[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S.J. Res. 19 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
106th CONGRESS
1st Session
S. J. RES. 19
Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to
advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of
the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer
Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in
positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
April 15, 1999
Mr. Roth (for himself, Mr. Biden, Mr. Helms, Mr. Stevens, Mr. Specter,
Mr. Thurmond, Mr. Enzi, Mr. Cochran, Mr. Murkowski, Mr. Abraham, Mr.
Craig, Mr. Domenici, Mr. Durbin, Mr. Kennedy, Mr. Kerry, Mr. Kyl, Mr.
Hollings, Mr. Smith of New Hampshire, Ms. Collins, Ms. Landrieu, Mr.
Voinovich, and Mr. DeWine) introduced the following joint resolution;
which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
JOINT RESOLUTION
Requesting the President to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E.
Kimmel on the retired list of the Navy to the highest grade held as
Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, during World War II, and to
advance the late Major General Walter C. Short on the retired list of
the Army to the highest grade held as Commanding General, Hawaiian
Department, during World War II, as was done under the Officer
Personnel Act of 1947 for all other senior officers who served in
positions of command during World War II, and for other purposes.
Whereas Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, formerly the Commander in Chief of the
United States Fleet and the Commander in Chief, United States Pacific
Fleet, had an excellent and unassailable record throughout his career in
the United States Navy prior to the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl
Harbor;
Whereas Major General Walter C. Short, formerly the Commander of the United
States Army Hawaiian Department, had an excellent and unassailable
record throughout his career in the United States Army prior to the
December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor;
Whereas numerous investigations following the attack on Pearl Harbor have
documented that Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were not
provided necessary and critical intelligence that was available, that
foretold of war with Japan, that warned of imminent attack, and that
would have alerted them to prepare for the attack, including such
essential communiques as the Japanese Pearl Harbor Bomb Plot message of
September 24, 1941, and the message sent from the Imperial Japanese
Foreign Ministry to the Japanese Ambassador in the United States from
December 6-7, 1941, known as the Fourteen-Part Message;
Whereas on December 16, 1941, Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short were
relieved of their commands and returned to their permanent ranks of rear
admiral and major general;
Whereas Admiral William Harrison Standley, who served as a member of the
investigating commission known as the Roberts Commission that accused
Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short of ``dereliction of duty''
only six weeks after the attack on Pearl Harbor, later disavowed the
report maintaining that ``these two officers were martyred'' and ``if
they had been brought to trial, both would have been cleared of the
charge'';
Whereas on October 19, 1944, a Naval Court of Inquiry exonerated Admiral Kimmel
on the grounds that his military decisions and the disposition of his
forces at the time of the December 7, 1941 attack on Pearl Harbor were
proper ``by virtue of the information that Admiral Kimmel had at hand
which indicated neither the probability nor the imminence of an air
attack on Pearl Harbor''; criticized the higher command for not sharing
with Admiral Kimmel ``during the very critical period of 26 November to
7 December 1941, important information...regarding the Japanese
situation''; and, concluded that the Japanese attack and its outcome was
attributable to no serious fault on the part of anyone in the naval
service;
Whereas on June 15, 1944, an investigation conducted by Admiral T. C. Hart at
the direction of the Secretary of the Navy produced evidence,
subsequently confirmed, that essential intelligence concerning Japanese
intentions and war plans was available in Washington but was not shared
with Admiral Kimmel;
Whereas on October 20, 1944, the Army Pearl Harbor Board of Investigation
determined that Lieutenant General Short had not been kept ``fully
advised of the growing tenseness of the Japanese situation which
indicated an increasing necessity for better preparation for war'';
detailed information and intelligence about Japanese intentions and war
plans were available in ``abundance'' but were not shared with the
General Short's Hawaii command; and General Short was not provided ``on
the evening of December 6th and the early morning of December 7th, the
critical information indicating an almost immediate break with Japan,
though there was ample time to have accomplished this'';
Whereas the reports by both the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor
Board of Investigation were kept secret, and Rear Admiral Kimmel and
Major General Short were denied their requests to defend themselves
through trial by court-martial;
Whereas the joint committee of Congress that was established to investigate the
conduct of Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short completed, on May
31, 1946, a 1,075-page report which included the conclusions of the
committee that the two officers had not been guilty of dereliction of
duty;
Whereas the then Chief of Naval Personnel, Admiral J. L. Holloway, Jr., on April
27, 1954, recommended that Admiral Kimmel be advanced in rank in
accordance with the provisions of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;
Whereas on November 13, 1991, a majority of the members of the Board for the
Correction of Military Records of the Department of the Army found that
Lieutenant General Short ``was unjustly held responsible for the Pearl
