the 
        economy.
            (2) The technical activities of United States efforts to 
        combat radiological terrorism should be centered in the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration because it has the 
        nuclear expertise and specialized facilities and activities 
        needed to develop new and improved protection and consequence 
        mitigation systems and technologies. New technologies and 
        systems should be developed by the Administration in 
        partnership with other agencies and first responders that also 
        have the operational responsibility to deal with the threat of 
        radiological terrorism.
            (3) Fissile materials are a special class of materials that 
        present a range of threats, from utilization in improvised 
        nuclear devices to incorporation in radiological dispersal 
        devices. The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 
        1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2301 et seq.) 
        focused on cooperative programs with the former Soviet Union to 
        control such materials. It is critical that these efforts 
        continue and that efforts commence to develop a sustainable 
        system by which improvements in such efforts are retained far 
        into the future. Development of such a sustainable system must 
        occur in partnership with the Russian Federation and the other 
        states of the former Soviet Union.
            (4) The Russian Federation and the other states of the 
        former Soviet Union are not the only locations of fissile 
        materials around the world. Cooperative programs to control 
        potential threats from any of such materials should be expanded 
        to other international partners. Programs, coordinated with the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency and other international 
        partners, should be initiated to optimize control of such 
        materials.
            (5) The Agreement Between the Government of the United 
        States of America and the Government of the Russian Federation 
        Concerning the Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted 
        from Nuclear Weapons, signed at Washington on February 18, 1993 
        (the so-called ``HEU deal''), represents an effective approach 
        to reducing the stocks of the Russian Federation of highly 
        enriched uranium (HEU). However, such stocks are much larger 
        than contemplated in the Agreement, and many other nations also 
        possess quantities of highly enriched uranium. Global stability 
        would be enhanced by modification of all available highly 
        enriched uranium into forms not suitable for weapons. Efforts 
        toward such modification of highly enriched uranium should 
        include expansion of programs to deal with research reactors 
        fueled by highly enriched uranium, which were provided by the 
        United States under the Atoms for Peace program and the Atomic 
        Energy Act of 1954 and similarly encouraged by the former 
        Soviet Union.
            (6) Expansion of commercial nuclear power around the world 
        will lead to increasing global stocks of reactor grade 
        plutonium and fission products in spent fuel. If improperly 
        controlled, such materials can contribute to proliferation and 
        represent health and environmental risks. The international 
        safeguards on such materials established through the 
        International Atomic Energy Agency must be strengthened to deal 
        with such concerns. The National Nuclear Security 
        Administration is the appropriate Federal agent for dealing 
        with technical matters relating to the safeguard and management 
        of nuclear materials. The United States, in cooperation with 
        the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy 
        Agency, should lead the international community in developing 
        proliferation-resistant nuclear energy technologies and 
        strengthened international safeguards that facilitate global 
        management of all nuclear materials.
            (7) Safety and security at nuclear facilities are 
        inextricably linked. Damage to such facilities by sabotage or 
        accident, or the theft or diversion of nuclear materials at 
        such facilities, will have substantial adverse consequences 
        worldwide. It is in the United States national interest to 
        assist countries that cannot afford proper safety and security 
        for their nuclear plants, facilities, and materials in 
        providing proper safety and security for such plants, 
        facilities, and materials, and in developing the sustainable 
        safety and security cultures that are required for the safe and 
        secure use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. The 
        National Nuclear Security Administration is the appropriate 
        Federal agent for dealing with the technical aspects of 
providing for international nuclear safety that must be coordinated 
with safeguards of nuclear materials.
            (8) The United States has provided sealed sources of 
        nuclear materials to many countries through the Atoms for Peace 
        program and the Atomic Energy Act of 1954. These sources remain 
        property of the United States. A recent report of the Inspector 
        General of the Department of Energy, entitled ``Accounting for 
        Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material Provided to Foreign 
        Countries'', noted that a total of 2-3 kilograms of plutonium 
        were in sources provided to 33 nations and that the Department 
        can not account fully for these sources. Many of these sources 
        are small enough to present little risk, but a careful review 
        of sources and recipients could identify concerns requiring 
        special attention. In addition, the former Soviet Union 
        supplied sealed sources of nuclear materials for research and 
        industrial purposes, including some to other countries. These 
        sources contain a variety of radioactive materials and are 
        often uncontrolled, missing, or stolen. The problem of 
        dangerous radiation sources is international, and a solution to 
        the problem will require substantial cooperation between the 
        United States, the Russian Federation, and other countries of 
        the former Soviet Union, as well as international organizations 
        such as the International Atomic Energy Agency. The 
        International Nuclear Safety and Cooperation program and the 
        Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program of the 
        National Nuclear Security Administration address such matters. 
        However those programs need to be strengthened.
            (9) Authorization for domestic testing of preparedness for 
        emergencies involving nuclear, radiological, chemical, and 
        biological weapons provided by section 1415 of the Defense 
        Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (50 U.S.C. 
        2315) has expired. These tests have been invaluable in 
        preparing first responders for a range of potential threats and 
        should be continued.
            (10) Coordination of all Federal nonproliferation programs 
        should be improved to maximize efficiency and effectiveness of 
        programs in multiple agencies. Congress needs a comprehensive 
        annual report detailing the nonproliferation policies, 
        strategies, and budgets of the Federal Government. Cooperation 
        among Federal and private non-proliferation programs is 
        critical to maximize the benefits of such programs.
            (11) The United States response to terrorism must be as 
        rapid as possible. In carrying out their antiterrorism 
        activities, the departments and agencies of the Federal 
        Government, and State and local governments, need rapid access 
        to the specialized expertise and facilities at the national 
        laboratories and sites of the Department of Energy. Multiple 
        agency sponsorship of these important national assets would 
        help achieve this objective.

