[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 208 Agreed to Senate (ATS)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
S. RES. 208

   Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy 
 toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, 
    in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the 
               European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.


_______________________________________________________________________


                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                            October 28, 1999

 Mr. Roth (for himself, Mr. Lugar, Mr. Biden, Mr. Kyl, Mr. Hagel, Mr. 
Smith of Oregon, Mr. Lieberman, and Mr. Helms) submitted the following 
  resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations

                            November 3, 1999

                Reported by Mr. Helms, without amendment

                            November 8, 1999

                   Considered, amended, and agreed to

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
   Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy 
 toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the European Union, 
    in light of the Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the 
               European Union's June 1999 Cologne Summit.

Whereas NATO is the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities 
        and a transatlantic membership;
Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic 
        perspective and approach to issues concerning the security of North 
        America and Europe;
Whereas NATO's military force structure, defense planning, command structures, 
        and force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of 
        its members, capable of projecting power when the security of a NATO 
        member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of 
        willing partners among NATO members to defend common values and 
        interests;
Whereas these requirements dictate that European NATO members possess national 
        military capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, 
        sustain operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly 
        with the United States in high-intensity conflicts;
Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
        (Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted (1) the significant 
        shortcomings of European allies in command, control, communication, and 
        intelligence resources; combat aircraft; precision-guided munitions; 
        airlift; deployability; and logistics; and (2) the overall imbalance 
        between United States and European defense capabilities;
Whereas this imbalance in United States and European NATO defense capabilities 
        undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;
Whereas NATO has undertaken great efforts to facilitate the emergence of a 
        stronger European pillar within NATO through the European Security and 
        Defense Identity, including the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme 
        Allied Commander as the commander of operations led by the Western 
        European Union (WEU); the creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led 
        operations; and the establishment of close linkages between NATO and the 
        WEU, including planning, exercises, and regular consultations;
Whereas in promulgating NATO's Defense Capabilities Initiative Alliance members 
        committed themselves to improving their respective forces in five areas: 
        (1) effective engagement; (2) deployability and mobility; (3) 
        sustainability and logistics; (4) survivability; and (5) command, 
        control and communications.
Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne 
        Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western 
        European Union, including its command structures and military forces, 
        and established within it the post of High Representative for Common 
        Foreign and Security Policy; and
Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne Summit 
        indicate a new determination of its member states to develop a European 
        Security and Defense Identity with strengthened defense capabilities to 
        address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved,

SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.

    (a) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate--
            (1) believes NATO should remain the primary institution through 
        which European and North American allies address security issues of 
        transatlantic concern;
            (2) believes all NATO members should commit to improving their 
        respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project power 
        decisively with equitable burden-sharing;
            (3) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense Capabilities 
        Initiative, which is intended to improve the defense capabilities of the 
        European Allies, particularly the deployability, mobility, 
        sustainability, and interoperability of these European forces;
            (4) acknowledges the resolve of the European Union to have the 
        capacity for autonomous action so that it can take decisions and approve 
        military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged; and
            (5) calls upon the member states of NATO and the European Union to 
        promulgate together during their respective meetings, ministerials, and 
        summits in the course of 1999 principles that will strengthen the 
        transatlantic partnership, reinforce unity within NATO, and harmonize 
        their roles in transatlantic affairs.
    (b) Further Sense of the Senate.--It is further the sense of the Senate 
that--
            (1) on matters of trans-Atlantic concern, the European Union should 
        make clear that it would undertake an autonomous mission through the 
        European Security and Defense Identity only after the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization had declined to undertake that mission;
            (2) improved European military capabilities, not new institutions 
        outside of the Alliance, are the key to a vibrant and more influential 
        European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;
            (3) failure of the European allies of the United States to achieve 
        the goals established through the Defense Capabilities Initiative would 
        weaken support for the Alliance in the United States;
            (4) the President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of 
        Defense should fully use their offices to encourage the NATO allies of 
        the United States to commit the resources necessary to upgrade their 
        capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain 
        operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the 
        United States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective 
        partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;
            (5) the European Union should implement its Cologne Summit decisions 
        concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in a manner that will 
        ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including Canada, the Czech Republic, 
        Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey, and the United 
        States, will not be discriminated against, but will be fully involved 
        when the European Union addresses issues affecting their security 
        interests;
            (6) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne Summit 
        decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on transatlantic 
        security issues that conflicts with that promoted by the North Atlantic 
        Treaty Organization;
            (7) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit 
        decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of the resources 
        and capabilities provided by NATO; and
            (8) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne Summit 
        decisions should not promote a decline in the military resources that 
        European allies contribute to NATO, but should instead promote the 
        complete fulfillment of their respective force commitments to the 
        Alliance.
                                 <all>