

107TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 938

To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

MARCH 8, 2001

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. HOUGHTON, Mr. LEWIS of Georgia, Ms. PELOSI, Mr. FRANK, and Ms. MILLENDER-MCDONALD) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on International Relations

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## A BILL

To enhance the capability of the United Nations to rapidly respond to emerging crises.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “United Nations Rapid  
5 Deployment Act of 2001”.

6 **SEC. 2. FINDINGS.**

7 The Congress finds the following:

8 (1) The December 1999 United Nations “Re-  
9 port on the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of

1 the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in  
2 Rwanda” indicates that in April 1994, the United  
3 Nations Security Council failed to deploy 5,500  
4 United Nations peacekeepers to Rwanda within two  
5 weeks of the initial violence, thereby allowing the  
6 conflict to escalate. The six-month estimated cost of  
7 the deployment would have been \$115,000,000. In-  
8 stead, the genocide consumed 800,000 lives along  
9 with \$2,000,000,000 in humanitarian aid.

10 (2) The April 2000 report of the United Na-  
11 tions Secretary General, “We the Peoples, The Role  
12 of the United Nations in the 21st Century”, states  
13 that only member nations of the United Nations can  
14 fix the structural weakness of United Nations peace  
15 operations. The report compares the current system  
16 for launching peacekeeping operations to a volunteer  
17 fire department that has to find fire engines and the  
18 funds to run them before starting to douse any  
19 flames. The present United Nations system relies al-  
20 most entirely on last minute, ad hoc arrangements  
21 that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision  
22 of civilian personnel even more so than military per-  
23 sonnel. Availability and readiness of forces is very  
24 unpredictable and constraints on resources preclude  
25 rapid deployment.

1           (3) In August 2000, the specially-appointed  
2 panel on United Nations Peace Operations issued its  
3 findings. Known as the “Brahimi Report” (A/55/  
4 305; S/2000/809), the report concludes that “few of  
5 the basic building blocks are in place for the United  
6 Nations to rapidly acquire and deploy the human  
7 and material resources required to mount any com-  
8 plex peace operation in the future”. These building  
9 blocks include a standing police corps, a reserve  
10 corps of mission leadership, a sufficient stockpile of  
11 equipment, and arrangements for recruitment of ci-  
12 vilian personnel. Furthermore, the report encourages  
13 member nations to enter partnerships with one an-  
14 other in the context of the United Nations Stand-by  
15 Arrangements System (UNSAS). These partnerships  
16 would form the basis for Rapid Deployment Bri-  
17 gades (RDBs), which would develop the operational  
18 capabilities to fully deploy “traditional” peace-  
19 keeping operations within 30 days of the adoption of  
20 an authorizing Security Council resolution and to  
21 fully deploy “complex” peacekeeping operations  
22 within 90 days of the adoption of an authorizing Se-  
23 curity Council resolution.

24           (4) Former United States Ambassador Richard  
25 C. Holbrooke, speaking before the United Nations

1 Security Council on November 15, 2000, stated that  
2 “[u]nless we move decisively on meaningful peace-  
3 keeping reform, those that threaten peacekeepers  
4 across the globe may draw the conclusion that the  
5 UN lacks the will, the cohesion and even the capa-  
6 bility to perform its essential peacekeeping func-  
7 tion”.

8 (5) Both the nations of Europe and the United  
9 States have recognized the value and need for rap-  
10 idly deployable combat units in response to a full  
11 spectrum of contingencies, including peacekeeping  
12 and humanitarian operations, low-intensity conflicts,  
13 and full-scale warfare. The European Union has pro-  
14 posed forming a standing police force and rapid de-  
15 ployment brigades as part of the European Defense  
16 Force, and in the United States, the Department of  
17 Defense is establishing interim brigade combat  
18 teams as part of the overall Army transformation  
19 strategy.

20 (6) The United States’ veto power in the  
21 United Nations Security Council gives it the capac-  
22 ity to halt the deployment of United Nations forces  
23 if the deployment is not in the national interests of  
24 the United States.

1 **SEC. 3. ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED NATIONS RAPID DE-**  
2 **PLOYMENT POLICE AND SECURITY FORCE.**

3 (a) ESTABLISHMENT.—The President shall direct the  
4 United States representative to the United Nations to use  
5 the voice, vote, and influence of the United States to urge  
6 the United Nations—

7 (1) to establish a United Nations Rapid Deploy-  
8 ment Police and Security Force (UNRDPSF) that—

9 (A) is rapidly deployable under the author-  
10 ity of the United Nations Security Council;

11 (B) should be able to deploy within 15  
12 days of a United Nations Security Council reso-  
13 lution to establish international peace oper-  
14 ations;

15 (C) is limited to a maximum deployment of  
16 six months for any given mission;

17 (D) should be deployed only when the  
18 United Nations Security Council determines  
19 that violations of human rights, breaches of the  
20 peace, or the failure to restore the rule of law,  
21 requires rapid response to ensure adherence to  
22 negotiated agreements to prevent or end hos-  
23 tilities;

24 (E) should be composed of at least 6,000  
25 volunteers who train together and are appro-



1 to encourage the member nations of the United Na-  
2 tions to enter into partnerships with one another, in  
3 the context of the United Nations Stand-by Arrange-  
4 ments System (UNSAS), to form the basis for  
5 Rapid Deployment Brigades, which would develop  
6 the operational capabilities to fully deploy “tradi-  
7 tional” peacekeeping operations within 30 days of  
8 the adoption of a Security Council resolution and  
9 “complex” peacekeeping operations within 90 days  
10 of the adoption of a Security Council resolution; and

11 (2) shall direct the Secretary of Defense to un-  
12 dertake a study, not later than six months after the  
13 date of the enactment of this Act, to determine the  
14 advisability of and the feasibility of using interim  
15 combat brigade teams as part of Rapid Deployment  
16 Brigades as described in paragraph (1).

17 **SEC. 5. REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS RAPID DEPLOYMENT.**

18 Not later than one year after the date of enactment  
19 of this Act, the President shall prepare and transmit to  
20 the Congress a report on—

21 (1) the status of negotiations to establish a  
22 United Nations Rapid Deployment Police and Secu-  
23 rity Force (UNRDPSF) in accordance with section  
24 3;

1           (2) the status of United States activities to en-  
2 encourage member nations of the United Nations to  
3 establish Rapid Deployment Brigades in accordance  
4 with section 4(1); and

5           (3) the results of the study conducted under  
6 section 4(2).

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