SEC. 3. TESTING OF PREPAREDNESS FOR EMERGENCIES INVOLVING NUCLEAR, 
              RADIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL, OR BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS.

    (a) Extension of Testing.--Section 1415 of the Defense Against 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public Law 104-
201; 110 Stat. 2720; 50 U.S.C. 2315) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)(2), by striking ``of five successive 
        fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting 
        ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''; and
            (2) in subsection (b)(2), by striking ``of five successive 
        fiscal years beginning with fiscal year 1997'' and inserting 
        ``of fiscal years 1997 through 2013''.
    (b) Construction of Extension with Designation of Attorney General 
as Lead Official.--The amendment made by subsection (a) may not be 
construed as modifying the designation of the President entitled 
``Designation of the Attorney General as the Lead Official for the 
Emergency Response Assistance Program Under Sections 1412 and 1415 of 
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1997'', dated 
April 6, 2000, designating the Attorney General to assume programmatic 
and funding responsibilities for the Emergency Response Assistance 
Program under sections 1412 and 1415 of the Defense Against Weapons of 
Mass Destruction Act of 1996.

SEC. 4. PROGRAM ON TECHNOLOGY FOR PROTECTION FROM NUCLEAR OR 
              RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM.

    (a) Program Required.--(1) The Administrator for Nuclear Security 
shall carry out a program on technology for protection from nuclear or 
radiological terrorism, including technology for the detection, 
identification, assessment, control, disposition, consequence 
management, and consequence mitigation of the dispersal of radiological 
materials or of nuclear terrorism.
    (2) The Administrator shall carry out the program as part of the 
nonproliferation and verification research and development programs of 
the National Nuclear Security Administration.
    (b) Program Elements.--In carrying out the program required by 
subsection (a), the Administrator shall--
            (1) provide for the development of technologies to respond 
        to threats or incidents involving nuclear or radiological 
        terrorism in the United States;
            (2) demonstrate applications of the technologies developed 
        under paragraph (1), including joint demonstrations with the 
        Office of Homeland Security and other appropriate Federal 
        agencies;
            (3) provide, where feasible, for the development in 
        cooperation with the Russian Federation of technologies to 
        respond to nuclear or radiological terrorism in the former 
        states of the Soviet Union, including the demonstration of 
        technologies so developed; and
            (4) provide, where feasible, assistance to other countries 
        on matters relating to nuclear or radiological terrorism, 
        including--
                    (A) the provision of technology and assistance on 
                means of addressing nuclear or radiological incidents;
                    (B) the provision of assistance in developing means 
                for the safe disposal of radioactive materials;
                    (C) in coordination with the Nuclear Regulatory 
                Commission, the provision of assistance in developing 
                the regulatory framework for licensing and developing 
                programs for the protection and control of radioactive 
                sources; and
                    (D) the provision of assistance in evaluating the 
                radiological sources identified as not under current 
                accounting programs in the report of the Inspector 
                General of the Department of Energy entitled 
                ``Accounting for Sealed Sources of Nuclear Material 
                Provided to Foreign Countries'', and in identifying and 
                controlling radiological sources that represent 
                significant risks.
    (c) Requirements for International Elements of Program.--(1) In 
carrying out activities in accordance with paragraphs (3) and (4) of 
subsection (b), the Administrator shall consult with--
            (A) the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and 
        Secretary of Commerce; and
            (B) the International Atomic Energy Agency.
    (2) The Administrator shall encourage joint leadership between the 
United States and the Russian Federation of activities on the 
development of technologies under subsection (b)(4).
    (d) Incorporation of Results in Emergency Response Assistance 
Program.--To the maximum extent practicable, the technologies and 
information developed under the program required by subsection (a) 
