[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[S. 1453 Referred in House (RFH)]


106th CONGRESS
  2d Session
                                S. 1453


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                            January 27, 2000

          Referred to the Committee on International Relations

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT


 
To facilitate famine relief efforts and a comprehensive solution to the 
                             war in Sudan.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Sudan Peace Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress makes the following findings:
            (1) With clear indications that the Government of Sudan 
        intends to intensify its prosecution of the war against areas 
        outside of its control, which has already cost nearly 2,000,000 
        lives and has displaced more than 4,000,000, a sustained and 
        coordinated international effort to pressure combatants to end 
        hostilities and to address the roots of the conflict offers the 
        best opportunity for a comprehensive solution to the continuing 
        war in Sudan.
            (2) A viable, comprehensive, and internationally sponsored 
        peace process, protected from manipulation, presents the best 
        chance for a permanent resolution of the war, protection of 
        human rights, and a self-sustaining Sudan.
            (3) Continued strengthening of humanitarian relief 
        operations in Sudan is an essential element in the effort to 
        bring an end to the war.
            (4) Continued leadership by the United States is critical.
            (5) Regardless of the future political status of the areas 
        of Sudan outside of the control of the Government of Sudan, the 
        absence of credible civil authority and institutions is a major 
        impediment to achieving self-sustenance by the Sudanese people 
        and to meaningful progress toward a viable peace process.
            (6) Through manipulation of traditional rivalries among 
        peoples in areas outside their full control, the Government of 
        Sudan has effectively used divide and conquer techniques to 
        subjugate their population, and Congress finds that 
        internationally sponsored reconciliation efforts have played a 
        critical role in reducing the tactic's effectiveness and human 
        suffering.
            (7) The Government of Sudan is increasingly utilizing and 
        organizing militias, Popular Defense Forces, and other 
        irregular troops for raiding and slaving parties in areas 
        outside of the control of the Government of Sudan in an effort 
        to severely disrupt the ability of those populations to sustain 
        themselves. The tactic is in addition to the overt use of bans 
        on air transport relief flights in prosecuting the war through 
        selective starvation and to minimize the Government of Sudan's 
        accountability internationally.
            (8) The Government of Sudan has repeatedly stated that it 
        intends to use the expected proceeds from future oil sales to 
        increase the tempo and lethality of the war against the areas 
        outside its control.
            (9) Through its power to veto plans for air transport 
        flights under the United Nations relief operation, Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan (OLS), the Government of Sudan has been able to 
        manipulate the receipt of food aid by the Sudanese people from 
        the United States and other donor countries as a devastating 
        weapon of war in the ongoing effort by the Government of Sudan 
        to subdue areas of Sudan outside of the Government's control.
            (10) The efforts of the United States and other donors in 
        delivering relief and assistance through means outside OLS have 
        played a critical role in addressing the deficiencies in OLS 
        and offset the Government of Sudan's manipulation of food 
        donations to advantage in the civil war in Sudan.
            (11) While the immediate needs of selected areas in Sudan 
        facing starvation have been addressed in the near term, the 
        population in areas of Sudan outside of the control of the 
        Government of Sudan are still in danger of extreme disruption 
        of their ability to sustain themselves.
            (12) The Nuba Mountains and many areas in Bahr al Ghazal, 
        Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions have been excluded completely 
        from relief distribution by OLS, consequently placing their 
        populations at increased risk of famine.
            (13) At a cost which can exceed $1,000,000 per day, and 
        with a primary focus on providing only for the immediate food 
        needs of the recipients, the current international relief 
        operations are neither sustainable nor desirable in the long 
        term.
            (14) The ability of populations to defend themselves 
        against attack in areas outside the Government of Sudan's 
        control has been severely compromised by the disengagement of 
        the front-line sponsor states, fostering the belief within 
        officials of the Government of Sudan that success on the 
        battlefield can be achieved.
            (15) The United States should use all means of pressure 
        available to facilitate a comprehensive solution to the war, 
        including--
                    (A) the maintenance and multilateralization of 
                sanctions against the Government of Sudan with explicit 
                linkage of those sanctions to peace;
                    (B) the support or creation of viable democratic 
                civil authority and institutions in areas of Sudan 
                outside government control;
                    (C) continued active support of people-to-people 
                reconciliation mechanisms and efforts in areas outside 
                of government control;
                    (D) the strengthening of the mechanisms to provide 
                humanitarian relief to those areas;
                    (E) cooperation among the trading partners of the 
                United States and within multilateral institutions 
                toward those ends; and
                    (F) the use of any and all possible unilateral and 
                multilateral economic and diplomatic tools to compel 
                Ethiopia and Eritrea to end their hostilities and again 
                assume a constructive stance toward facilitating a 
                comprehensive solution to the ongoing war in Sudan.

SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS.

    In this Act:
            (1) Government of sudan.--The term ``Government of Sudan'' 
        means the National Islamic Front government in Khartoum, Sudan.
            (2) IGAD.--The term ``IGAD'' means the Inter-Governmental 
        Authority on Development.
            (3) OLS.--The term ``OLS'' means the United Nations relief 
        operation carried out by UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
        participating relief organizations known as ``Operation 
        Lifeline Sudan''.

SEC. 4. CONDEMNATION OF SLAVERY, OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NEW 
              TACTICS BY THE GOVERNMENT OF SUDAN.

    Congress hereby--
            (1) condemns--
                    (A) violations of human rights on all sides of the 
                conflict in Sudan;
                    (B) the Government of Sudan's overall human rights 
                record, with regard to both the prosecution of the war 
                and the denial of basic human and political rights to 
                all Sudanese;
                    (C) the ongoing slave trade in Sudan and the role 
                of the Government of Sudan in abetting and tolerating 
                the practice; and
                    (D) the Government of Sudan's increasing use and 
                organization of ``murahalliin'' or ``mujahadeen'', 
                Popular Defense Forces (PDF), and regular Sudanese Army 
                units into organized and coordinated raiding and 
                slaving parties in Bahr al Ghazal, the Nuba Mountains, 
                Upper Nile, and Blue Nile regions; and
            (2) recognizes that, along with selective bans on air 
        transport relief flights by the Government of Sudan, the use of 
        raiding and slaving parties is a tool for creating food 
        shortages and is used as a systematic means to destroy the 
        societies, culture, and economies of the Dinka, Nuer, and Nuba 
        peoples in a policy of low-intensity ethnic cleansing.

SEC. 5. SUPPORT FOR THE IGAD PEACE PROCESS.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby--
            (1) declares its support for the efforts by executive 
        branch officials of the United States and the President's 
        Special Envoy for Sudan to lead in a reinvigoration of the 
        IGAD-sponsored peace process;
            (2) calls on IGAD member states, the European Union, the 
        Organization of African Unity, Egypt, and other key states to 
        support the peace process; and
            (3) urges Kenya's leadership in the implementation of the 
        process.
    (b) Relation to United States Diplomacy.--It is the sense of 
Congress that any such diplomatic efforts toward resolution of the 
conflict in Sudan are best made through a peace process based on the 
Declaration of Principles reached in Nairobi, Kenya, on July 20, 1994, 
and that the President should not create any process or diplomatic 
facility or office which could be viewed as a parallel or competing 
diplomatic track.
    (c) United States Diplomatic Support.--The Secretary of State is 
authorized to utilize the personnel of the Department of State for the 
support of--
            (1) the secretariat of IGAD;
            (2) the ongoing negotiations between the Government of 
        Sudan and opposition forces;
            (3) any peace settlement planning to be carried out by the 
        National Democratic Alliance and IGAD Partners' Forum (IPF); 
        and
            (4) other United States diplomatic efforts supporting a 
        peace process in Sudan.

SEC. 6. INCREASED PRESSURE ON COMBATANTS.

