

107TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# S. 180

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IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

JULY 20, 2001

Referred to the Committee on International Relations

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## AN ACT

To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive  
solution to the war in Sudan.

1       *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2       *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3       **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4       This Act may be cited as the “Sudan Peace Act”.

1 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

2 Congress makes the following findings:

3 (1) The Government of Sudan has intensified  
4 its prosecution of the war against areas outside of  
5 its control, which has already cost more than  
6 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more than  
7 4,000,000.

8 (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally  
9 sponsored peace process, protected from manipula-  
10 tion, presents the best chance for a permanent reso-  
11 lution of the war, protection of human rights, and  
12 a self-sustaining Sudan.

13 (3) Continued strengthening and reform of hu-  
14 manitarian relief operations in Sudan is an essential  
15 element in the effort to bring an end to the war.

16 (4) Continued leadership by the United States  
17 is critical.

18 (5) Regardless of the future political status of  
19 the areas of Sudan outside of the control of the Gov-  
20 ernment of Sudan, the absence of credible civil au-  
21 thority and institutions is a major impediment to  
22 achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people  
23 and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace  
24 process.

25 (6) Through manipulation of traditional rival-  
26 ries among peoples in areas outside their full con-

1 trol, the Government of Sudan has effectively used  
2 divide and conquer techniques to subjugate their  
3 population, and internationally sponsored reconcili-  
4 ation efforts have played a critical role in reducing  
5 the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.

6 (7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and  
7 organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and  
8 other irregular units for raiding and slaving parties  
9 in areas outside of the control of the Government of  
10 Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the ability of  
11 those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic  
12 is in addition to the overt use of bans on air trans-  
13 port relief flights in prosecuting the war through se-  
14 lective starvation and to minimize the Government  
15 of Sudan's accountability internationally.

16 (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly  
17 stated that it intends to use the expected proceeds  
18 from future oil sales to increase the tempo and  
19 lethality of the war against the areas outside its con-  
20 trol.

21 (9) Through its power to veto plans for air  
22 transport flights under the United Nations relief op-  
23 eration, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Gov-  
24 ernment of Sudan has been able to manipulate the  
25 receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from the

1 United States and other donor countries as a dev-  
2 astating weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the  
3 Government of Sudan to subdue areas of Sudan out-  
4 side of the Government's control.

5 (10) The efforts of the United States and other  
6 donors in delivering relief and assistance through  
7 means outside OLS have played a critical role in ad-  
8 dressing the deficiencies in OLS and offset the Gov-  
9 ernment of Sudan's manipulation of food donations  
10 to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.

11 (11) While the immediate needs of selected  
12 areas in Sudan facing starvation have been ad-  
13 dressed in the near term, the population in areas of  
14 Sudan outside of the control of the Government of  
15 Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption of  
16 their ability to sustain themselves.

17 (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in  
18 Bahr al Ghazal, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions  
19 have been excluded completely from relief distribu-  
20 tion by OLS, consequently placing their populations  
21 at increased risk of famine.

22 (13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded  
23 \$1,000,000 per day, and with a primary focus on  
24 providing only for the immediate food needs of the  
25 recipients, the current international relief operations

1 are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long  
2 term.

3 (14) The ability of populations to defend them-  
4 selves against attack in areas outside the Govern-  
5 ment of Sudan's control has been severely com-  
6 promised by the disengagement of the front-line  
7 sponsor states, fostering the belief within officials of  
8 the Government of Sudan that success on the battle-  
9 field can be achieved.

10 (15) The United States should use all means of  
11 pressure available to facilitate a comprehensive solu-  
12 tion to the war in Sudan, including—

13 (A) the multilateralization of economic and  
14 diplomatic tools to compel the Government of  
15 Sudan to enter into a good faith peace process;

16 (B) the support or creation of viable demo-  
17 cratic civil authority and institutions in areas of  
18 Sudan outside government control;

19 (C) continued active support of people-to-  
20 people reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in  
21 areas outside of government control;

22 (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms  
23 to provide humanitarian relief to those areas;  
24 and

1 (E) cooperation among the trading part-  
2 ners of the United States and within multilat-  
3 eral institutions toward those ends.

4 **SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.**

5 In this Act:

6 (1) GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.—The term “Gov-  
7 ernment of Sudan” means the National Islamic  
8 Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.

9 (2) OLS.—The term “OLS” means the United  
10 Nations relief operation carried out by UNICEF, the  
11 World Food Program, and participating relief orga-  
12 nizations known as “Operation Lifeline Sudan”.