shall be incorporated into the program on responses to emergencies 
involving nuclear and radiological weapons carried out under section 
1415 of the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 
(title XIV of Public Law 104-201; 50 U.S.C. 2315).
    (e) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of Energy for the National Nuclear 
Security Administration to carry out activities under this section 
amounts as follows:
            (1) For fiscal year 2003, $40,000,000.
            (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
        as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

SEC. 5. EXPANSION OF INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND 
              ACCOUNTING PROGRAM.

    (a) Expansion of Program to Additional Countries Authorized.--The 
Secretary of Energy may expand the International Materials Protection, 
Control, and Accounting (MPC&A) program of the Department of Energy to 
encompass countries outside the Russian Federation and the independent 
states of the former Soviet Union.
    (b) Notice to Congress of Use of Funds for Additional Countries.--
Not later than 30 days after the Secretary obligates funds for the 
International Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program, as 
expanded under subsection (a), for activities in or with respect to a 
country outside the Russian Federation and the independent states of 
the former Soviet Union, the Secretary shall submit to Congress a 
notice of the obligation of such funds for such activities.
    (c) Assistance to Department of State for Nuclear Materials 
Safeguards Programs.--(1) As part of the International Materials 
Protection, Control, and Accounting program, the Secretary of Energy 
may provide technical assistance to the Secretary of State in the 
efforts of the Secretary of State to assist other nuclear weapons 
states to review and improve their nuclear materials safeguards 
programs.
    (2) The technical assistance provided under paragraph (1) may 
include the sharing of technology or methodologies to the states 
referred to in that paragraph. Any such sharing shall--
            (A) be consistent with the treaty obligations of the United 
        States; and
            (B) take into account the sovereignty of the state 
        concerned and its weapons programs, as well the sensitivity of 
        any information involved regarding United States weapons or 
        weapons systems.
    (3) The Secretary of Energy may include the Russian Federation in 
activities under paragraph (1) if the Secretary determines that the 
experience of the Russian Federation under the International Materials 
Protection, Control, and Accounting program with the Russian Federation 
would make the participation of the Russian Federation in such 
activities useful in providing technical assistance under that 
paragraph.
    (d) Plan for Accelerated Conversion or Return of Weapons-Usable 
Nuclear Materials.--(1) The Secretary shall build on efforts to 
accelerate the conversion or return to the country of origin of all 
weapons-usable nuclear materials located in research reactors and other 
facilities outside the country of origin.
    (2) The plan under paragraph (1) for nuclear materials of origin in 
the Soviet Union shall be developed in consultation with the Russian 
Federation.
    (3) As part of the plan under paragraph (1), the Secretary shall 
assist the research reactors and facilities referred to in that 
paragraph in upgrading their materials protection, control, and 
accounting procedures until the weapons-usable nuclear materials in 
such reactors and facilities are converted or returned in accordance 
with that paragraph.
    (4) The provision of assistance under paragraph (3) shall be 
closely coordinated with ongoing efforts of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the same purpose.
    (e) Radiological Dispersal Device Protection, Control, and 
Accounting.--(1) The Secretary shall establish within the International 
Materials Protection, Control, and Accounting program a program on the 
protection, control, and accounting of materials usable in radiological 
dispersal devices.
    (2) The program under paragraph (1) shall include--
            (A) an identification of vulnerabilities regarding 
        radiological materials worldwide;
            (B) the mitigation of vulnerabilities so identified through 
        appropriate security enhancements; and
            (C) an acceleration of efforts to recover and control so-
        called ``orphaned'' radiological sources.
    (3) The program under paragraph (1) shall be known as the 
Radiological Dispersal Device Protection, Control, and Accounting 
program.
    (f) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out activities under 
this section amounts as follows:
            (1) For fiscal year 2003, $10,000,000.
            (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
        as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