    It is the sense of Congress that the President, acting through the 
United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, should--
            (1) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations Security 
        Council to investigate the practice of slavery in Sudan and 
        provide recommendations on measures for its eventual 
        elimination;
            (2) sponsor a condemnation of the human rights practices of 
        the Government of Sudan at the United Nations conference on 
        human rights in Geneva in 2000;
            (3) press for implementation of the recommendations of the 
        United Nations Special Rapporteur for Sudan with respect to 
        human rights monitors in areas of conflict in Sudan;
            (4) press for UNICEF, International Committee of the Red 
        Cross, or the International Federation of Red Cross and Red 
        Crescent Societies, or other appropriate international 
        organizations or agencies to maintain a registry of those 
        individuals who have been abducted or are otherwise held in 
        bondage or servitude in Sudan;
            (5) sponsor a condemnation of the Government of Sudan each 
        time it subjects civilian populations to aerial bombardment; 
        and
            (6) sponsor a resolution in the United Nations General 
        Assembly condemning the human rights practices of the 
        Government of Sudan.

SEC. 7. REPORTING REQUIREMENT.

    Beginning 3 months after the date of enactment of this Act, and 
every 3 months thereafter, the President shall submit a report to 
Congress on--
            (1) the specific sources and current status of Sudan's 
        financing and construction of oil exploitation infrastructure 
        and pipelines;
            (2) the extent to which that financing was secured in the 
        United States or with involvement of United States citizens;
            (3) such financing's relation to the sanctions described in 
        subsection (a) and the Executive Order of November 3, 1997;
            (4) the extent of aerial bombardment by the Government of 
        Sudan forces in areas outside its control, including targets, 
        frequency, and best estimates of damage;
            (5) the number, duration, and locations of air strips or 
        other humanitarian relief facilities to which access is denied 
        by any party to the conflict; and
            (6) the status of the IGAD-sponsored peace process and any 
        other ongoing effort to end the conflict, including the 
        specific and verifiable steps taken by parties to the conflict, 
        the members of the IGAD Partners Forum, and the members of IGAD 
        toward a comprehensive solution to the war.

SEC. 8. REFORM OF OPERATION LIFELINE SUDAN (OLS).

    It is the sense of Congress that the President should organize and 
maintain a formal consultative process with the European Union, its 
member states, the members of the United Nations Security Council, and 
other relevant parties on coordinating an effort within the United 
Nations to revise the terms of OLS to end the veto power of the 
Government of Sudan over the plans by OLS for air transport relief 
flights.

SEC. 9. CONTINUED USE OF NON-OLS ORGANIZATIONS FOR RELIEF EFFORTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes the progress made by officials of 
the executive branch of Government toward greater utilization of non-
OLS agencies for more effective distribution of United States relief 
contributions.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should continue to increase the use of non-OLS agencies in 
the distribution of relief supplies in southern Sudan.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a detailed report to Congress 
describing the progress made toward carrying out subsection (b).

SEC. 10. CONTINGENCY PLAN FOR ANY BAN ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Plan.--The President shall develop a detailed and implementable 
contingency plan to provide, outside United Nations auspices, the 
greatest possible amount of United States Government and privately 
donated relief to all affected areas in Sudan, including the Nuba 
Mountains, Upper Nile, and Blue Nile, in the event the Government of 
Sudan imposes a total, partial, or incremental ban on OLS air transport 
relief flights.
    (b) Element of Plan.--The plan developed under subsection (a) shall 
include coordination of other donors in addition to the United States 
Government and private institutions.
    (c) Report.--Not later than 2 months after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit a classified report to Congress on 
the costs and startup time such a plan would require in the event of a 
total ban on air transport relief flights or in the event of a partial 
or incremental ban on such flights if the President has made the 
determination required by subsection (a)(2).
    (d) Reprogramming Authority.--Notwithstanding any other provision 
of law, in carrying out the plan developed under subsection (a), the 
President may reprogram up to 100 percent of the funds available for 
support of OLS operations (but for this subsection) for the purposes of 
the plan.

SEC. 11. NEW AUTHORITY FOR USAID'S SUDAN TRANSITION ASSISTANCE FOR 
              REHABILITATION (STAR) PROGRAM.

