[Congressional Bills 107th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 3198 Introduced in House (IH)]







107th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 3198

   To respond to the vulnerability of the United States agricultural 
     production and food supply system to international terrorism.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            October 31, 2001

Mr. Putnam of Florida introduced the following bill; which was referred 
                    to the Committee on Agriculture

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL


 
   To respond to the vulnerability of the United States agricultural 
     production and food supply system to international terrorism.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Agricultural Terrorism Prevention 
and Response Act of 2001''.

SEC. 2. ENHANCED SECURITY FOR UNITED STATES AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND 
              FOOD SUPPLY SYSTEM.

    (a) Findings.--Congress finds the following:
            (1) The agricultural production sector of the United States 
        economy accounts for approximately 13 percent of the United 
        States gross national product.
            (2) The strength, importance, and value of the United 
        States agricultural production and food supply system increases 
        the possibility that the system could become a target for 
        international terrorism, particularly a terrorism incident 
        specifically targeted to key animal or plant commodities used 
        in the production of food.
            (3) Targeted terrorism activities could include the 
        deliberate introduction of chemical or biological agents that 
        would be harmful or infectious to crops or livestock and could 
        disrupt the processing and distribution of food products.
            (4) A successful terrorist attack against the United States 
        agricultural sector involving the release of a contagious agent 
        against crops or livestock could damage public confidence in 
        the safety of the United States food supply.
            (5) The United States agricultural sector is particularly 
        susceptible to a foreign crop or livestock disease, against 
        which domestic animals and plants do not have a natural 
        resistance. With crops and animals concentrated in fewer 
        production facilities, and with the frequent transport among 
        these facilities, a single pathogen introduction could cause 
        widespread infection.
            (6) Terrorism threats to the agricultural production and 
        food supply system need to receive the same level of priority 
        as other terrorism threats, and should be treated in a highly 
        coordinated and integrated manner.
            (7) An awareness of the terrorism threat against the United 
        States agricultural sector has increased within the 
        intelligence and counterterrorism agencies of the Federal 
        Government, and efforts must be undertaken to position the 
        agricultural sector to anticipate and defend against such a 
        threat.
            (8) The internal and external agency structures of the 
        Department of Agriculture must be strengthened to enable to the 
        United States agricultural sector to fully realize its 
        strengths and vulnerabilities in the face of international 
        terrorism.
            (9) The Department of Agriculture is a critical component 
        of the collaborative infrastructure needed to deal with 
        terrorism threats to the United States agricultural production 
        and food supply system.
    (b) Interagency Agricultural Terrorism Committee.--(1) The 
President shall establish an Interagency Agricultural Terrorism 
Committee to coordinate the counterterrorism effort for the protection 
of the United States agricultural production and food supply system. 
Greater coordination between Federal and State government agencies is 
necessary to effectively address potential terrorism threats against 
the system. Primary agencies of concern include--
            (A) The Department of Agriculture, in particular the Animal 
        and Plant Health Inspection Service of the Department of 
        Agriculture.
            (B) The United States Customs Service.
            (C) The Food and Drug Administration.
            (D) State departments of agriculture.
    (2) The responsibilities of the Interagency Agricultural Terrorism 
Committee shall include--
            (A) preparing a plan defining the role of each agency in 
        safeguarding agricultural production, processing and marketing 
        systems;
            (B) improving domestic crisis planning and management 
        criteria;
            (C) safeguarding critical infrastructures in agricultural 
        production and food supply system; and
            (D) supporting research efforts to enhance counterterrorism 
        capabilities related to the agricultural production and food 
        supply system.
    (c) Department of Agriculture Cooperation With Other Agencies.--The 
Secretary of Agriculture shall continue and strengthen cooperation with 
the National Security Council, the Department of Justice, and other 
departments and agencies with responsibilities under Presidential 
Decision Directive 62 concerning the role of the Department of 
Agriculture in counterterrorism programs of the Federal Government. The 
Secretary of Agriculture shall engage in active partnership with the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Preparedness Group of the National Security 
Council focusing on the role of the Department of Agriculture regarding 
food and agricultural protection issues.
    (d) Department of Agriculture Counterterrorism Policy Council.--The 
Department of Agriculture Counterterrorism Policy Council, established 
in 1999 and chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Agriculture, shall 
continue to serve as the Department of Agriculture's senior policy 
forum for coordinating and leveraging departmental-wide support 
regarding terrorism issues. The Secretary of Agriculture shall appoint 
an agricultural liaison on terrorism to report to the Homeland Security 
Office and serve as a liaison on all agricultural matters involving 
security and agricultural terrorism threats.
    (e) Agricultural Industry Involvement.--The Secretary of 
Agriculture shall establish an Industry Working Group on Agricultural 
Terrorism comprised of agricultural producer, processing, distribution, 
and retail organizations to serve in a consultative manner with the 
Department of Agriculture to develop measures to counteract terrorist 
threats against the agricultural production and food supply system. The 
Secretary shall also establish training and information programs for 
agricultural producers to counter the threat of pests and disease at 
the farm level and to convey counterterrorism information to 
agricultural producers.
    (f) Increased Surveillance, Detection and Interdiction.--Greater 
financial and staff resources should be dedicated at the State and 
Federal Government levels for the detection and interdiction of 
agricultural terrorism threats. Critical among these priorities are 
increasing the number of inspectors and detection devices at ports of 
entry for the interception of prohibited and damaging agricultural 
products or agriculturally related products.
    (g) Diagnostic Facilities.--To improve the capability of Federal 
diagnostic facilities to accurately and efficiently identify diseases 
and substances that are hazardous to plants and animals used in food 
production, the Secretary of Agriculture shall establish a Biosafety 
Level 4 facility within the Department of Agriculture at the Plum 
Island Diagnostic Laboratory, to create the diagnostic tests and 
vaccines needed to protect the United States swine industry from acts 
of biological terrorism and disease, such as the Nipah virus. The 
Biosafety Level 4 facility shall be designed to prevent contact between 
microorganisms and personnel as well as escape into the environment. A 
database shall be established to link animal and human disease 
information systems.
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