SEC. 6. ACCELERATED DISPOSITION OF HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM AND 
              PLUTONIUM.

    (a) Program Authorized.--(1) The Secretary of Energy may carry out 
a program to pursue with the Russian Federation, and any other nation 
that possesses highly enriched uranium, options for blending such 
uranium so that the concentration of U-235 in such uranium is below 20 
percent.
    (2) The options pursued under paragraph (1) shall include expansion 
of the Material Consolidation and Conversion program of the Department 
of Energy to include--
            (A) additional facilities for the blending of highly 
        enriched uranium; and
            (B) additional centralized secure storage facilities for 
        highly enriched uranium, as so blended.
    (b) Incentives Regarding Highly Enriched Uranium in Russia.--As 
part of the options pursued under subsection (a) with the Russian 
Federation, the Secretary may provide financial and other incentives 
for the removal of all highly enriched uranium from any particular 
facility in the Russian Federation if the Secretary determines that 
such incentives will facilitate the consolidation of highly enriched 
uranium in the Russian Federation to the best-secured facilities.
    (c) Construction with HEU Disposition Agreement.--Nothing in this 
section may be construed as terminating, modifying, or otherwise 
effecting requirements for the disposition of highly enriched uranium 
under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the 
Disposition of Highly Enriched Uranium Extracted from Nuclear Weapons, 
signed at Washington on February 18, 1993.
    (d) Priority in Blending Activities.--In pursuing options under 
this section, the Secretary shall give priority to the blending of 
highly enriched uranium from weapons, though highly enriched uranium 
from sources other than weapons may also be blended.
    (e) Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium and Plutonium to United 
States.--(1) As part of the program under subsection (a), the Secretary 
may, upon the request of any nation--
            (A) purchase highly enriched uranium or weapons grade 
        plutonium from the nation at a price determined by the 
        Secretary;
            (B) transport any uranium or plutonium so purchased to the 
        United States; and
            (C) store any uranium or plutonium so transported in the 
        United States.
    (2) The Secretary is not required to blend any highly enriched 
uranium purchased under paragraph (1)(A) in order to reduce the 
concentration of U-235 in such uranium to below 20 percent. Amounts 
authorized to be appropriated by subsection (m) may not be used for 
purposes of blending such uranium.
    (f) Transfer of Highly Enriched Uranium to Russia.--(1) As part of 
the program under subsection (a), the Secretary may encourage nations 
with highly enriched uranium to transfer such uranium to the Russian 
Federation for disposition under this section.
    (2) The Secretary shall pay any nation that transfers highly 
enriched uranium to the Russian Federation under this subsection an 
amount determined appropriate by the Secretary.
    (3) The Secretary shall bear the cost of any blending and storage 
of uranium transferred to the Russian Federation under this subsection, 
including any costs of blending and storage under a contract under 
subsection (g).
    (g) Contracts for Blending and Storage of Highly Enriched Uranium 
in Russia.--As part of the program under subsection (a), the Secretary 
may enter into one or more contracts with the Russian Federation--
            (1) to blend in the Russian Federation highly enriched 
        uranium of the Russian Federation and highly enriched uranium 
