[Congressional Bills 106th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H. Res. 380 Introduced in House (IH)]







106th CONGRESS
  1st Session
H. RES. 380

  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the 
 location and removal of weapons caches placed in the United States by 
                   the Russian or Soviet Government.


_______________________________________________________________________


                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                           November 16, 1999

Mr. Weldon of Pennsylvania (for himself, Mr. Oberstar, Mr. Gilman, Mr. 
Saxton, Mr. Burton of Indiana, Mr. Hill of Montana, Mr. Kuykendall, Mr. 
Campbell, Mr. Walden of Oregon, Mr. Sweeney, Mr. Traficant, Mr. Pitts, 
   Mr. Lewis of Kentucky, Mr. Bartlett of Maryland, Mr. Wicker, Mr. 
      LoBiondo, Mr. Weldon of Florida, Mr. Packard, Mr. Taylor of 
    Mississippi, Mr. Goode, Mr. Condit, Mr. Cramer, Mr. Reyes, Mr. 
 Rodriguez, Mr. Dicks, Mr. Andrews, Mr. Borski, Mr. Holden, Mr. Klink, 
  and Mr. Abercrombie) submitted the following resolution; which was 
 referred to the Committee on International Relations, and in addition 
  to the Committee on Armed Services, for a period to be subsequently 
   determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such 
 provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

_______________________________________________________________________

                               RESOLUTION


 
  Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives concerning the 
 location and removal of weapons caches placed in the United States by 
                   the Russian or Soviet Government.

Whereas General Alexander Lebed, Secretary of the Russian Security Council, told 
        a United States congressional delegation in May 1997 that an audit of 
        Russia's nuclear stockpile found that dozens of atomic demolition units 
        (often referred to as ``nuclear suitcases'') were unaccounted for and 
        could be in terrorist hands;
Whereas the Russian Government has denied the existence of any such nuclear 
        suitcases and the United States administration has stated that there is 
        no reason not to believe the Russian Government;
Whereas Alexei Yablokov, a former Member of the Russian Security Council, in 
        testimony before the Military Research and Development Subcommittee of 
        the Committee on Armed Services on October 2, 1997, supported General 
        Lebed's claims that Russia had in fact manufactured nuclear suitcase 
        weapons;
Whereas General Lebed, in testimony before that subcommittee on March 19, 1998, 
        publicly acknowledged the existence of Russian nuclear suitcase weapons 
        for sabotage purposes;
Whereas Stanislav Lunev, the highest ranking GRU defector in the United States, 
        testified before that subcommittee that while he was stationed at the 
        Russian Embassy in the United States, he was assigned the task of 
        identifying sites for the pre-positioning of man-portable nuclear 
        weapons in the United States and was specially trained to disguise and 
        camouflage such weapons;
Whereas in a December 1998 meeting between Defense Minister Sergeyev of Russia 
        and a delegation of Members of the House of Representatives, the Russian 
        administration admitted to having built nuclear suitcase weapons;
Whereas Christopher Andrew (author of ``The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin 
        Archive and the Secret History of the KGB'') and Oleg Gordievsky (author 
        of ``KGB: The Inside Story'') testified before the Military Research and 
        Development Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services on October 
        26, 1999, about KGB operations during the Soviet era and contemporary 
        Russia threat perceptions;
Whereas Oleg Gordievsky was the KGB's station chief in London during the early 
        1980's and is the highest ranking KGB defector in the United States;
Whereas Vasili Mitrokhin, a KGB defector and a former KGB archivist who 
        absconded from Russia with the most comprehensive collection of 
        classified notes on KGB operations ever to reach the West, revealed the 
        KGB's pre-positioning on NATO and United States territory of caches of 
        arms and high explosives intended for sabotage operations in the event 
        of war;
Whereas the disclosure of the KGB's weapons predeployment plan has led to the 
        unearthing of weapons caches and explosives in Switzerland and Belgium 
        and has resulted in searches for such caches in the United States by 
        non-Government entities;
Whereas the Mitrokhin files state that there are numerous sites for such caches 
        throughout the United States, in places including Montana, Minnesota, 
        California, Texas, and New York, but do not give specific locations of 
        those caches;
Whereas the United States Government has made almost no efforts to locate 
        Russian weapons sites on United States territory;
Whereas the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has confirmed that the United 
        States has information as to the general vicinity of predeployed Russian 
        weapons caches in the United States, such as the one reported to be 
        located near Brainerd, Minnesota, but does not have specific locations;
Whereas both the FBI and Department of Defense have confirmed that the United 
        States Government has not asked the Russian Government about these 
        sites, despite the fact that the United States has known about these 
        sites since the Mitrokhin files were opened to the West in 1992;
Whereas the United States still lacks the critical information necessary to 
        remove the known dangers to its citizens posed by those pre-positioned 
        weapons caches;
Whereas the testimonies of Christopher Andrew and Oleg Gordievsky corroborate 
        Stanislav Lunev's testimony concerning GRU operations involving the 
        predeployment of nuclear suitcase weapons in the United States; and
Whereas the testimonies of Andrew, Gordievsky, and Lunev leave open a window of 
        opportunity that the caches that have been located in NATO territory 
        could include the nuclear suitcase weapons that General Alexander Lebed 
        was unable to inventory: Now, therefore, be it
    Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that 
the President should immediately transmit to Congress a report 
containing--
            (1) the President's certification as to whether or not the 
        United States Government has ever requested the Government of 
        Russia to provide to the United States information on the 
        specific sites in the United States at which either the Russian 
        or Soviet Government placed weapons or military equipment for 
        use in a possible conflict with the United States; and
            (2) depending on the certification under paragraph (1), 
        either--
                    (A) a full accounting of why such a request has not 
                been made (if such a request has not been made); or
                    (B) detailed information on when and to whom each 
                such request was transmitted and what information (if 
                any) was provided by Russia in response (if such a 
                request has been made).
    Sec. 2. It is the sense of the House of Representatives that the 
President should prepare and provide to Congress a report describing in 
detail the President's plan to find and remove any military equipment 
or bombs (such as those identified in the so-called Mitrokhin files) 
that have been placed by the Russian or Soviet Government on United 
States territory.
                                 <all>