[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1565 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
107th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. 1565
Relating to United States adherence to the ABM Treaty.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
October, 18, 2001
Mrs. Feinstein (for herself, Mr. Wyden, Mr. Feingold, Mr. Corzine, Mr.
Harkin, and Mr. Leahy) introduced the following bill; which was read
twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
Relating to United States adherence to the ABM Treaty.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. FINDINGS.
The Senate makes the following findings:
(1) On May 26, 1972, President Nixon and General Secretary
Brezhnev signed the Treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation
of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. The ABM Treaty was ratified
by the Senate on August 3, 1972, by a vote of 88-2, and entered
into force on October 3, 1972.
(2) The ABM Treaty sought to end an emerging competition in
defensive systems between the United States and the Soviet
Union that threatened to spur an offensive nuclear arms race,
and to create more favorable conditions to further limit
strategic nuclear weapons.
(3) The ABM Treaty was designed to address the major threat
to the United States at that time, the threat of a nuclear arms
race with the Soviet Union, and did not contemplate the
potential emergence of other strategic missile threats.
(4) The ABM Treaty remains important to arms control,
nuclear nonproliferation, and United States national security
because it promotes strategic stability, facilitates reductions
in offensive nuclear weapons, and encourages movement toward
more secure and stable nuclear alert postures.
(5) The ABM Treaty is of unlimited duration, but each party
to the treaty has the right to withdraw on six months notice if
the party decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized by
``extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this
Treaty''.
(6) The mid-course hit-to-kill national missile defense
system is currently in the early stages of research and
development. The fourth research and development intercept test
of the system was conducted on July 14, 2001. A total of
twenty-one developmental intercept tests are planned, and
subsequent operational testing of the system is not scheduled
to begin until fiscal year 2005.
(7) On July 12, 2001, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld stated
that ``[t]he United States is not going to violate the [ABM]
Treaty. If we get to the point where we need to get beyond the
treaty and we haven't been able to negotiate something,
obviously, there's a provision you can withdraw in six months
and that's what you'd have to do.''.
(8) Unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM Treaty
by the United States will have profound implications for global
security and stability and for United States national security
interests, and is viewed with apprehension by United States
allies as well as other states.
(9) While unilateral abrogation or withdrawal from the ABM
Treaty would have negative consequences for United States
security, negotiated modest modifications of the Treaty could
preserve the essential effectiveness of the Treaty with respect
to Russia, and allow the United States to address threats that
have emerged since the ABM Treaty was drafted in 1972.
(10) At their July 22, 2001 meeting in Geneva, Presidents
Bush and Putin agreed ``that major changes in the world require
concrete discussion of both offensive and defensive systems. We
already have some strong and tangible points of agreement. We
will shortly begin intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.''.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF SENATE ON UNITED STATES ADHERENCE TO THE ABM TREATY.
It is the sense of the Senate that--
(1) all research, development, test, and evaluation
programs and activities of the United States for missile
defense purposes should remain consistent with United States
commitments to and obligations under the ABM Treaty;
(2) the United States should pursue good faith
consultations with Russia to address such modest modifications
of the ABM Treaty as may be necessary to address threats which
have emerged since the Treaty was signed and lead to an
agreement on appropriate limits on strategic nuclear offensive
and defensive systems that is in the national security interest
of the United States;
(3) the United States should not unilaterally abrogate or
withdraw from the ABM Treaty; and
(4) the United States should not deploy a national missile
defense system until--
(A) operational tests of a fully integrated version
of the system have been conducted utilizing realistic
test parameters; and
(B) the operational tests have demonstrated, in a
manner consistent with the provisions of section 2399
of title 10, United States Code, that the system,
whether part of a fully integrated system or an
emergency deployment, is operationally effective and
suitable for use in combat.
SEC. 3. LIMITATION ON USE OF FUNDS FOR MISSILE DEFENSE PROGRAMS AND
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Limitation on Use To Abrogate ABM Treaty.--Notwithstanding any
other provision of law, no funds may be obligated or expended for any
test, evaluation, or deployment of a National Missile Defense system,
or any program or activity relating to a National Missile Defense
system, that would result in the abrogation of or withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty.