        transferred to the Russian Federation under subsection (f); or
            (2) to store the blended material in the Russian 
        Federation.
    (h) Limitation on Release for Sale of Blended Uranium.--Uranium 
blended under this section may not be released for sale until the 
earlier of--
            (1) January 1, 2014; or
            (2) the date on which the Secretary certifies that such 
        uranium can be absorbed into the global market without undue 
        disruption to the uranium mining industry in the United States.
    (i) Proceeds of Sale of Uranium Blended by Russia.--Upon the sale 
by the Russian Federation of uranium blended under this section by the 
Russian Federation, the Secretary may elect to receive from the 
proceeds of such sale an amount not to exceed 75 percent of the costs 
incurred by the Department of Energy under subsections (b), (f), and 
(g).
    (j) Report on Status of Program.--Not later than July 1, 2003, the 
Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on the status of the 
program carried out under the authority in subsection (a). The report 
shall include--
            (1) a description of international interest in the program;
            (2) schedules and operational details of the program; and
            (3) recommendations for future funding for the program.
    (k) Disposition of Plutonium in Russia.--(1) The Secretary may 
assist the Russian Federation in any fiscal year with the plutonium 
disposition program of the Russian Federation (as established under the 
agreement referred to in paragraph (2)) if the President certifies to 
Congress at the beginning of such fiscal year that the United States 
and the Russian Federation have entered into a binding agreement on the 
disposition of the weapons grade plutonium of the Russian Federation.
    (2) The agreement referred to in this paragraph is the Agreement 
Between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Russian Federation Concerning the Management and 
Disposition of Plutonium Designated As No Longer Required For Defense 
Purposes and Related Cooperation, signed August 29, 2000, and September 
1, 2000.
    (3) The program under paragraph (1)--
            (A) shall include transparent verifiable steps;
            (B) shall proceed at roughly the rate of the United States 
        program for the disposition of plutonium;
            (C) shall provide for cost-sharing among a variety of 
        countries;
            (D) shall provide for contributions by the Russian 
        Federation;
            (E) shall include steps over the near term to provide high 
        confidence that the schedules for the disposition of plutonium 
        of the Russian Federation will be achieved; and
            (F) may include research on more speculative long-term 
        options for the future disposition of the plutonium of the 
        Russian Federation in addition to the near-term steps under 
        subparagraph (E).
    (l) Highly Enriched Uranium Defined.--In this section, the term 
``highly enriched uranium'' means uranium with a concentration of U-235 
of 20 percent or more.
    (m) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out activities under 
this section amounts as follows:
            (1) For fiscal year 2003--
                    (A) for activities under subsections (a) through 
                (i), $100,000,000; and
                    (B) for activities under subsection (k), 
                $200,000,000.
            (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
        as may be necessary in such fiscal year for activities under 
        subsection (a) through (i).

SEC. 7. STRENGTHENED INTERNATIONAL SAFEGUARDS FOR NUCLEAR MATERIALS AND 
              SAFETY FOR NUCLEAR OPERATIONS.