13 **SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN**  
14 **RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS OF THE GOV-**  
15 **ERNMENT OF SUDAN.**

16 Congress hereby—

17 (1) condemns—

18 (A) violations of human rights on all sides  
19 of the conflict in Sudan;

20 (B) the Government of Sudan’s overall  
21 human rights record, with regard to both the  
22 prosecution of the war and the denial of basic  
23 human and political rights to all Sudanese;

1 (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and  
 2 the role of the Government of Sudan in abet-  
 3 ting and tolerating the practice; and

4 (D) the Government of Sudan's use and  
 5 organization of "muraHalliin" or  
 6 "mujahadeen", Popular Defense Forces (PDF),  
 7 and regular Sudanese Army units into orga-  
 8 nized and coordinated raiding and slaving par-  
 9 ties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains,  
 10 Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and

11 (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on  
 12 air transport relief flights by the Government of  
 13 Sudan, the use of raiding and slaving parties is a  
 14 tool for creating food shortages and is used as a sys-  
 15 tematic means to destroy the societies, culture, and  
 16 economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba peoples in  
 17 a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

18 **SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED**

19 **PEACE PROCESS.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress hereby recognizes that—

21 (1) a single viable, internationally and region-  
 22 ally sanctioned peace process holds the greatest op-  
 23 portunity to promote a negotiated, peaceful settle-  
 24 ment to the war in Sudan; and

1           (2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best  
 2           made through a peace process based on the Declara-  
 3           tion of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July  
 4           20, 1994.

5           (b) UNITED STATES DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT.—The  
 6           Secretary of State is authorized to utilize the personnel  
 7           of the Department of State for the support of—

8           (1) the ongoing negotiations between the Gov-  
 9           ernment of Sudan and opposition forces;

10          (2) any necessary peace settlement planning or  
 11          implementation; and

12          (3) other United States diplomatic efforts sup-  
 13          porting a peace process in Sudan.

14   **SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.**

15          It is the sense of Congress that—

16          (1) the United Nations should be used as a tool  
 17          to facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and

18          (2) the President, acting through the United  
 19          States Permanent Representative to the United Na-  
 20          tions, should seek to—

21                (A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline  
 22                Sudan to end the veto power of the Government  
 23                of Sudan over the plans by Operation Lifeline  
 24                Sudan for air transport of relief flights and, by  
 25                doing so, to end the manipulation of the deliv-



1           ery of those relief supplies to the advantage of  
2           the Government of Sudan on the battlefield;

3                 (B) investigate the practice of slavery in  
4           Sudan and provide mechanisms for its elimi-  
5           nation; and

6                 (C) sponsor a condemnation of the Govern-  
7           ment of Sudan each time it subjects civilians to  
8           aerial bombardment.

9   **SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.**

10       Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961  
11   (22 U.S.C. 2151n) is amended by adding at the end the  
12   following:

13       “(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections  
14   (d) and (f), the report required by subsection (d) shall  
15   include—

16               “(1) a description of the sources and current  
17       status of Sudan’s financing and construction of oil  
18       exploitation infrastructure and pipelines, the effects  
19       on the inhabitants of the oil fields regions of such  
20       financing and construction, and the Government of  
21       Sudan’s ability to finance the war in Sudan;

22               “(2) a description of the extent to which that  
23       financing was secured in the United States or with  
24       involvement of United States citizens;

1           “(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial  
2       bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in  
3       areas outside its control, including targets, fre-  
4       quency, and best estimates of damage; and

5           “(4) a description of the extent to which hu-  
6       manitarian relief has been obstructed or manipu-  
7       lated by the Government of Sudan or other forces  
8       for the purposes of the war in Sudan.”.

9       **SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR**  
10           **RELIEF EFFORTS.**

11       (a) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
12       gress that the President should continue to increase the  
13       use of non-OLS agencies in the distribution of relief sup-  
14       plies in southern Sudan.

15       (b) REPORT.—Not later than 90 days after the date  
16       of enactment of this Act, the President shall submit a de-  
17       tailed report to Congress describing the progress made to-  
18       ward carrying out subsection (a).

19       **SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANS-**  
20           **PORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.**

21       (a) PLAN.—The President shall develop a contin-  
22       gency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices if  
23       necessary, the greatest possible amount of United States  
24       Government and privately donated relief to all affected  
25       areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains, Upper

1 Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan  
2 imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air  
3 transport relief flights.

4 (b) REPROGRAMMING AUTHORITY.—Notwith-  
5 standing any other provision of law, in carrying out the  
6 plan developed under subsection (a), the President may  
7 reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for  
8 support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for  
9 the purposes of the plan.

10 **SEC. 10. HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE FOR EXCLUSIONARY**

11 **“NO GO” AREAS OF SUDAN.**

12 (a) PILOT PROJECT ACTIVITIES.—The President,  
13 acting through the United States Agency for International  
14 Development, is authorized and requested to undertake,  
15 immediately, pilot project activities to provide food and  
16 other humanitarian assistance, as appropriate, to vulner-  
17 able populations in Sudan that are residing in exclusionary  
18 “no go” areas of Sudan.

19 (b) STUDY.—The President, acting through the  
20 United States Agency for International Development, shall  
21 conduct a study examining the adverse impact upon indig-  
22 enous Sudan communities by OLS policies that curtail di-  
23 rect humanitarian assistance to exclusionary “no go”  
24 areas of Sudan.

1       (c) EXCLUSIONARY “NO GO” AREAS OF SUDAN DE-  
2 FINED.—In this section, the term “exclusionary ‘no go’  
3 areas of Sudan” means areas of Sudan designated by OLS  
4 for curtailment of direct humanitarian assistance, includ-  
5 ing, but not limited to, the Nuba Mountains, the Upper  
6 Nile, and the Blue Nile

Passed the Senate July 19, 2001.

Attest:

JERI THOMSON,

*Secretary.*