    (a) Sense of Congress.--Congress hereby expresses its support for 
the President's ongoing efforts to diversify and increase effectiveness 
of United States assistance to populations in areas of Sudan outside of 
the control of the Government of Sudan, especially the long-term focus 
shown in the Sudan Transition Assistance for Rehabilitation (STAR) 
program with its emphasis on promoting future democratic governance, 
rule of law, building indigenous institutional capacity, promoting and 
enhancing self-reliance, and actively supporting people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.
    (b) Allocation of Funds.--Of the amounts made available to carry 
out chapter 1 of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (22 
U.S.C. 2151 et seq:, relating to development assistance) for the period 
beginning on October 1, 2000, and ending on September 30, 2003, 
$16,000,000 shall be available for development of a viable civil 
authority, and civil and commercial institutions, in Sudan, including 
the provision of technical assistance, and for people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts.
    (c) Additional Authorities.--Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, the President is granted authority to undertake any appropriate 
programs using Federal agencies, contractual arrangements, or direct 
support of indigenous groups, agencies, or organizations in areas 
outside of control of the Government of Sudan in an effort to provide 
emergency relief, promote economic self-sufficiency, build civil 
authority, provide education, enhance rule of law and the development 
of judicial and legal frameworks, support people-to-people 
reconciliation efforts, or implementation of any programs in support of 
any viable peace agreement at the local, regional, or national level.
    (d) Implementation.--It is the sense of Congress that the President 
should immediately and to the fullest extent possible utilize the 
Office of Transition Initiatives at the Agency for International 
Development in an effort to pursue the type of programs described in 
subsection (c).
    (e) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that enhancing 
and supporting education and the development of rule of law are 
critical elements in the long-term success of United States efforts to 
promote a viable economic, political, social, and legal basis for 
development in Sudan. Congress recognizes that the gap of 13-16 years 
without secondary educational opportunities in southern Sudan is an 
especially important problem to address with respect to rebuilding and 
sustaining leaders and educators for the next generation of Sudanese. 
Congress recognizes the unusually important role the secondary school 
in Rumbek has played in producing the current generation of leaders in 
southern Sudan, and that priority should be given in current and future 
development or transition programs undertaken by the United States 
Government to rebuilding and supporting the Rumbek Secondary School.
    (f) Programs in Areas Outside Government Control.--Congress also 
intends that such programs include cooperation and work with indigenous 
groups in areas outside of government control in all of Sudan, to 
include northern, southern, and eastern regions of Sudan.

SEC. 12. ASSESSMENT AND PLANNING FOR NUBA MOUNTAINS AND OTHER AREAS 
              SUBJECT TO BANS ON AIR TRANSPORT RELIEF FLIGHTS.

    (a) Finding.--Congress recognizes that civilians in the Nuba 
Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile regions of Sudan are not 
receiving assistance through OLS due to restrictions by the Government 
of Sudan.
    (b) Sense of Congress.--It is the sense of Congress that the 
President should--
            (1) conduct comprehensive assessment of the humanitarian 
        needs in the Nuba Mountains, Red Sea Hills, and Blue Nile 
        regions of Sudan;
            (2) respond appropriately to those needs based on such 
        assessment; and
            (3) report to Congress on an annual basis on efforts made 
        under paragraph (2).

SEC. 13. OPTIONS OR PLANS FOR NONLETHAL ASSISTANCE FOR NATIONAL 
              DEMOCRATIC ALLIANCE PARTICIPANTS.

    (a) Report.--Not later than 90 days after the date of enactment of 
this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional 
committees a report, in classified form if necessary, detailing 
possible options or plans of the United States Government for the 
provision of nonlethal assistance to participants of the National 
Democratic Alliance.
    (b) Consultations.--Not later than 30 days after submission of the 
report required by subsection (a), the President should begin formal 
consultations with the appropriate congressional committees regarding 
the findings of the report.
    (c) Definition.--In this section, the term ``appropriate 
congressional committees'' means the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on 
International Relations and the Committee on Appropriations of the 
House of Representatives.

            Passed the Senate November 19, 1999.

            Attest:

                                                    GARY SISCO,

                                                             Secretary.