[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 2492 Introduced in Senate (IS)]
106th CONGRESS
2d Session
S. 2492
To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian nuclear
complex to expedite the containment of nuclear expertise that presents
a proliferation threat, and for other purposes.
_______________________________________________________________________
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
May 1, 2000
Mr. Domenici introduced the following bill; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on Armed Services
_______________________________________________________________________
A BILL
To expand and enhance United States efforts in the Russian nuclear
complex to expedite the containment of nuclear expertise that presents
a proliferation threat, and for other purposes.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.
This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Weapons Complex Conversion
Act of 2000''.
SEC. 2. FINDINGS.
Congress makes the following findings:
(1) The Russian nuclear weapons complex is still at its
Cold War size. Little information about this complex is shared,
and 10 of its most sensitive cities remain closed. These cities
house 750,000 people and employ approximately 150,000 people in
nuclear military facilities. Although the Russian Federation
Ministry of Atomic Energy has announced the need to
significantly downsize its workforce, perhaps by as much as 50
percent, it has been very slow in accomplishing this goal.
Information on the extent of any progress is very closely held.
The major impediments to downsizing have been economic and
social conditions in Russia.
(2) The United States, on the other hand, has significantly
downsized its nuclear weapons complex in an open and
transparent manner. As a result, an enormous asymmetry now
exists between the United States and Russia in nuclear weapon
production capacities and in transparency of such capacities.
It is in the national security interest of the United States to
assist the Russian Federation in accomplishing significant
reductions in its nuclear military complex and in helping it to
protect its nuclear weapons, nuclear materials, and nuclear
secrets during such reductions. Such assistance will accomplish
critical nonproliferation objectives and provide essential
support towards future arms reduction agreements. Without a
significant, transparent reduction in nuclear weapons
production capacity, the Russian Federation's ability to
quickly reconstitute its arsenal remains inconsistent with
current and contemplated arms control agreements.
(3) Several current programs address portions of the
downsizing and nuclear security concerns. The Nuclear Cities
Initiative was established to assist Russia in creating job
opportunities for employees who are not required to support
realistic Russian nuclear security requirements. Its focus has
been on creating commercial ventures that can provide self-
sustaining jobs in three of the closed cities. The current
scope and funding of the program are not commensurate with the
scale of the threats to the United States sought to be
addressed by the program.
(4) To effectively address threats to United States
national security interests, progress with respect to the
nuclear cities must be expanded and accelerated. The Nuclear
Cities Initiative has laid the groundwork for an immediate
increase in investment and potential for immediate risk
reduction in the cities of Sarov, Snezhinsk, and Seversk, which
house four key Russian nuclear facilities. Furthermore, the
Nuclear Cities Initiative has made considerable progress with
the limited funding available. However, to gain sufficient
advocacy for additional support, the program must demonstrate--
(A) rapid progress in conversion and restructuring;
and
(B) an ability for the United States to track
progress against verifiable milestones that support a
Russian nuclear complex consistent with their future
national security requirements.
(5) Reductions in the nuclear weapons-grade material stocks
in the United States and Russia enhance prospects for future
arms control agreements and reduce concerns that these
materials could lead to proliferation risks. Confidence in both
nations will be enhanced by knowledge of the extent of each
nation's stockpiles of weapons-grade materials. The United
States already makes this information public.
(6) Many current programs contribute to the goals stated
herein. However, the lack of programmatic coordination within
and among United States Government agencies impedes the
capability of the United States to make rapid progress. A
formal single point of coordination is essential to ensure that
all United States programs directed at cooperative threat
reduction, nuclear materials reduction and protection, and the
downsizing, transparency, and nonproliferation of the nuclear
weapons complex effectively mitigate the risks inherent in the
Russian Federation's military complex.
(7) Specialists in the United States and the former Soviet
Union trained in nonproliferation studies can significantly
assist in the downsizing process while minimizing the threat
presented by potential proliferation of weapons materials or
expertise.
SEC. 3. EXPANSION AND ENHANCEMENT OF NUCLEAR CITIES INITIATIVE.
(a) In General.--The Secretary of Energy shall, in accordance with
the provisions of this section, take appropriate actions to expand and
enhance the activities under the Nuclear Cities Initiative in order
to--
(1) assist the Russian Federation in the downsizing of the
Russian Nuclear Complex; and
(2) coordinate the downsizing of the Russian Nuclear
Complex under the Initiative with other United States
nonproliferation programs.