    (a) Report on Options for International Program To Strengthen 
Safeguards and Safety.--(1) Not later than 180 days after the date of 
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator for Nuclear Security shall 
submit to Congress a report on options for an international program to 
develop strengthened safeguards for all nuclear materials and safety 
for nuclear operations.
    (2) Each option for an international program under paragraph (1) 
may provide that the program is jointly led by the United States, the 
Russian Federation, and the International Atomic Energy Agency.
    (3) The Administrator shall include with the report on options for 
an international program under paragraph (1) a description and 
assessment of various management alternatives for the international 
program. If any option requires Federal funding or legislation to 
implement, the report shall also include recommendations for such 
funding or legislation, as the case may be.
    (b) Joint Programs with Russia on Proliferation Resistant Nuclear 
Technologies.--The Administrator shall pursue with the Russian 
Federation joint programs between the United States and the Russian 
Federation on proliferation resistant nuclear technologies.
    (c) Participation of Office of Nuclear Energy Science.--The 
Administrator shall consult with the Office of Nuclear Energy Science 
and Technology of the Department of Energy in the development of 
options under subsection (a) and joint programs under (b).
    (d) Participation of International Technical Experts.--In 
developing options under subsection (a), the Administrator shall, in 
consultation with the Russian Federation and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, convene and consult with an appropriate group of 
international technical experts on the development of various options 
for technologies to provide strengthened safeguards for nuclear 
materials and safety for nuclear operations, including the 
implementation of such options.
    (e) Assistance Regarding Hostile Insiders and Aircraft Impacts.--
(1) The Secretary of Energy may, utilizing appropriate expertise of the 
Department of Energy, provide assistance to nuclear facilities abroad 
on the interdiction of hostile insiders at such facilities in order to 
prevent incidents arising from the disablement of the vital systems of 
such facilities.
    (2) The Secretary may carry out a joint program with the Russian 
Federation and other countries to address and mitigate concerns on the 
impact of aircraft with nuclear facilities in such countries.
    (f) Assistance to IAEA in Strengthening International Nuclear 
Safeguards.--The Secretary may expand and accelerate the programs of 
the Department of Energy to support the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in strengthening international nuclear safeguards.
    (g) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is hereby authorized to 
be appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out activities 
under this section amounts as follows:
            (1) For fiscal year 2003--
                    (A) for activities under subsections (a) through 
                (e), $20,000,000, of which $5,000,000 shall be 
                available for sabotage protection for nuclear power 
                plants and other nuclear facilities abroad; and
                    (B) for activities under subsection (f), 
                $30,000,000.
            (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
        as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

SEC. 8. EXPORT CONTROL PROGRAMS.

    (a) Authority To Pursue Options for Strengthening Export Control 
Programs.--The Secretary of Energy may pursue in the former Soviet 
Union and other regions of concern, principally in South Asia, the 
Middle East, and the Far East, options for accelerating programs that 
assist countries in such regions in improving their domestic export 
control programs for materials, technologies, and expertise relevant to 
the construction or use of a nuclear or radiological dispersal device.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated for the Department of Energy to carry out activities under 
this section amounts as follows:
            (1) For fiscal year 2003, $5,000,000.
            (2) For each fiscal year after fiscal year 2003, such sums 
        as may be necessary in such fiscal year.

SEC. 9. IMPROVEMENTS TO NUCLEAR MATERIALS PROTECTION, CONTROL, AND 
              ACCOUNTING PROGRAM OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION.

    (a) Revised Focus for Program.--(1) The Secretary of Energy shall 
work cooperatively with the Russian Federation to update and improve 
the Joint Action Plan for the Materials Protection, Control, and 
Accounting programs of the Department and the Russian Federation 
Ministry of Atomic Energy.
    (2) The updated plan shall shift the focus of the upgrades of the 
nuclear materials protection, control, and accounting program of the 
Russian Federation in order to assist the Russian Federation in 
achieving, as soon as practicable but not later than January 1, 2012, a 
sustainable safeguards system for the nuclear materials of the Russian 
Federation that is supported solely by the Russian Federation.
    (b) Pace of Program.--The Secretary shall work with the Russian 
Federation, including applicable institutes in Russia, to pursue 
acceleration of the nuclear materials protection, control, and 
accounting programs at nuclear defense facilities in the Russian 
Federation.
    (c) Transparency of Program.--(1) The Secretary shall work with the 
Russian Federation to identify various alternatives to provide the 
United States adequate transparency in the nuclear materials 
protection, control, and accounting program of the Russian Federation 
to assure that such program is meeting applicable goals for nuclear 
materials protection, control, and accounting.
    (2) The alternatives identified under paragraph (1) may not include 
full intrusive access to sensitive facilities in the Russian 
Federation.
    (d) Sense of Congress.--In furtherance of the activities required 
under this section, it is the sense of Congress the Secretary should--
            (1) improve the partnership with the Russian Ministry of 
        Atomic Energy in order to enhance the pace and effectiveness of 
        nuclear materials safeguards at facilities in the Russian 
        Federation, including serial production enterprises; and
            (2) clearly identify the assistance required by the Russian 
        Federation, the contributions anticipated from the Russian 
        Federation, and the transparency milestones that can be used to 
        assess progress in meeting the requirements of this section.