Harbor disaster'' and that ``it would be equitable and just'' to advance
him to the rank of lieutenant general on the retired list'';
Whereas in October 1994, the then Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carlisle
Trost, withdrew his 1988 recommendation against the advancement of
Admiral Kimmel and recommended that the case of Admiral Kimmel be
reopened;
Whereas the Dorn Report, a report on the results of a Department of Defense
study that was issued on December 15, 1995, did not provide support for
an advancement of Rear Admiral Kimmel or Major General Short in grade,
it did set forth as a conclusion of the study that ``responsibility for
the Pearl Harbor disaster should not fall solely on the shoulders of
Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short, it should be broadly
shared'';
Whereas the Dorn Report found that ``Army and Navy officials in Washington were
privy to intercepted Japanese diplomatic communications...which provided
crucial confirmation of the imminence of war''; that ``the evidence of
the handling of these messages in Washington reveals some ineptitude,
some unwarranted assumptions and misestimations, limited coordination,
ambiguous language, and lack of clarification and follow-up at higher
levels''; and, that ``together, these characteristics resulted in
failure...to appreciate fully and to convey to the commanders in Hawaii
the sense of focus and urgency that these intercepts should have
engendered'';
Whereas, on July 21, 1997, Vice Admiral David C. Richardson (United States Navy,
retired) responded to the Dorn Report with his own study which confirmed
findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry and the Army Pearl Harbor Board
of Investigation and established, among other facts, that the war effort
in 1941 was undermined by a restrictive intelligence distribution
policy, and the degree to which the commanders of the United States
forces in Hawaii were not alerted about the impending attack on Hawaii
was directly attributable to the withholding of intelligence from
Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short;
Whereas the Officer Personnel Act of 1947, in establishing a promotion system
for the Navy and the Army, provided a legal basis for the President to
honor any officer of the Armed Forces of the United States who served
his country as a senior commander during World War II with a placement
of that officer, with the advice and consent of the Senate, on the
retired list with the highest grade held while on the active duty list;
Whereas Rear Admiral Kimmel and Major General Short are the only two eligible
officers from World War II who were excluded from the list of retired
officers presented for advancement on the retired lists to their highest
wartime ranks under the terms of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947;
Whereas this singular exclusion from advancement on the retired list serves only
to perpetuate the myth that the senior commanders in Hawaii were
derelict in their duty and responsible for the success of the attack on
Pearl Harbor, a distinct and unacceptable expression of dishonor toward
two of the finest officers who have served in the Armed Forces of the
United States;
Whereas Major General Walter Short died on September 23, 1949, and Rear Admiral
Husband Kimmel died on May 14, 1968, without the honor of having been
returned to their wartime ranks as were their fellow veterans of World
War II; and
Whereas the Veterans of Foreign Wars, the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association,
the Admiral Nimitz Foundation, the Naval Academy Alumni Association, the
Retired Officers Association, and the Pearl Harbor Commemorative
Committee, and other associations and numerous retired military officers
have called for the rehabilitation of the reputations and honor of
Admiral Kimmel and Lieutenant General Short through their posthumous
advancement on the retired lists to their highest wartime grades: Now,
therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. ADVANCEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND MAJOR GENERAL SHORT
ON RETIRED LISTS.
(a) Request.--The President is requested--
(1) to advance the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel to
the grade of admiral on the retired list of the Navy; and
(2) to advance the late Major General Walter C. Short to
the grade of lieutenant general on the retired list of the
Army.
(b) Additional Benefits Not To Accrue.--Any advancement in grade on
a retired list requested under subsection (a) shall not increase or
change the compensation or benefits from the United States to which any
person is now or may in the future be entitled based upon the military
service of the officer advanced.
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING THE PROFESSIONAL PERFORMANCE OF
ADMIRAL KIMMEL AND LIEUTENANT GENERAL SHORT.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) the late Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel performed his
duties as Commander in Chief, United States Pacific Fleet,
competently and professionally, and, therefore, the losses
incurred by the United States in the attacks on the naval base
at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and other targets on the island of
Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a result of
dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then
Admiral Kimmel; and
(2) the late Major General Walter C. Short performed his
duties as Commanding General, Hawaiian Department, competently
and professionally, and, therefore, the losses incurred by the
United States in the attacks on Hickam Army Air Field and
Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, and other targets on the island of
Oahu, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941, were not a result of
dereliction in the performance of those duties by the then
Lieutenant General Short.
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