[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 180 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
107th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 180
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 25, 2001
Mr. Frist (for himself, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Brownback, Mr. Lieberman, Mr.
DeWine, Mr. Santorum, Mr. Cleland, and Mr. Sessions) introduced the
following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on
Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the
war in Sudan.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Government of Sudan has intensified its prosecution
of the war against areas outside of its control, which has
already cost more than 2,000,000 lives and has displaced more
than 4,000,000.
(2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored
peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best
chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of
human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
(3) Continued strengthening and reform of humanitarian
relief operations in Sudan is an essential element in the
effort to bring an end to the war.
(4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
(5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas
of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the
absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major
impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people
and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
(6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among
peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of
Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to
subjugate their population, and internationally sponsored
reconciliation efforts have played a critical role in reducing
the tactic's effectiveness and human suffering.
(7) The Government of Sudan is utilizing and organizing
militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other irregular units for
raiding and slaving parties in areas outside of the control of
the Government of Sudan in an effort to severely disrupt the
ability of those populations to sustain themselves. The tactic
is in addition to the overt use of bans on air transport relief
flights in prosecuting the war through selective starvation and
to minimize the Government of Sudan's accountability
internationally.
(8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it
intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to
increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas
outside its control.
(9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport
flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation
Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to
manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from
the United States and other donor countries as a devastating
weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan
to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
(10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in
delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have
played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS
and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food
donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
(11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan
facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the
population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the
Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption
of their ability to sustain themselves.
(12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely
from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their
populations at increased risk of famine.
(13) At a cost which has sometimes exceeded $1,000,000 per
day, and with a primary focus on providing only for the
immediate food needs of the recipients, the current
international relief operations are neither sustainable nor
desirable in the long term.
(14) The ability of populations to defend themselves
against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's
control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of
the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within
officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the
battlefield can be achieved.
(15) The United States should use all means of pressure
available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war in
Sudan, including--
(A) the multilateralization of economic and
diplomatic tools to compel the Government of Sudan to
enter into a good faith peace process;
(B) the support or creation of viable democratic
civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan
outside government control;
(C) continued active support of people-to-people
reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside
of government control;
(D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide
humanitarian relief to those areas; and
(E) cooperation among the trading partners of the
United States and within multilateral institutions
toward those ends.
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan''
means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
(2) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief
operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and
participating relief organizations known as ``Operation
Lifeline Sudan''.
SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND TACTICS
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.
Congress hereby--
(1) condemns--
(A) violations of human rights on all sides of the
conflict in Sudan;
(B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights
record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war
and the denial of basic human and political rights to
all Sudanese;
(C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role
of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating
the practice; and
(D) the Government of Sudan's use and organization
of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', Popular Defense
Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army units into
organized and coordinated raiding and slaving parties
in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, Upper Nile, and
Blue Nile regions; and
(2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air
transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of
raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food
shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the
societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba
peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.
SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONALLY SANCTIONED PEACE PROCESS.
(a) Findings.--Congress hereby recognizes that--
(1) a single viable, internationally and regionally
sanctioned peace process holds the greatest opportunity to
promote a negotiated, peaceful settlement to the war in Sudan;
and
(2) resolution to the conflict in Sudan is best made
through a peace process based on the Declaration of Principles
reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994.
(b) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the
support of--
(1) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of
Sudan and opposition forces;
(2) any necessary peace settlement planning or
implementation; and
(3) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a
peace process in Sudan.
SEC. 6. MULTILATERAL PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the United Nations should be used as a tool to
facilitating peace and recovery in Sudan; and
(2) the President, acting through the United States
Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should seek
to--
(A) revise the terms of Operation Lifeline Sudan to
end the veto power of the Government of Sudan over the
plans by Operation Lifeline Sudan for air transport of
relief flights and, by doing so, to end the
manipulation of the delivery of those relief supplies
to the advantage of the Government of Sudan on the
battlefield;
(B) investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan
and provide mechanisms for its elimination; and
(C) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of
Sudan each time it subjects civilians to aerial
bombardment.
SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.
Section 116 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 U.S.C. 2151n)
is amended by adding at the end the following:
``(g) In addition to the requirements of subsections (d) and (f),
the report required by subsection (d) shall include--
``(1) a description of the sources and current status of
Sudan's financing and construction of oil exploitation
infrastructure and pipelines, the effects on the inhabitants of
the oil fields regions of such financing and construction, and
the Government of Sudan's ability to finance the war in Sudan;
``(2) a description of the extent to which that financing
was secured in the United States or with involvement of United
States citizens;
``(3) the best estimates of the extent of aerial
bombardment by the Government of Sudan forces in areas outside
its control, including targets, frequency, and best estimates
of damage; and
``(4) a description of the extent to which humanitarian
relief has been obstructed or manipulated by the Government of
Sudan or other forces for the purposes of the war in Sudan.''.
SEC. 8. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.
(a) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
(b) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (a).
SEC. 9. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.
(a) Plan.--The President shall develop a contingency plan to
provide, outside United Nations auspices if necessary, the greatest
possible amount of United States Government and privately donated
relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba Mountains,
Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of Sudan imposes
a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport relief
flights.
(b) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of
the plan.
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