SEC. 10. COMPREHENSIVE ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS OF ALL UNITED STATES 
              NONPROLIFERATION ACTIVITIES.

    Section 1205 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2002 (Public Law 107-107; 115 Stat. 1247) is amended by adding at 
the end the following new subsection:
    ``(d) Annual Report on Implementation of Plan.--(1) Not later than 
January 31, 2003, and each year thereafter, the President shall submit 
to Congress a report on the implementation of the plan required by 
subsection (a) during the preceding year.
    ``(2) Each report under paragraph (1) shall include--
            ``(A) a discussion of any progress made during the year 
        covered by such report in the matters of the plan required by 
        subsection (a);
            ``(B) a discussion of any consultations with foreign 
        nations, and in particular the Russian Federation, during such 
        year on joint programs to implement the plan;
            ``(C) a discussion of any cooperation and coordination 
        during such year in the implementation of the plan between the 
        United States and private entities that share objectives 
        similar to the objectives of the plan; and
            ``(D) any recommendations that the President considers 
        appropriate regarding modifications to law or regulations, or 
        to the administration or organization of any Federal department 
        or agency, in order to improve the effectiveness of any 
        programs carried out during such year in the implementation of 
        the plan.''.

SEC. 11. UTILIZATION OF DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND 
              SITES IN SUPPORT OF ANTITERRORISM ACTIVITIES.

    (a) Agencies as Joint Sponsors of Laboratories for Work on 
Antiterrorism.--Each department or agency of the Federal Government, or 
of a State or local government, that carries out work on antiterrorism 
activities at a Department of Energy national laboratory shall be a 
joint sponsor, under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the 
Department, of such laboratory in the performance of such work.
    (b) Agencies as Joint Sponsors of Sites for Work on 
Antiterrorism.--Each department or agency of the Federal Government, or 
of a State or local government, that carries out work on antiterrorism 
activities at a Department site shall be a joint sponsor of such site 
in the performance of such work as if such site were a federally funded 
research and development center and such work were performed under a 
multiple agency sponsorship arrangement with the Department.
    (c) Primary Sponsorship.--The Department of Energy shall be the 
primary sponsor under a multiple agency sponsorship arrangement 
required under subsection (a) or (b).
    (d) Work.--(1) The Administrator for Nuclear Security shall act as 
the lead agent in coordinating the submittal to a Department national 
laboratory or site of requests for work on antiterrorism matters by 
departments and agencies that are joint sponsors of such national 
laboratory or center, as the case may be, under this section.
    (2) A request for work may not be submitted to a national 
laboratory or site under this section unless approved in advance by the 
Administrator.
    (3) Any work performed by a national laboratory or site under this 
section shall comply with the policy on the use of federally funded 
research and development centers under section 35.017(a)(4) of the 
Federal Acquisition Regulation.
    (4) The Administrator shall ensure that the work of a national 
laboratory or site requested under this section is performed 
expeditiously and to the satisfaction of the head of the department or 
agency submitting the request.
    (e) Funding.--(1) Subject to paragraph (2), a joint sponsor of a 
national laboratory or site under this section shall provide funds for 
work of such center or site, as the case may be, under this section 
under the same terms and conditions as apply to the primary sponsor of 
such center under section 303(b)(1)(C) of the Federal Property and 
Administrative Services Act of 1949 (41 U.S.C. 253(b)(1)(C)) or of such 
site to the extent such section applies to such site as a federally 
funded research and development center by reason of subsection (b).
    (2) The total amount of funds provided a national laboratory or 
site in a fiscal year under this subsection by joint sponsors other 
than the Department of Energy shall not exceed an amount equal to 25 
percent of the total funds provided such center or site, as the case 
may be, in such fiscal year from all sources.
                                 <all>