[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 180 Reported in Senate (RS)]






                                                        Calendar No. 89
107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                 S. 180

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            January 25, 2001

Mr. Frist (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Lieberman, Mr. 
DeWine, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Cleland, Mr. Sessions, Mr. Harkin, Mr. Nelson 
 of Nebraska, Mrs. Lincoln, Mr. Bunning, and Mr. Grassley) introduced 
the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee 
                          on Foreign Relations

                             July 16, 2001

                Reported by Mr. Biden, with an amendment
 [Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed 
                               in italic]

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

<DELETED>SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace 
Act''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 2. FINDINGS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress makes the following findings:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its 
        prosecution of the war against areas outside of its control, 
        which has already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has 
        displaced more than 4,000,000.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally 
        sponsored peace process, protected from manipulation, presents 
        the best chance for a permanent resolution of the war, 
        protection of human rights, and a self-sustaining 
        Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) Continued strengthening and reform of 
        humanitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential element 
        in the effort to bring an end to the war.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (4) Continued leadership by the United States is 
        critical.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (5) Regardless of the future political status of 
        the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of 
        Sudan, the absence of credible civil authority and institutions 
        is a major impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the 
        Sudanese people and to meaningful progress toward a viable 
        peace process.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries 
        among peoples in areas outside their full control, the 
        Government of Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer 
        techniques to subjugate their population, and internationally 
        sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in 
        reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human 
        suffering.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and 
        organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
        irregular units for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort 
        to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
        themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans 
        on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through 
        selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's 
        accountability internationally.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated 
        that it intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil 
        sales to increase the tempo and lethality of the war against 
        the areas outside its control.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (9) Through its power to veto plans for air 
        transport flights under the United Nations relief operation, 
        Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has 
        been able to manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese 
        people from the United States and other donor countries as a 
        devastating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the 
        Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the 
        Government's control.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (10) The efforts of the United States and other 
        donors in delivering relief and assistance through means 
        outside OLS have played a critical role in addressing the 
        deficiencies in OLS and offset the Government of Sudan's 
        manipulation of food donations to advantage in the civil war in 
        Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas 
        in Sudan facing starvation have been addressed in the near 
        term, the population in areas of Sudan outside of the control 
        of the Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme 
        disruption of their ability to sustain themselves.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al 
        Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded 
        completely from relief distribution by OLS, consequently 
        placing their populations at increased risk of 
        famine.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded 
        $1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on providing only 
        for the immediate food needs of the recipients, the current 
        international relief operations are neither sustainable nor 
        desirable in the long term.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (14) The ability of populations to defend 
        themselves against attack in areas outside the Government of 
        Sudan's control has been severely compromised by the 
        disengagement of the front-line sponsor states, fostering the 
        belief within officials of the Government of Sudan that success 
        on the battlefield can be achieved.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (15) The United States should use all means of 
        pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to 
        the war in Sudan, including--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) the multilateralization of economic 
                and diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan 
                to enter into a good faith peace process;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the support or creation of viable 
                democratic civil authority and institutions in areas of 
                Sudan outside government control;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) continued active support of people-to-
                people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas 
                outside of government control;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to 
                provide humanitarian relief to those areas; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (E) cooperation among the trading partners 
                of the United States and within multilateral 
                institutions toward those ends.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    In this Act:</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of 
        Sudan'' means the National Islamic Front government in 
        Khartoum, Sudan.</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United 
        Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food 
        Program, and participating relief organizations known as 
        ``Operation Lifeline Sudan''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, 
              AND TACTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Congress hereby--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) condemns--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) violations of human rights on all 
                sides of the conflict in Sudan;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall 
                human rights record, with regard to both the 
                prosecution of the war and the denial of basic human 
                and political rights to all Sudanese;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and 
                the role of the Government of Sudan in abetting and 
                tolerating the practice; and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (D) the Government of Sudan's use and 
                organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', 
                Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army 
                units into organized and coordinated raiding and 
                slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, 
                Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on 
        air transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the 
        use of raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba 
        peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic 
        cleansing.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE 
              PROCESS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) a single viable, internationally and 
        regionally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest 
        opportunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the 
        war in Sudan; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best 
        made through a peace process based on the Declaration of 
        Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 
        1994.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of 
State is authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State 
for the support of--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the ongoing negotiations between the 
        Government of Sudan and opposition forces;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or 
        implementation; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (3) other United States diplomatic efforts 
        supporting a peace process in Sudan.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    It is the sense of Congress that--</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to 
        facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    (2) the President, acting through the United 
        States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should 
        seek to--</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline 
                Sudan to end the veto power of the Government of Sudan 
                over the plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air 
                transport of relief flights and, by doing so, to end 
                the manipulation of the delivery of those relief 
                supplies to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on 
                the battlefield;</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (B) investigate the practice of slavery in 
                Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimination; 
                and</DELETED>
                <DELETED>    (C) sponsor a condemnation of the 
                Government of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to 
                aerial bombardment.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the following:</DELETED>
<DELETED>    ``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) 
and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall include--
</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(1) a description of the sources and current 
        status of Sudan's financing and construction of oil 
        exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the 
        inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such financing and 
        construction, and the Government of Sudan's ability to finance 
        the war in Sudan;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(2) a description of the extent to which that 
        financing was secured in the United States or with involvement 
        of United States citizens;</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial 
        bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside 
        its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates 
        of damage; and</DELETED>
        <DELETED>    ``(4) a description of the extent to which 
        humanitarian relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the 
        Government of Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war 
        in Sudan.''.</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF 
              EFFORTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that 
the President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies 
in the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of 
enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to 
Congress describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection 
(a).</DELETED>

