[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 180 Reported in Senate (RS)]
Calendar No. 89
107th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 180
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 25, 2001
Mr. Frist (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Lieberman, Mr.
DeWine, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Cleland, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Nelson
of Nebraska, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. Bunning, and Mr. Grassley) introduced
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee
on Foreign Relations
July 16, 2001
Reported by Mr. Biden, with an amendment
[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed
in italic]
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>
<DELETED> This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace
Act''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its
prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control,
which has already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has
displaced more than 4,000,000.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally
sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents
the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war,
protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining
Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) Continued strengthening and reform of
humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element
in the effort to bring an end to the war.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (4) Continued leadership by the United States is
critical.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (5) Regardless of the future political status of
the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of
Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions
is a major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the
Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable
peace process.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries
among peoples in areas outside their full control, the
Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer
techniques to subjugate their population, and internationally
sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in
reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human
suffering.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and
organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other
irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas
outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort
to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain
themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans
on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through
selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's
accountability internationally.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated
that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil
sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against
the areas outside its control.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (9) Through its power to veto plans for air
transport flights under the United Nations relief operation,
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has
been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese
people from the United States and other donor countries as a
devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the
Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the
Government's control.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (10) The efforts of the United States and other
donors in delivering relief and assistance through means
outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the
deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's
manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in
Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas
in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near
term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control
of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme
disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al
Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded
completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently
placing their populations at increased risk of
famine.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded
$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only
for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current
international relief operations are neither sustainable nor
desirable in the long term.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (14) The ability of populations to defend
themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of
Sudan's control has been severely compromised by the
disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the
belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success
on the battlefield can be achieved.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (15) The United States should use all means of
pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to
the war in Sudan, including--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) the multilateralization of economic
and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan
to enter into a good faith peace process;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the support or creation of viable
democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of
Sudan outside government control;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) continued active support of people-to-
people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas
outside of government control;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to
provide humanitarian relief to those areas;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (E) cooperation among the trading partners
of the United States and within multilateral
institutions toward those ends.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> In this Act:</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of
Sudan'' means the National Islamic Front government in
Khartoum, Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United
Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food
Program, and participating relief organizations known as
``Operation Lifeline Sudan''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES,
AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Congress hereby--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) condemns--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) violations of human rights on all
sides of the conflict in Sudan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) the Government of Sudan's overall
human rights record, with regard to both the
prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human
and political rights to all Sudanese;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and
the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and
tolerating the practice; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (D) the Government of Sudan's use and
organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'',
Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army
units into organized and coordinated raiding and
slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on
air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the
use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food
shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the
societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba
peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic
cleansing.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE
PROCESS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) a single viable, internationally and
regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest
opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the
war in Sudan; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best
made through a peace process based on the Declaration of
Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20,
1994.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of
State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State
for the support of--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the ongoing negotiations between the
Government of Sudan and opposition forces;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (3) other United States diplomatic efforts
supporting a peace process in Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to
facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (2) the President, acting through the United
States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should
seek to--</DELETED>
<DELETED> (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline
Sudan to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan
over the plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air
transport of relief flights and, by doing so, to end
the manipulation of the delivery of those relief
supplies to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on
the battlefield;</DELETED>
<DELETED> (B) investigate the practice of slavery in
Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimination;
and</DELETED>
<DELETED> (C) sponsor a condemnation of the
Government of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to
aerial bombardment.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.</DELETED>
<DELETED> Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22
U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d)
and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall include--
</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(1) a description of the sources and current
status of Sudan's financing and construction of oil
exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the
inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such financing and
construction, and the Government of Sudan's ability to finance
the war in Sudan;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(2) a description of the extent to which that
financing was secured in the United States or with involvement
of United States citizens;</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside
its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates
of damage; and</DELETED>
<DELETED> ``(4) a description of the extent to which
humanitarian relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the
Government of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war
in Sudan.''.</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF
EFFORTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that
the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies
in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to
Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection
(a).</DELETED>
<DELETED>SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF
FLIGHTS.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan
to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest
possible amount of United States Government and privately donated
relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes
a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief
flights.</DELETED>
<DELETED> (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other
provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection
(a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds
available for support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for
the purposes of the plan.</DELETED>
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution
of the war against areas outside of its control, which has
already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more
than 4,000,000.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored
peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best
chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of
human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian
relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the
effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas
of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the
absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major
impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among
peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of
Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to
subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored
reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing
militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for
raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of
the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the
ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic
is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief
flights in prosecuting the war through selective starvation and
to minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability
internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it
intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to
increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas
outside its control.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport
flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to
manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from
the United States and other donor countries as a devastating
weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan
to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in
delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have
played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS
and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food
donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan
facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the
population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption
of their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely
from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their
populations at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per
day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the
immediate food needs of the recipients, the current
international relief operations are neither sustainable nor
desirable in the long term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves
against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's
control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of
the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within
officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the
battlefield can be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of pressure
available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in
Sudan, including--
(A) the multilateralization of economic and
diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to
enter into a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable democratic
civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan
outside government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-people
reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside
of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide
humanitarian relief to those areas; and
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the
United States and within multilateral institutions
toward those ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan''
means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief
operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and
participating relief organizations known as ``Operation
Lifeline Sudan''.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby--
(1) condemns--
(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the
conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights
record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war
and the denial of basic human and political rights to
all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role
of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating
the practice; and
(D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization
of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense
Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into
organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties
in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and
Blue Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air
transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of
raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food
shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the
societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba
peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE PROCESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally
sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to
promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan;
and
(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made
through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles
reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
(b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the
support of--
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of
Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a
peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to
facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek
to--
(A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to
end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the
plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of
relief flights and, by doing so, to end the
manipulation of the delivery of those relief supplies
to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on the
battlefield;
(B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan
and provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
(C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of
Sudan each time it subjects civilians to aerial
bombardment.
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) and (f),
the report required by subsection (d) shall include--
``(1) a description of the sources and current status of
Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation
infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants of
the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, and
the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in Sudan;
``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing
was secured in the United States or with involvement of United
States citizens;
``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside
its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates
of damage; and
``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian
relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government of
Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in Sudan.''.
SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (a).
SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan to
provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest
possible amount of United States Government and privately donated
relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes
a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief
flights.
(b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of
the plan.
SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY ``NO GO'' AREAS OF
SUDAN.
(a) Pilot Project Activities.--The President, acting through the
United States Agency for International Development, is authorized and
requested to undertake, immediately, pilot project activities to
provide food and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to
vulnerable populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary ``no
go'' areas of Sudan.
(b) Study.--The President, acting through the United States Agency
for International Development, shall conduct a study examining the
adverse impact upon indigenous Sudan communities by OLS policies that
curtail direct humanitarian assistance to exclusionary ``no go'' areas
of Sudan.
(c) Exclusionary ``No Go'' Areas of Sudan Defined.--In this
section, the term ``exclusionary `no go' areas of Sudan'' means areas
of Sudan designated by OLS for curtailment of direct humanitarian
assistance, including, but not limited to, the Nuba Mountains, the
Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile.
Calendar No. 89
107th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 180
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
_______________________________________________________________________
July 16, 2001
Reported with an amendment