[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. Res. 175 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. RES. 175
Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy
toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the
Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
August 5, 1999
Mr. Roth (for himself and Mr. Lugar) submitted the following
resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations
_______________________________________________________________________
RESOLUTION
Expressing the sense of the Senate regarding United States policy
toward the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, in light of the
Alliance's April 1999 Washington Summit and the conflict in Kosovo.
Whereas NATO, the only military alliance with both real defense capabilities and
a transatlantic membership, has successfully defended the territory and
interests of its members over the last 50 years, prevailed in the Cold
War, and continues to make a vital contribution to the promotion and
protection of freedom, democracy, stability, and peace throughout,
Europe;
Whereas NATO enhances the security of the United States by embedding European
states in a process of cooperative security planning, by preventing the
destabilizing renationalization of European military policies, and by
ensuring an ongoing and direct leadership role for the United States in
European security affairs;
Whereas the March 12, 1999, accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary
to NATO has strengthened the Alliance, and is an important step toward a
Europe that is truly whole, undivided, free, and at peace;
Whereas extending NATO membership to other qualified European democracies will
also strengthen NATO, enhance security and stability, deter potential
aggressors, and thereby advance the interests of the United States and
its NATO allies;
Whereas the enlargement of NATO, a defensive alliance, threatens no nation and
reinforces peace and stability in Europe, and provides benefits to all
nations;
Whereas article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty states that ``any other European
state in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to
contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area'' is eligible to
be granted NATO membership;
Whereas Congress has repeatedly endorsed the enlargement of NATO with bipartisan
majorities;
Whereas the selection of new members should depend on NATO's strategic
interests, potential threats to security and stability, and actions
taken by prospective members to complete the transition to democracy and
to harmonize policies with the political, economic, and military
guidelines established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement;
Whereas the members of NATO face new threats, including conflict in Europe
stemming from historic, ethnic, and religious enmities, the potential
for the reemergence of a hegemonic power confronting Europe, rogue
states and nonstate actors possessing weapons of mass destruction, and
threats to the wider interests of the NATO members (including the
disruption of the flow of vital resources);
Whereas NATO military force structure, defense planning, command structures, and
force goals must be sufficient for the collective self-defense of its
members, but also capable of projecting power when the security of a
NATO member is threatened, and provide a basis for ad hoc coalitions of
willing partners among NATO members;
Whereas this will require that NATO members possess national military
capabilities to rapidly deploy forces over long distances, sustain
operations for extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the
United States in high-intensity conflicts;
Whereas NATO's military operations against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(Serbia and Montenegro) in 1999 highlighted the glaring short-comings of
European allies in command, control, communication, and intelligence
resources; combat aircraft; and munitions, particularly precision-guided
munitions; and the overall imbalance between United States and European
defense capabilities;
Whereas this imbalance in United States and European defense capabilities
undercuts the Alliance's goal of equitable transatlantic burden-sharing;
Whereas NATO is the only institution that promotes a uniquely transatlantic
perspective and approach to issues concerning the interests and security
of North America and Europe;
Whereas NATO has undertaken great effort to facilitate the emergence of a
European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance, including
the identification of NATO's Deputy Supreme Allied Commander as the
commander of operations led by the Western European Union (WEU); the
creation of a NATO Headquarters for WEU-led operations; the
establishment of close linkages between NATO and the WEU, including
planning, exercises, and regular consultations; and a framework for the
release and return of Alliance assets and capabilities;
Whereas on June 3, 1999, the European Union, in the course of its Cologne
Summit, agreed to absorb the functions and structures of the Western
European Union, including its command structures and military forces,
and established within it the post of High Representative for Common
Foreign and Security Policy;
Whereas the member States of the European Union at the Cologne Summit pledged to
reinforce their capabilities in intelligence, strategic transport, and
command and control; and
Whereas the European Union's decisions at its June 3, 1999 Cologne summit
indicate a new determination of European states to develop a European
Security and Defense Identity featuring strengthened defense
capabilities to address regional conflicts and crisis management: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved,
SECTION 1. UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD NATO.
(a) Sense of the Senate.--The Senate--
(1) regards the political independence and territorial
integrity of the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern
Europe as vital to European peace and security and, thus, to
the interests of the United States;
(2) endorses the commitment of the North Atlantic Council
that NATO will remain open to the accession of further members
in accordance with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty;
(3) endorses the Alliance's decision to implement the
Membership Action Plan as a means to further enhance the
readiness of those European democracies seeking NATO membership
to bear the responsibilities and burdens of membership;
(4) believes all NATO members should commit to improving
their respective defense capabilities so that NATO can project
power decisively within and outside NATO borders in a manner
that achieves transatlantic parity in power projection
capabilities and facilitates equitable burdensharing among NATO
members; and
(5) endorses NATO's decision to launch the Defense
Capabilities Initiative, intended to improve the defense
capabilities of the European Allies, particularly the
deployability, mobility, sustainability, and interoperability
of these European forces.
(b) Further Sense of the Senate.--It is further the sense of the
Senate that--
(1) the North Atlantic Council should pace, not pause, the
process of NATO enlargement by extending an invitation of
membership to those states able to meet the guidelines
established by the 1995 NATO Study on Enlargement and should do
so on a country-by-country basis;
(2) the North Atlantic Council in the course of its
December 1999 Ministerial meeting should initiate a formal
review of all pending applications for NATO membership in order
to establish the degree to which such applications conform to
the guidelines for membership established by the 1995 NATO
Study on Enlargement;
(3) the results of this formal review should be presented
to the membership of the North Atlantic Council in May 2000
with recommendations concerning enlargement;
(4) NATO should assess potential applicants for NATO
membership on a continual basis;
(5) the President, the Secretary of State, and the
Secretary of Defense should fully use their offices to
encourage the NATO allies of the United States to commit the
resources necessary to upgrade their capabilities to rapidly
deploy forces over long distances, sustain operations for
extended periods of time, and operate jointly with the United
States in high-intensity conflicts, thus making them effective
partners of the United States in supporting mutual interests;
(6) improved European military capabilities, not new
institutions, are the key to a vibrant and more influential
European Security and Defense Identity within NATO;
(7) NATO should be the primary institution through which
European and North American allies address security issues of
transatlantic concern;
(8) the European Union must implement its Cologne Summit
decisions concerning its Common Foreign and Security Policy in
a manner that will ensure that non-WEU NATO allies, including
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Hungary, Iceland, Norway,
Poland, Turkey, and the United States, will not be
discriminated against, but will be fully involved when the
European Union addresses issues affecting their security
interests;
(9) the European Union's implementation of the Cologne
summit decisions should not promote a strategic perspective on
transatlantic security issues that conflicts with that promoted
by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
(10) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne
summit decisions should not promote unnecessary duplication of
the resources and capabilities provided by NATO; and
(11) the European Union's implementation of its Cologne
summit decisions should not promote a decline in the military
resources that European allies contribute to NATO, but should
instead promote the complete fulfillment of their respective
force commitments to the Alliance.
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