(b) Limitation on Use Inconsistent With Future Agreements.--
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, if an agreement with Russia
to amend the ABM Treaty, or an agreement with Russia governing
strategic nuclear offensive and defensive systems, comes into force
after the date of the enactment of this Act, no funds may be obligated
or expended after the date such agreement comes into force for any
test, evaluation, or deployment of a National Missile Defense system,
or any program or activity relating to a National Missile Defense
system, that would by inconsistent with such agreement.
(c) Scope of Limitation.--For purposes of this section, a test,
evaluation, or deployment of a system shall include any construction
required to carry out the test, evaluation, or deployment of the
system.
SEC. 4. REPORTS ON DECISIONS RELATING TO DEPLOYMENT OF A NATIONAL
MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEM.
(a) Report by Secretary of State Before Decisions.--Not later than
120 days before any decision by the President described in subsection
(c), the Secretary of State shall submit to Congress a report, in
writing, containing the following:
(1) A description of the specific national security threat
that justifies such decision.
(2) An assessment of the extent to which testing not
compliant with the ABM Treaty, and the deployment of an
integrated missile defense system or emergency capability using
test assets, will enhance overall United States national
security, which assessment shall take into account--
(A) the likelihood of the missile threat that the
testing or deployment, as the case may be, is designed
to counter;
(B) the impact of the testing or deployment, as the
case may be, on United States relations with our
allies, and with Russia and China; and
(C) the impact of the testing or deployment, as the
case may be, on existing nuclear arms control
agreements, nuclear risk reduction objectives, and
United States nonproliferation goals and treaty
commitments.
(b) Certification by Secretary of Defense Before Decisions.--(1)
Not later than 120 days before a decision by the President described in
subsection (c)(1), the Secretary of Defense shall certify to Congress,
in writing, that--
(A) operational tests of a fully integrated version of the
missile system or emergency capability concerned have been
conducted utilizing realistic test parameters, including
countermeasures and decoys; and
(B) such operational tests have demonstrated, in a manner
consistent with the provisions of section 2399 of title 10,
United States Code, that the missile system or emergency
capability, as the case may be, whether part of a fully
integrated system or an emergency deployment, is operationally
effective and suitable for use in combat.
(2) A certification under this subsection shall be submitted in
both classified and unclassified form.
(c) Covered Decisions.--The decisions described in this subsection
are as follows:
(1) A decision to deploy a missile system designated to
defend the territory of the United States against ballistic
missile attack, including the deployment of an emergency
capability utilizing missile defense assets.
(2) A decision to notify Russia of the intention of the
United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
SEC. 5. ANNUAL ASSESSMENTS ON THREAT OF ATTACK ON THE UNITED STATES
USING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.
Not later than six months after the date of the enactment of this
Act, and annually thereafter, the President shall submit to Congress a
report containing the following:
(1) An assessment, current as of the date of such report,
of the threat posed to the United States and its allies by the
use of a weapon of mass destruction by both foreign states and
transnational groups, including--
(A) an assessment of the scope and nature of the
threat of delivery of such a weapon of mass destruction
by a variety of means of delivery; and
(B) a comparison of the threat posed by delivery of
such a weapon of mass destruction by ballistic missile
with the threat posed by delivery of such a weapon of
mass destruction by another delivery system, whether
conventional or unconventional, including by cruise
missile, truck, suitcase, boat, or airplane.
(2) The total estimated cost, current as of the fiscal year
ending in the year preceding the year in which such report is
submitted, of all research, development, test, and evaluation,
deployment, and operation and maintenance activities with
respect to the national missile defense system during the
period beginning on January 1, 2002, and ending on December 31,
2020.
(3) A determination whether or not, during the fiscal year
in which such report is submitted, the allocation of funds for
the national missile defense system will impair the allocation
of funds for priority programs of the Department of Defense (as
determined by the Secretary of Defense), including programs
relating to force structure, force readiness, force training,
force modernization, homeland defense, and research,
development, test, and evaluation.
SEC. 6. ABM TREATY DEFINED.
In this Act, the term ``ABM Treaty'' means the Treaty Between the
United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, signed at Moscow on
May 26, 1972, and includes the Protocol to that treaty, signed at
Moscow on July 3, 1974.
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