[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 211 Introduced in Senate (IS)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 211

    Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February 2000 
 deployment of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine 
    Expeditionary Unit to an area of potential hostilities and the 
  essential requirements that the battle group and expeditionary unit 
have received the essential training needed to certify the warfighting 
proficiency of the forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary 
                                 unit.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 29, 1999

     Mr. Warner (for himself and Mr. Robb) submitted the following 
   resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Armed Services

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
    Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding the February 2000 
 deployment of the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine 
    Expeditionary Unit to an area of potential hostilities and the 
  essential requirements that the battle group and expeditionary unit 
have received the essential training needed to certify the warfighting 
proficiency of the forces comprising the battle group and expeditionary 
                                 unit.

Whereas the President, as Commander-in-Chief of all of the Armed Forces of the 
        United States, makes the final decision to order a deployment of those 
        forces into harm's way;
Whereas the President, in making that decision, relies upon the recommendations 
        of the civilian and military leaders tasked by law with the 
        responsibility of training those forces, including the Commander of the 
        Second Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the 
        Atlantic;
Whereas the Atlantic Fleet Weapons Training Facility has been since World War 
        II, and continues to be, an essential part of the training 
        infrastructure that is necessary to ensure that maritime forces 
        deploying from the east coast of the United States are prepared and 
        ready to execute their assigned missions;
Whereas, according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
        Staff, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine 
        Corps, the Island of Vieques is a vital part of the Atlantic Fleet 
        Weapons Training Facility and makes an essential contribution to the 
        national security of the United States by providing integrated live-fire 
        combined arms training opportunities to Navy and Marine Corps forces 
        deploying from the east coast of the United States;
Whereas, according to testimony before the Committee on Armed Services of the 
        Senate and the report of the Special Panel on Military Operations on 
        Vieques, a suitable alternative to Vieques cannot now be identified;
Whereas, during the course of its hearings on September 22 and October 19, 1999, 
        the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate acknowledged and expressed 
        its sympathy for the tragic death and injuries that resulted from the 
        training accident that occurred at Vieques in April 1999;
Whereas the Navy has failed to take those actions necessary to develop sound 
        relations with the people of Puerto Rico;
Whereas the Navy should implement fully the terms of the 1983 Memorandum of 
        Understanding between the Navy and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico 
        regarding Vieques and work to increase its efforts to improve the 
        economic conditions for and the safety of the people on Vieques;
Whereas in February 2000, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine 
        Expeditionary Unit are scheduled to deploy to the Mediterranean Sea and 
        the Persian Gulf where the battle group and expeditionary unit will face 
        the possibility of combat, as experienced by predecessor deploying 
        units, during operations over Iraq and during other unexpected 
        contingencies;
Whereas in a September 22, 1999, letter to the Committee on Armed Services of 
        the Senate, the President stated that the rigorous, realistic training 
        undergone by military forces ``is essential for success in combat and 
        for protecting our national security'';
Whereas in that letter the President also stated that he would not permit Navy 
        or Marine Corps forces to deploy ``unless they are at a satisfactory 
        level of combat readiness'';
Whereas Richard Danzig, the Secretary of the Navy, recently testified before the 
        Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that ``only by providing this 
        preparation can we fairly ask our service members to put their lives at 
        risk'';
Whereas according to the testimony of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
        the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, 
        Vieques provides integrated live-fire training ``critical to our 
        readiness'', and the failure to provide for adequate live-fire training 
        for our naval forces before deployment will place those forces at 
        unacceptably high risk during deployment;
Whereas Admiral Johnson, the Chief of Naval Operations, and General Jones, the 
        Commandant of the Marine Corps, recently testified before the Committee 
        on Armed Services of the Senate that without the ability to train on 
        Vieques, the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group and the 24th Marine 
        Expeditionary Unit scheduled for deployment in February 2000 would not 
        be ready for such deployment ``without greatly increasing the risk to 
        those men and women who we ask to go in harm's way'';
Whereas Vice Admiral Murphy, Commander of the Sixth Fleet of the Navy, recently 
        testified before the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate that the 
        loss of training on Vieques would ``cost American lives''; and
Whereas the Navy is currently prevented as a consequence of unrestrained civil 
        disobedience from using the training facilities on Vieques which are 
        required to accomplish the training necessary to achieve a satisfactory 
        level of combat readiness: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the Senate that the President 
should not deploy the U.S.S. Eisenhower Battle Group or the 24th Marine 
Expeditionary Unit until--
            (1) the President, in consultation with the Secretary of 
        Defense, the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval 
        Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps, reviews the 
        certifications regarding the readiness of the battle group and 
        the expeditionary unit made by the Commander of the Second 
        Fleet of the Navy and the Commander of the Marine Forces in the 
        Atlantic, as the case may be; and
            (2) the President determines and so notifies Congress that 
        the battle group and the expeditionary unit are free of serious 
        deficiencies in major warfare areas.
                                 <all>