(b) Enhanced Use of MINATOM Technology and Research and Development
Services.--In carrying out actions under this section, the Secretary
shall facilitate the enhanced use of the technology, and the research
and development services, of the Russia Ministry of Atomic Energy
(MINATOM) by--
(1) fostering the commercialization of peaceful, non-
threatening advanced technologies of the Ministry through the
development of projects to commercialize research and
development services for industry and industrial entities; and
(2) authorizing the Department of Energy, and encouraging
other departments and agencies of the United States Government,
to utilize such research and development services for
activities appropriate to the mission of the Department, and
such departments and agencies, including activities relating
to--
(A) remediation of the environmental consequences
of United States nuclear weapons activities and Russian
nuclear weapons activities;
(B) nonproliferation (including the detection and
identification of weapons of mass destruction and
verification of treaty compliance);
(C) global energy and environmental matters; and
(D) basic scientific research.
(c) Acceleration of Nuclear Cities Initiative.--(1) In carrying out
actions under this section, the Secretary shall accelerate the Nuclear
Cities Initiative by implementing, as soon as practicable after the
date of the enactment of this Act, programs at the nuclear cities
referred to in paragraph (2) in order to convert significant portions
of the activities carried out at such nuclear cities from military
activities to civilian activities.
(2) The nuclear cities referred to in this paragraph are the
following:
(A) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
(B) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
(C) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
(D) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
(3) Before implementing a program under paragraph (1), the
Secretary shall establish appropriate, measurable milestones for the
first year of the program.
(d) Plan for Restructuring the Russian Nuclear Complex.--(1) The
President, acting through the Secretary of Energy, is urged to enter
into negotiations with the Russian Federation for purposes of the
development by the Russian Federation of a plan to restructure the
Russian Nuclear Complex in order to meet changes in the national
security requirements of Russia by 2010.
(2) The plan under paragraph (1) should include the following:
(A) Mechanisms to achieve a nuclear weapons production
capacity in Russia that is consistent with the obligations of
Russia under current and future arms control agreements.
(B) Mechanisms to increase transparency regarding nuclear
weapons production processes and nuclear materials inventories
in Russia to the levels of transparency for such matters in the
United States, including the participation of Department of
Energy officials with expertise in transparency of such
matters.
(C) Measurable milestones that will permit the United
States and the Russian Federation to monitor progress under the
plan.
(e) Encouragement of Careers in Nonproliferation.--(1) In carrying
out actions under this section, the Secretary shall carry out a program
to encourage students in the United States and in the Russian
Federation to pursue a career in an area relating to nonproliferation.
(2) Of the amounts available under subsection (f), $2,000,000 shall
be available for purposes of the program required under paragraph (1).
(f) Funding for Fiscal Year 2001.--There is hereby authorized to be
appropriated for the Department of Energy for fiscal year 2001,
$50,000,000 for purposes of the Nuclear Cities Initiative, including
activities under this section.
(g) Sense of Congress Regarding Funding for Fiscal Years After
Fiscal Year 2001.--It is the sense of Congress that the availability of
funds for the Nuclear Cities Initiative in fiscal years after fiscal
year 2001 should be contingent upon--
(1) demonstrable progress in the programs carried out under
subsection (c), as determined utilizing the milestones required
under paragraph (3) of that subsection; and
(2) the development and implementation of the plan required
by subsection (d).
SEC. 4. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL
COORDINATOR FOR NONPROLIFERATION MATTERS.
It is the sense of Congress that--
(1) there should be a National Coordinator for
Nonproliferation Matters to coordinate--
(A) the Nuclear Cities Initiative;
(B) the Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
program;
(C) the Cooperative Threat Reduction programs;
(D) the materials protection, control, and
accounting programs; and
(E) the International Science and Technology
Center; and
(2) the position of National Coordinator for
Nonproliferation Matters should be similar, regarding
nonproliferation matters, to the position filled by designation
of the President under section 1441(a) of the Defense Against
Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 (title XIV of Public
Law 104-201; 110 Stat. 2727; 50 U.S.C. 2351(a)).
SEC. 5. DEFINITIONS.
In this Act:
(1) Nuclear city.--The term ``nuclear city'' means any of
the closed nuclear cities within the complex of the Russia
Ministry of Atomic Energy (MINATOM) as follows:
(A) Sarov (Arzamas-16 and Avangard).
(B) Zarechnyy (Penza-19).
(C) Novoural'sk (Sverdlovsk-44).
(D) Lesnoy (Sverdlovsk-45).
(E) Ozersk (Chelyabinsk-65).
(F) Snezhinsk (Chelyabinsk-70).
(G) Trechgornyy (Zlatoust-36).
(H) Seversk (Tomsk-7).
(I) Zhelenznogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-26).
(I) Zelenogorsk (Krasnoyarsk-45).
(2) Russian nuclear complex.--The term ``Russian Nuclear
Complex'' refers to all of the nuclear cities.
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