<DELETED>SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF 
              FLIGHTS.</DELETED>

<DELETED>    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan 
to provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest 
possible amount of United States Government and privately donated 
relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, 
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes 
a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief 
flights.</DELETED>
<DELETED>    (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other 
provision of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection 
(a), the President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds 
available for support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for 
the purposes of the plan.</DELETED>

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution 
        of the war against areas outside of its control, which has 
        already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more 
        than 4,000,000.
            (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
        peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
        chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
        human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
            (3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian 
        relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the 
        effort to bring an end to the war.
            (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
            (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
        of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the 
        absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major 
        impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people 
        and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
            (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
        peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of 
        Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to 
        subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored 
        reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing 
        the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
            (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing 
        militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for 
        raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of 
        the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the 
        ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic 
        is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief 
        flights in prosecuting the war through selective starvation and 
        to minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability 
        internationally.
            (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
        intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
        increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
        outside its control.
            (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
        flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to 
        manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from 
        the United States and other donor countries as a devastating 
        weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan 
        to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
            (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
        delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have 
        played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS 
        and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
        donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
            (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
        facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
        population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
        Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
        of their ability to sustain themselves.
            (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
        Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely 
        from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their 
        populations at increased risk of famine.
            (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per 
        day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the 
        immediate food needs of the recipients, the current 
        international relief operations are neither sustainable nor 
        desirable in the long term.
            (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
        against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
        control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
        the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
        officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
        battlefield can be achieved.
            (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
        available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in 
        Sudan, including--
                    (A) the multilateralization of economic and 
                diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to 
                enter into a good faith peace process;
                    (B) the support or creation of viable democratic 
                civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan 
                outside government control;
                    (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
                reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside 
                of government control;
                    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
                humanitarian relief to those areas; and
                    (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the 
                United States and within multilateral institutions 
                toward those ends.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
        means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
            (2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
        operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
        participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan''.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS 
              OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

    Congress hereby--
            (1) condemns--
                    (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the 
                conflict in Sudan;
                    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights 
                record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war 
                and the denial of basic human and political rights to 
                all Sudanese;
                    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role 
                of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating 
                the practice; and
                    (D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization 
                of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense 
                Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into 
                organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties 
                in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and 
                Blue Nile regions; and
            (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
        transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of 
        raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba 
        peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE PROCESS.

    (a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
            (1) a single viable, internationally and regionally 
        sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to 
        promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan; 
        and
            (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made 
        through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles 
        reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
    (b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is 
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the 
support of--
            (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
        Sudan and opposition forces;
            (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or 
        implementation; and
            (3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
        peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that--
            (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to 
        facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
            (2) the President, acting through the United States 
        Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek 
        to--
                    (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to 
                end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the 
                plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of 
                relief flights and, by doing so, to end the 
                manipulation of the delivery of those relief supplies 
                to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on the 
                battlefield;
                    (B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan 
                and provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
                    (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of 
                Sudan each time it subjects civilians to aerial 
                bombardment.

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n) 
is amended by adding at the end the following:
    ``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) and (f), 
the report required by subsection (d) shall include--
            ``(1) a description of the sources and current status of 
        Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation 
        infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants of 
        the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, and 
        the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in Sudan;
            ``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing 
        was secured in the United States or with involvement of United 
        States citizens;
            ``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial 
        bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside 
        its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates 
        of damage; and
            ``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian 
        relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government of 
        Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in Sudan.''.

SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in 
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
    (b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress 
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (a).

SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan to 
provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest 
possible amount of United States Government and privately donated 
relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, 
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes 
a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief 
flights.
    (b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the 
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for 
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of 
the plan.

SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY ``NO GO'' AREAS OF 
              SUDAN.

    (a) Pilot Project Activities.--The President, acting through the 
United States Agency for International Development, is authorized and 
requested to undertake, immediately, pilot project activities to 
provide food and other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to 
vulnerable populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary ``no 
go'' areas of Sudan.
    (b) Study.--The President, acting through the United States Agency 
for International Development, shall conduct a study examining the 
adverse impact upon indigenous Sudan communities by OLS policies that 
curtail direct humanitarian assistance to exclusionary ``no go'' areas 
of Sudan.
    (c) Exclusionary ``No Go'' Areas of Sudan Defined.--In this 
section, the term ``exclusionary `no go' areas of Sudan'' means areas 
of Sudan designated by OLS for curtailment of direct humanitarian 
assistance, including, but not limited to, the Nuba Mountains, the 
Upper Nile, and the Blue Nile.




                                                        Calendar No. 89

107th CONGRESS

  1st Session

                                 S. 180

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

_______________________________________________________________________

                             July 16, 2001

                       Reported with an amendment